the foundation: where the instance is, and who is who on it

One Linkwarden per Officer install, pointed at by the owner, with every Officer
user mapped onto an account of their own. Officer stores no bookmarks; it owns
the credential and the door.

The model is Vault's, and the parts that are the same are the same on purpose:
a one-row config table rather than an env var, because a plugin cannot ask the
owner to edit a file and restart a process; a sidecar that is the only thing
knowing where the upstream is; and two doors, one authenticated for our own UI
and one unauthenticated for a client that carries its own credential.

`linkwarden_accounts` is the part Vault does not have. Its schema says so in as
many words - "mapping Officer accounts onto them is not a column here" - so this
is new work rather than a copy, and it follows plugins/USER_PROVISIONING.md,
written from the photos plugin against Immich.

── The difference that matters ──

Vaultwarden speaks a host-agnostic bearer protocol. Linkwarden is a Next.js app
using NextAuth, which issues host-scoped cookies, checks CSRF against the host,
and hands clients absolute URLs built from NEXTAUTH_URL. Measured rather than
inferred: a sign-in posted to the tailnet address answers with an absolute URL
to a hostname that does not answer at all.

So serving the extension through Officer needs NEXTAUTH_URL to name the address
Officer serves it at. That is a change to the container rather than to this
plugin, and it is a prerequisite, not a preference. The API half is unaffected -
/api/v1/* takes a bearer token and never touches NextAuth - so the panel and
anything an agent does work either way.

Verified against Linkwarden v2.16.2 on 2026-09-05: every route 401 without a
token and 200 with one, including /api/v1/users, which is the admin surface
provisioning needs. Links carry textContent and readable, which is what makes a
saved page searchable rather than merely re-openable.

Foundation only. No sidecar, routers, provisioning or panel yet.
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# Linkwarden
Your bookmarks, behind an Officer session. One self-hosted [Linkwarden](https://linkwarden.app) per
Officer install, pointed at by the owner, with every Officer user mapped onto an account of their own.
Officer stores no bookmarks. Linkwarden owns those. What this plugin owns is the **credential** and the
**door**.
## The model
It is the Vault model, and deliberately so:
| | |
| --- | --- |
| **One instance per install** | `linkwarden_config`, one row pinned by a CHECK, set in the panel. Not `.env` — a plugin cannot ask the owner to edit a file and restart a process. |
| **A sidecar owns the upstream** | `officer-linkwarden` reads the URL from Postgres with a short TTL and reverse-proxies. Nothing else knows where Linkwarden is. |
| **Two doors** | An authenticated one for Officer's own UI, which injects the mapped user's token so the device never holds one. And `/api/linkwarden/lw`, unauthenticated, for the browser extension — which carries its own credential and has nowhere to put an Officer JWT. |
| **A mapped account per user** | `linkwarden_accounts`. This is the part Vault does not have; its schema says so outright. Provisioning follows [`../USER_PROVISIONING.md`](../USER_PROVISIONING.md). |
## The one thing that is not like Vault
**Vaultwarden speaks a host-agnostic bearer protocol. Linkwarden is a Next.js app using NextAuth.**
That difference is the whole of the difficulty. NextAuth issues host-scoped session cookies, checks CSRF
against the host, and hands clients absolute URLs built from `NEXTAUTH_URL`. Measured on the live
instance rather than inferred — a sign-in posted to `100.64.0.1:3000` answers with:
```json
{"url":"https://linkwarden.home.pastilhas.eu/api/v1/auth/signin?csrf=true"}
```
So **serving the extension through Officer requires `NEXTAUTH_URL` to name the address Officer serves it
at.** That is a change to the container, not to this plugin, and it is a prerequisite rather than a
preference: leave it and the extension is bounced out of the proxy mid-login, to a host that in this case
does not even answer.
The API half is unaffected. `/api/v1/*` accepts `Authorization: Bearer <access token>` and never touches
NextAuth, so the panel — and anything an agent does — works either way. Only the extension's *login*
depends on it.
## Verified against the live instance
Linkwarden **v2.16.2**, 2026-09-05. Every status below was observed, not read in a doc.
| Route | Without a token | With a token |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `/api/v1/dashboard` | 401 | 200 |
| `/api/v1/collections` | 401 | 200 |
| `/api/v1/tags` | 401 | 200 |
| `/api/v1/links` | 401 | 200 |
| `/api/v1/users` | 401 | 200 — the admin surface, used for provisioning |
Shapes worth knowing before reading the code:
- **collections** — nested through `parentId`, with `isPublic`, `ownerId` and `members`.
- **tags** — paginated, `{ tags, nextCursor }`, unlike the others.
- **links** — carry the archive: `textContent` and `readable` (extracted text), plus `preview`, `image`,
`pdf` and `monolith`, with `lastPreserved`. `textContent` is the reason this is worth more than a
bookmark bar: it makes a saved link something that can be searched and quoted rather than re-opened.
## State
Foundation only. `manifest.ts`, `db/schema.ts` and this file. The sidecar, the routers, provisioning and
the panel are not written yet.