platform/SECURITY_AUDIT.md

# Security Audit — Officer.dev Pi-Monorepo

**Date:** 2026-02-25
**Scope:** Full-stack audit of server, frontend, and infrastructure code.

---

## Executive Summary

The codebase has solid foundations (JWT + argon2 auth, WebAuthn passkeys, token blacklisting, Docker-sandboxed terminals, role-based access control). However, several critical and high-severity vulnerabilities exist — primarily around CORS misconfiguration, weak secret management, unauthenticated admin routes, XSS via `rehype-raw`, and token exposure in URLs.

**Totals:** 5 Critical, 13 High, 14 Medium, 9 Low, 5 Info

---

## CRITICAL

### C1. Weak JWT Secret — `"officer"`

**Files:** `.env` (line 2), `src/servers/jwt.ts` (lines 2, 25)

The live `.env` contains `JWT_SECRET="officer"` — a single dictionary word. The `.env.example` uses `"change-me"`. The server uses a non-null assertion (`JWT_SECRET!`) with no startup validation for length or complexity.

**Impact:** Complete authentication bypass. Anyone who knows/guesses the secret can forge JWTs for any user including Super Admin.

**Remediation:**
- Generate a cryptographically random secret: `openssl rand -base64 32`
- Add a startup guard: throw if `JWT_SECRET` is absent or shorter than 32 characters
- Update `.env.example` with a placeholder: `JWT_SECRET=<generate with: openssl rand -base64 32>`

---

### C2. Global CORS Wildcard on All API Routes

**File:** `src/servers/hono.ts` (lines 36–42)

```ts
cors({ origin: '*', allowHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization'] })
```

Applied to every route. The `Authorization` header allowlist means any website can make cross-origin requests using a victim's token (obtained via XSS or other leaks).

**Impact:** Full cross-origin request forgery against all API endpoints for users tricked into visiting a malicious page.

**Remediation:** Replace `origin: '*'` with the allowlist from `origin-validation.ts` (`ALLOWED_ORIGINS`). Use a dynamic origin validation function in the CORS middleware.

---

### C3. Server-Settings Routes Entirely Unauthenticated

**Files:** `src/servers/hono.ts` (lines 46–48), `src/servers/api/server-settings/server-settings.ts`

The `serverSettingsRouter` is mounted on the **public** router (outside `protectedRouter`). All sub-routes — SMTP, TTS, STT, OCR, SearXNG, Pi-Mono, Claude Code, OpenCode, applications, resources — have no auth checks. Any unauthenticated request can read settings (including masked credentials), write new settings, and trigger software installs.

**Impact:** Full server configuration takeover by any unauthenticated user.

**Remediation:** Move `serverSettingsRouter` inside `protectedRouter`. Add Super Admin role checks on all write operations. Exempt only `GET /api/server-settings/onboarding-complete` as public.

---

### C4. Unauthenticated Dev-Server WebSocket Proxy

**Files:** `src/server.tsx` (lines 114–139), `src/servers/api/dev-server/router.ts` (lines 241–268), `src/servers/hono.ts` (line 49)

The dev-server proxy (`/api/dev-server-proxy/*`) is mounted on the public router. WebSocket upgrades carry no authentication. The HTTP proxy has no auth gate either. Additionally, the Referer header fallback allows probing any running dev server.

**Impact:** Unauthenticated access to dev-servers spawned for any user, which may expose internal APIs, HMR endpoints, or local services.

**Remediation:** Require a valid JWT (via query param) before upgrading WebSocket connections. Apply `userMiddleware` to the HTTP proxy router.

---

### C5. AI Chat Messages Rendered with `rehype-raw` — LLM-Driven XSS

**File:** `src/workspaces/officerdev/src/apps/Chat/components/MessageBubble.tsx` (lines 132, 181)

```tsx
<ReactMarkdown rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw]}>{assistantText}</ReactMarkdown>
```

AI-generated assistant responses containing HTML tags (`<script>`, `<iframe>`, `<img onerror=...>`) are rendered verbatim into the DOM.

