Files
caldav/api/ios-profile.ts
T
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5 a161e2ac5f agents can manage the calendar and the address book
the owner's scenario: any chat, "I'm having dinner Saturday with my wife, add
that", "cancel it", "add Peter Griffin, this number" — and it happens.

reading already worked through the JSON api. writing is the DAV door, and the
credential question is what took the thinking: every option meant a NEW secret
and then somewhere to keep it — a file, the secret store, one per commander —
each a password to distribute, rotate and eventually leak.

$OFFICER_AGENT_KEY is already in every agent's environment, already bound to one
user, already revoked when the session ends. so the DAV door accepts it as the
basic-auth password, and no new secret exists anywhere.

it cannot reach another account, and that is structural rather than a check:
resolveApiKey says whose the key is and that id becomes X-Remote-User. the URL
is never consulted, radicale refuses any other principal, and the username in
the header must AGREE with the key rather than select the account. verified —
own principal 207/201, another account 403, spoofed username 401.

the permission check is isApiRequestAllowed against this plugin's own prefix, so
the answer is exactly what the gate would give the same credential at
/api/caldav. a second copy of that rule is the copy that stops being updated.
DAV methods are mapped to read/write with PROPFIND and REPORT as reads —
unmapped they counted as writes and a member with read could not list their own
calendar. anything unrecognised defaults to write, which is the safe direction.

the skill is written from recipes that were RUN, not recalled: create 201, move
204 (same UID, same href, SEQUENCE bumped), delete 200, contact create and
delete, and the json read for lookups.

the trap it exists to prevent, found while testing rather than by reading:
`date -u -d 'saturday 20:00'` does not convert. -u parses AND prints as UTC, so
8pm becomes 20:00Z, which is 21:00 in lisbon. every event an hour out, nothing
errors, and it is invisible until someone is stood up. the two-step through
epoch is the only form that works and the skill leads with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
2026-08-27 06:08:25 +00:00

