platform/TODO.md

# TODO

Deferred work.

**Context, corrected 2026-08-07.** This file used to open by saying Officer was "collapsing from
multi-tenant / open-source-ready to a **single-user platform**", and told you to treat multi-tenant
indirection as accidental complexity. **That direction was reversed.** The permission permission model
shipped on 2026-08-07 to serve a real goal — deploy to the company server, onboard people, give each
one their own Gitea account through the platform. Per-user scoping is now a requirement, and the items
below that proposed deleting it have been removed rather than left to mislead the next reader.

What did NOT reverse: `execution` permissions (terminal, chat, tasks, files, desktop, browser) run as
the owner's OS user and can never be granted. Indirection there really is accidental complexity.

## Multi-user

- [ ] **`deprovisionOsAccount` is written but has never run against a real account.** Landed 2026-08-12 in
      `os-user-deprovision.ts` and wired into `deleteUserHandler`, which now refuses to delete the row when
      the Linux teardown fails — so a failure is retryable instead of forgotten. Only the pure guards
      (`guardDeletable`, `guardMemberTree`, `parseSubUidEntry`) have tests; the reap loop, the `chown -R`
      sever and `userdel` have been exercised by nobody. `docs/deprovision-os-account.md` → "What is still
      unproven" has the five-step validation, and it has to happen on the production host with a throwaway
      account that has **a shell left open** and **a container writing as a non-root user** — those are the
      two cases the quiet path passes vacuously.

- [ ] **The terminal replays terminal QUERIES, which get typed into the shell.** `sidecar/pty/sessions.mjs`
      replays the whole scrollback on attach; query sequences in the buffer get re-asked, xterm.js answers,
      and the answers arrive as keystrokes. Visible to a member daily. Fix is to strip query sequences in
      `appendBuffer`, so a replay reproduces output and never re-issues requests.

- [ ] **The web terminal renders a long URL as unreadable fragments.** Claude Code's first-run login prints
      a ~400-character OAuth URL; the web terminal shows scattered characters with large gaps, nothing
      selectable. Half worked around by `2a8f004` (OSC 52, so "press c to copy" reaches the clipboard) — the
      rendering itself is undiagnosed. This is every new member's first five minutes.
      `docs/open-threads-after-per-user-claude.md` §1 has what is known and where to start.

- [ ] **Agent sessions are not durable, and it is one property behind three symptoms.** A sidecar restart
      loses session identity, which is why `endTurnIfAgentIsGone` must skip sessions with no recorded
      `userId`, why a stuck "generating" spinner survives until a reconnect, and why any crash in that process
      is destructive rather than merely inconvenient. Fixing the three separately would miss that they are one
      missing property. `docs/open-threads-after-per-user-claude.md` §2.

- [ ] **`ProcessTransport is not ready for writing` — survivable since `8c4f150`, still unexplained.** A
      floating rejection inside the SDK's own input pump, with no frames from our code, so no `await` of ours
      can catch it. It crashed `officer-agent` four times on 2026-08-11, once truncating a turn mid-sentence;
      the `unhandledRejection` backstop has caught it once since. Best hypothesis is the `claude` CLI exiting
      while `streamInput` is still pumping. It needs looking at after the next occurrence, not catching in the
      act — markers to grep in `docs/open-threads-after-per-user-claude.md` §3.

- [x] **No way to create a second account.** Fixed 2026-08-11 on `sidecar-app-store`: `POST /api/users`
      (`api/users/create-user.ts`, owner-gated) plus an Add-account form in
      Settings → User management. Created accounts are `status: 'Active'` — the column defaults to
      `'Unverified'` and `signin.ts` refuses anything else with a bare UNAUTHORIZED, which is the trap
      the hand-INSERT route fell into. The owner sets the password and reads it out; `passwordChangedAt`
      stays null. Directories come from the shared `provisionUserDirs`/`USER_DIRS` in `data-path.ts`,
      which `scripts/provision-user-dirs.ts` now imports rather than restating.

- [ ] **Still no invite flow, and no password reset for a member.** The owner types the password and
      tells the person, which means the owner knows it and the member cannot change it back if they
      forget theirs — recovery today is delete-and-recreate. An invite (token, expiry, member sets
      their own) needs a mail path. This is the next piece, not a nice-to-have.

- [x] **A second Super Admin was storable, and made the owner nondeterministic.** Fixed 2026-08-11.
      `ck_users_owner_is_super_admin` pins user 1's role but a row-level CHECK cannot see other rows, and
      `updateUserRoleHandler` happily promoted anyone — while `getOwnerUser()` was
      `WHERE role='Super Admin' LIMIT 1` with no ORDER BY. Two holders would have made "who owns this
      server" a question the query plan answered, and that answer feeds the agent sidecar's identity,
      vault access and origin scoping. Both write paths now refuse the role, the list endpoint offers
      `assignableRoles` without it, and `getOwnerUser()` orders by id.

