Tenth plugin out, and the one whose extraction turned on a permission decision rather than a mechanical move. The wallet permission was kind: 'admin' — owner only, not grantable, invisible to every other account. Plugin permissions are ALWAYS kind: 'app': mount.ts forces it and the manifest has no field for anything else, deliberately, so that "can a plugin escalate itself" is a question which cannot be asked. So extraction could not preserve admin, and that was raised as a blocker before any code moved. It was the right change anyway, and the objection inverts. Every wallet query is scoped by user_id, and that id comes from X-Officer-User which the platform injects from the authenticated session — a caller cannot name someone else's. So granting this gives an account ITS OWN wallet. Not through the API and not with root either does it hand over anyone else's, because their seed is sealed under a passphrase the server never stores. kind: 'admin' was single-user thinking; grantable is how a second person gets a wallet at all. Named bitcoin-wallet rather than wallet: it is a bitcoin wallet specifically, and the appName drives the route, the API prefix, the table prefix and the install key together. Tables renamed to bitcoin_wallet_* accordingly — the prefix guard normalises the hyphen. Free only because no wallet table existed on any server, which was checked before deciding: db:push treats a rename as a drop plus a create. The three custody test files moved with it and still run — 72 tests over scrypt sealing, envelope open and bolt11. bunfig.toml's test root was widened on 2026-08-15 after music took lyrics.test.ts and the suite silently shrank by nine, so that trap was already closed. 68 palette classes converted, five status vocabularies hoisted into shared.ts. Two deliberate flattenings recorded in PLUGIN.md: testnet/signet/regtest all read as warning, and the bitcoin and lightning rails no longer differ by hue. Deferred on purpose: watch-only data (xpubs, balances, history) stays unencrypted so a locked wallet still shows a balance. Anyone with the database can therefore SEE any user's balances; they can never move a coin.
381 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
381 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
import { blake2b } from '@noble/hashes/blake2.js';
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// AEZ v5 — the wide-block cipher LND's aezeed uses to encrypt a cipher seed.
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//
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// SCOPE, deliberately narrow. This is a DECRYPT-ONLY implementation of the SHORT-INPUT path:
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//
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// - No encrypt. Officer never mints aezeed seeds — it only imports ones LND/Zeus already created.
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// A new Officer wallet gets a BIP39 mnemonic, which is the portable format.
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// - No aezCore. An aezeed ciphertext is a FIXED 23 bytes (33 total, minus the 1-byte version, the
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// 5-byte salt and the 4-byte CRC), and AEZ dispatches on length: anything under 32 bytes takes the
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// `aezTiny` Feistel path. `aezCore` is unreachable here, so shipping it would mean carrying ~120
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// lines of untested cipher in a seed-recovery path. `decrypt` throws rather than guess.
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// - No aezPRF. Only reached when the ciphertext is exactly `tau` bytes (empty plaintext).
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//
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// Every line below is exercised by the tests. That is the point of the narrowness — a subtle bug in
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// unreachable crypto is a bug nobody finds until it eats someone's wallet.
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//
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// Ported from the reference implementation (Yawning/aez, as used by lnd/aezeed). Faithful to the point
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// of preserving its integer-truncation quirks; where the original relied on a JavaScript accident, the
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// comment says so.
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const BLOCK_SIZE = 16;
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const EXTRACTED_KEY_SIZE = 48;
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const ZERO = new Uint8Array(BLOCK_SIZE);
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// ── AES round tables ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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//
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// AEZ is built on reduced-round AES (4 and 10 rounds, always with MixColumns and no key schedule —
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// the "keys" are just the extracted key material). The four 256-entry T-tables are pure functions of
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// the AES S-box: TE0[i] = [2·S[i], S[i], S[i], 3·S[i]] big-endian, and TE1..TE3 are TE0 rotated right
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// by 8, 16 and 24 bits. Deriving them costs microseconds once and removes 1024 hand-copied constants
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// from a file where a single wrong digit silently produces the wrong wallet.
