86079adb9a615dfc7e4868817ef41b2d3f142c11
1194
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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86079adb9a |
mail transport is configured in the app, not in .env
MAIL_TRANSPORT was a fallback left from the old registration flow that sent
confirmation mail. That flow is gone; the variable outlived it.
It was never the primary source anyway. getTransport reads server_config
('server-settings' → smtp) first, which already backs a full UI at Settings →
Server → SMTP and its API in api/server-settings/smtp.ts, supporting resend,
smtp and mailhog. The env var only answered when that was absent — which is a
second source of truth for something the owner can already set, with the failure
mode that a stale URL in .env silently answers for a server whose settings row
is simply empty.
Removed from transport.ts, .env.example and the setup script's Environment
section, which no longer asks for it. setup-old/ still mentions it; that is the
archive and is left alone.
Also split the try. It wrapped the read AND the transport construction and
swallowed both, so three different problems produced one message. Unreachable
database, nothing configured, and stored settings that do not build a transport
now say different things, because the fix for each is different and this message
is all the caller ever sees.
The two consumers — queue/engine.ts and auth/forgot-password.ts — now raise
until SMTP is set in the UI, which is the honest answer rather than a regression.
Not typechecked: node_modules is empty here and installs are frozen. transport.ts
parses under `bun build --no-bundle`; the setup script was run and no longer
prompts for or writes the variable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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040ea41dbc |
per-user linux accounts are not optional any more
OFFICER_OS_USERS is gone. The platform behaves as it always would have with the flag on, and there is nothing to enable. Six conditionals, five of which were dead weight — provisionOsAccount, deprovisionOsAccount and the create/delete paths each opened with an early "not enabled on this server" return, and the API told the frontend whether to render the Linux controls at all. Those go, along with the 'disabled' DeprovisionResult stage, which nothing can produce now. The sixth is the one with teeth. assertSecretsClosed opened with `if (!OS_USERS_ENABLED) return`, described in its own comment as "a no-op when the feature is off, so an existing install is unaffected until the owner opts in". It is now unconditional: the server refuses to boot while any .env in the project root is group- or world-readable. A member's shell reading .env and printing JWT_SECRET was confirmed exploitable when this check was written, and a prerequisite that only holds when somebody remembers to set a variable is not a prerequisite. Nothing to remove on the environment side — the flag was never in .env.example or in the setup script. Not typechecked: node_modules is empty in this tree and installs are frozen, so tsgo could not run. All six files parse under `bun build --no-bundle`, and the changes are deletions of dead branches plus one removed early return. Formatted with prettier 3.9.6 via bunx rather than the pinned resolution, for the same reason; its one unrelated reformat was reverted by hand. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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32af97e260 |
secret-store: the anthropic proxy secret moves in too
Third value for the store, agreed in conversation. Neither an encryption nor a signing key — a bearer credential the agent presents to the proxy on localhost — but it qualifies on the same properties: generated once, shared between two core processes, fatal to regenerate silently. It makes the case better than the other two, because it is not in .env. It is in $DATA_PATH/sidecar/claude-state.json, which is the exact location decision 3 rules out by name: DATA_PATH is what gets backed up. Also records the rename. ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is wrong in both halves — not Anthropic's, not an API key; Anthropic's real credential is the OAuth token in ~/.claude/.credentials.json that the proxy swaps this one for. It is anthropic-proxy-secret everywhere we control, and keeps the CLI's name only on the assignment `claude` itself reads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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cb67b22f80 |
officer-setup: the environment section
Writes .env, and the whole point of the section is the two values it must not write twice. JWT_SECRET and VAULT_STORE_KEY are read back from any existing .env and kept. The original script reminted JWT_SECRET on every run that agreed to regenerate .env, which logs every device out with no stated reason, and never wrote VAULT_STORE_KEY at all — so a scripted install had no at-rest key and the vault and wallet refused to store anything. VAULT_STORE_KEY is the more dangerous of the two now that it is being written. It is not Vaultwarden's despite the name: it encrypts every secret column in Postgres, and the wallet seed envelope on top of the owner passphrase. Changing it is unrecoverable for the seed, because the passphrase opens the inner envelope and that is the outer one. Said in the section, in the file it writes, and in .env.example, which described it as Vaultwarden's and understated it. DATA_PATH and OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR are derived from $OFFICER_ROOT rather than asked — two questions that had to agree with each other and with the app store. ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN is written explicitly from whether tailscale0 exists, rather than left to the platform default. The default is ON, which CLAUDE.md says is only defensible because the tailnet is the perimeter; with no tailnet there is no perimeter, so it goes out as false. Added to .env.example, which omitted it. PORT defaults to 9000, matching .env.example. The old script used 9010; nothing depends on either, and it is a prompt. write_env restores the prior umask. It was set to 077 so the secrets are never briefly world-readable, but umask is not scoped to a function and would have made every file the later sections create owner-only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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9eabc3ee4c |
design: the secret store
Written from the conversation of 2026-08-12. Nothing implemented; every claim about the current tree was checked on that date. The short version: secrets stay in Postgres, the keys move out of .env into a small SQLite store, and rotation becomes an operation instead of data loss. What is actually wrong today is narrower than "secrets in .env" and worth stating precisely, because the separation that exists is correct and must survive a refactor: secrets live in Postgres and the key that opens them does not. The problem is blast radius across processes — Bun auto-loads .env, so VAULT_STORE_KEY sits in the environment of all twenty pm2 processes, and officer-music holds the key that decrypts wallet seed envelopes for no reason. The document records the decisions and, more usefully, what was ruled out: Keys cannot go in Postgres. A dump would carry the ciphertext and the thing that opens it. Encrypting the key with a second key only moves the question — one secret has to be readable without any other, and the only decision is where it lives. The store is not encrypted at rest, and this was tested rather than assumed: stock SQLite silently ignores unknown pragmas, so `PRAGMA key` succeeds, encrypts nothing, and the value is readable with `strings`. bun:sqlite ships stock SQLite 3.53.0. Whole-file encryption needs SQLCipher, which is a second native dependency, and this project already knows what one of those costs. SQLite rather than a flat file for rotation, not secrecy: rotation needs key VERSIONS, since an interrupted rotation needs the old key and the new one to both exist. The file must not live in $OFFICER_ROOT/data/ — that is what people back up, and a key store in the same tarball as a database dump rebuilds the problem. It also records the core/plugin split the design assumes: light plus officer-headscale is the core, because CLAUDE.md rests the security model on the tailnet and a model that rests on the tailnet cannot treat administering it as optional. Vaultwarden and the wallet become plugins. Moving headscale into light removes it from the app store automatically, since catalogue.test.ts asserts the catalogue equals full minus light. Five open questions are left open rather than guessed at. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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0bceace6f1 |
an officerdev docker network, and the reasoning next to the port binding
One network for everything Officer provisions, created before anything joins it and declared external in the compose file. Postgres needs nothing from it today — the platform is a host process reaching it over loopback — but a reverse proxy in front of the web UI does, and so does any app-store service that talks to another. Creating it now means the later ones do not have to be migrated onto it. Two things written next to the line they explain, rather than assumed: Why loopback. Publishing a port makes Docker write its own DNAT and ACCEPT rules into iptables, and those are evaluated BEFORE ufw sees the packet — so `ports: "5432:5432"` is reachable from the internet while `ufw status` reports everything denied. That is the same mechanism the machine-setup firewall section hooks DOCKER-USER to close. Binding to 127.0.0.1 sidesteps it: the DNAT rule only matches traffic arriving on loopback. Why the password is not decoration. Loopback means nothing off this machine, but every account ON it can open 127.0.0.1:5432 — including the per-user Linux accounts Officer gives its members. What stops them is that they cannot authenticate. The password is the boundary between the platform and anyone with a login here, which is why it stays random and why both files holding it are 0600. A unix socket would remove even that, and was ruled out for a specific reason: postgres.js only treats a host as a socket path when the host FIELD contains a slash (src/index.js:468), and officer_db/src/db.ts passes a bare URL string. It would take a change to db.ts, which is not a setup-script change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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a64d5610e6 |
officer-setup section 5: Postgres, and only Postgres
The original offered five containers. Of those:
Postgres the only database Officer has — account, passkeys, settings,
dashboards, email accounts, the queue. Required.