- [ ] **`dashboards.id` is a global primary key, and ids are `slugify(name)`.** Two accounts cannot
      both have a dashboard named "Home". Reachable today: six accounts exist. The recommendation on
      the table is a composite PK `(user_id, id)` — it matches the `uq_dashboards_user_id` index
      already there and keeps every stored `ws-layout-<id>` address valid, which uuid ids would not.
      Note the drizzle composite-PK re-diff quirk in `databases/CLAUDE.md`. Full analysis in
      `docs/workspace-panel-todo.md` §3.

- [ ] **`permissions/authorize.ts` has no automated tests.** `registry.test.ts` covers the pure
      registry functions and the totality check; the resolver that does the owner bypass, the grant
      lookup, the role cache and the fail-closed catches is exercised only by hand. It is the file
      standing between a Member and a shell.

- [ ] **`assertPermissionTotality` checks the wrong list, and `registry.test.ts` has been red since
      2026-08-13.** It is fed `Object.keys(handlers)` from `server.tsx`, but Bun serves the _route table_.
      Those diverged when the cliamp/desktop/vault plugins were switched off: `/api/cliamp/ws` and
      `/api/cliamp/audio/ws` are still live routes with their handlers and registry claims commented out.
      Not exploitable — `isWsProviderAllowed` finds no permission and 403s a member; the owner upgrades onto
      a dead socket. But the boot check that exists to stop exactly this cannot see it. Two fixes: point
      totality at the route table, and either delete the dead routes or restore their claims. The 8 failing
      tests in `registry.test.ts` are the same drift — `REAL_WS` still lists all nine providers as served,
      which is why nobody noticed. Found 2026-08-14.

- [ ] **No empty state for a denied screen.** A member who reaches a route their role lacks gets a
      broken panel or an endless spinner rather than a clean refusal.

- [ ] **`getOwnerHomeDir(email)` ignores its argument** whenever `HOME_DIR` is set, which it is here —
      every caller resolves to the owner's real login home. Safe only because all seven callers sit
      behind `execution` permissions. If per-user home confinement is ever attempted, this is the
      function to start from.

- [ ] **`pty`, `vault` and `opencode` receive no identity at all.** Every other sidecar validates
      `X-Officer-User`. The pty sidecar keys purely on a `sessionId` from the query string and its
      `/_officer/sessions` endpoints list and kill _every_ session on the box; vault and opencode take
      no user argument. All three are covered today only because `terminal`, `vault` and the agent are
      owner-only permissions — that is a correct outcome resting on the wrong layer, and it is the
      thing to fix first if any of them is ever granted.

- [ ] **Radicale is configured `type = owner_only`** (`sidecar/caldav/radicale.ts:54`) while the caldav
      sidecar itself is fully per-user and confines every JSON read to `/dav/<userId>/`. The platform
      side is ready for members; the CalDAV server underneath is not.

- [ ] **The music library is one global index.** `sidecar/music/indexer.ts` reads `HOME_DIR` and serves
      every account from it. Favourites, playlists and now-playing _are_ per-user. Deliberate for now
      (one household, one library) but worth stating rather than discovering.

- [ ] **`markInterruptedJobs()` and `getOldestPendingJob()` are platform-wide.** The pipeline queue is a
      single global lane; ownership is enforced one layer up, in `pipeline-jobs-routes.ts`, by an
      explicit `job.userId !== user.id → 404` on every by-id route. Correct today, but the queue itself
      has no notion of whose work it is running.

- [x] **Cross-user writes in the notify sidecar** (fixed 2026-08-07, this session).
      `DELETE /_officer/devices/:token` deleted by token with no user predicate, so any account with the
      `notify` permission could deregister another's device; and `POST /_officer/notify` let a request
      body's `userId` override the proxy-injected `X-Officer-User`, so the same account could push to
      another's devices. `deletePushDevice` now takes an optional `userId` (the route passes it, the
      APNs/FCM dead-token paths deliberately do not) and the header now wins over the body.

- [ ] **Remove dead `username` plumbing.** `send-claude-code.ts` declares `username` in two types
      without using it. (`toShellUsername` is NOT dead — `server.tsx:190` and
      `pipeline-job-manager.ts:267` both call it. The `provision.ts` caller this item used to name no
      longer exists.)

## Email

Email became a plugin on 2026-08-18 (`plugins/email/`, `gitea.officer.dev/plugins/email`). Its work queue
went with it — the open items pointed at `sidecar/email/store.ts`, a path in another repository, which is
exactly the way a leftover list sends someone to edit files that are not there.

Anything still owed to the mail client belongs in that repository's own TODO.

## Transmission

Phase 1 (parity with `_references/transmission-web`) shipped 2026-07-30: the `officer-transmission`
sidecar plus `/transmission` (torrents / stats / settings). Everything below is **phase 2** — none of
it exists in the reference app, so none of it was in scope for parity.