**Impact:** Stored XSS in the chat interface. Prompt injection via uploaded files, tool results, or a compromised AI provider can execute arbitrary JavaScript — exfiltrating the Bearer token from localStorage.

**Remediation:** Remove `rehype-raw` from chat rendering. If basic HTML is needed, use `rehype-sanitize` with an allowlist of safe tags (no `<script>`, `<iframe>`, event handlers).

---

## HIGH

### H1. Bearer Token Stored in `localStorage`

**Files:** `src/workspaces/hooks/src/useAuth/useAuth.ts` (lines 56, 84, 99), `usePasskeys.ts` (line 44)

The primary 30-day authentication token is stored in `localStorage`, readable by any JavaScript on the page origin — including via XSS.

**Impact:** Combined with any XSS vector (C5, H5, H6), an attacker can exfiltrate the token and hijack the session.

**Remediation:** Use `HttpOnly` cookies for the Bearer token so it is inaccessible to JavaScript.

---

### H2. Bearer Token Exposed in WebSocket/Media URL Query Strings

**Files:** `src/workspaces/officerdev/src/hooks/usePiChat.ts` (line 58), `src/workspaces/officerdev/src/apps/Terminal/Terminal.tsx` (line 43), `src/workspaces/officerdev/src/apps/FileViewer/file-types.ts` (lines 144–148), `src/server.tsx` (line 87), `src/servers/_middlewares/user-middleware.ts` (line 32)

The full 30-day JWT appears in URLs for WebSocket connections, raw file downloads, and media transcoding.

**Impact:** Tokens are logged by servers, proxies, CDNs; stored in browser history; sent in `Referer` headers; visible to browser extensions and analytics scripts.

**Remediation:** For WebSocket: send the token as the first message after connection. For media: use short-lived single-use tokens generated by a dedicated endpoint (e.g., 60-second TTL).

---

### H3. `rehype-raw` Used in Multiple Content-Rendering Contexts

**Files:**
- `src/apps/officer-web/Screens/Dashboard/CapabilityPage.tsx` (line 354)
- `src/apps/officer-web/Screens/Dashboard/Plans/index.tsx` (line 5)
- `src/apps/officer-web/Screens/Dashboard/Automation/CapabilityDetailView.tsx` (line 5)
- `src/apps/officer-web/Screens/Dashboard/Settings/ResourceSettings/Resources.tsx` (line 5)
- `src/workspaces/components/MarkdownEditor.tsx` (line 98)
- `src/workspaces/officerdev/src/apps/FileViewer/renderers/MarkdownRenderer.tsx` (line 43)

Markdown from user-editable files (skills, tasks, processes, arbitrary filesystem files) is rendered with `rehype-raw`, allowing embedded HTML/script injection.

**Impact:** Stored XSS. A malicious Markdown file opened in the file viewer or capability page executes arbitrary JavaScript.

**Remediation:** Add `rehype-sanitize` alongside `rehype-raw` in all locations, or remove `rehype-raw` entirely for untrusted content.

---

### H4. Email HTML Rendered with `allow-same-origin` Sandbox

**File:** `src/apps/officer-web/Screens/Dashboard/Email/EmailReader.tsx` (lines 25–41)

HTML email bodies are written into an iframe via `document.write()` with `sandbox="allow-same-origin"`. While `allow-scripts` is not set (blocking script execution), CSS injection and phishing forms can still render.

**Impact:** Email phishing attacks rendered within the Officer UI. CSS-based data exfiltration possible.

**Remediation:** Change to `sandbox=""` (no attributes). Consider running email HTML through DOMPurify server-side.

---

### H5. Mass Email Template — Unsanitized `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`

**Files:** `src/workspaces/emailer/emails/MassEmail.tsx` (line 23), `src/workspaces/components/MarkdownEditor.tsx` (line 41)

```tsx
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: greetingHtml + content }} />
```

User names are interpolated via `String.replace()` without HTML encoding. A user with `<script>` in their name triggers XSS in the admin's email preview.