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// prettier-ignore
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const SBOX_HEX =
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'637c777bf26b6fc53001672bfed7ab76ca82c97dfa5947f0add4a2af9ca472c0' +
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'b7fd9326363ff7cc34a5e5f171d8311504c723c31896059a071280e2eb27b275' +
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'09832c1a1b6e5aa0523bd6b329e32f8453d100ed20fcb15b6acbbe394a4c58cf' +
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'd0efaafb434d338545f9027f503c9fa851a3408f929d38f5bcb6da2110fff3d2' +
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'cd0c13ec5f974417c4a77e3d645d197360814fdc222a908846eeb814de5e0bdb' +
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'e0323a0a4906245cc2d3ac629195e479e7c8376d8dd54ea96c56f4ea657aae08' +
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'ba78252e1ca6b4c6e8dd741f4bbd8b8a703eb5664803f60e613557b986c11d9e' +
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'e1f8981169d98e949b1e87e9ce5528df8ca1890dbfe6426841992d0fb054bb16';
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const SBOX = Uint8Array.from(SBOX_HEX.match(/../g)!, (h) => parseInt(h, 16));
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/** GF(2^8) doubling — the `xtime` of the AES spec. */
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const xtime = (b: number): number => ((b << 1) ^ (b & 0x80 ? 0x1b : 0)) & 0xff;
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function buildTables(): [Uint32Array, Uint32Array, Uint32Array, Uint32Array] {
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const te0 = new Uint32Array(256);
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for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
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const s = SBOX[i]!;
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te0[i] = ((xtime(s) << 24) | (s << 16) | (s << 8) | (xtime(s) ^ s)) >>> 0;
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}
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const ror8 = (x: number): number => ((x >>> 8) | (x << 24)) >>> 0;
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const te1 = te0.map(ror8);
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const te2 = te1.map(ror8);
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const te3 = te2.map(ror8);
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return [te0, te1, te2, te3];
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}
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const [TE0, TE1, TE2, TE3] = buildTables();
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// ── block helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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const block = (size = BLOCK_SIZE): Uint8Array => new Uint8Array(size);
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function xor16(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array, dst: Uint8Array): void {
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for (let i = 0; i < BLOCK_SIZE; i++) dst[i] = a[i]! ^ b[i]!;
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}
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function xor4x16(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array, c: Uint8Array, d: Uint8Array, dst: Uint8Array): void {
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for (let i = 0; i < BLOCK_SIZE; i++) dst[i] = a[i]! ^ b[i]! ^ c[i]! ^ d[i]!;
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}
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/** Multiply a block by x in GF(2^128), in place. */
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function doubleBlock(p: Uint8Array): void {
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const carry = p[0]!;
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for (let i = 0; i < 15; i++) p[i] = ((p[i]! << 1) | (p[i + 1]! >> 7)) & 0xff;
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p[15] = ((p[15]! << 1) ^ (carry >> 7 ? 135 : 0)) & 0xff;
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}
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/** Multiply a block by the integer `x` in GF(2^128) — repeated doubling, accumulating odd bits. */
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function multBlock(x: number, src: Uint8Array, dst: Uint8Array): void {
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const t = block();
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const r = block();
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t.set(src);
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let n = x;
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while (n !== 0) {
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if (n & 1) xor16(r, t, r);
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doubleBlock(t);
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n >>= 1;
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}
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dst.set(r);
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}
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const readU32BE = (b: Uint8Array, off: number): number =>
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((b[off]! << 24) | (b[off + 1]! << 16) | (b[off + 2]! << 8) | b[off + 3]!) >>> 0;
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function writeU32BE(b: Uint8Array, off: number, v: number): void {
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b[off] = (v >>> 24) & 0xff;
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b[off + 1] = (v >>> 16) & 0xff;
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b[off + 2] = (v >>> 8) & 0xff;
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b[off + 3] = v & 0xff;
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}
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// ── reduced-round AES ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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type AesKeys = { aes4: Uint32Array; aes10: Uint32Array };