Redis not referenced anywhere in the platform. No import of the client,
no environment variable, no mention; the only "redis" string in
src/ is the word "rediscover" in a comment. Dropped. (It is still
in package.json and comes out in the dependency pass.)
SearXNG zero references anywhere. Dropped. If it ever arrives it brings
its own compose file and its own Redis with it.
Mailhog a development convenience, offered separately rather than here.
Nginx PM a deployment choice — Caddy, Traefik, nginx or the tailnet — and
not something a setup script should pick.
Provisioned into $OFFICER_ROOT/dockers/postgres/, the same convention the app
store uses: one directory per service, the compose file in it, relative bind
mounts so the data sits beside the compose file.
Bound to 127.0.0.1, deliberately and with the reason in the compose file itself.
Docker publishes ports by writing iptables rules underneath ufw, so "5432:5432"
is reachable from the internet whatever the firewall reports — the same mechanism
the machine-setup firewall section exists to close. The platform runs on this
machine, so loopback is all it needs.
The password lives in a 0600 .env beside the compose file rather than inside it,
so the compose file can be read or copied without carrying a credential. A second
run reuses it rather than minting a new one, which would leave the container and
the URL disagreeing.
Readiness is waited for rather than assumed: Postgres initialises its data
directory on first start, and db:push against a database that is still starting
fails in a way that reads as a schema problem.
Choosing an existing database checks the URL but does not insist on it — the URL
may be right and the database not yet started, and refusing to continue over that
would be worse than saying so.
Also carries the whitespace fix for the comment removed in the previous commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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911b79b6a2 |
drop a comment describing a machine that no longer exists
paths.ts carried a parenthetical explaining that the development machine had the layout inverted — the project inside ~/dockers/officer.dev/, so the root derived to officer.dev and the app store's directory came out as a dockers inside a dockers. That machine is gone. The project sits at ~/officerdev/platform, which is the clean shape the comment said new installs would get. Anyone reading it now goes looking for a directory that is not there and comes away unsure whether the derivation can be trusted. The rule above it is unchanged and is the whole contract: data/ is a direct child of the root, and OFFICER_ROOT is dirname(DATA_PATH). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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a0b083db8f |
officer-setup section 2: one root, and nothing configurable underneath it
$OFFICER_ROOT/
platform/ the app
data/ managed homes, attachments, job logs
dockers/ anything the app store provisions
capabilities/ skills, tools, tasks, processes
The original asked separately for DATA_PATH and OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR and left the
app store's directory implicit — three answers that had to agree with each other,
given by somebody with no reason to know they had to. One question now, at the
top of the run, and the rest follows from it.
This is also what the code already assumes rather than a new convention:
app-store/paths.ts derives OFFICER_ROOT as dirname(DATA_PATH) and DOCKERS_DIR as
OFFICER_ROOT/dockers, so writing DATA_PATH=<root>/data is the whole of what makes
the layout correct. No code changes.
Anybody who wants data/ on a bigger volume can symlink it. That is a decision
about storage, not about how Officer is laid out, and it does not need a prompt.
The one check worth having: a directory that exists but belongs to somebody else.
That happens when an earlier run created it as root, and everything written into
it afterwards fails in a way that reads as a permissions bug in the platform
rather than as a bad directory. Reported with what writes there and offered as a
chown.
Placed before the repository, because the checkout lands inside it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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8a0946ea39 |
officer-setup section 3: dependencies
bun install, as the account, in the checkout. Two things stated because a failure here is otherwise opaque. The lockfile is frozen — bunfig.toml sets [install] frozenLockfile = true — so bun resolves from bun.lock and nothing else. A package.json that disagrees with it is a hard failure rather than a quiet resolution, which is deliberate: the friction exists so an unexplained lockfile change shows up in a diff. If the install fails complaining about the lockfile, the section says that is the frozen lockfile working and that it wants a human to read the diff, rather than reporting a generic failure. node-pty has no Linux prebuild, so this compiles it from source on every machine. That is what build-essential and python3 are in machine-setup's core utils for, and the section says so — the failure would otherwise surface much later as a terminal that never starts. Success is checked by the artefact rather than by the exit status: bun can complete while the native module is not built, because it skips a dependency's lifecycle scripts unless it trusts the package. So the section looks for node_modules/node-pty/build/Release/*.node and, when it is missing, names the consequence and the command that fixes it instead of reporting success. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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ee21fa16f0 |
officer-setup: the repository URL is https
https://gitea.officer.dev/officerdev/platform.git, not the ssh form. The reachability check is now one test for either scheme: `git ls-remote` with both prompts disabled. That is the real question — not whether the host answers but whether this account can read the repository — and neither prompt fails cleanly on its own. Over https git asks for a username nobody is there to type; over ssh it asks for a password or stops on host-key verification. With GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 and BatchMode both off, an unreadable repository is an immediate non-zero rather than a hang. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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a5a8cd4e9c |
officer-setup section 2: the repository
Clones from ssh://git@gitea.officer.dev:2222/officerdev/platform.git, or uses the checkout already at $OFFICER_ROOT/platform. Cloned as the account, never as root. A repository owned by root is one the owner cannot pull, cannot commit in, and whose node_modules they cannot write — and every later section in this script writes into that directory as them. Three things it refuses to do quietly: It does not repoint an existing remote. This checkout points at gitea.pastilhas.dev rather than the new gitea.officer.dev; that is reported with the command to change it, because where somebody's work pushes to is their decision. It does not pull over uncommitted changes. A dirty tree means the pull is skipped and said so, rather than failing halfway or burying the work. It pulls with --ff-only, so a failure means the branch has diverged rather than that the network was down, and the message says which. SSH reachability is checked before the clone, not after. An ssh URL with no usable key does not fail cleanly: git prompts for a password nobody is there to type, or stops on host-key verification. BatchMode turns both into an immediate answer, and the check reads the server's response rather than the exit code — Gitea greets a successful authentication and then exits 1, so exit status alone reports success as failure. When the key is missing it offers the https form of the same URL, which works without a key if the repository is readable anonymously, and otherwise stops and says to add the key. Verified against the new host: ssh authentication from this account already works. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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b724e3ffbe |
start officer-setup: pre-flight, inheriting what machine-setup already asked