### Probably needed regardless

- [ ] **Resizable detail pane.** `TorrentsView` pins it at `DETAIL_HEIGHT = '45%'`, which is a guess.
      Either a drag handle or a persisted height in `useLocalStorageState`, alongside the column set.
- [ ] **Revisit `DEFAULT_VISIBLE_COLUMNS`.** Eleven of thirty, chosen before ever seeing the table
      rendered against the real 43-torrent library. Likely wrong in both directions.
- [ ] **Files tab on huge torrents.** `detail/FilesTab.tsx` builds the whole tree and renders every
      node — no virtualisation. Fine at 14 files; unknown at a few thousand. If it stalls, the fix is
      `useVirtualizer` over a flattened visible-node list, the same shape as `TorrentTable`.

### Ideas, unprioritised

- [ ] **Container→host path mapping.** The daemon reports its own namespace (`/downloads/complete`),
      which is not a path on this host. A mapping table (`/downloads` → `~/hdds/08_TB_01/Torrents`,
      `/downloadsTV` → `14_TB_02/Torrents`) would make locations clickable through to `/files` and
      make "Set location" offer real destinations. Deliberately dropped from phase 1: the reference
      app has no such feature, so it would have been config nothing read.
- [ ] **Push instead of poll.** Transmission RPC has no push channel, so `useTransmissionData` polls
      every 5s. The sidecar could poll once and fan out over a WebSocket, which is both cheaper and
      what every other live surface in the platform already does.
- [ ] **Cross-surface links.** Soulseek and `download-media` both land files in the same library;
      Transmission is the third door to it. Worth a think about whether they should know about each
      other at all.

## Headscale

Gaps against headscale's own API, found while reading the app on 2026-08-05 — all closed the same
day. Kept here for what the policy work turned up, which is not obvious from the code.

- [x] **ACL policy.** `/api/v1/policy` GET/PUT behind `/_officer/policy`, with a plain HuJSON textarea
      that sends the text byte for byte and shows headscale's verdict verbatim (line and column
      included). Officer does not pre-validate: headscale owns the only parser that resolves groups,
      tags and hosts, and a second weaker one would disagree with the thing that actually enforces.
      **The mode cannot be read.** A file-backed policy is still served over GET; only a PUT refuses,
      with "update is disabled for modes other than 'database'". So the first save is what discovers
      writability, and a refusal becomes a persistent read-only banner. Verified live, not inferred.

- [x] **A node can be moved between users.** `/api/v1/node/{id}/user`, in the expanded node card next
      to the tag editor — both being the things that decide which policy rules apply to a node.

- [x] **User rename** — was already shipped end to end (`/users/:id/rename`, `UsersView`); this entry
      was stale when it was written.

- [x] **Polling** — `useHeadscaleNodes` has had `refetchInterval: 20_000` all along; also stale.

- [x] **Device invites, platform side** (`COMMS/OFFSCALE_INVITE_ENROLLMENT.md` §5, built 2026-08-05).
      Authorize-new-device form, the one-time link with copy/share/QR, and the invite list with revoke —
      `/_officer/enroll/invites` in `invites.ts`, `InvitesView`. **The records are not Officer's.** They
      proxy to the server's Officer Companion, because the joining phone has to claim without an Officer
      account and this sidecar is loopback-only behind our auth; the spec's own "an invite must work when
      the platform is down" argument says the same. Officer stores no invite and no claim token.
      **Live on all four servers since 2026-08-05.** The 401 that blocked it was a companion-side prefix
      parse (a Headscale key prefix is a fixed 12 chars and may contain `-`; they split on the first one);
      fixed upstream. Verified end to end against pastilhas-eu: create returns the
      `officer-offscale://join#…` link, list shows the record, revoke flips it to `revoked`. The list
      envelope is not in the spec, so `pickInvites` takes the body's array whatever it is keyed under.
      Four gaps were sent back to the spec author: `keys.ts` has no
      sub-day key TTL for the 5-minute claim key, "the sidecar must refuse plaintext" is unenforceable
      behind nginx, `tailnet` is not a headscale concept and has to be recorded on the invite, and
      `/api/v1/enroll/*` collides with headscale's own namespace.

## Workspaces & Panels

Its own list — **`docs/workspace-panel-todo.md`** — because it is long and actively worked. Full
analysis behind it: `COMMS/workspace-panel-framework-analysis-2026-08-07.md`.

Headlines: the framework has **no panel lifecycle** (a panel can be destroyed but never told, which is
the real cause of the terminal orphan leak); three state-key families are **silently dropped on every
write**, orphaning a pty per reload; Running Shells has **404'd since 2026-07-31**; there are **zero
error boundaries** anywhere in the repo; and `dashboards.id` is a **global** primary key fed by
`slugify(name)`, so two members naming a dashboard the same thing collide.

- [ ] **Renaming a panel key is a silent data migration, and the repair is destructive.** A saved layout
      holds `appType` strings. `normalizeLayout` replaces any appType not in the allow-list with the
      caller's `fallback`, and `WorkspaceView.tsx:97` writes that back — so a renamed key turns every
      saved layout into N copies of whichever panel is `allowed[0]`, permanently, on one page load.
      Renaming `headscale-*` → `offscale-*` did exactly this: `/offscale` rendered three server pickers,
      `ServersView` never mounted, and it survived every restart because the code was correct and the
      data was not (2026-08-17, `ed3806f9`).