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/** Lay the 48-byte extracted key out into the fixed round-key schedules AEZ prescribes. */
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function aesKeys(extracted: Uint8Array): AesKeys {
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const k = new Uint32Array(12);
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for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++) k[i] = readU32BE(extracted, 4 * i);
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const aes10 = new Uint32Array(40);
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aes10.set(k, 0);
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aes10.set(k, 12);
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aes10.set(k, 24);
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aes10.set(k.subarray(0, 4), 36);
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const aes4 = new Uint32Array(16);
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aes4.set(k.subarray(4, 8), 0);
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aes4.set(k.subarray(0, 4), 4);
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aes4.set(k.subarray(8, 12), 8);
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return { aes4, aes10 };
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}
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/** AES rounds with MixColumns applied on every round, including the last (as AEZ specifies). */
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function rounds(keys: Uint32Array, count: number, b: Uint8Array): void {
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let s0 = readU32BE(b, 0);
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let s1 = readU32BE(b, 4);
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let s2 = readU32BE(b, 8);
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let s3 = readU32BE(b, 12);
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for (let r = 0; r < count; r++) {
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const o = r * 4;
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const t0 =
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TE0[(s0 >>> 24) & 0xff]! ^ TE1[(s1 >>> 16) & 0xff]! ^ TE2[(s2 >>> 8) & 0xff]! ^ TE3[s3 & 0xff]! ^ keys[o]!;
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const t1 =
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TE0[(s1 >>> 24) & 0xff]! ^ TE1[(s2 >>> 16) & 0xff]! ^ TE2[(s3 >>> 8) & 0xff]! ^ TE3[s0 & 0xff]! ^ keys[o + 1]!;
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const t2 =
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TE0[(s2 >>> 24) & 0xff]! ^ TE1[(s3 >>> 16) & 0xff]! ^ TE2[(s0 >>> 8) & 0xff]! ^ TE3[s1 & 0xff]! ^ keys[o + 2]!;
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const t3 =
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TE0[(s3 >>> 24) & 0xff]! ^ TE1[(s0 >>> 16) & 0xff]! ^ TE2[(s1 >>> 8) & 0xff]! ^ TE3[s2 & 0xff]! ^ keys[o + 3]!;
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s0 = t0 >>> 0;
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s1 = t1 >>> 0;
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s2 = t2 >>> 0;
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s3 = t3 >>> 0;
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}
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writeU32BE(b, 0, s0);
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writeU32BE(b, 4, s1);
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writeU32BE(b, 8, s2);
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writeU32BE(b, 12, s3);
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}
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function aes4(k: AesKeys, j: Uint8Array, i: Uint8Array, l: Uint8Array, src: Uint8Array, dst: Uint8Array): void {
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xor4x16(j, i, l, src, dst);
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rounds(k.aes4, 4, dst);
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}
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function aes10(k: AesKeys, l: Uint8Array, src: Uint8Array, dst: Uint8Array): void {
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xor16(src, l, dst);
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rounds(k.aes10, 10, dst);
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}
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// ── AEZ state ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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type AezState = { I: Uint8Array[]; J: Uint8Array[]; L: Uint8Array[]; aes: AesKeys };
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/** AEZ tolerates any key length by hashing it to 48 bytes; a 48-byte key is used verbatim. */
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function extractKey(key: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
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return key.length === EXTRACTED_KEY_SIZE ? key : blake2b(key, { dkLen: EXTRACTED_KEY_SIZE });
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}
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function init(key: Uint8Array): AezState {
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const ext = extractKey(key);
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const I = [block(), block()];
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const J = [block(), block(), block()];
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const L = Array.from({ length: 8 }, () => block());
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I[0]!.set(ext.subarray(0, 16));
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multBlock(2, I[0]!, I[1]!);
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J[0]!.set(ext.subarray(16, 32));
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multBlock(2, J[0]!, J[1]!);
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multBlock(2, J[1]!, J[2]!);
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// L[0] is deliberately left as the zero block — the reference never assigns it.