The second half of the install, and a much smaller script than the original: of the old setup.sh's thirteen sections, seven are machine-setup's job now and two more were already removed. What is left is the repository, dependencies, the database, .env, the schema, the build and pm2. Pre-flight asks nothing on a normal run. machine-setup saves the account, the Officer path and the role beside itself, and this reads the same file — so machine-setup then officer-setup is two scripts and one set of answers. It prompts only where that file is absent, which is a supported case rather than an error: somebody may have provisioned the box their own way. It then checks the machine is actually ready — git, node, bun and pm2 required, docker optional — and reports all of them together with what each is for. Finding out about a missing bun three sections in, after a repository has been cloned and a database started, is a worse way to learn it. A missing required tool stops the run and names machine-setup. Found by running it: a remembered answer can go stale. My own earlier testing had left SETUP_USERNAME=gitfresh in that file, for a throwaway account I then deleted, and the run dead-ended on it. A remembered account that no longer exists is a reason to ask again, not a reason to stop — so it is checked before it is trusted, reported, and replaced. Docker being absent is a warning rather than a failure: Postgres can be one you already run, and the app store simply cannot provision until Docker is there. Sections 2 to 9 are listed and not built. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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e120dfa36e |
full read: fix the set -e footguns a full run would have hit
Read the whole thing — 2392 lines of entry point and 2700 of libraries — looking for what shellcheck cannot see. shellcheck itself is clean at error level; its warnings are cross-file false positives and one deliberate tilde in a display string. Everything below is a real defect. ── The Git section aborted on any machine where git was not already configured ── `git config --global --get <key>` exits NON-ZERO when the key is simply unset, and `VAR="$(git_get …)"` propagates that under `set -e`. So on a fresh machine — the case this script exists for — the section died at its first assignment, before printing anything, and took the remaining nine sections with it. It passed every earlier test because those harnesses sourced the section under a `bash -c` with no `set -e`. Verified now against a genuinely fresh account with the real script: the section completes and writes a correct .gitconfig. ── An optional step failing aborted the whole run ── Twelve functions ended on a command that can fail — `systemctl enable --now earlyoom`, `systemctl restart systemd-logind`, `chsh`, `sysctl -w`, `chown -R`, the oh-my-zsh installer, and others. Called as plain commands under `set -e`, any one of them failing ends the script, so a masked unit or a container without systemd would abort a 28-section run over an optional improvement. They now return 0 explicitly and the callers verify the outcome instead — which also fixed a lie: the sleep section printed "sleep disabled, logind reloaded" whether or not the restart had worked. It now checks the targets and the logind values and reports honestly. ── chown user:user assumed the primary group is named after the user ── True on Debian and Ubuntu, which create a group per user. Not true for an account from LDAP, or made with `useradd -g users`, or on an image with a shared group — there `install -g <user>` fails with "invalid group" and the step aborts. Proved it against an account whose primary group is `oddgroup`: the old form fails, the new one gets ownership right. Eight call sites now ask `id -gn`. ── Also hardened ── agent_path and current_editor gained `|| true` for the same reason git_get needed it: "nothing is set" is an answer, not a failure. Verified afterwards: shellcheck clean at error level, every section runs standalone without aborting, and the two apparent failures in that sweep are correct behaviour — Timezone and Git refusing an empty answer from /dev/null. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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30052e3295 |
port the firewall, last, and bind the Docker rules to the real interface
Last in the run for the reason the original gave: enabling a firewall is the one step that can cut the connection it is running over. The security bug is in the shipped rules. ufw-docker-rules.conf hardcodes eth0 in all three of its rules. Docker publishes container ports by writing its own iptables rules underneath ufw — DOCKER-USER is the hook that lets ufw have a say at all — so on a machine with predictable interface names (ens18, enp1s0, most VPS images) none of those rules match, the final DROP never fires, and every published port is open to the internet while `ufw status` reports active. A firewall that says it is working and is not is worse than no firewall. The rules are now substituted with the interface the machine actually uses, verified by applying them against a stubbed ens18. Order inside the section is the other thing that matters: OpenSSH is allowed BEFORE anything is enabled, unconditionally, because a firewall enabled without an ssh rule on a machine reached over ssh needs a console to fix. The prompt says so, and says to open a second session before closing the current one. tailscale0 is checked and offered, because the default is deny inbound and the tailnet is an inbound interface like any other — without that rule Officer is unreachable over the tailnet while Tailscale reports itself connected. A correction to something I said while writing this: I reported that this host was missing its tailscale0 rule. It is not. I had run `ufw status verbose | head -8`, which cut the output above the rule list. The full status shows it allowed, and nothing was wrong. That leaves the NOT PORTED list empty. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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d6a78d7b5a |
put the shell configuration in one place, after everything it configures
The Shell section moves to 26, after Neovim, the runtimes and the agent CLIs. Everything that writes to .zshrc now happens there and only there: the starship init, the PATH for the agent CLIs (moved out of that section), the aliases, and the editor. That ordering is what the editor choice needs — it offers whichever of nvim, vim and nano are actually present, so it has to run after Neovim is installed rather than naming an editor that is not there. Which was the original's mistake in the other direction: it set core.editor to nvim four sections before installing it. The default editor is the setting git's core.editor was deliberately left out in favour of. EDITOR, VISUAL and SUDO_EDITOR go in the account's shell, and the Debian `editor` alternative is set too — an account's shell config cannot reach root or sudoedit, and those are exactly the cases where the wrong editor is most annoying. Recorded a limitation of append_once while cleaning up after it: renaming a marker orphans the block that used the old name, and changing a block's content does nothing because the marker is still found. Both need the old block removed by hand. This run left exactly that — a `local-bin` block superseded by `agent-clis` — in the dev box's .zshrc, now removed. UFW is deliberately still unported and will be last, for the reason the original gave: it is the one step that can cut the connection the run is happening over. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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607a962115 |
port the agent CLIs, using Anthropic's installer rather than npm
