pastilhas
f7c9a28c33
`stripHopByHop` copies headers with `out.set(key, value)`, which overwrites. Correct for every header except the one that legitimately repeats: a NextAuth sign-in sends several Set-Cookie - csrf-token, callback-url, session-token - and collapsing them to one drops the rest. Measured: two Set-Cookie headers direct from Linkwarden, one through the door, and the survivor was callback-url. So the csrf cookie never reached the browser, the sign-in posted, failed its CSRF check and bounced back to the form. A redirect loop with nothing in any log saying why - and the owner predicted this exact symptom from the other side before it was found. `getSetCookie()` returns them unjoined, which is the reason to use it rather than splitting a combined value: `Expires` contains a comma, so naive splitting corrupts the date and the cookie is discarded. Both hops use this one function, so both are fixed by it.
Linkwarden
Your bookmarks, behind an Officer session. One self-hosted Linkwarden per Officer install, pointed at by the owner, with every Officer user mapped onto an account of their own.
Officer stores no bookmarks. Linkwarden owns those. What this plugin owns is the credential and the door.
The model
It is the Vault model, and deliberately so:
| One instance per install | linkwarden_config, one row pinned by a CHECK, set in the panel. Not .env — a plugin cannot ask the owner to edit a file and restart a process. |
| A sidecar owns the upstream | officer-linkwarden reads the URL from Postgres with a short TTL and reverse-proxies. Nothing else knows where Linkwarden is. |
| Two doors | An authenticated one for Officer's own UI, which injects the mapped user's token so the device never holds one. And /api/linkwarden/lw, unauthenticated, for the browser extension — which carries its own credential and has nowhere to put an Officer JWT. |
| A mapped account per user | linkwarden_accounts. This is the part Vault does not have; its schema says so outright. Provisioning follows ../USER_PROVISIONING.md. |
The one thing that is not like Vault
Vaultwarden speaks a host-agnostic bearer protocol. Linkwarden is a Next.js app using NextAuth.
That difference is the whole of the difficulty. NextAuth issues host-scoped session cookies, checks CSRF
against the host, and hands clients absolute URLs built from NEXTAUTH_URL. Measured on the live
instance rather than inferred — a sign-in posted to 100.64.0.1:3000 answers with:
{"url":"https://linkwarden.home.pastilhas.eu/api/v1/auth/signin?csrf=true"}
So serving the extension through Officer requires NEXTAUTH_URL to name the address Officer serves it
at. That is a change to the container, not to this plugin, and it is a prerequisite rather than a
preference: leave it and the extension is bounced out of the proxy mid-login, to a host that in this case
does not even answer.
The API half is unaffected. /api/v1/* accepts Authorization: Bearer <access token> and never touches
NextAuth, so the panel — and anything an agent does — works either way. Only the extension's login
depends on it.
Verified against the live instance
Linkwarden v2.16.2, 2026-09-05. Every status below was observed, not read in a doc.
| Route | Without a token | With a token |
|---|---|---|
/api/v1/dashboard |
401 | 200 |
/api/v1/collections |
401 | 200 |
/api/v1/tags |
401 | 200 |
/api/v1/links |
401 | 200 |
/api/v1/users |
401 | 200 — the admin surface, used for provisioning |
Shapes worth knowing before reading the code:
- collections — nested through
parentId, withisPublic,ownerIdandmembers. - tags — paginated,
{ tags, nextCursor }, unlike the others. - links — carry the archive:
textContentandreadable(extracted text), pluspreview,image,pdfandmonolith, withlastPreserved.textContentis the reason this is worth more than a bookmark bar: it makes a saved link something that can be searched and quoted rather than re-opened.
State
Foundation only. manifest.ts, db/schema.ts and this file. The sidecar, the routers, provisioning and
the panel are not written yet.