**Impact:** Stored XSS in admin email previews.

**Remediation:** HTML-encode all interpolated user data. Use DOMPurify on the final output.

---

### H6. `applyGlobals` — Arbitrary JavaScript Injection

**File:** `src/workspaces/injector/apply-changes/apply-globals.ts` (lines 11–13)

```ts
script.innerHTML = `;(function(){${globalJavascript}})();`;
document.body.appendChild(script);
```

A/B test experiment configuration injects arbitrary JavaScript into every user's browser session.

**Impact:** If a non-admin can influence the `globalJavascript` payload, it's instant code execution across the organization.

**Remediation:** Restrict write access to experiment configurations to Admin/Owner/Super Admin. Audit API endpoints that set `globalJavascript`.

---

### H7. Unsanitized URL Passed to `yt-dlp` and `git clone`

**File:** `src/servers/api/file-browser/router.ts` (lines 901–944)

Both `yt-dlp` and `git clone` are invoked with user-supplied URLs without scheme validation. `git clone file:///etc/passwd` reads local files. `yt-dlp` accepts plugin URLs and SSRF targets.

**Impact:** Local file exfiltration via `file://`, SSRF to internal services, potential exploitation via git remote helpers.

**Remediation:** Validate URLs to allow only `http://` and `https://` schemes. Add `--` argument terminator and `--no-config` for yt-dlp. Add `--no-local` for git.

---

### H8. File Browser Exposes Host Filesystem to Super Admin

**File:** `src/servers/api/file-browser/router.ts` (lines 54–61)

Super Admin can access `~` (host homedir) and `officer.dev` (project root), giving read/write access to `.env`, auth store files, API keys, and the entire host filesystem.

**Impact:** A compromised Super Admin account (or forged JWT — trivial with C1) has full host filesystem access.

**Remediation:** Restrict roots to `DATA_PATH` only. Remove `~` and `officer.dev` roots or restrict them to read-only with path filtering.

---

### H9. Rate Limiting Disabled Outside Production

**File:** `src/servers/_middlewares/rate-limiter.ts` (lines 27–28, 45–46)

All rate limiters are bypassed unless `PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV` is `production` or `staging`. The `.env` doesn't set this variable, so rate limiting is off by default.

**Impact:** Unrestricted brute-force attacks on passwords, verification codes, and passkey challenges in any deployment that doesn't explicitly set `PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV=production`.

**Remediation:** Enable rate limiting by default. Only disable when `PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV === 'test'`.

---

### H10. Rate Limiter Uses Spoofable `X-Forwarded-For`

**File:** `src/servers/_middlewares/rate-limiter.ts` (line 34)

The default key is the raw `X-Forwarded-For` header, which is client-controlled and trivially spoofed.

**Impact:** Complete rate limit bypass by setting any `X-Forwarded-For` value.

**Remediation:** Use the actual socket IP (Bun provides this) or validate `X-Forwarded-For` against a trusted proxy list.

---

### H11. Terminal Sidecar Users Get Passwordless Sudo

**File:** `src/servers/api/terminal/entrypoint.sh` (line 24)

```sh
echo "$USERNAME ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL" > /etc/sudoers.d/terminal-user
```

**Impact:** Full root inside container. If Docker sandboxing is bypassed or misconfigured, this escalates to host root.

**Remediation:** Remove NOPASSWD sudo entirely or restrict to specific commands.

---

### H12. Google OAuth State Parameter Not Signed

**File:** `src/servers/api/integrations/integrations.ts` (lines 134–150)

The OAuth state is just `base64(JSON)` — no HMAC. The `origin` query parameter is user-controlled and embedded in the state. The callback is a public endpoint.