Claude Code goes in through https://claude.ai/install.sh, matching what the platform already does for members in os-user-claude.ts and chosen there for the auto-update npm does not give. The comment at os-user-claude.ts:28 claiming setup.sh already did this was simply wrong — setup-ubuntu.sh used `npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code`. Two things that installer insists on, both of which a naive port gets wrong and both of which os-user-claude.ts had already found: It REFUSES to run under sudo from a regular user's shell — it checks for uid 0 with SUDO_USER set, because everything it writes goes under $HOME and under sudo that is root's. This script runs as root, so the install has to be done AS the account. It declares #!/bin/bash and uses [[ … =~ … ]], so it must be piped to bash. On Ubuntu /bin/sh is dash and `| sh` fails. Two bugs found by running it rather than reading it: opencode does not install to ~/.local/bin. It goes to ~/.opencode/bin, which is what sidecar/opencode/index.ts:22 hardcodes. The first version looked in the wrong place, reported a working install as missing, and installed it again — the run said "did not complete" while the installer had plainly succeeded. claude on this machine came from npm, so `command -v claude` found it and the section would have left a copy that never updates. It now detects an npm install by resolving the binary into node_modules, says so, and offers to reinstall through the official installer — naming the npm copy and how to remove it rather than deleting something it did not put there. ~/.local/bin and ~/.opencode/bin are both added to the account's PATH. The sidecars do not need it — they check the exact paths — but a user who cannot run `claude` in their own terminal reasonably concludes it was never installed. PI stays optional and says outright that nothing in the platform spawns it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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cb3e7062b9 |
ensure the bun symlink on every run, not only after installing it
The link was made as part of install_bun, so a machine that already had bun never got one. That is this machine: bun 1.3.14 in ~/.bun/bin, no /usr/local/bin/bun, and `bun` resolving to nothing at all for root. Nothing has broken yet only because `pm2 startup` has never been run here — the moment boot persistence is enabled, all twenty ecosystem apps that say `script: 'bun'` fail at boot and work perfectly when started by hand. ensure_bun_symlink now runs whether or not this script did the install, and says which of the three things happened: made it, found it already correct, or could not find bun to link. The last records an error, since a missing link is a reboot-shaped failure rather than a cosmetic one. Safe across upgrades, which was the question: a symlink resolves by path, not by inode, and `bun upgrade` replaces the file at $BUN_INSTALL/bin/bun rather than moving it. Demonstrated by replacing a target with a new file — new inode, link still resolves. It breaks only if the home directory goes, which breaks bun anyway. Also fixed the status line, which reported "not installed" on a machine with bun in the user's home: it asked root's PATH, which is exactly what has no bun before the link exists. bun_version now asks whichever copy is there. This run created the link on this machine — /usr/local/bin/bun -> the account's copy, and root can now run bun. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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00e58931ff |
port the JS runtimes: node, bun and pm2 installed rather than offered
Not a choice. Officer does not run without them, so asking would be asking
whether to install Officer — which was settled by running the script. They are
installed and reported, with the reason each is load-bearing stated once:
node pm2 is a Node application, and officer-pty compiles node-pty against
whatever Node is installed. There is no Linux prebuild, so this is not
an ABI question — it is a build dependency on every machine.
bun the platform itself and nineteen of the twenty pm2 apps.
pm2 supervises all of them, and the ecosystem files are written for it.
Node now tracks the current LTS, asked of nodejs.org, rather than the pinned
setup_22.x the original used — which ages into "the version we happened to pick"
the moment a new LTS lands. Resolves to v24.19.0 (Krypton) today, and NodeSource
publishes setup_24.x, checked with a HEAD request before anything is piped into a
shell.
Deno is the one genuine choice and stays optional, defaulting to no. Nothing in
Officer imports it — verified across the whole tree, the only references left are
in the old setup script — so the prompt says that outright and offers it for the
user's own work rather than pretending it is part of the platform.
bun is installed as the account and then symlinked into /usr/local/bin. pm2
started at boot by systemd has no login shell and therefore no ~/.bun/bin on
PATH; without the symlink every bun-based sidecar fails on reboot and works when
started by hand, which is a miserable thing to debug.
Every install is verified after it runs rather than trusting an exit status. A
NodeSource run can succeed while apt holds an older nodejs back, and reporting
the version asked for instead of the one present is how a machine ends up
disagreeing with its own setup log. Tested with an installer stubbed to succeed
and change nothing: both report failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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999362948f |
allow Node 22 or newer, and record why it was pinned to exactly 22
The preinstall check demanded exactly 22 — `v < 22 || v > 22` — which refuses Node 24, the current LTS. Relaxed to `>= 22`. Recording the reason it was exact, because it was deliberate and the details are gone: some months before now there was a real node-pty build failure that pinning to 22 solved. Nobody remembers what it was. That is exactly the kind of decision that gets undone twice, so it is written down here, in CLAUDE.md, and in the project memory rather than living in one person's recollection. What the evidence says now: node-pty 1.1.0 ships prebuilt binaries for darwin-arm64, darwin-x64, win32-arm64 and win32-x64 — and nothing for Linux. So its install script always falls through to `node-gyp rebuild` and compiles against whatever Node is installed. There is no prebuilt binary, so there is no ABI to mismatch, and node-pty declares no engines field. That reasoning is sound and completely untested: nothing here has built node-pty against 24, and node_modules has never existed on this machine. If `bun install` fails building it, or officer-pty cannot load its native module, restore the exact pin — CLAUDE.md says so, with the line to put back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
068a310bd3 |
add python3 to core utils — node-gyp needs it, and node-gyp is not optional
node-pty ships prebuilt binaries for darwin-arm64, darwin-x64, win32-arm64 and win32-x64. That is the complete list — there are no Linux prebuilds. So on Linux its install script always falls through to `node-gyp rebuild` and compiles from source, every time, on every machine. node-gyp needs Python 3. python3 was in the old setup.sh and I dropped it when rewriting the package list as "what the script itself would break without" — which missed that the thing it breaks is not this script but `bun install`, later, with an error about a Python that was never mentioned. The terminal sidecar then does not come up, and the reason is three steps removed from the symptom. build-essential was already there and is the other half of the same requirement; they are now noted together where they are declared. Found while answering whether node-pty constrains the Node version. It does not — with no prebuilt binary there is no ABI to mismatch, so it builds against whatever Node is installed, including 24. The exact-22 pin in package.json:11 is the platform's own choice, not node-pty's requirement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
0286cc6db6 |
port the Neovim section