229 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript

import { randomUUID, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
// Generates the iOS configuration profile that sets up CalDAV + CardDAV in one install, and holds it
// against a single-use token until Safari fetches it.
//
// WHY A TOKEN AND NOT A SESSION. The profile is fetched by Safari, which has no platform JWT — the app
// hands the URL to the OS browser and loses all control of the request. So the token IS the credential.
// It is therefore minted long, used once, and dropped after five minutes, because the thing it protects
// is a live DAV password sitting in a file on a public endpoint. A profile URL that stays valid is a
// password that stays valid.
//
// WHY IN MEMORY. The profile contains the app password in PLAINTEXT — it has to, that is what makes the
// install one-tap. `createDavAppPassword` promises the plaintext "is not stored", and writing the
// profile to Postgres or to disk would quietly make that false. A process restart inside the five-minute
// window costs the owner one extra tap; persisting the secret costs the guarantee.
//
// See docs/mobile-dav-provisioning.md §3 for the payload keys and where they come from.
/*
How long a provisioning link lives.
Five minutes until 2026-08-27, which assumed the person minting the link is the person clicking it —
true for a button in the UI, false for every other way this gets used. Handing a URL to someone who then
has to pick up a phone, open Safari and type it took longer than that every single time, and the failure
is indistinguishable from a broken profile: the link 404s and iOS says "Invalid Profile", which sends you
looking at the plist rather than at the clock. That cost most of an evening.
Thirty minutes, still single-use. The link embeds a live password, so this is a real trade — but the
binding constraint is that it is claimed ONCE and then gone, not that the window is narrow.
*/
const TTL_MS = 30 * 60_000;
// A restart clears everything anyway; this is only a guard against a script hammering the mint endpoint.
const MAX_PENDING = 32;
type PendingProfile = { body: Uint8Array; expiresAt: number };
const pending = new Map<string, PendingProfile>();
const sweep = () => {
const now = Date.now();
for (const [token, entry] of pending) if (entry.expiresAt <= now) pending.delete(token);
};
const escapeXml = (value: string) =>
value.replace(/&/g, '&amp;').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;').replace(/"/g, '&quot;');
type ProfileParams = {
host: string;
port: number;
username: string;
password: string;
/** The DAV principal, e.g. `/dav/1/`. Both payloads point at it and let the client discover the rest. */
principalUrl: string;
/** What the user sees as the account name in Settings. */
accountName: string;
/**
* Which accounts this profile creates. Both, unless something is wrong.
*
* ── Why this had to exist ──
*
* The comment below says one profile carrying both payloads sidesteps iOS folding CardDAV into an
* existing CalDAV account with the same server and username. On iOS 26.6 it does not: installing the
* two-payload profile produced ONE account offering Calendars and Reminders, with no Contacts toggle
* anywhere and 460 cards that the phone never once requested. Verified from the server side — the
* principal advertises `addressbook-home-set`, `/1/contacts/` is typed as an addressbook, and nothing
* had ever asked for it.
*
* So CardDAV gets its own profile, with its own PayloadIdentifier, which iOS has nothing to merge into.
*/
kinds?: ('CalDAV' | 'CardDAV')[];
};
// One profile, both payloads. This is not a convenience: iOS keys accounts by server+username, so adding
// CardDAV separately with the same pair gets folded into the existing CalDAV account and contacts
// silently never appear. A single profile creates both accounts outright and sidesteps it. Detail in
// docs/mobile-dav-provisioning.md §1.6, which cost an evening to learn.
function buildPlist(params: ProfileParams): string {
const { host, port, username, password, principalUrl, accountName, kinds = ['CalDAV', 'CardDAV'] } = params;
// Stable per host, so re-running setup REPLACES the profile instead of stacking a second account, and
// two Officer instances on one phone do not overwrite each other.
const suffix = kinds.length === 1 ? `.${kinds[0]!.toLowerCase()}` : '';
const identifier = `dev.officer.dav.${host.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]+/g, '-')}${suffix}`;
const e = escapeXml;
const account = (kind: 'CalDAV' | 'CardDAV', label: string) => ` <dict>
<key>PayloadType</key><string>com.apple.${kind.toLowerCase()}.account</string>
<key>PayloadVersion</key><integer>1</integer>
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key><string>${identifier}.${kind.toLowerCase()}</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key><string>${randomUUID().toUpperCase()}</string>
<key>PayloadDisplayName</key><string>${e(label)}</string>
<key>${kind}AccountDescription</key><string>${e(accountName)}</string>
<key>${kind}HostName</key><string>${e(host)}</string>
<key>${kind}Port</key><integer>${port}</integer>
<key>${kind}UseSSL</key><true/>
<key>${kind}Username</key><string>${e(username)}</string>
<key>${kind}Password</key><string>${e(password)}</string>
<key>${kind}PrincipalURL</key><string>${e(principalUrl)}</string>
</dict>`;
return `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>PayloadType</key><string>Configuration</string>
<key>PayloadVersion</key><integer>1</integer>
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key><string>${identifier}</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key><string>${randomUUID().toUpperCase()}</string>
