every signed profile was rejected with "Invalid Profile". `openssl smime -verify` reported success the whole time, which is exactly why it took so long to see: the signature was valid over the WRONG BYTES. without `-binary`, openssl treats the input as TEXT — it canonicalises line endings and adds MIME headers before signing — so what iOS unwraps is no longer the plist that was written. this was already found and written down in officer-oas/enroll.ts on 2026-08-20, four wrong endings into a hunt that was never about the ending. this file was written without reading that one, and repeated it exactly. also reads OFFICERDEV_DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_* as well as the bare names, which is the convention every other consumer follows. on a converted install the signing certificate could be configured correctly and silently ignored, and the only symptom is a profile that says "Not Signed" for no visible reason. verified on a real iPhone (iOS 26.6): the profile installs, and the signed inner payload starts with <?xml with no MIME headers and no CRLF mangling. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
304 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
304 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
import { randomUUID, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
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// Generates the iOS configuration profile that sets up CalDAV + CardDAV in one install, and holds it
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// against a single-use token until Safari fetches it.
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//
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// WHY A TOKEN AND NOT A SESSION. The profile is fetched by Safari, which has no platform JWT — the app
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// hands the URL to the OS browser and loses all control of the request. So the token IS the credential.
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// It is therefore minted long, used once, and dropped after five minutes, because the thing it protects
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// is a live DAV password sitting in a file on a public endpoint. A profile URL that stays valid is a
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// password that stays valid.
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//
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// WHY IN MEMORY. The profile contains the app password in PLAINTEXT — it has to, that is what makes the
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// install one-tap. `createDavAppPassword` promises the plaintext "is not stored", and writing the
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// profile to Postgres or to disk would quietly make that false. A process restart inside the five-minute
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// window costs the owner one extra tap; persisting the secret costs the guarantee.
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//
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// See docs/mobile-dav-provisioning.md §3 for the payload keys and where they come from.
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/*
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How long a provisioning link lives.
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Five minutes until 2026-08-27, which assumed the person minting the link is the person clicking it —
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true for a button in the UI, false for every other way this gets used. Handing a URL to someone who then
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has to pick up a phone, open Safari and type it took longer than that every single time, and the failure
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is indistinguishable from a broken profile: the link 404s and iOS says "Invalid Profile", which sends you
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looking at the plist rather than at the clock. That cost most of an evening.
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Thirty minutes, still single-use. The link embeds a live password, so this is a real trade — but the
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binding constraint is that it is claimed ONCE and then gone, not that the window is narrow.
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*/
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const TTL_MS = 30 * 60_000;
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// A restart clears everything anyway; this is only a guard against a script hammering the mint endpoint.
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const MAX_PENDING = 32;
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type PendingProfile = { body: Uint8Array; expiresAt: number };
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const pending = new Map<string, PendingProfile>();
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const sweep = () => {
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const now = Date.now();
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for (const [token, entry] of pending) if (entry.expiresAt <= now) pending.delete(token);
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};
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const escapeXml = (value: string) =>
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value.replace(/&/g, '&').replace(/</g, '<').replace(/>/g, '>').replace(/"/g, '"');
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type ProfileParams = {
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host: string;
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port: number;
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username: string;
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password: string;
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/** The DAV principal, e.g. `/dav/1/`. Both payloads point at it and let the client discover the rest. */
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principalUrl: string;
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/** What the user sees as the account name in Settings. */
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accountName: string;
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/**
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* Which accounts this profile creates. Both, unless something is wrong.
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*
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* ── Why this had to exist ──
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*
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* The comment below says one profile carrying both payloads sidesteps iOS folding CardDAV into an
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* existing CalDAV account with the same server and username. On iOS 26.6 it does not: installing the
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* two-payload profile produced ONE account offering Calendars and Reminders, with no Contacts toggle
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* anywhere and 460 cards that the phone never once requested. Verified from the server side — the
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* principal advertises `addressbook-home-set`, `/1/contacts/` is typed as an addressbook, and nothing
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* had ever asked for it.
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*
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* So CardDAV gets its own profile, with its own PayloadIdentifier, which iOS has nothing to merge into.
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*/
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kinds?: ('CalDAV' | 'CardDAV')[];
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};
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// One profile, both payloads. This is not a convenience: iOS keys accounts by server+username, so adding
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// CardDAV separately with the same pair gets folded into the existing CalDAV account and contacts
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// silently never appear. A single profile creates both accounts outright and sidesteps it. Detail in
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// docs/mobile-dav-provisioning.md §1.6, which cost an evening to learn.
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function buildPlist(params: ProfileParams): string {
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const { host, port, username, password, principalUrl, accountName, kinds = ['CalDAV', 'CardDAV'] } = params;
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// Stable per host, so re-running setup REPLACES the profile instead of stacking a second account, and
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// two Officer instances on one phone do not overwrite each other.