Kept as it worked — upstream tarball, symlink, a config repo cloned into the account's ~/.config/nvim — with the defects fixed rather than the design changed. The one that mattered: the asset name. Neovim publishes nvim-linux-x86_64.tar.gz and nvim-linux-arm64.tar.gz. The original mapped aarch64 to "aarch64", which is not a name Neovim has ever published, so on an arm machine it downloaded a 404 and handed the HTML error page to tar. Verified against the release API — same class of bug as lazygit's hardcoded x86_64, and the second one this port has found in an arch mapping. The tarball is now checked with `tar -tzf` before anything is removed, so a bad download says what is wrong instead of failing inside tar. The rest: The tarball went to the working directory, via `curl -LO`, and stayed there if tar failed. It goes to /tmp and is cleaned up. The old /opt install was removed before the new one was known to be good. The download and its sanity check now come first, so a failed fetch leaves the working copy alone. The custom-repo option defaulted to git@gogs:andrepadez/nvim-config.git — a private repository nobody else can clone, and the same mistake as defaulting the login server to a personal headscale. No default now. git clone runs from /, for the reason git config does: the script's working directory is usually under the invoking user's home at 0750, which the target account cannot stat. The ~/.config/nvim/.git removal is now conditional on it being the starter. That is a template and dropping its history is right; a config of the user's own is something they will want to keep pulling. An existing config is left alone and said so, rather than moved to a .bak that silently overwrote the previous .bak. The PATH line the original appended to .zshrc is gone. /usr/local/bin/nvim is symlinked and already on PATH, so it was doing nothing except growing the file on every run. Verified on this host (already current, existing config left alone) and against a fresh account (LazyVim starter cloned, owned correctly, .git dropped). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
5a33a517e7 |
move Tailscale ahead of the command-line tools
Now section 6, with the tools at 7. No dependency in either direction: Tailscale needs curl, which core utils installs at 5, and nothing in it touches lazydocker, lazygit, starship or fastfetch. Same reasoning as putting it early in the first place — it is a second way into the machine, so it should exist before anything that can go wrong does, and fetching four upstream binaries is a longer gap than it needs to sit behind. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
2e70a6dd21 |
ask before replacing a config the user already has, and show the difference
Keeping theirs silently was safe but unhelpful: they never learn a newer version exists, and the only hint was a cp command printed in a warning. Now it asks. [1] keep yours — nothing changes [2] use ours — yours is kept as <file>.before-machine-setup [3] show me the difference first The diff is labelled "yours" and "ours" rather than by path, so - is what you would lose and + is what you would gain, and it goes through the pager because a config diff is routinely longer than a screen. Choosing to replace always keeps the old file beside the new one; nothing is destroyed. An unattended run — ASSUME_YES, or no terminal on stdin — keeps theirs and says so. "Yes to everything" cannot sensibly mean "overwrite configuration nobody was present to defend", so this is the one prompt ASSUME_YES answers conservatively rather than affirmatively. Applies to every file that goes through install_config, which is .tmux.conf and starship.toml today and is where any other dotfile should go. On the starship question: there is one file now, scripts/setup/starship.toml, and the inline copy is gone. Owner and members get the same prompt, which is what os-user-shell.ts always claimed. Verified through a pty, since the -t 0 guard correctly makes the interactive path untestable over a pipe: the diff renders, replacing writes the backup, and the live file ends up byte-identical to ours. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
2b9e16c11e |
port the shell section, and make one starship config serve both audiences
os-user-shell.ts:33 calls scripts/setup/starship.toml "the prompt config the owner's own install uses — one file, both audiences". It was not: the original machine script wrote a DIFFERENT config inline, so the owner got a prompt that only disabled language modules while every member got the repo file with its custom format. Two prompts, one comment claiming otherwise. This deploys the same file the platform does, which makes the comment true. Verified with cmp against a fresh account: byte-identical to what a member gets. Nothing overwrites any more: .config/starship.toml and .tmux.conf go through install_config, so they are written when absent, skipped when identical, and KEPT when they differ — with the cp printed, so taking ours stays the reader's decision. On this host that is what happens: the existing config differs and is left alone. The starship line in .zshrc is marker-wrapped by append_once. Verified over three consecutive runs: one block, not three. The original appended it unguarded every time. The login shell is now its own question. Having zsh on the machine and being handed it at every login are different decisions, and `chsh` made the second one silently. It also adds the shell to /etc/shells first, which chsh requires. .tmux.conf lives here now, with the rest of the dotfiles, rather than in user creation where the original put it only because that is where $USER_HOME first exists. One bug found by running it: install_config returns 2 for "kept yours", which is an outcome rather than a failure — but still non-zero, so calling it as a plain command under `set -e` ended the run before `case $?` could read it. Captured with && / || at both call sites, and the contract is documented where the function is defined so the next caller does not repeat it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
03cc01a135 |
say that stopping and coming back costs nothing
Choosing option 1 means leaving to set up a server elsewhere, which could take an afternoon. The run now says outright that Ctrl-C is fine and that returning picks up here — completed steps skipped, answers kept — so nobody feels they have to finish in one sitting or start over. The same promise once at the top, where the resume notice already was. That notice is now phrased as what it means rather than as file paths: "2 step(s) already done, and they will be skipped", with the command to start over instead of a bare mention of the file. On the question of why pre-flight kept re-asking: it does not, and I caused what you saw. Nearly every test command I have run today ended with `sudo rm -f .setup-answers`, so the file was deleted between your runs. Proved the round trip — a run with the variables set writes all three, and a second run with no environment at all asks nothing and prints what it remembered. The file is gitignored, so there was never a reason to be deleting it. Stopped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
4fcc34de18 |
frame the public server as common to all three, not a cost of offscale
"offscale runs on a publicly reachable server" read as a demand offscale makes and the easy route does not. It is not. Tailscale's coordination server is publicly reachable too — they run it for you, and that is the entire difference between option 3 and hosting it yourself. Said that way round, the requirement stops being a reason not to self-host and becomes what self-hosting means. Same sentence in all three places: the menu entry, the branch taken when 1 is chosen, and the long answer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
a989f8fbfa |
say where offscale runs, which matters more than how it installs
"One command to install" was the wrong emphasis and read as though it happens here. It does not: a coordination server has to be reachable by every device that joins, including phones on mobile data and laptops in other buildings, so it needs an address that resolves from anywhere. It goes on a small public VPS of its own — not this machine, and not behind a home router. That is the thing people get wrong, and getting it wrong produces a private network unreachable from exactly the devices it exists to reach. It is a property of being the thing everyone checks in with, so it is true of headscale too, and the long answer now says so. Choosing option 1 leads with it, links the install anchor rather than the page, and says plainly that nothing below will work until that server is up and answering — so somebody who has not done it stops here instead of typing an address that does not exist yet. "Installs in one command" survives in the goodies list, where it belongs: it is one command ON THAT SERVER, and the sentence now says so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
c629a849d9 |
make all four network options work, including having no network at all
Option 1 no longer refuses. It assumes offscale is already running — installing
it is one command, documented on the site — and asks for its address and a key,
which is mechanically what option 2 does. The two share a branch because the
difference between them is what to say, not what to do: one is "you already have
a server", the other is "set one up first, here is where".
