the foundation: where the instance is, and who is who on it

One Linkwarden per Officer install, pointed at by the owner, with every Officer
user mapped onto an account of their own. Officer stores no bookmarks; it owns
the credential and the door.

The model is Vault's, and the parts that are the same are the same on purpose:
a one-row config table rather than an env var, because a plugin cannot ask the
owner to edit a file and restart a process; a sidecar that is the only thing
knowing where the upstream is; and two doors, one authenticated for our own UI
and one unauthenticated for a client that carries its own credential.

`linkwarden_accounts` is the part Vault does not have. Its schema says so in as
many words - "mapping Officer accounts onto them is not a column here" - so this
is new work rather than a copy, and it follows plugins/USER_PROVISIONING.md,
written from the photos plugin against Immich.

── The difference that matters ──

Vaultwarden speaks a host-agnostic bearer protocol. Linkwarden is a Next.js app
using NextAuth, which issues host-scoped cookies, checks CSRF against the host,
and hands clients absolute URLs built from NEXTAUTH_URL. Measured rather than
inferred: a sign-in posted to the tailnet address answers with an absolute URL
to a hostname that does not answer at all.

So serving the extension through Officer needs NEXTAUTH_URL to name the address
Officer serves it at. That is a change to the container rather than to this
plugin, and it is a prerequisite, not a preference. The API half is unaffected -
/api/v1/* takes a bearer token and never touches NextAuth - so the panel and
anything an agent does work either way.

Verified against Linkwarden v2.16.2 on 2026-09-05: every route 401 without a
token and 200 with one, including /api/v1/users, which is the admin surface
provisioning needs. Links carry textContent and readable, which is what makes a
saved page searchable rather than merely re-openable.

Foundation only. No sidecar, routers, provisioning or panel yet.

db/schema.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+import { pgTable, integer, text, timestamp, boolean, check, index } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
+import { sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { users } from 'officerdb/auth/schema';
+
+// Officer's server-side state for a self-hosted Linkwarden. Officer stores no bookmarks: Linkwarden owns
+// those. What lives here is WHERE the instance is, and WHO on this Officer is who on that Linkwarden.
+// Every secret column is AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest (officerdb/crypto).
+
+/**
+ * Where this install's Linkwarden lives. ONE ROW, ever — `id` is pinned to 1 by a CHECK.
+ *
+ * The reasoning is Vault's, and it is worth not re-deriving: a plugin cannot ask the owner to edit `.env`
+ * and restart a process, `.env` is auto-loaded into every pm2 process so a value one sidecar needs is
+ * readable from every other one, and a variable read at module load cannot change without a restart.
+ * Installing the plugin and pointing it at a server has to be enough.
+ *
+ * Server-wide rather than per-user because the owner runs one Linkwarden. That is a different question
+ * from which ACCOUNT a person uses on it, which is the table below — and the thing Vault explicitly left
+ * for later.
+ */
+export const linkwardenConfig = pgTable(
+  'linkwarden_config',
+  {
+    /** Always 1. A single-row table wants to say so structurally, or a second row arrives eventually. */
+    id: integer('id').primaryKey().default(1),
+    /** Base URL, no trailing slash (normalised on write). Null before the owner has pointed it anywhere. */
+    url: text('url'),
+    /**
+     * The admin access token, used ONLY to provision accounts — `plugins/USER_PROVISIONING.md`.
+     *
+     * Separate from any user's token and never injected on a user's request: this one can list and create
+     * accounts, so it is reachable from exactly one place (`api/accounts.ts`, owner-only) and is not what
+     * the proxy holds.
+     */
+    adminToken: text('admin_token'), // encrypted
+    /**
+     * Whether to serve at all. Distinct from `url` being set: the owner may want to stop exposing an
+     * instance without forgetting where it is.
+     */
+    enabled: boolean('enabled').notNull().default(true),
+    updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+  },
+  (table) => [check('ck_linkwarden_config_singleton', sql`${table.id} = 1`)],
+);
+
+/**
+ * Who an Officer account is on that Linkwarden.
+ *
+ * ── Why a mapping and not one shared login ──
+ *
+ * Linkwarden has its own users, its own collections and its own sharing. One account shared between
+ * everyone on an Officer would put every member's reading in one pile with no way to unpick it, and would
+ * make "revoke this person" mean "change the password for everybody". A row per user is what makes a
+ * member's bookmarks theirs, and removing them a delete rather than a negotiation.
+ *
+ * This is the part Vault does not have. Its schema says so in as many words — "mapping Officer accounts
+ * onto them is not a column here" — so this is new work rather than a copy, and the contract it follows
+ * is `plugins/USER_PROVISIONING.md`: check before create, force a password change, verify by logging in.
+ *
+ * ── The token is the whole point ──
+ *
+ * With it, a proxied request carries the mapped user's own credential and Linkwarden decides what they
+ * may see. Without it the platform would have to be the thing that decides, which is a permission model
+ * re-implemented on top of one that already exists and is already right.
+ */
+export const linkwardenAccounts = pgTable(
+  'linkwarden_accounts',
+  {
+    userId: integer('user_id')
+      .primaryKey()
+      .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+    /** The id Linkwarden knows them by. Kept so a rename on either side cannot break the mapping. */
+    linkwardenUserId: integer('linkwarden_user_id').notNull(),
+    /** Their username there, for showing in the panel — the id is what anything reads. */
+    username: text('username').notNull(),
+    /**
+     * That account's own access token, minted at provisioning.
+     *
+     * Null is a real state and not an error: an account can exist before a token has been issued for it,
+     * and the panel says so rather than looking broken.
+     */
+    accessToken: text('access_token'), // encrypted
+    createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+    updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+  },
+  (table) => [
+    /*
+      Ordinary, NOT unique.
+
+      Two Officer accounts pointing at one Linkwarden account is a mistake, but it is the OWNER's mistake
+      to make and un-make: a unique index turns it into a failed insert with no explanation at the moment
+      of provisioning, and the m3e-canvas review this week is a fresh reminder of what a constraint chosen
+      for tidiness does to the ordinary path. `api/accounts.ts` checks and refuses with a sentence.
+    */
+    index('linkwarden_accounts_by_linkwarden_user').on(table.linkwardenUserId),
+  ],
+);