      Plugin screens are now cleared at install, which covers plugins and nothing else. The general fix
      is a rule about wholesale mismatch: **a layout in which NO panel has a recognised appType is
      residue from older code — discard it and use the screen's default**, rather than collapsing it.
      `fallback: allowed[0]` is arbitrary (it is whatever `panels.ts` happens to list first) and should
      probably not be a per-panel substitution at all.

## Code editor

- [ ] **The owner wants to go deeper here — ideas pending (noted 2026-08-15).** Raised right after the file
      browser gained its first links into `/code-editor`. Do this after the file-browser test pass.

      What is worth knowing before starting, all established on 2026-08-15:

      **It has been effectively invisible for six months.** The app landed 2026-02-21 (`9e9acd96`), the
      screen 2026-02-17, and `1fa3a659` on 2026-07-25 is titled "**restore** the code editor screen" — so
      it was dropped and brought back at least once. It IS in `CORE_DOCK_ITEMS` as "Editor", but
      `DEFAULT_DOCK_PATHS` is `['/', '/files', '/terminal', '/dashboards', '/chat']` and the owner's own
      `dock_configs` row does not list it either. Until today the only way in was typing the URL.

      **So it has no users, and that is the risk.** A surface nobody reached for six months is where things
      rot quietly. Nothing about the editor itself has been verified — whether saving works, how the file
      tree behaves, what closing the last tab does, what an unsaved-changes navigation does. Only the
      plumbing was checked: `?file=` is read (`EDITOR_FILE_PARAM`), `/code-editor` renders with `urlState`,
      and `CodeEditor.tsx:60-76` fetches a path that arrives in the URL rather than only matching already
      open tabs.

      **One bug of exactly this kind was already found and fixed** in the FileViewer's editor on the same
      day: the Edit toggle was gated on `content` rather than `content !== null`, so an empty file — the
      one "New file" produces — could not be edited at all. Assume siblings.

      **Open question, deliberately not decided:** `Open in editor` in the file browser's row menu still
      navigates to `/code-editor`, which is the last action that leaves the browser. Editing now happens
      in place via double-click → the viewer's pane. Either `/code-editor` earns its keep as a genuinely
      different tool (tree, tabs, multi-file) or that menu item should go.

## Files app — routing

**The URL model is done (2026-08-15).** The folder is the pathname —
`/files/archive/Tests/platform/docs` — and `?view=` is a NAME within it, not a second copy of the path.
Deep links and refresh work, which they never had. Landed across `559560de`, `98ba604a`, `7e31564c`,
`0dc88b51`, `7359af2f`, with `files-route.ts` + 23 tests as the one owner of encoding and of which params
belong to the overlay.

Four bugs came out of that work and are fixed: closing a pane sent you home; `?view=` was stripped on
every page load by a mount effect that had made deep links impossible since 2026-02-23; navigating kept a
pane belonging to the folder you left; and the breadcrumb opted out of that last rule because it is a
`<Link>` and never called the function enforcing it.

- [ ] **Rows are still not links.** This is the half that did not get done, and it is the original
      finding. Both list and grid render `<div onDoubleClick>` (`FileItem.tsx:701,748`), and search
      results render `<div onClick>` (`FileViewContainer.tsx:187`) — the "opaque click" that
      `docs/navigation-audit.md` names. No cmd-click into a new tab, no middle-click, not
      link-focusable, and the target lives in a closure rather than the DOM.

      It is now much easier than it was: `folderHref(path)` gives a folder's URL and `hrefForPath` gives
      a full `To` with the overlay already stripped, so a row becomes
      `<Link to={hrefForPath(childPath)}>` and a file row becomes a link that sets `?view=<name>`. The
      breadcrumb has done exactly this since before today and is the model.

      Watch for: a row is also a click target for SELECTION (single click selects, double opens,
      shift/cmd extend). An anchor changes what those gestures mean by default, so the selection
      handlers have to keep working and `preventDefault` where they win.

- [ ] **The acts that clear the overlay have no owner, only the list does.** `VIEWER_PARAMS` and
      `withoutViewerParams` live in `files-route.ts` and are shared. But every site still decides FOR
      ITSELF whether to call them, which is precisely how the breadcrumb shipped wrong an hour after the
      rule was written. Three bugs in a row came from this. A single `navigateToFolder()` that every
      caller must go through — rather than a helper they may remember — is the fix if a fourth appears.

- [ ] **A panel's folder is still not addressable.** `urlPath` is true only on the `/files` screen;
      panels keep the path in local state, so they always open at their base and cannot be linked or
      restored. Deliberate as written — a dashboard can hold two browsers and one URL cannot serve both —
      but worth re-deciding rather than inheriting.

## Affordances (2026-08-19)

Agreed and written down in `plugins/CLAUDE.md`; **nothing is built**. An affordance is what the surface
on the other end offers the agent — declared by the code that implements it, read at runtime. The first
two are image rendering (core) and gitea (`git` for git, `tea` for everything else).