Option 4 is new: no private network. Presented as a real choice rather than a
failure to choose, with what it costs stated before it is taken and paged so it
is read rather than scrolled past:
· anything reachable remotely has to be published deliberately and kept closed
otherwise
· TLS certificates are yours to obtain and renew
· every exposed service needs its own authentication, since there is no longer
a boundary in front of it
· the machine will be found — anything on a public address is scanned within
minutes
And the one that is specific to this platform rather than general advice:
ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN defaults ON, which is deliberate and only defensible because
the tailnet is the perimeter. With no tailnet it must be set to false with an
HTTPS proxy in front, or Officer runs with a check disabled on an assumption that
is no longer true. The summary line says so, so it survives the run.
Declining option 4 redraws the menu rather than dropping to a bare prompt.
Tailscale is still installed when 4 is chosen, and the run says how to connect it
later.
Verified all four end to end with tailscale stubbed, plus the decline-and-choose-
again path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
06492c3297 |
name the control server explicitly, and log out before moving between them
Two gaps found by tracing the assembled command rather than assuming it, and the first meant option 3 did not work at all on a machine like this one. `tailscale up` with no --login-server keeps whatever ControlURL is already stored. So on a node already pointed at a self-hosted server — which this host is — choosing "the easy route" left it exactly where it was. No error, no message, and a summary line claiming it had connected. The URL is now passed explicitly in both cases, TS_DEFAULT_CONTROL_URL for Tailscale's own service. And a node logged in to one coordination server cannot simply be pointed at another; it has to be logged out first. That is now detected by comparing the stored URL with the target, and offered rather than done quietly — the tailnet drops while it happens, and the run says so, because on a machine reached over the tailnet that is the session you are reading this in. Declining leaves the node where it is and records that. Verified all three paths with tailscale stubbed: switching logs out then connects to controlplane.tailscale.com, declining leaves it on offscale, and reconnecting to the SAME server offers no logout at all. Also noted while tracing: lan_cidr correctly finds nothing on this host, since a /32 with host routes has no subnet to advertise. That means the homelab subnet-router prompt is the one path here that has not been exercised on real hardware. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
22a661131d |
page the ? output
The long answer is now well past a screen, so it scrolls the question off the top and the reader lands at a prompt having lost what they were choosing between. Piped through a pager, so it is read a screen at a time and the menu is redrawn underneath it afterwards. `more` rather than `less`: it exits at the end of the file instead of sitting there waiting to be quit, which is right for something asked for once. Only when stdout is a terminal. Redirected or piped — a transcript, a log, the test harness — it comes through whole, since a pager there either blocks or mangles the output. Applied to confirm()'s help hook as well, so every ? in the script pages, not just this one. Verified both ways: driven through a pty it shows --More--, and with output piped all four help sections come through in full. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
85d8fa62f1 |
mention that Officer administers the network it just told you to set up
The section explains three ways to get a coordination server and then says nothing about running one afterwards, which is the part that decides whether self-hosting is a good idea. Officer's Headscale app is the answer to it, and it works against headscale and offscale alike. Written from what the app actually does rather than from the pitch: several servers registered and switched between, each PROBED rather than remembered — the comment in ServersView.tsx is explicit that a "not checked" dot is the one thing that list must never show — and, on the active one, nodes, users, pre-auth keys, invites and the ACL policy with an assistant, plus a console and diagnostics. Placed in FOR OFFICER rather than under offscale, because it is true of either self-hosted option and is the reason picking one is not a commitment to administering it over ssh. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
766c8ee655 |
say what the mobile app actually is, rather than overclaiming it
"our implementation of the same protocol rather than a wrapper around theirs" was too strong. It is the Tailscale client with our branding, and one real difference: it takes an invite from the server directly. The corrected version is not a weaker claim, it is a more specific one. "Our own implementation" invites the question of whether it is trustworthy and whether it keeps up; "the Tailscale client, our branding, and it takes an invite directly" answers both — it is their client, so it is as good as their client, and the thing it adds is the thing that was hard. The reason it is hard stays in, since it is what makes the difference worth naming: the official app has to be talked into using a server that is not Tailscale's, and that is where people abandon self-hosted headscale. And it still says there are no desktop apps of our own, now with what to do instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
2d544db07e |
write the offscale copy from officer.dev, and link it in both places
Read https://officer.dev/infrastructure/offscale.html and used its own words for the protocol claim — "the protocol on the wire is Tailscale's, the encryption is WireGuard's" — which is stronger than my paraphrase and is the sentence that stops "our own distribution" reading as a fork. The goodies are named rather than gestured at. No placeholders left: · installs in one command, with the certificates handled · health, logs, restarts and access policies from the app, instead of a config file and a CLI · enrolling a device is a link and a tap — the key is minted and handed over for you · several networks at once, and services reachable across them The URL appears twice, as asked: in the menu entry, where somebody deciding between three options can reach it without typing ?, and at the end of the long answer for somebody who read the whole thing and wants more. The mobile-app paragraph stays and is not from the page — the page does not name its client platforms. It is your account of them, kept because it answers the obvious objection to self-hosting, and it still says plainly that there are no desktop apps of our own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
46ce58dd12 |
correct the client claim: the mobile apps are ours
"talking to stock Tailscale clients" was wrong, and wrong in a way that gave away the strongest thing offscale has. On computers it is the stock client. On iPhone, iPad and Android it is our own app — our implementation of the same protocol, not a wrapper around theirs. No desktop app of our own yet, and the copy says so. Stated as a differentiator rather than a footnote, because it is the specific that answers the obvious objection to self-hosting. Getting the official mobile app to talk to a self-hosted server is the part of running headscale people give up at; having an app that simply does is worth more than any sentence about extras. The protocol claim is unchanged and still leads, because it is what makes the mobile app reassuring rather than alarming: our own client is our implementation of Tailscale's protocol, not a private one. "Our own distribution" plus "our own app" reads as a fork unless the first thing said is that there is nothing to fork. Marker narrowed from "goodies" to "more goodies" — one is now named. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
2803bc34b7 |
draft the offscale copy: same protocol, different amount of work
Two things said plainly, because they are the two a reader needs before choosing: Nothing about the protocol changes. offscale is headscale's open-source code speaking to stock Tailscale clients, so a machine on an offscale network behaves exactly as it would on either of the others. Worth stating outright — "our own distribution" reads as a fork, and a fork of a network protocol is something to be wary of. There is no offscale protocol to be locked into, because there is no offscale protocol. What changes is the work. Running headscale yourself is a project: install it, put TLS in front of it, keep it upgraded, administer it through a config file and a CLI. offscale makes that a step in a setup script. "our own sugar on top" is gone. One marker left, in both the menu and the long answer: the goodies are unnamed. Two or three specifics would be worth more than the sentence they replace — every product claims extras, and the claim is only interesting when it says which. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
538a2d3b6d |
give every network option its own exposition, not just offscale
Each of the three now carries a couple of lines under it, separated by a blank line, so the choice can be made from the menu itself rather than by typing ? and reading a page. 2 and 3 are written; offscale's is a marked placeholder with your one-liner standing in until the longer copy arrives. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
ff7035a47a |
correct the mechanism recorded for the set -e failure
The previous commit blamed the loop body. That is wrong, and I only found out by trying to reproduce it: the same `[[ … ]] && assign` inside a case inside a while loop survives `set -e` perfectly well at top level. What actually happened is one level further out. The failing assignment was the last thing the case ran, the case was the last thing the loop body ran, and the loop was the last thing THE FUNCTION ran — so load_answers returned non-zero, and calling a function that returns non-zero is a plain command failure, which does end the script. Worth getting right because the general rule is different from the one I wrote: it is not "avoid && in loops", it is "a function whose last statement can return non-zero fails when it is called, however innocuous the statement looks". Scanned the libraries for that shape. The only hit is lan_cidr, which ends in an awk pipeline and returns 0. Predicate functions ending in a bare test — ballast_exists, has_authorized_key and the rest — are meant to return non-zero and are only ever called in conditions, which set -e exempts. The fix itself was already correct and is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
4d478cc0f1 |
add the offscale line, and fix a set -e bug the test exposed
The menu is one function now rather than being written out twice — it is shown
again after ? prints the long answer — and option 1 carries your line: offscale is
just tailscale and headscale, with our own sugar on top.