<key>PayloadDisplayName</key><string>${e(accountName)} — Calendar &amp; Contacts</string>
<key>PayloadDescription</key><string>Adds your Officer calendars and address book to this device.</string>
<key>PayloadOrganization</key><string>Officer</string>
<!-- PayloadScope is deliberately absent: Apple documents it for macOS only, and iOS rejected this
profile outright with "Invalid Profile" while it was present. Removed 2026-08-27. -->
<key>PayloadRemovalDisallowed</key><false/>
<key>PayloadContent</key>
<array>
${kinds.map((k) => account(k, k === 'CalDAV' ? 'Officer Calendar' : 'Officer Contacts')).join('\n')}
</array>
</dict>
</plist>
`;
}
// Signing is OPT-IN and off by default, because this machine has no TLS certificate on it — TLS
// terminates upstream. An unsigned profile installs exactly the same way; the only difference is that
// the install screen says "Not Signed" in red instead of naming the signer.
//
// Point these at a cert whose chain iOS already trusts (a public CA — the TLS cert of the reverse proxy
// works, iOS checks the trust chain and not the key usage) and profiles are signed from then on:
// DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CERT leaf certificate, PEM
// DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_KEY its private key, PEM
// DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CHAIN intermediates, PEM (iOS ships roots, not intermediates — without this the
// signature cannot be verified and shows as Not Verified)
//
// Signed at mint time, reading the cert from disk on every call, so a renewed certificate is picked up
// with no restart and no renewal hook — the failure mode the mobile team flagged cannot happen here.
// The remaining caveat is Apple's: a REPLACEMENT profile must be signed by the same identity as the one
// it replaces, so after a certificate rotation a device may refuse to replace an older profile until the
// old one is removed. Nothing detects that for you.
const signingConfig = () => {
const cert = process.env.DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CERT;
const key = process.env.DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_KEY;
if (!cert || !key) return null;
return { cert, key, chain: process.env.DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CHAIN };
};
let warnedUnsigned = false;
async function sign(plist: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {
const config = signingConfig();
if (!config) {
if (!warnedUnsigned) {
warnedUnsigned = true;
console.warn(
'[dav] serving UNSIGNED iOS profiles — iOS will show "Not Signed" in red. Set DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CERT/KEY to sign.',
);
}
return null;
}
// Piped through stdin/stdout rather than temp files: the plist holds a live password in plaintext and
// there is no reason for it to touch the filesystem. `-outform der` and `-nodetach` are both
// load-bearing — the default output is base64 S/MIME, which iOS will not parse, and without -nodetach
// the file is a signature with no profile embedded in it.
const args = ['smime', '-sign', '-signer', config.cert, '-inkey', config.key, '-outform', 'der', '-nodetach'];
if (config.chain) args.push('-certfile', config.chain);
args.push('-md', 'sha256');
const proc = Bun.spawn(['openssl', ...args], {
stdin: new TextEncoder().encode(plist),
stdout: 'pipe',
stderr: 'pipe',
});
const [out, err, code] = await Promise.all([
new Response(proc.stdout).arrayBuffer(),
new Response(proc.stderr).text(),
proc.exited,
]);
if (code !== 0 || out.byteLength === 0) {
// Deliberately not fatal. An unsigned profile still installs and still works; failing the whole
// provisioning request over a cosmetic signature would be the worse outcome.
console.error(`[dav] profile signing failed (exit ${code}), serving unsigned: ${err.trim().slice(0, 200)}`);
return null;
}
return new Uint8Array(out);
}
export type StoredProfile = { url: string; expiresAt: string; signed: boolean };
/** Build the profile and park it behind a one-shot token. Returns the URL Safari should be sent to. */
export async function stashIosProfile(params: ProfileParams, publicUrl: string): Promise<StoredProfile> {
sweep();
if (pending.size >= MAX_PENDING) throw new Error('too many pending profiles');
const plist = buildPlist(params);
const signed = await sign(plist);
const body = signed ?? new TextEncoder().encode(plist);
const token = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
const expiresAt = Date.now() + TTL_MS;
pending.set(token, { body, expiresAt });
return {
url: `${publicUrl.replace(/\/$/, '')}/dav/provision/${token}.mobileconfig`,
expiresAt: new Date(expiresAt).toISOString(),
signed: signed !== null,
};
}
/** Take the profile for this token, if it is still valid. Consumes it — a second fetch gets nothing. */
export function claimIosProfile(token: string): Uint8Array | null {
sweep();
const entry = pending.get(token);
if (!entry) {
// SAID OUT LOUD, because the alternative is silence at the only moment it matters.
//
// A miss means expired, already used, or never existed, and the caller cannot be told which — telling
// them would confirm a token once existed. But WE need to know: the response is a 404, iOS renders
// that as "Invalid Profile", and the person reading it goes and inspects the plist. Nothing in the log
// said a phone had even asked. One line here is the difference between "the link expired" and an
// evening spent validating XML that was correct the whole time.
console.warn(`[dav] ios profile claim MISSED (expired, already used, or never minted) — ${pending.size} pending`);
return null;
}
pending.delete(token);
console.log(`[dav] ios profile claimed — ${pending.size} still pending`);
return entry.body;
}