Built 2026-08-19: `servers/affordances/load.ts` reads the tree and compiles one block, and
`claude-manager.ts` appends it to every Claude session via
`systemPrompt: { type: 'preset', preset: 'claude_code', append }`. Read per session, so a plugin
installed an hour ago is live on the next message.

Still to build:

- `capabilities/affordances/` created by the setup script, with `officer/core/` populated from an
  officer-capabilities repository. The directory exists on this machine by hand; a fresh install gets
  nothing, so the first affordance is currently a local artefact rather than a shipped one.
- **Opencode delivery.** It has its own driver and gets nothing, so image rendering is currently a claim
  that holds on one harness — exactly the drift affordances exist to remove. Deliberate: opencode work is
  paused pending its v2 migration and this would be thrown away. Revisit when v2 lands.
- A bare `claude` run in a terminal on the host gets nothing either, since it never passes through
  `claude-manager`. Would need a generated file, which is the thing `user-instance.ts` refuses to write
  for the owner.
- Plugin contribution: an `affordances/` directory in the plugin repository, copied to
  `capabilities/affordances/<publisher>/<plugin>/` on install and removed on uninstall. Same shape as
  `assets/` and `publishAssets`. **Nothing does this yet** — gitea will be the first.

Open, and deliberately deferred:

- **Scoping.** Everything is loaded into every conversation. Fine at two files, not at twenty. A
  `surface` field was drafted and dropped because it was doing two jobs at once: for image rendering it
  means _what the client renders_ (a phone, a web bubble, a cron run with nobody watching), for gitea
  _what tooling exists on this machine_. Those are different axes and one field cannot be both. Decide
  the axis before adding the field — and note this codebase has already been bitten by a field that
  validated itself and was never consumed (`unauthenticatedPaths`, see `plugins/public-paths.ts`).
- **Drift.** The rule is "declared where implemented", but a hand-authored markdown file in a repository
  is not that — `ChatImage` could stop rendering images and no file would notice. Accepted for now
  because prose that reaches every harness beats a registry that reaches one; revisit if it bites.

## Plugin ecosystem — before it opens to third parties (2026-08-18)

Not now. Months away. Recorded so it is not re-derived.

- [ ] **A plugin install is not pinned, so a review would bind a repository rather than code.**
      `fetch.ts:70` is `git clone --depth 1 <source>` — no ref — so it takes whatever the default branch
      points at when the install runs. A plugin reviewed at commit X installs at whatever was pushed
      since, and `--depth 1` leaves no history to compare against.

      This is the shape of the npm attack already documented in `CLAUDE.md` (2026-08-04), and the same
      shape as the Chrome Web Store's real failures — not bad extensions passing review, but good ones
      sold or compromised and then pushing an update to users who had already accepted them.

      Fix: a `reviewedCommit` on the catalogue entry, checkout detached at that SHA, and **verify
      `rev-parse HEAD` matches or refuse**. The verification is the part that matters. An update then
      becomes "a new reviewed SHA exists" — a catalogue change rather than something the author triggers.

- [ ] **Third-party plugin sidecars are unconfined.** A plugin sidecar runs `bun run <script>` with
      `cwd: PLATFORM_DIR`, so Bun auto-loads `.env` and it gets `POSTGRES_URL`; it runs as the service
      user, which owns `secrets/officer-keys.db` and can therefore mint an owner JWT. Fine for
      first-party plugins, total compromise for anyone else's.

      The mechanism to fix it already exists and is pointed elsewhere: `spawn-as-member.ts` drops
      privileges with `setpriv --reset-env` and a six-name allowlist for exactly this reason.

- [ ] **No install-from-git-URL.** The catalogue is the only route for a remote plugin, so the
      "build your own, give it to a friend" path has no affordance. Small, and needed before the
      unofficial channel is real.

## Plugin system — gaps the email extraction found (2026-08-18)

- [ ] **A plugin cannot declare its own npm dependencies, so the PLATFORM is carrying them.** `imapflow`,
      `mailparser` and `@types/mailparser` are in the platform's `package.json` and are imported by nothing
      in `src/` — they exist solely for `plugins/email/sidecar/`. Plugins have no `package.json`, run with
      `cwd: PLATFORM_DIR`, and resolve from the platform's `node_modules`, so deleting those three lines
      breaks the installed plugin on its first sync.

      This does not scale and it is the wrong party holding the risk: the platform cannot be answerable for
      what an arbitrary plugin decides to install, and `bunfig.toml` sets `frozenLockfile = true` precisely
      so a dependency change is a deliberate, reviewed act. Publishing will be reviewed rather than a
      free-for-all, which narrows the threat but does not move the responsibility.

      What it probably needs: a `dependencies` field in the manifest (the manifest already holds
      `osDependencies` for host binaries, which is the same shape of problem solved once), installed into
      the plugin's own directory at install time rather than merged into the platform's tree. Note the
      install path already learned not to trust `$PATH` — `pushPluginSchema` resolves a binary rather than
      spawning `bunx` — so whatever runs the install has to do the same.