The bug it surfaced is the more useful half. load_answers used
[[ -z "${MACHINE_ROLE:-}" ]] && MACHINE_ROLE="$value"
as the last statement in a while-read loop body. When the variable is already set
the test is false, the compound returns non-zero, and as the final statement in a
loop body under `set -e` that ends the script. The failure is silent about its
cause: the trap prints "Step: unknown" and a line number inside the library,
before pre-flight has run.
It needed both conditions to appear — an answers file on disk AND the variables
already set in the environment — which is why every earlier test missed it and
running with env overrides hit it immediately. Written as if/then now, and the
other lib files scanned for the same shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
6a29c39b74 |
restructure the Tailscale network choice, with offscale left to be written
Four options, in the order you gave: 1 set up your own network (offscale) 2 use a network you already run (headscale, offscale) 3 the easy route (tailscale.com) ? what are tailscale, headscale and offscale? ? prints the long answer and then shows the options again, rather than dropping the reader back at a bare prompt having forgotten what they were choosing between. The explanation frames all three as one question — who keeps the list of your machines and hands out the keys — and says plainly that the coordination server never carries traffic, since that is the thing people assume it does. Tailscale and headscale are written. OFFSCALE is a marked placeholder, and so is what option 1 actually does; both are yours to fill in and the run says so rather than pretending. Option 3 is the plain flow: no --login-server at all, and the auth-key prompt says what that means — leave it blank and Tailscale prints a link that either creates the account or adds this machine to an existing one. Option 2 keeps the "no suggested URL" rule, because a coordination server URL is somebody's private infrastructure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
059f0f6df2 |
lead the Tailscale section with the question, not the explanation
Ten lines of prose before the first prompt assumed the reader had never heard of Tailscale. Anyone already running it does not need to be told what it is, and having to scroll past it every run is the cost of writing for the other reader. The prompt comes first now, and `?` is an answer. Typing it prints the full description and asks again; not typing it costs nothing. confirm() takes an optional help function as its third argument. Where one is given the prompt becomes [Y/n/?], so the explanation announces that it is available without taking up room. The same hook is there for any other section that wants it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
a63a327065 |
remember the pre-flight answers between runs
The --only flag worked, in that it reached the section — but reaching it meant answering four pre-flight questions first, every time, which is not usable for working on one section. The same problem was already there without --only: a resumed run re-asked the role, the account and the Officer path that it had been told on the previous pass. Answers are saved beside the progress file and loaded before anything is asked. The environment still wins over what was saved, so SETUP_USERNAME=x on the command line overrides it, and --reask throws the file away and asks again. Read as assignments rather than sourced. The file sits next to the script and is read by a run that is already root; sourcing it would make it executable content in a place nothing guards. Second run now goes straight through pre-flight, printing what it remembered, to the one step asked for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
09303299cc |
port Tailscale as its own section, early, and stop it hanging
Moved to position 7 — after core utils, which give it curl, and well before SSH
hardening, which is the step that can lock you out. The argument is that
Tailscale is a second way into the machine, so it wants to exist before anything
that can go wrong does.
── Why the original hung, and what stops it now ──
Its prompt accepted an empty auth key and passed it anyway. `tailscale up
--authkey ""` falls back to the interactive flow: it prints a URL and blocks,
with no timeout, forever. From the outside that is a script that has frozen.
Nothing here passes an empty key — the flag is omitted entirely, and the run says
in advance that a URL is coming and that it will wait. Every call carries
--timeout=60s, and a timeout is reported with the command to run by hand rather
than left as silence. State is read with `tailscale status --json` before
anything is run, so a node that is already up is offered a reconfigure instead of
having `up` fired at it blindly.
Diagnosed on this host rather than guessed at, and honestly the diagnosis is
partial: the exit-node branch left no trace at all — no /etc/sysctl.d file,
networkd-dispatcher present but with zero mentions in apt history, so it came
with the image. ip_forward=1 came from the unconditional part of the section, not
the branch. That points at `tailscale up` as where it stopped, and the empty-key
path is the candidate that fits, but I could not reproduce it to be certain.
── What the section now covers ──
control plane Tailscale's own service by default; a self-hosted headscale as
an explicit choice with NO suggested URL. The original defaulted
to headscale.pastilhas.eu, so a stranger running it pointed
their machine at somebody else's control plane.
auth key, or the browser flow, stated as an equal option
Tailscale SSH ssh over the tailnet with no keys, governed by tailnet ACLs —
and pointed out as a way back in if the sshd hardening later in
the run goes wrong
subnet router homelab only, defaulting to this machine's actual LAN CIDR
exit node with what it means for whose traffic goes where
forwarding sysctls and Tailscale's recommended NIC offload settings, and
only when an exit node or a route actually needs them
Approval is mentioned: an advertised route or exit node does nothing until it is
approved in the admin console, which is otherwise a silent non-event.
Also added --only <step> and --list, because this section in particular needs to
be run on its own while it is being worked on. A step run that way ignores the
progress file and does not record itself — asking for one step is not progress
through the script.
One bash quirk fixed on the way: "${VAR:-Tailscale's own service}" does not
parse. An apostrophe inside a ${:-} default opens a quoted section that swallows
the closing brace, and the error surfaces as "unexpected EOF" 400 lines away.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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9d53ff506e |
port Docker, with the group-versus-rootless choice spelled out
Three options, each explained rather than named, because the difference between
them is a security posture and the default is the one that sounds harmless.
1 docker group, the default. The text says what the group actually is: anyone
in it can run `docker run -v /:/host -it alpine chroot /host` and have a root
shell. It is not "access to Docker", it is root by a longer route — the same
framing os-user-docker.ts already uses for why members never get it.