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const suffix = kinds.length === 1 ? `.${kinds[0]!.toLowerCase()}` : '';
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const identifier = `dev.officer.dav.${host.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]+/g, '-')}${suffix}`;
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const e = escapeXml;
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const account = (kind: 'CalDAV' | 'CardDAV', label: string) => ` <dict>
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<key>PayloadType</key><string>com.apple.${kind.toLowerCase()}.account</string>
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<key>PayloadVersion</key><integer>1</integer>
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<key>PayloadIdentifier</key><string>${identifier}.${kind.toLowerCase()}</string>
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<key>PayloadUUID</key><string>${randomUUID().toUpperCase()}</string>
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<key>PayloadDisplayName</key><string>${e(label)}</string>
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<key>${kind}AccountDescription</key><string>${e(accountName)}</string>
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<key>${kind}HostName</key><string>${e(host)}</string>
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<key>${kind}Port</key><integer>${port}</integer>
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<key>${kind}UseSSL</key><true/>
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<key>${kind}Username</key><string>${e(username)}</string>
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<key>${kind}Password</key><string>${e(password)}</string>
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<key>${kind}PrincipalURL</key><string>${e(principalUrl)}</string>
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</dict>`;
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return `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
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<plist version="1.0">
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<dict>
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<key>PayloadType</key><string>Configuration</string>
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<key>PayloadVersion</key><integer>1</integer>
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<key>PayloadIdentifier</key><string>${identifier}</string>
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<key>PayloadUUID</key><string>${randomUUID().toUpperCase()}</string>
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<key>PayloadDisplayName</key><string>${e(accountName)} — Calendar & Contacts</string>
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<key>PayloadDescription</key><string>Adds your Officer calendars and address book to this device.</string>
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<key>PayloadOrganization</key><string>Officer</string>
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<!-- PayloadScope is deliberately absent: Apple documents it for macOS only, and iOS rejected this
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profile outright with "Invalid Profile" while it was present. Removed 2026-08-27. -->
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<key>PayloadRemovalDisallowed</key><false/>
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<key>PayloadContent</key>
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<array>
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${kinds.map((k) => account(k, k === 'CalDAV' ? 'Officer Calendar' : 'Officer Contacts')).join('\n')}
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</array>
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</dict>
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</plist>
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`;
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}
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// Signing is OPT-IN and off by default, because this machine has no TLS certificate on it — TLS
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// terminates upstream. An unsigned profile installs exactly the same way; the only difference is that
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// the install screen says "Not Signed" in red instead of naming the signer.
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//
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// Point these at a cert whose chain iOS already trusts (a public CA — the TLS cert of the reverse proxy
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// works, iOS checks the trust chain and not the key usage) and profiles are signed from then on:
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// DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CERT leaf certificate, PEM
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// DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_KEY its private key, PEM
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// DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CHAIN intermediates, PEM (iOS ships roots, not intermediates — without this the
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// signature cannot be verified and shows as Not Verified)
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//
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// Signed at mint time, reading the cert from disk on every call, so a renewed certificate is picked up
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// with no restart and no renewal hook — the failure mode the mobile team flagged cannot happen here.
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// The remaining caveat is Apple's: a REPLACEMENT profile must be signed by the same identity as the one
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// it replaces, so after a certificate rotation a device may refuse to replace an older profile until the
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// old one is removed. Nothing detects that for you.
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/**
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* `OFFICERDEV_X ?? X`, which is the convention every other consumer follows.
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*
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* This read the bare names only. `.env` on a converted install prefixes everything — see
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* `servers/env-prefix.ts` — so on those machines the signing certificate could be configured correctly
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* and silently ignored, and the only symptom is a profile that says "Not Signed" for no visible reason.
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* The unprefixed name stays as the fallback, never the source.
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*/
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const env = (name: string) => process.env[`OFFICERDEV_${name}`] ?? process.env[name];
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const signingConfig = () => {
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const cert = env('DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CERT');
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const key = env('DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_KEY');
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if (!cert || !key) return null;
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return { cert, key, chain: env('DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CHAIN') };
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};
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let warnedUnsigned = false;
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async function sign(plist: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {
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const config = signingConfig();
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if (!config) {
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if (!warnedUnsigned) {
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warnedUnsigned = true;
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console.warn(
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'[dav] serving UNSIGNED iOS profiles — iOS will show "Not Signed" in red. Set DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CERT/KEY to sign.',
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);
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}
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return null;
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}
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// Piped through stdin/stdout rather than temp files: the plist holds a live password in plaintext and
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// there is no reason for it to touch the filesystem. `-outform der` and `-nodetach` are both
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// load-bearing — the default output is base64 S/MIME, which iOS will not parse, and without -nodetach
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// the file is a signature with no profile embedded in it.
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/*
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`-binary` IS NOT OPTIONAL, and its absence is why every signed profile was refused.
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Without it `openssl smime -sign` treats the input as TEXT: it canonicalises line endings and adds MIME
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headers before signing. The signature then verifies perfectly — `openssl smime -verify` reports
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"Verification successful" — while the bytes iOS unwraps are no longer the plist that was written. The
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device shows the profile, then refuses it with "Invalid Profile".