      Until then: `imapflow` and `mailparser` STAY. Removing them is not tidying, it is breaking email.

- [ ] **`email_accounts/` is created by the PLATFORM for every account, and should be the plugin's job.**
      `USER_DIRS` in `data-path.ts` pre-creates it at 0700 for every user, whether or not the email plugin
      is installed — so a core install provisions a directory named for a plugin it does not have.

      Ownership should invert: the plugin provisions its own storage, in all three moments —

      1. **on plugin install**, for accounts that already exist;
      2. **on user provisioning**, for accounts created afterwards;
      3. **lazily**, the first time a provisioned user opens the plugin, so a machine that missed either of
         the above still heals itself.

      The third is the one that makes the other two non-critical, and it belongs in the email sidecar
      rather than in the platform's account handler.

      This is entangled with the `email_db` leak below — core reads that directory today, so the plugin
      cannot become its sole owner until that is resolved too. Do them together.

- [ ] **The platform still knows email's on-disk vocabulary, deliberately, and it is untested by anything.**
      `findEmailAccountName` in `data-path.ts` reads `DATA_PATH/<user>/email_accounts/*/emails.db` and picks
      the newest by mtime. Two core callers use it: `user-instance.ts` (`OFFICER_EMAIL_DB`, for the agent's
      `email_db` MCP tool) and `chat/websocket.ts` (`resolveEmailCwd`, for a chat opened against a mailbox).
      `ChatPanelWrapper.tsx` hardcodes `workspace.id === 'email'` to trigger the second.

      This traded a CODE dependency for a CONVENTION, which was the right trade at the time — the code
      dependency is what put `officer-agent` into a restart loop on 2026-08-13 (`fbb6d6c7`). But the
      convention has no enforcement on either side: if the plugin ever renames `emails.db`, moves to one
      database per folder, or nests differently, core silently points the agent at a path that does not
      exist. No import breaks, no type fails, no test covers it. The tool just goes quiet.

      The clean version needs two things the platform does not have: a way for a plugin to ship an MCP tool,
      and a way for a plugin to declare a chat context. Until both exist this stays — but it should be a
      decision someone re-takes, not one that is inherited.

## Plugin repos — what writing their READMEs turned up

Three READMEs were written on 2026-08-16 (`music`, `offscale`, `example`) and pushed to their own repos.
Writing them meant reading each plugin against its own documentation, which is the cheapest audit there
is. Everything below was found that way and none of it is fixed.

**Offscale is still branded headscale in shipped, user-visible places.**

- [ ] `web/panels.ts` registers three panels named "Headscale servers", "Headscale", "Headscale" — these
      are what a user reads in the panel picker.
- [ ] `web/OffscaleServerPicker.tsx:26` renders the literal heading `Headscale`.
- [ ] `web/ConsoleView.tsx:22` mints terminal session ids as `headscale-console-<id>`. That is persisted
      state rather than a comment, so renaming it orphans live console sessions — cheap now, less so later.
- [ ] ~12 stale `/headscale` route paths in comments across `web/`, plus `App.tsx:78` in the platform.
- [ ] `PLUGIN.md` has ~11 stale self-references (`headscale_servers`, `listHeadscaleServers`, permission
      key `headscale`, `/api/headscale`, panel keys, `useHeadscaleSection()`).

**Documentation that actively lies.**

- [ ] `plugins/offscale/PLUGIN.md:445-449` says the ACL assistant is deliberately unwired and must not be
      wired up. It IS wired — `sidecar/assist.ts`, `claude-proxy.ts`, `web/PolicyAssistant.tsx` and the
      manifest's `readOnlyWrites` all ship.
- [ ] `plugins/offscale/OFFSCALE_API.md` claims to publish the contract "in full" and omits six live
      surfaces, including all of `/_officer/companion/*` and `/_officer/enroll/invites`.
- [ ] `plugins/music/MUSIC_API.md` says favourites and now-playing are served by the platform from
      Postgres; the sidecar serves them itself, scoped by `X-Officer-User`. It also documents the playlist
      item key as `<albumRel>/<file>` while the schema and favourites use the home path — the same file
      contradicts itself.
- [ ] `plugins/music/MUSIC_API.md` documents now-playing as one snapshot per user with no mention of
      `?device=`, which the schema makes part of the primary key. A mobile client written to that doc is
      correct only by accident.
- [ ] `plugins/example/manifest.ts:12` lists `web/Router.tsx` as the frontend convention; discovery
      requires `web/panels.ts` AND `web/layout.ts`. The same file documents an `ownerOnly` field that does
      not exist and never did.
- [ ] The Companion contract docs the offscale code cites (`COMMS/OFFSCALE_COMPANION_API.md`,
      `COMMS/OFFSCALE_INVITE_ENROLLMENT.md`) exist nowhere — `COMMS/` was deleted. Two of the plugin's
      eight sections depend on a service with no published spec.