**Impact:** OAuth CSRF. An attacker can craft a state parameter to bind their Google account to a victim's email.

**Remediation:** Sign the state with HMAC using `JWT_SECRET`. Derive `redirectUri` from `PUBLIC_URL`, not from the query parameter.

---

### H13. `maxRequestBodySize` Set to 50 GB

**File:** `src/server.tsx` (line 144)

**Impact:** DoS by exhausting server memory/disk with a single request.

**Remediation:** Set a reasonable limit (100 MB–1 GB). Apply per-route size limits for file uploads.

---

## MEDIUM

### M1. Rate Limiter Only Counts Failed Requests

**File:** `src/servers/_middlewares/rate-limiter.ts` (lines 59–67)

Only 4xx responses increment the counter. Successful auths reset the window.

**Impact:** Attackers can interleave successful/failed attempts to effectively bypass rate limits.

**Remediation:** Count all requests toward the limit, regardless of response code.

---

### M2. Password Reset Tokens Not Blacklisted After Use

**File:** `src/servers/api/auth/reset-password.ts`

The same reset link can be used multiple times within its validity window.

**Impact:** Reset link replay — an intercepted link works even after the user has already reset their password.

**Remediation:** Blacklist the token's JTI immediately after first use.

---

### M3. Password Validation Skipped in Non-Production

**File:** `src/servers/api/auth/change-password.ts` (lines 8–13)

```ts
if (isProduction) validatePassword(newPassword);
```

**Impact:** Weak/empty passwords accepted if `PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV` is unset in production.

**Remediation:** Always validate password complexity regardless of environment.

---

### M4. User Settings PUT — No Schema Validation or Size Limit

**File:** `src/servers/api/settings/settings.ts` (lines 43–51)

The entire request body is written verbatim to the settings JSON file.

**Impact:** Disk exhaustion, injection of arbitrary keys that may affect server-side logic (e.g., `tts.voice`).

**Remediation:** Apply a size limit (64 KB) and schema validation for known fields only.

---

### M5. SSRF via Scrape Endpoint (Playwright)

**File:** `src/servers/api/scrape/scrape.ts` (lines 31–45)

The scrape endpoint navigates Playwright to any user-supplied URL without validation.

**Impact:** SSRF to internal network, cloud metadata (`169.254.169.254`), and localhost services. Full HTML returned.

**Remediation:** Validate scheme (`http://`/`https://` only), resolve hostname, block private IP ranges.

---

### M6. SSRF via User-Configured OCR/TTS/STT URLs

**File:** `src/servers/api/file-browser/router.ts` (lines 509–545)

External API URLs come from server configuration (writable via unauthenticated C3 routes). An attacker can point them to internal services.

**Impact:** SSRF to internal network via AI provider proxy.

**Remediation:** Fix C3 first. Then validate configured URLs don't resolve to private/loopback ranges.

---

### M7. OCR Sends Arbitrary Files to External Vision API

**File:** `src/servers/api/file-browser/router.ts` (lines 481–555)

MIME type derived from extension only. No file type validation or size limit.

**Impact:** Data exfiltration of non-image files (config, keys) to third-party AI providers.

**Remediation:** Validate magic bytes, enforce max size, restrict allowed extensions.

---

### M8. `resend-verification` Leaks User Existence

**File:** `src/servers/api/auth/resend-verification.ts` (line 13)

Returns distinct responses for "user not found" vs "already verified" with no rate limiting.

**Impact:** Automated user enumeration.

**Remediation:** Return the same success response regardless. Add rate limiting.

---

### M9. API Keys + `JWT_SECRET` Leaked to AI Subprocess

**File:** `src/servers/api/pi/pi-bridge.ts` (lines 234–235, 281–283)

The unsandboxed path spreads `process.env` (including `JWT_SECRET`, DB credentials, SMTP passwords) into every Pi process.

**Impact:** A prompt-injected AI model can exfiltrate all server secrets.

**Remediation:** Explicitly enumerate allowed environment variables. Never pass `JWT_SECRET` or DB credentials to AI subprocesses.