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L[1]!.set(ext.subarray(32, 48));
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multBlock(2, L[1]!, L[2]!);
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xor16(L[2]!, L[1]!, L[3]!);
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multBlock(2, L[2]!, L[4]!);
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xor16(L[4]!, L[1]!, L[5]!);
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multBlock(2, L[3]!, L[6]!);
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xor16(L[6]!, L[1]!, L[7]!);
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return { I, J, L, aes: aesKeys(ext) };
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}
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/** The AXU hash binding the tag length, the nonce and each associated-data string into `delta`. */
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function aezHash(st: AezState, nonce: Uint8Array | null, ad: Uint8Array[], tauBits: number): Uint8Array {
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const buf = block();
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const sum = block();
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const I = block();
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const J = block();
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writeU32BE(buf, 12, tauBits >>> 0);
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xor16(st.J[0]!, st.J[1]!, J);
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aes4(st.aes, J, st.I[1]!, st.L[1]!, buf, sum);
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const nonceEmpty = !nonce || nonce.length === 0;
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let n = nonce ?? new Uint8Array(0);
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let nBytes = n.length;
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I.set(st.I[1]!);
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for (let i = 1; nBytes >= BLOCK_SIZE; i++, nBytes -= BLOCK_SIZE) {
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aes4(st.aes, st.J[2]!, I, st.L[i % 8]!, n.subarray(0, BLOCK_SIZE), buf);
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xor16(sum, buf, sum);
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n = n.subarray(BLOCK_SIZE);
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if (i % 8 === 0) doubleBlock(I);
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}
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if (nBytes > 0 || nonceEmpty) {
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buf.fill(0);
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if (!nonceEmpty) buf.set(n.subarray(0, nBytes));
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buf[nBytes] = 0x80;
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aes4(st.aes, st.J[2]!, st.I[0]!, st.L[0]!, buf, buf);
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xor16(sum, buf, sum);
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}
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ad.forEach((entry, k) => {
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let p = entry ?? new Uint8Array(0);
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const adEmpty = p.length === 0;
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let bytes = p.length;
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I.set(st.I[1]!);
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multBlock(5 + k, st.J[0]!, J);
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for (let i = 1; bytes >= BLOCK_SIZE; i++, bytes -= BLOCK_SIZE) {
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aes4(st.aes, J, I, st.L[i % 8]!, p.subarray(0, BLOCK_SIZE), buf);
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xor16(sum, buf, sum);
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p = p.subarray(BLOCK_SIZE);
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if (i % 8 === 0) doubleBlock(I);
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}
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if (bytes > 0 || adEmpty) {
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buf.fill(0);
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if (!adEmpty) buf.set(p.subarray(0, bytes));
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buf[bytes] = 0x80;
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aes4(st.aes, J, st.I[0]!, st.L[0]!, buf, buf);
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xor16(sum, buf, sum);
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}
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});
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return sum;
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}
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/**
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* The short-input (< 32 byte) balanced Feistel network. `d` is 0 to encipher, 1 to decipher — the only
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* difference is which end of the round counter it starts from.
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*/
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function aezTiny(st: AezState, delta: Uint8Array, input: Uint8Array, d: 0 | 1, dst: Uint8Array): void {
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const inBytes = input.length;
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const buf = block(2 * BLOCK_SIZE);
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const L = block();
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const R = block();
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const tmp = block();
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let mask = 0x00;
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let pad = 0x80;
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// Integer halves. The reference indexes with `inBytes/2` and leans on truncation; spelling the two
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// halves out makes the odd-length case readable instead of accidental.
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const half = inBytes >> 1;
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const halfUp = (inBytes + 1) >> 1;
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let i = 7;
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let roundCount: number;
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if (inBytes === 1) roundCount = 24;
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else if (inBytes === 2) roundCount = 16;
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else if (inBytes < 16) roundCount = 10;
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else {
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i = 6;
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roundCount = 8;
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}
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L.set(input.subarray(0, halfUp));
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R.set(input.subarray(half, half + halfUp));
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if (inBytes & 1) {
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// Odd length: the two halves overlap by a nibble, so shift R left by 4 bits and switch to
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// nibble-granular padding.