**Conventions a plugin author has to guess.** All verified in `discover.ts`/`mount.ts`, none documented
outside the example's new README:

- [ ] Panel `key`s and layout `appType`s must agree, and a mismatch fails SILENTLY — `PluginScreen.tsx`
      pins `appTypes.allowed` with `fallback: allowed[0]`, so a typo renders the first panel.
- [ ] The `<appName>_` table prefix is unenforced. The barrel is `export *` across every plugin into one
      `public` schema, so two plugins choosing the same unprefixed name collide with no error until push.
- [ ] A manifest is module-cached for the process lifetime: editing it does nothing until
      `pm2 restart officer`, and `outdated` cannot see a version bump either.
- [ ] Permission-key prefixing is convention, not validation. Only a collision with a CORE key is refused,
      silently, at mount, with a console error.

**Genuinely missing.**

- [ ] `plugins/offscale` spawns the `ssh` binary (`sidecar/ssh.ts`) but declares no `osDependencies`, so
      install never checks for it and the Console fails at runtime instead of refusing at install.
      `PLUGIN.md:421` already lists it as a host dependency — the manifest is the file that is wrong.
- [ ] `scripts/reindex-music.ts` resolves its port file from `process.env.DATA_PATH ?? cwd/data`, and
      `DATA_PATH` stopped being an env var on 2026-08-13. Run from the repo it looks in
      `platform/data/music/.server` and never finds it. One line.
- [ ] `plugins/music/web/MusicPlayerHost.tsx` header says it is mounted once in the persistent
      DashboardLayout; it moved into `MusicDetail`. That is exactly the comment that would mislead
      someone about why playback stops off-route.
- [ ] A plugin's `assets/icon.png` is only published while installed, so its real icon is invisible in the
      store before install. The catalogue's `iconUrl` works around it, and an author has to know to add one.

## Waiting on the owner to run it

- [ ] **The AI usage panel works for one account; the multi-account half is unproven.** Landed and verified
      live 2026-08-18 — click the harness pill in the chat composer and it shows Claude Code's own usage
      display, limits with countdowns, tokens by day and by model.

      What is NOT proven is the reason it was built: a second Anthropic login, the account tabs, and a
      stored row surviving a switch. **Group C of `docs/ai-usage-panel.md`** is that, and test 10 is the one
      most likely to be wrong — a refresh must not overwrite an account it could not measure, and that
      failure is silent.

      Deliberately deferred rather than forgotten: the owner switches accounts when the work needs it, and
      the worst case is one wrong tab. Run Group C the first time a second login lands on this machine.

      Also unexercised: the model dropdown no longer renders the literal string `claude-code` for a chat
      that named no tier. Needs `officer-claude-code` restarted, not just `officer` — the parser in the
      sidecar is what emits it.

- [ ] **Plan mode is live and has never been exercised.** Landed `1b811dfa` on 2026-08-17; all three
      processes were restarted the same evening, so the code IS running. Not one part of it has been used:
      not the toggle, not the plan card, not the round trip from the sidecar's pending promise to a browser
      and back, not the stored column, not `settleAllPlans`.

      **`docs/chat-plan-mode-test-plan.md` is the checklist** — eleven ordered tests, what each should show,
      and what its failure looks like. Test 4 (approve) is the one most likely to be wrong: it is the case
      that changed the design, because approving `ExitPlanMode` drops the harness into `default` rather than
      back into `bypassPermissions`.

      Safe to leave untested. Plan mode is opt-in and off by default, so a conversation that never touches
      the toggle behaves exactly as it did before. The one failure worth knowing in advance is a turn that
      never ends after a plan is answered — that would be a leaked `canUseTool` promise, and
      `pm2 restart officer-claude-code` clears it.

      Design and the probe results behind it: `docs/chat-plan-mode.md`.

## Known bugs

- [ ] **Background job logs appeared INSIDE an open file in the code editor.** Reported 2026-08-16 by the
      owner, on the production host, running as a member with a `bun dev` background job streaming. The
      editor had a file open; the runner's log output was rendered into that file's buffer. **It was never
      saved** — the file on disk was intact, and the editor was not marked dirty as far as the report goes.
      So this is a DISPLAY-layer mixing, not a write path: the bytes reached a buffer that only exists in
      the browser.

      Not reproduced, not diagnosed, and deliberately not guessed at further than this. What is worth
      recording is where the two streams could meet, because both were added in the same week and they are
      the only two things writing text into a panel:

      - `useTaskDetail` polls `GET /chat/tasks/:id` every 2s while a job runs and returns `{kind:'log', text}`.
        `CodeSurface` renders it — and `CodeSurface` is shared with the editor's own surfaces.
      - The editor keys open files by PATH (`useEditorState`), while the task panel keys by TASK ID, and
        several panel-scoped stores in between are keyed by `panelId` through `useGlobal` /
        `usePanelMemory`. A key collision between those namespaces would produce exactly this: one panel's
        text arriving in another's buffer, with no server involvement and nothing persisted.