---

### M10. Auth Store Has No File Locking

**File:** `src/databases/officer_db/src/store.ts`

In-memory arrays with async file writes. No mutex or write queue.

**Impact:** Concurrent writes (signups, signouts) can lose data or corrupt the JSON file.

**Remediation:** Add a write lock/queue. Consider SQLite for the auth store.

---

### M11. JSON Parse Errors Silently Swallowed in Body Parser

**File:** `src/servers/_middlewares/body-parser.ts` (lines 27–29)

```ts
} catch (ex) {
  // throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('Invalid request body');
}
```

**Impact:** Malformed request bodies become `{}`, bypassing input validation in handlers that don't check required fields.

**Remediation:** Uncomment the `throw errors.BAD_REQUEST(...)` line.

---

### M12. Module-Level Token Singleton Race Condition

**File:** `src/workspaces/hooks/src/useClient.ts` (lines 2–14)

`theToken` is a module-level variable set once per `createClient()` call. Stale after logout.

**Impact:** Authenticated requests may continue after logout in race conditions.

**Remediation:** Read the token fresh from storage in `getHeaders()` rather than caching in a module variable.

---

### M13. No Content Security Policy

**Files:** `src/apps/officer-web/index.html`, `src/servers/hono.ts`

No CSP header or meta tag. Every XSS vulnerability has maximum impact.

**Impact:** No defense-in-depth against script injection.

**Remediation:** Add a CSP header at the server level. At minimum: `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'`.

---

### M14. Gmail Token Cache Is Global, Not Per-User

**File:** `src/servers/queue/handlers/gmail-sync.ts` (lines 40–46)

Module-level `cachedAccessToken` shared across all users.

**Impact:** One user's Gmail access token may be used for another user's API calls.

**Remediation:** Scope the cache by user email using a `Map`.

---

## LOW

### L1. `TEST_USERS` Backdoor Mechanism in Signin

**File:** `src/servers/api/auth/signin.ts` (lines 11, 23, 33)

Currently empty, but the code allows bypassing password and passkey verification for listed user IDs.

**Remediation:** Remove the mechanism entirely.

---

### L2. API Keys and OAuth Tokens Stored Unencrypted at Rest

**Files:** `src/servers/api/server-settings/pi-mono.ts` (line 10), `src/databases/officer_db/src/store.ts`

All provider API keys, Google OAuth tokens, and passkey data stored as plaintext JSON.

**Remediation:** Encrypt sensitive values at rest using a key derived from a separate `ENCRYPTION_KEY` env variable.

---

### L3. Sensitive Credentials Returned to Frontend Unnecessarily

**Files:** `src/apps/officer-web/Screens/Dashboard/Settings/IntegrationsSettings/GoogleOAuthConfig.tsx` (line 201), `SMTPSection.tsx`

Google OAuth `clientSecret` and SMTP passwords are fetched to frontend state on every settings page load.

**Remediation:** Return masked values for display. Only require the full value when updating.

---

### L4. Host `$HOME` Path Leaked in API Response

**File:** `src/servers/api/pi/rest.ts` (line 34)

```ts
return ctx.json({ models, providerNames, hostHome: process.env.HOME ?? '' });
```

**Remediation:** Remove `hostHome` from the response or restrict to Super Admin.

---

### L5. Verification Codes Not Cleared from URL

**Files:** `src/apps/officer-web/Screens/Authentication/Verify.tsx` (line 19), `useResetPassword.ts` (line 14)

Codes remain in browser history and `Referer` headers.

**Remediation:** Call `history.replaceState(null, '', window.location.pathname)` after reading the code.

---

### L6. Missing HTTP Security Headers

No `X-Content-Type-Options`, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`, or `Strict-Transport-Security` headers.

