av-club keeps doing exactly what it did — sharp, ffmpeg and ffprobe behind one
API, and the invariant that the caller never names a path. What changes is how it
is reached and who decides who may reach it.
`src/` is `sidecar/`, because that is the name the platform looks for:
`sidecar/index.ts` present means "this plugin ships a process", and presence is
the declaration for everything structural here. `manifest.ts` at the root is the
other half of that rule.
api/router.ts is a proxy and nothing else. the platform authenticates, checks the
`av-club` permission, and forwards — so the sidecar now accepts a request
carrying `X-Officer-User` and no longer demands its own bearer token from
callers who came that way. it binds LOOPBACK to make that trustworthy, which is
the same boundary caldav's DAV door already relies on. AV_CLUB_TOKEN stays, and
still guards anything calling the port directly: fofos/platform is the stated
first consumer and is not Officer.
THREE THINGS HAD TO GO, and each one broke it in a way worth writing down.
package.json and bun.lock: a package.json inside a plugin is a package boundary,
so bun stops walking up for the platform's tsconfig and `@@/sidecar/connect`
stops resolving. the sidecar died on its first import, fifteen times. npm
dependencies go in the manifest instead, where npm-deps.ts intersects them across
plugins into one plugins/node_modules — which is also how this surfaced a real
conflict: sharp ^0.33.5 (atelier) and ^0.35.3 here do not overlap, since a 0.x
caret pins the minor. atelier moved up; it calls one method.
tsconfig.json: same failure one layer earlier, shadowing the platform's `@@/*`
paths so api/router.ts would not mount. no other plugin has one.
no screens, deliberately. this is an API and a body of documentation; its callers
are a commander watching a folder, an agent, or curl. a dock tile would advertise
a page with nothing on it.
verified through /api/av-club with an agent key: a 3000x2000 jpeg uploaded,
probed, and resized to a 1200x800 avif — 166 KB to 1 KB — without the caller ever
holding av-club's own token.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
Exposes sharp and ffprobe with their own vocabulary — operations are named what
sharp names them, ffprobe fields come back spelled the way ffprobe spells them —
so the tools' own documentation applies and there is no house dialect to learn.
Safety comes from one architectural invariant rather than from filtering: the
caller never supplies a path, a URL or a protocol. Input is an id we issued, output
is a name we chose. That removes the entire class of attack that makes "just pass
the flags through" a remote shell, which is precisely what makes it safe to open up
everything else. docs/SECURITY.md has the reasoning and the specific attacks.
The vocabulary is a data table, so the validator and docs/SHARP.md are generated
from one source and cannot drift. Two things are deliberately absent from it:
withMetadata, because that is how a client's GPS coordinates get published, and
limitInputPixels, because a caller who could raise it could turn a 1 KB PNG into a
40 GB allocation.
Verified against a running server, not asserted: traversal ids rejected, unknown
operations and typo'd parameters rejected by name, out-of-range values rejected
with the bound, a GPS-tagged photo coming out clean end to end, video probe, Range
requests, and a rejected upload leaving nothing on disk.
Found while building: config threw at import if AV_CLUB_TOKEN was unset, so
generating documentation required a production secret. The token is read at boot in
server.ts now — still a refusal to start, no longer a module-scope landmine.
ffmpeg is designed in docs/API.md and not built yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5