      **Screenshot 2026-08-16 answers the first question and kills two theories.** The tab carries a DIRTY
      dot, and the log lines have Monaco line numbers continuing the file's own sequence (…180, then eight
      lines of dotenv/POSTGRES_URL output, then 189 `</Link>`). So the MODEL was mutated — this is the
      editor's content state, not its render, and the earlier "the file was okay" means it was simply never
      saved. Note the splice is mid-file, not a replacement: JSX text and log text share line 180
      (`Forgot?--env-file=.env --watch src/server.tsx`).

      Ruled out by that: `CodeSurface` renders with shiki, not Monaco, so the two cannot share an editor
      instance. And the app's only other Monaco mount (`FileViewer/renderers/EditorRenderer.tsx`) passes no
      `path`, so its model URI is `inmemory://model/N` and cannot collide with the editor's `file:///…`.

      So the pollution arrives as TEXT through the editor's own content path — `openFile`, `setContent`, or
      the end-of-turn refresh that re-reads every clean file. That last one is the prime suspect: it is the
      only thing that writes a buffer without a keystroke, it runs exactly when a background job is
      producing output, and it lands its result by path.

      **Narrowed 2026-08-16, and a trap is now set.** `reloadFile` sets `originalContent` and clears
      `isDirty`, so the end-of-turn refresh CANNOT produce the dirty dot in the screenshot — the refresh
      path is out. Nothing in the app injects text into the page either: no `execCommand('insertText')`,
      no synthetic keyboard events, no clipboard writes near the editor. That leaves Monaco's own change
      event, which means it looks like a paste or a programmatic `executeEdits`.

      **`docs/editor-buffer-corruption.md` is the procedure — read that when someone reports this.** A
      trap is set: `reportSuspiciousEdit` in CodeEditor.tsx records any insertion over 200 characters
      arriving while the editor is NOT focused, with the stack at that moment, into
      `localStorage['officer:editor-buffer-trap']` (last five). It persists rather than only logging
      because this arrives as a report hours later, when the console is long gone — the question becomes
      "paste this key" instead of "what did you see?". Delete all of it once the cause is known.

      One thing to rule out first, because it is mine and it is recent: `2b70a570` gave `<Editor>` a real
      `path`, so models are now keyed by file URI globally rather than being per-mount `inmemory://`. Two
      panels open on the same file now share one model. That should be an improvement, but it is a change
      in exactly the layer that turned out to be involved.

      Worth noting because it is the reason to look at all: an editor that can show content the file does
      not contain is a correctness problem even when it never writes — the next person's instinct will be to
      save the file to "fix" it.

- [ ] **`bootstrap.ts` runs `npm install -g` for Pi on every boot.** `findPiPackageDir` checks stale
      paths and an outdated package name, so `installPi` always fires and floods the logs with
      `EEXIST` noise. Should detect `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` at the real npm prefix.

- [x] **VNC mirror can orphan/duplicate x11vnc across sidecar restarts.** FIXED 2026-08-01 in the
      Xvnc rewrite. The diagnosis was right and survived the move off mirroring: the running desktop is
      tracked in module-level state, so a sidecar restart forgot it while the server kept running
      orphaned, and `waitForPort` treated ANY listener on 5900 as success — so the next start reported
      success while the browser talked to the stale process. Now `reclaimPort` frees 5900 (TERM, then
      KILL after 2s) before spawning, and `waitForPort` also fails if the process we spawned has
      exited, so a listener that is not ours can no longer be mistaken for a healthy start.

## Infra (alpha)

- [ ] **Delete `/etc/systemd/system/officer-vnc.service`.** Hand-installed unit (not in this repo)
      that ran `vncserver :1 -geometry 1920x1080 -localhost yes -fg` with `Restart=on-failure`,
      enabled at boot — it kept a whole parallel XFCE session alive on `:1` (283 MB, 166 tasks)
      independently of the platform, and silently respawned it whenever the display was killed.
      Obsolete now that the Desktop panel mirrors `:0` via x11vnc. Disabled 2026-07-15
      (`systemctl disable --now`), but the unit file is still on disk. Nothing in the codebase
      recreates it and nothing documents it, so delete the file rather than leave a mystery service
      one `systemctl enable` away from returning.

- [ ] **`ufw` blocks port 9010 on the LAN.** Default deny incoming; only `22/tcp`, `80/tcp`,
      `443/tcp`, and everything on `tailscale0` are allowed — so `http://192.168.47.196:9010` is
      unreachable from the LAN while localhost and Tailscale work.
      Fix: `sudo ufw allow from 192.168.47.0/24 to any port 9010 proto tcp`

## Backburner

- [ ] **Music tagging feature** (`/music`, Mp3tag-inspired). v1 was scoped as a two-panel workspace —
      file browser left, table right, single "Load" context-menu item flattening audio files into the
      table. Discarded before completion; would need `GET /file-browser/flatten-audio`, a
      `useFilesAPI.flattenAudio` method, and the Music app panel rebuilt from scratch.