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for (let k = 0; k < half; k++) R[k] = ((R[k]! << 4) | (R[k + 1]! >> 4)) & 0xff;
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R[half] = (R[half]! << 4) & 0xff;
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pad = 0x08;
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mask = 0xf0;
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}
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let j: number;
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let step: number;
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if (d !== 0) {
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if (inBytes < 16) {
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buf.set(input.subarray(0, BLOCK_SIZE));
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buf[0] = buf[0]! | 0x80;
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xor16(delta, buf, buf);
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aes4(st.aes, ZERO, st.I[1]!, st.L[3]!, buf, tmp);
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L[0] = L[0]! ^ (tmp[0]! & 0x80);
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}
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j = roundCount - 1;
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step = -1;
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} else {
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j = 0;
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step = 1;
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}
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for (let k = 0; k < roundCount / 2; k++, j += step * 2) {
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buf.fill(0, 0, BLOCK_SIZE);
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buf.set(R.subarray(0, halfUp));
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buf[half] = (buf[half]! & mask) | pad;
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xor16(buf, delta, buf);
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buf[15] = buf[15]! ^ (j & 0xff);
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aes4(st.aes, ZERO, st.I[1]!, st.L[i]!, buf, tmp);
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xor16(L, tmp, L);
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buf.fill(0, 0, BLOCK_SIZE);
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buf.set(L.subarray(0, halfUp));
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buf[half] = (buf[half]! & mask) | pad;
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xor16(buf, delta, buf);
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buf[15] = buf[15]! ^ ((j + step) & 0xff);
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aes4(st.aes, ZERO, st.I[1]!, st.L[i]!, buf, tmp);
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xor16(R, tmp, R);
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}
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buf.set(R.subarray(0, half), 0);
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buf.set(L.subarray(0, halfUp), half);
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if (inBytes & 1) {
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for (let k = inBytes - 1; k > half; k--) buf[k] = ((buf[k]! >> 4) | (buf[k - 1]! << 4)) & 0xff;
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buf[half] = (L[0]! >> 4) | (R[half]! & 0xf0);
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}
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dst.set(buf.subarray(0, inBytes));
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if (inBytes < 16 && d === 0) {
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buf.fill(0, inBytes, BLOCK_SIZE);
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buf[0] = buf[0]! | 0x80;
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xor16(delta, buf, buf);
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aes4(st.aes, ZERO, st.I[1]!, st.L[3]!, buf, tmp);
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dst[0] = dst[0]! ^ (tmp[0]! & 0x80);
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}
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}
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/**
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* AEZ decrypt-and-verify. Returns the plaintext, or `null` when the `tau`-byte authenticator does not
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* check out — which is the signal that the key (and therefore the seed passphrase) is wrong.
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*
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* Throws for inputs outside the aezeed envelope rather than silently taking an untested path; see the
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* scope note at the top of this file.
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*/
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export function aezDecrypt(
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key: Uint8Array,
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nonce: Uint8Array | null,
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ad: Uint8Array[],
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tau: number,
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ciphertext: Uint8Array,
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): Uint8Array | null {
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if (ciphertext.length >= 32 || ciphertext.length <= tau) {
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throw new Error(`aez: unsupported ciphertext length ${ciphertext.length} (decrypt is short-input only)`);
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}
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const st = init(key);
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const delta = aezHash(st, nonce, ad, tau * 8);
|
|
const x = new Uint8Array(ciphertext.length);
|
|
aezTiny(st, delta, ciphertext, 1, x);
|
|
|
|
// Constant-time-ish: fold every authenticator byte before deciding, so the comparison does not
|
|
// short-circuit on the first mismatch.
|
|
let sum = 0;
|
|
for (let i = 0; i < tau; i++) sum |= x[ciphertext.length - tau + i]!;
|
|
if (sum !== 0) return null;
|
|
|
|
return x.slice(0, ciphertext.length - tau);
|
|
}
|