pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
f20d4a300e
The same registry photos got: any number of labelled instances stored encrypted in invoiceshelf_accounts, one selected, switchable from the nav. The token is write-only across the sidecar boundary — the list has no field that could carry it back — and nothing reads INVOICESHELF_URL/TOKEN/COMPANY_ID any more, so officer's own process.env no longer holds a credential only the sidecar can use. The company is pinned on the account row rather than resolved per request. InvoiceShelf's `company` header does not error on a wrong or missing value; it silently returns another company's books. So the choice is made once, at add time, and a token that can act for several answers 409 with the list instead of guessing. Both apps also take an email and password now, because neither service makes a key easy to get: InvoiceShelf 2.4.2 ships no screen that issues tokens at all (POST /auth/login is the only way), and Immich's is buried in account settings. The sidecar does the exchange — InvoiceShelf mints a Sanctum token, Immich logs in, creates an all-permissions API key and closes the session again — and stores only what comes back. The password is never persisted. Pasting a key still works. Verified against the live instances: InvoiceShelf 2.4.2 and Immich 3.1.0, routes and DTOs read from the running containers. The two sign-in paths are untested end to end — no second login to try them with. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
76 lines
4.4 KiB
Bash
76 lines
4.4 KiB
Bash
PORT=9000
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JWT_SECRET="<generate with: openssl rand -base64 32>"
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POSTGRES_URL="postgres://postgres:password@localhost:5432/officer"
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MAIL_TRANSPORT="smtp://localhost:1025"
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PUBLIC_URL=http://localhost:9000
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# Guards (CORS origin checks, rate limits, password-strength rules) are ON unless this is set to
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# "dev" or "development". Leave it unset or set it to "production" for a real deployment; only set
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# it to "dev" on a local machine you trust, since that disables all three.
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PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV=production
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DATA_PATH=/path/to/data
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OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR=/path/to/officer-items
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HOME_DIR=/home/user
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BROWSER_RELAY_PORT=18792
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# ── Sidecars ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Each sidecar owns its upstream's credentials; the platform API is only a thin auth+forward proxy
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# and never sees them. An unset upstream URL is not fatal — the sidecar logs a warning at boot and
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# answers 503 until it is set, so you can run Officer with any subset of these configured.
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# Transmission (officer-transmission). TRANSMISSION_USER/PASS are only needed if the daemon has RPC
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# auth turned on; leave them empty otherwise, since Transmission rejects an empty Basic header.
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# TRANSMISSION_RPC_PATH defaults to /transmission/rpc and only needs setting behind a reverse proxy
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# that mounts the RPC endpoint somewhere else.
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TRANSMISSION_URL=http://127.0.0.1:9091
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TRANSMISSION_USER=
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TRANSMISSION_PASS=
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# TRANSMISSION_RPC_PATH=/transmission/rpc
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# InvoiceShelf (officer-invoiceshelf) is configured from the app, not from here — Invoices → Connection.
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# Instances, their Sanctum tokens and the company each one is pinned to live encrypted in
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# `invoiceshelf_accounts`, so nothing outside the sidecar can read a token.
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# slskd (officer-slskd). The key is injected as X-API-Key on every forwarded request.
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SLSKD_URL=http://127.0.0.1:5030
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SLSKD_API_KEY="<slskd api key>"
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# Vaultwarden (officer-vault). VAULT_STORE_KEY encrypts stored secrets at rest — any strong secret
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# of 16+ chars works, and CHANGING IT MAKES EXISTING STORED SECRETS UNREADABLE.
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VAULTWARDEN_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8222
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VAULT_STORE_KEY="<generate with: openssl rand -base64 32>"
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# Anthropic proxy (officer-anthropic-proxy). Defaults to 5051; it holds the API credential, which
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# lives in the host env rather than here.
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# ANTHROPIC_PROXY_PORT=5051
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# ReClip — the self-hosted yt-dlp service the download-media capability talks to. Defaults to
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# http://localhost:8899.
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# RECLIP_URL=http://localhost:8899
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# ── Headscale (/api/vpn) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# These drive the /api/vpn router, NOT the officer-headscale sidecar. The sidecar deliberately reads
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# neither, keeping its registered servers and their keys in Postgres so host env can never shadow
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# one. Set these only if you use /api/vpn.
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# HEADSCALE_URL=https://headscale.example.com
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# HEADSCALE_API_KEY="<headscale admin api key>"
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# HEADSCALE_USER=officer
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# ── Bitcoin wallet (officer-wallet) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Chain data source for the self-custodial on-chain wallet. Any Esplora-compatible API works —
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# mempool.space by default, or point it at your own node's esplora/electrs when you run one.
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# WALLET_ESPLORA_URL=https://mempool.space/api
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# WALLET_NETWORK=bitcoin # bitcoin | testnet | signet | regtest
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#
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# How long an unlocked wallet stays unlocked, in seconds. Default 900 (15 min). The root key is held
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# in the sidecar's memory for exactly this long after an unlock, then wiped. Shorter is safer.
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# WALLET_UNLOCK_TTL_SEC=900
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#
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# NOTE: seed material is encrypted with VAULT_STORE_KEY (above) on top of the owner passphrase that
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# seals it. Both are required to spend. If you lose VAULT_STORE_KEY, every stored seed is
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# unrecoverable — back up the mnemonics separately, offline.
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# Immich (officer-photos) is configured from the app, not from here — Photos → Connection. Instances and
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# their API keys live encrypted in `photos_config`, so the platform never sees a key.
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