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Apple's own sample signs with `OpenSSL::PKCS7::BINARY` for the same reason. This was found and written
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down in `officer-oas/enroll.ts` on 2026-08-20, four wrong endings into a hunt that was never about the
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ending — and then repeated here on 2026-08-27 because this file was written without reading that one.
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*/
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const args = [
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'smime',
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'-sign',
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'-binary',
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'-signer',
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config.cert,
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'-inkey',
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config.key,
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'-outform',
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'der',
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'-nodetach',
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];
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if (config.chain) args.push('-certfile', config.chain);
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args.push('-md', 'sha256');
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const proc = Bun.spawn(['openssl', ...args], {
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stdin: new TextEncoder().encode(plist),
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stdout: 'pipe',
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stderr: 'pipe',
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});
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const [out, err, code] = await Promise.all([
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new Response(proc.stdout).arrayBuffer(),
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new Response(proc.stderr).text(),
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proc.exited,
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]);
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if (code !== 0 || out.byteLength === 0) {
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// Deliberately not fatal. An unsigned profile still installs and still works; failing the whole
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// provisioning request over a cosmetic signature would be the worse outcome.
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console.error(`[dav] profile signing failed (exit ${code}), serving unsigned: ${err.trim().slice(0, 200)}`);
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return null;
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}
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return new Uint8Array(out);
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}
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export type StoredProfile = {
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url: string;
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/** The same profile at a URL a person can TYPE. See `shortCode`. */
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shortUrl: string;
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code: string;
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expiresAt: string;
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signed: boolean;
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};
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/*
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A code short enough to type into Safari's address bar.
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── Why a long URL is not good enough ──
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The 43-character token cannot be typed, so it has to be tapped or pasted — and on a phone neither
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works. Officer runs from the Home Screen in a WEBVIEW, and a webview cannot hand a `.mobileconfig` to
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Settings: the download has nowhere to go and the screen does nothing. Every link the chat renders also
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gets `target="_blank"`, and a popup tab breaks the profile hand-off in Safari too.
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So the only path that reliably reaches iOS is a person typing a URL into real Safari, and that means it
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has to be short.
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── Why this is not a weaker credential ──
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Crockford's alphabet minus the ambiguous letters, 8 characters: ~10^12 combinations. It is SINGLE USE
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and lives ten minutes, so an attacker gets one guess per attempt against a target that disappears when
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it is claimed or when the clock runs out. The long token still exists and still works; this is a second
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door to the same one-shot entry, not a replacement for it.
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*/
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const CODE_ALPHABET = 'ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ23456789';
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const CODE_TTL_MS = 10 * 60_000;
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const shortCode = (): string => {
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const bytes = randomBytes(8);
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return Array.from(bytes, (b) => CODE_ALPHABET[b % CODE_ALPHABET.length]).join('');
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};
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/** Build the profile and park it behind a one-shot token. Returns the URL Safari should be sent to. */
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export async function stashIosProfile(params: ProfileParams, publicUrl: string): Promise<StoredProfile> {
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sweep();
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if (pending.size >= MAX_PENDING) throw new Error('too many pending profiles');
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const plist = buildPlist(params);
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const signed = await sign(plist);
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const body = signed ?? new TextEncoder().encode(plist);
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const token = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
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const expiresAt = Date.now() + TTL_MS;
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pending.set(token, { body, expiresAt });
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// The same profile behind a typeable code. Shorter-lived on purpose — see `shortCode`.
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const code = shortCode();
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pending.set(code, { body, expiresAt: Date.now() + CODE_TTL_MS });
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const base = publicUrl.replace(/\/$/, '');
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return {
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url: `${base}/dav/provision/${token}.mobileconfig`,
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shortUrl: `${base}/dav/p/${code}`,
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code,
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expiresAt: new Date(expiresAt).toISOString(),
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signed: signed !== null,
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};
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}
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/** Take the profile for this token, if it is still valid. Consumes it — a second fetch gets nothing. */
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export function claimIosProfile(token: string): Uint8Array | null {
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sweep();
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const entry = pending.get(token);
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if (!entry) {
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// SAID OUT LOUD, because the alternative is silence at the only moment it matters.
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//
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// A miss means expired, already used, or never existed, and the caller cannot be told which — telling
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// them would confirm a token once existed. But WE need to know: the response is a 404, iOS renders
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// that as "Invalid Profile", and the person reading it goes and inspects the plist. Nothing in the log
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// said a phone had even asked. One line here is the difference between "the link expired" and an
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// evening spent validating XML that was correct the whole time.
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console.warn(`[dav] ios profile claim MISSED (expired, already used, or never minted) — ${pending.size} pending`);
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return null;
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}
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pending.delete(token);
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console.log(`[dav] ios profile claimed — ${pending.size} still pending`);
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return entry.body;
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}
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