Whether that matters is conditional, and the run works it out rather than
asserting either way: on an account that already has sudo it is a shorter
path to something they can reach anyway, and it says so; on an account that
does not, it is a real escalation, and it says that instead. Caught in
testing, where the reassuring sentence was being printed for a throwaway
account with no sudo at all — the exact case where it is untrue.
2 rootless, with the thing nobody would find out stated at the prompt:
Officer's app store cannot provision containers with it. compose.ts,
preflight.ts and system-monitor all spawn `docker` with no environment of
their own, so they reach /var/run/docker.sock; DOCKER_HOST is set only for
member commands, in os-user-docker.ts. pm2 started at boot by systemd has no
session either, so exporting it in a shell rc does not reach the process
that matters. The consequence is recorded in the summary, not just spoken.
3 neither, and what that costs.
Also fixed in the port: the repository codename came from `lsb_release -cs`, which
is wrong on every derivative — Mint reports "vanessa", Pop reports its own, and
Docker publishes neither, so `apt update` fails against a repository that does not
exist. os-release carries UBUNTU_CODENAME on exactly those systems for exactly
this reason; it is preferred now, with VERSION_CODENAME as the fallback, and the
ubuntu/debian half of the URL comes from ID_LIKE rather than being hardcoded.
The shared `services` network is created only when missing, checked with
`docker network inspect` rather than by running create and discarding the error.
Verified on this host, and against a throwaway account both with and without
sudo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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f9c6b7925a |
record the default-editor section, to come last
Asks for nano, vim or nvim and sets EDITOR/VISUAL in the shell config, plus the Debian `editor` alternative so root and anything reading the system default agree with it. Has to come after the Neovim section, or nvim cannot honestly be offered as one of the choices — which is the same ordering mistake the original made by setting core.editor to nvim four sections before installing it. This is the setting core.editor was left out in favour of: one preference that git, crontab -e, visudo and systemctl edit all follow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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4339ab829d |
set pull.rebase, and say why core.editor is not set
pull.rebase true, which is the setting whose absence stopped this very repository mid-session today: git refuses to pull when branches have diverged and asks which of three things you meant, every time, until told once. Rebasing replays local commits on top of what was fetched rather than adding a merge commit that records nothing but the fact that you had not pulled yet. core.editor stays out, deliberately, and the run says so rather than leaving its absence to look like an oversight. Git's fallback chain is GIT_EDITOR → core.editor → $VISUAL → $EDITOR → system default, so core.editor is a git-only override sitting above $EDITOR. The original set both it and `export EDITOR` in the shell section — two settings for one preference, which drift apart the moment either is changed and leave git using an editor nothing else does. Setting only $EDITOR means git, crontab -e, visudo and systemctl edit all follow one answer. Verified on a throwaway account: .gitconfig comes out with user, init.defaultBranch master and pull.rebase true. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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28673869c3 |
port the git section, and stop it overwriting an identity that already exists
Detects first, then asks. If there is a name and email configured it shows them and offers to change them, defaulting to no — the common reason to re-run this script is everything except this. If there is nothing configured it just asks. Default branch is master rather than main, unless the answer says otherwise. Three problems in the original, beyond running unconditionally: prompt_value accepts an empty answer, so pressing Enter wrote `user.name = ""`. An empty name is worse than none: unset makes git refuse to commit and say why, empty makes it commit with a blank author and never mention it. ask_required re-asks instead. core.editor was set to nvim four sections before Neovim is installed, so anything invoking the editor in between failed. Dropped for now rather than moved — it is a preference, and worth deciding separately. Nothing checked whether the writes worked. That last one was not theoretical. Testing against a throwaway account, all three writes failed and the section still printed "OK: written". `git config --global` needs no repository, but git stats the working directory on the way, looking for one — and the script runs from under the invoking user's home, which is 0750, so the target account cannot stat it: fatal: failed to stat '<cwd>': Permission denied The wrappers now run in a subshell from /, which every account can stat, and the caller checks the exit status and reads the value back before claiming success. Also recorded where it is written: docs/agent-git-identity.md says every agent Officer runs commits as the owner, because it runs as the owner. This is not only the human's identity, it is what git log attributes agent commits to — which is worth knowing while choosing it. Verified both paths: this host's existing identity is shown and left alone by default, and a fresh account gets a correct .gitconfig owned by that account with defaultBranch master. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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08e7de1b6d |
move unattended-upgrades into core utils, and make sure it is actually on
apt only. It is a Debian and Ubuntu package — dnf's equivalent is dnf-automatic
and pacman has no equivalent at all — so it is not a name to translate across the
other lists.
Installing the package is not by itself enough to switch it on. The apt-daily
timers read /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades, and on this host no package owns
that file: `dpkg -S` says it came from nothing, which means the original script
wrote it. So the section checks for it and offers to write it, rather than
assuming the install did.
Beyond that it only reports, because the interesting facts about unattended
upgrades are not whether it installed:
It never reboots on its own, deliberately. A kernel or libc update is installed
and then not used, and the machine keeps running the old one until it restarts.
Nothing announces that except /var/run/reboot-required, which nobody reads. The
section prints it, names the packages waiting, and puts it in the summary — it
is the failure people do not notice for months.
Ubuntu's Allowed-Origins includes plain ${distro_codename} as well as
-security, so this takes ordinary updates too, not only security ones.
Verified both paths: this host reports enabled with no reboot pending, and
pointing AUTO_UPGRADES at a temp file exercises the enable path and writes the
three periodic settings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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0da184d082 |
verify the fail2ban defaults instead of recalling them
The previous commit hedged on the ban policy because I thought fail2ban was not installed here. It is — the earlier ubuntu-setup run installed it — so the claim could be checked rather than remembered. Checked, and it was right: /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf ships `[sshd] enabled = true`, and the running jail reports maxretry 5, findtime 600, bantime 600. This host has banned 6 addresses already. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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f176b92378 |
move fail2ban into core utils, and reduce its section to a status report
Your call, and the reasoning holds: it configures nothing of its own, an existing install with its own jails is untouched because pkg_install never names a package that is already present, and it is worth having by default. One thing recorded where it is declared, because it makes fail2ban unlike every other entry in that list: it is a daemon, not a binary. Installing it starts it, and Debian and Ubuntu ship an enabled sshd jail — so from that moment an address that fails to log in five times in ten minutes is blocked for ten. That is the point of it, and it includes you, from wherever you are connecting. (Recalled rather than verified: fail2ban is not installed on this host and the sandbox would not let me unpack the .deb to check the shipped jail.d file.) The section no longer installs anything. It reports whether fail2ban is running, which jails are active, and how to unban an address — because a daemon quietly blocking connections is worth knowing about before it blocks yours, and a run that installs it as one name in a list of twenty gives no hint that anything started. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |