The same registry photos got: any number of labelled instances stored encrypted in
invoiceshelf_accounts, one selected, switchable from the nav. The token is write-only across
the sidecar boundary — the list has no field that could carry it back — and nothing reads
INVOICESHELF_URL/TOKEN/COMPANY_ID any more, so officer's own process.env no longer holds a
credential only the sidecar can use.
The company is pinned on the account row rather than resolved per request. InvoiceShelf's
`company` header does not error on a wrong or missing value; it silently returns another
company's books. So the choice is made once, at add time, and a token that can act for several
answers 409 with the list instead of guessing.
Both apps also take an email and password now, because neither service makes a key easy to get:
InvoiceShelf 2.4.2 ships no screen that issues tokens at all (POST /auth/login is the only way),
and Immich's is buried in account settings. The sidecar does the exchange — InvoiceShelf mints a
Sanctum token, Immich logs in, creates an all-permissions API key and closes the session again —
and stores only what comes back. The password is never persisted. Pasting a key still works.
Verified against the live instances: InvoiceShelf 2.4.2 and Immich 3.1.0, routes and DTOs read
from the running containers. The two sign-in paths are untested end to end — no second login to
try them with.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
officer-photos owns the whole Immich contract: the instance URL and the API
key live there and nowhere else, and the platform side is an auth-gated
forwarder holding no credentials. The route surface is an allow-list keyed on
the first path segment, so admin, auth, api-keys, sessions, jobs, system-config
and libraries are unreachable by construction rather than by enumeration.
The UI mirrors Immich's own sidebar — timeline, explore, map, search, albums,
people, favorites, sharing, archive, trash — because the point of a sidecar
screen is to reproduce what the upstream already ships, then extend it. The
timeline reads Immich's columnar time-bucket format directly; selection lives
in the URL per docs/navigation-audit.md.
Two things worth knowing for anyone touching this later:
- `duration` is an integer count of milliseconds in Immich 3.0. It was an
HH:MM:SS.mmm string before, and every stale example still shows that form.
- the map container is sized with h-full/w-full, never `absolute inset-0`.
maplibre's stylesheet sets `position: relative; overflow: hidden` on the
element it is given, and an unlayered vendor rule beats Tailwind 4's layered
`.absolute` regardless of source order — so the div collapses to height 0 and
clips its own canvas away. Nothing errors: the GL context is healthy, tiles
download and pixels are drawn into a buffer nobody ever composites.
maplibre-gl is pinned to 5.x deliberately; 6.0 resolves a separate worker file
from import.meta.url, which Officer's index.html fallback answers with HTML.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
the owner's work, committed as one unit rather than split: the registration
files (App.tsx, Dock, AppRegistry, hono.ts, the schema and db barrels,
ecosystem.config.cjs) all reference modules under src/servers/{api,sidecar}/wallet
and src/workspaces/officerdev/src/apps/Wallet, so committing the shared plumbing
on its own would leave a commit that does not build.
officer-wallet is a new pm2 peer holding seed material sealed under an owner
passphrase on top of VAULT_STORE_KEY, with an unlock ttl after which the root key
is wiped from memory. five backends: on-chain via esplora, and lnd, clnrest,
lndhub and nwc for lightning. bolt11 encode/decode is implemented in-tree.
no secrets in the diff — the key-shaped literals under sidecar/wallet are the
bolt11 spec vectors and the bip39 "abandon … about" vector. .env.example gains
placeholders only. bun test src/servers/sidecar/wallet: 38 pass, 0 fail.
not reviewed line by line; assembled and verified to build, not audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
owns the invoiceshelf contract: instance url, sanctum token and the company
header that scopes every request. the platform side is the usual thin
auth+forward proxy at /api/invoiceshelf and holds no credentials.
built against the live 2.4.2 instance rather than the 3.0.0-alpha.1 checkout
in _references — the route allow-list came from artisan route:list on the
running container. they differ: 2.4.2 has estimates/{id}/convert-to-invoice
but no invoices/{id}/convert-to-estimate.
three upstream quirks absorbed here:
- accept: application/json is mandatory, or an unauthenticated request 302s
to an html login instead of returning 401
- origin/referer must never be sent, or statefulapi() switches to session+csrf
and every request 419s. the proxy forwards neither.
- a wrong company header does not error, it silently returns another company's
data. the pinned company is explicit and logged.
document pdfs are repaired: 2.4.2 prefixes them with a literal serialised http
response (201 bytes) inside a body already typed application/pdf. we slice to
the %PDF- magic. the report routes don't have the bug.
resources are an allow-list. backups, disks, modules, update/*, installation/*,
mail config, settings writes and ownership transfer stay unreachable, and the
per-resource action list keeps `send` — which really emails the customer —
from being reachable by accident.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
the example stopped at the core five and never mentioned the sidecars, so a
fresh checkout gave no hint that transmission, slskd or the vault are
configured at all. every value here is a placeholder.
notes the two things that are easy to get wrong: transmission rejects an
empty basic header, so user/pass must stay empty rather than blank-filled
when the daemon has no rpc auth; and HEADSCALE_URL/API_KEY drive /api/vpn,
not the officer-headscale sidecar, which deliberately reads neither.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Origin validation, every rate limiter and the password-strength check each
treated an unset PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV as "relaxed", so a deployment that forgot the
variable silently ran with CORS reflecting any origin, no brute-force limit on
the sole account, and no password rules. setup.sh writes it, but .env.example
never mentioned it.
The three now share IS_DEV_BUILD, which is true only when PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV is
explicitly "dev" or "development". Anything else, including unset, is hardened.
Documented in .env.example.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the marketplace service dependency and the native/global/user
scope tiers with a single external directory ($OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR) holding
skills, tools, tasks, processes and extensions as plain files.
- tasks move from Postgres to TASK.md files (new file-backed task layer);
task editing now works, which the DB path never supported
- skills/tools/processes collapse into one shared file router (single dir)
- remove the marketplace client (sync-marketplace/sync-version) and the
boot-time sync; pi-bridge/pi-manager/sandbox point at the flat store
- drop the dead tasks + vestigial skills/tools/processes/extensions +
item_chats tables (migration 0004)
- one-time migration script exports DB tasks and consolidates disk items
Migration verified: all 6 tasks round-trip through the runtime parser
identically to their DB rows (pipeline steps, triggers, script impls and
agentic bodies all intact).
NOTE: not yet functionally tested end-to-end — every item (each task mode,
tool, skill, extension) still needs to be run/exercised in the app before
this is trusted. To be done manually.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5