**Remediation:** Add a security headers middleware to `hono.ts`.

---

### L7. Package Install Endpoints Lack Role Restriction

**Files:** `src/servers/api/server-settings/claude-code.ts` (line 24), `opencode.ts` (line 47), `pi-mono.ts` (line 275)

Three endpoints run `curl | bash` or `npm install -g` on the host. Even after fixing C3, any authenticated user (not just Super Admin) can trigger installs.

**Remediation:** Restrict to Super Admin. Add integrity checks (SHA256 pinning).

---

### L8. Token Accepted via URL `officerToken` Parameter

**File:** `src/workspaces/hooks/src/useAuth/useAuth.ts` (line 27)

Token in URL is stored permanently in browser history and sent in `Referer` headers. Not cleared from the URL after consumption.

**Remediation:** Use short-lived single-use tokens for embedding. Call `history.replaceState` to remove from URL bar.

---

### L9. Bootstrap Race Condition

**File:** `src/servers/api/auth/auth.ts` (lines 35–36)

Two concurrent bootstrap requests could create two Super Admins before `getUserCount()` reflects the first.

**Remediation:** Add a mutex or atomic check-and-insert.

---

## INFO

### I1. No Automated Security Test Coverage

No tests exist for auth flows, authorization, rate limiting, or path traversal guards.

### I2. Stack Traces Logged to Console

**File:** `src/servers/hono.ts` (lines 89–90) — full stack traces logged. If logs are user-accessible, this reveals internal paths.

### I3. `passwordChangedAt` Not Checked in WebSocket Upgrade

**File:** `src/server.tsx` (lines 86–112) — existing WebSocket connections are not invalidated after password change.

### I4. Docker Container Map File Has No Integrity Protection

**File:** `src/servers/api/terminal/websocket.ts` (line 30) — plain JSON at a known path, tamperable to redirect terminal sessions.

### I5. `preinstall` Script Rejects Non-Node 22 but Project Uses Bun

**File:** `package.json` (line 11) — inconsistent runtime enforcement.

---

## Prioritized Remediation Plan

### Immediate (do first)

1. **Rotate JWT secret** (C1) — generate a 256-bit random value, add startup length check
2. **Fix CORS** (C2) — replace `origin: '*'` with `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` allowlist
3. **Protect server-settings routes** (C3) — move inside `protectedRouter` + Super Admin role check
4. **Protect dev-server proxy** (C4) — require JWT for WebSocket upgrades and HTTP proxy
5. **Remove `rehype-raw` from chat** (C5) — or add `rehype-sanitize` with strict allowlist

### Short-term (next sprint)

6. **Move token to `HttpOnly` cookies** (H1, H2) — eliminates XSS token theft and URL leakage
7. **Add `rehype-sanitize` everywhere** (H3) — all Markdown rendering of user content
8. **Validate URLs for git-clone/yt-dlp/scrape** (H7, M5) — allow only `http://`/`https://`
9. **Enable rate limiting by default** (H9) — disable only in `test` environment
10. **Fix rate limiter key** (H10) — use socket IP, not `X-Forwarded-For`
11. **Sign OAuth state** (H12) — HMAC with `JWT_SECRET`
12. **Reduce `maxRequestBodySize`** (H13) — 100 MB or less
13. **Uncomment body parser error** (M11) — fail loudly on malformed JSON

### Medium-term

14. **Add Content Security Policy** (M13)
15. **Add HTTP security headers** (L6)
16. **Blacklist password reset tokens after use** (M2)
17. **Always validate password complexity** (M3)
18. **Scope Gmail token cache per user** (M14)
19. **Restrict file browser roots** (H8) — remove `~` and `officer.dev` access
20. **Filter AI subprocess environment** (M9) — never pass `JWT_SECRET` or DB credentials
21. **Add schema validation to settings PUT** (M4)
22. **Restrict install endpoints to Super Admin** (L7)

### Longer-term

23. Encrypt sensitive values at rest (L2)
24. Add security test coverage (I1)
25. Implement structured logging with configurable verbosity (I2)
26. Consider SQLite for auth store (M10)
27. Remove `TEST_USERS` mechanism (L1)