POST /users/:id/provision-linux, and a terminal button on each user row. One
operation covering three needs that were all previously answered by "delete the
account and make it again":
backfill an account created before the feature existed, or while the host was not
set up for it
retry the first attempt failed for something since fixed — the traversable
ancestor chmod being the one everybody hits once
re-key replace authorized_keys with a new public key
Deleting to redo a retryable side effect throws away the password, the dashboards and
everything else keyed to the row.
The provisioning block moves out of create-user into provisionOsAccount, shared by
both entry points for the same reason app-store/members.ts is shaped that way: two
moments, one piece of work.
Found by testing the retry rather than the create: provisionUserDirs re-chmods every
directory including home, and home belongs to the MEMBER after the first successful
run — chmod requires ownership, so it threw EPERM and took every retry down before it
started. Those chmods are now a default for directories being created, not an
assertion about ones that already exist; os-user.ts sets the home's mode through sudo
and is the authority for it.
The route answers 200 with the error in the body, because the interesting cases are
partial: "the account exists and is confined but the keys failed" is not nothing
having happened, and the row shows both halves.
Verified end to end: blocked ancestor reports the chmod and leaves osUser null, the
retry after that chmod succeeds and records the row, and a re-key replaces
authorized_keys without rotating the outbound key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
142 lines
7.5 KiB
TypeScript
142 lines
7.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { join, resolve } from 'node:path';
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import { chmodSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { homedir } from 'node:os';
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export const DATA_PATH = process.env.DATA_PATH ?? join(process.cwd(), 'data');
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// Unified, file-based store for all agent items, living outside the repo. Every skill/tool/task/
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// process/extension is a directory under one of these type subfolders — no scope tiers, no DB.
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export const OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR = process.env.OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR ?? join(process.cwd(), 'officer-items');
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export type ItemType = 'skills' | 'tools' | 'tasks' | 'processes' | 'extensions' | 'agents';
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export const ITEM_TYPES: ItemType[] = ['skills', 'tools', 'tasks', 'processes', 'extensions', 'agents'];
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export const itemsDir = (type: ItemType) => join(OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR, type);
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export const ensureItemDirs = () => {
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for (const type of ITEM_TYPES) mkdirSync(itemsDir(type), { recursive: true });
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};
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export const SERVER_CONFIG_DIR = join(DATA_PATH, 'server-settings');
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// Every run of a given agent shares one working directory. That is deliberate and load-bearing: the
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// `claude` CLI groups transcripts by cwd (see api/chat/claude-sessions.ts), so a shared cwd is what
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// makes an agent's runs show up as their own project group in /chat, listed newest-first, with no
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// database row anywhere. The accumulated CLAUDE.md / LEARNINGS.md for the agent live here too.
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export const getAgentRunsDir = (dirName: string) => join(DATA_PATH, 'agentic_runs', dirName);
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// The `pi`/opencode agent's own config dir (auth.json + models.json). External-tool path.
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export const AGENT_CONFIG_DIR = join(homedir(), '.pi', 'agent');
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export const SEED_PATH = resolve(import.meta.dir, '../../seed');
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// The managed home under DATA_PATH. A remnant of the first architecture, where every user ran inside
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// their own Docker container and this was that container's home — seeded by provisioning, described to
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// the agent by a generated CLAUDE.md. Both of those are gone, and nothing executes here any more:
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// terminals, chats and task runs all use getOwnerHomeDir below. It survives only as that function's
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// fallback for when HOME_DIR is unset, and in pipeline-executor.
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export const getHomeDir = (email: string) => join(DATA_PATH, email, 'home');
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// Where the owner's sessions actually run: their real login home when HOME_DIR is set, so platform
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// terminals/chats/tasks share config and credentials with the shell they use outside Officer.
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export const getOwnerHomeDir = (email: string): string => process.env.HOME_DIR ?? getHomeDir(email);
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// The directory skeleton a new account gets under DATA_PATH.
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//
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// Most of these are also created on demand by whichever feature owns them, so pre-creating them buys
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// legibility more than function — the tree shows what an account has without it having to be used first.
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// `home` is the exception and the reason this exists: nothing else creates it, and it is where a
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// non-owner's sessions would run.
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//
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// Single-sourced here rather than in the script that used to own the list, because there are now two
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// callers — `scripts/provision-user-dirs.ts` and the owner's create-account handler — and a skeleton
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// that differs depending on how the account was made is a bug nobody would think to look for.
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export const USER_DIRS = [
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'home',
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'attachments',
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'cache',
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'dashboards',
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'email_accounts',
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'general_chat_sessions',
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'logs',
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'sidecar',
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] as const;
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/**
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* The folders a home is seeded with, so a new account's file browser is not an empty rectangle.
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*
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* Here rather than in the file browser because there are now two seeders: that router (for the owner, whose
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* home it can write to) and the Linux-account provisioner, which has to create them AS the member because
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* their home is 700 and theirs. Two lists would mean a member's home quietly differing from the owner's.
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*/
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export const HOME_SEED_DIRS = ['Downloads', 'Documents', 'Music', 'Videos', 'Pictures'] as const;
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/**
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* Create an account's root and its skeleton, closed by default.
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*
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* Keyed on email because that is what the on-disk layout uses everywhere else (`DATA_PATH/<email>/…`).
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* Renaming an account's email would orphan its directory; that is pre-existing and not this function's
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* problem, but it is the reason nothing here derives a path from the id.
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*
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* ── Why the modes are set here and not only by os-user.ts ──
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*
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* `711` on the account directory, `700` on everything inside it. Measured while testing per-user Linux
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* accounts: at the default umask these came out `755`, and a member with a shell could read ANOTHER
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* member's home directory just by naming it — the parent being unlistable is not protection when the
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* child itself is world-readable. "Locked unless something opens it" has to be the resting state, so it
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* belongs at creation rather than in the confinement pass, which only ever runs for accounts that have an
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* OS user.
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*
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* `chmod` explicitly rather than mkdir's `mode`, which is masked by the umask and does nothing at all for
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* a directory that already exists.
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*/
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export const provisionUserDirs = (email: string): void => {
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const accountDir = join(DATA_PATH, email);
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for (const dir of USER_DIRS) mkdirSync(join(accountDir, dir), { recursive: true });
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// Traversable, not listable: reaching `home` must not mean enumerating the platform's tree beside it.
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chmodSync(accountDir, 0o711);
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for (const dir of USER_DIRS) {
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try {
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chmodSync(join(accountDir, dir), 0o700);
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} catch {
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// A directory that is no longer OURS to chmod. `home` becomes the member's on the first successful
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// provision, and `chmod` requires ownership — so re-running this threw EPERM and took every RETRY down
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// before it began, which is how this was found. os-user.ts sets the home's mode through sudo and is the
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// authority for it; here the mode is a default for directories we are creating, not an assertion about
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// ones that already exist.
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}
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}
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};
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export const getTmpAttachmentsDir = (email: string) => join(DATA_PATH, email, 'attachments', 'tmp');
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export const getAttachmentsDir = (email: string, sessionId: string) => join(DATA_PATH, email, 'attachments', sessionId);
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// Per-account email storage: DATA_PATH/<owner>/email_accounts/<accountEmail>/emails.db, with a
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// single attachment_cache/ shared across the owner's accounts.
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export const getEmailAccountsDir = (ownerEmail: string) => join(DATA_PATH, ownerEmail, 'email_accounts');
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export const getEmailDbPath = (ownerEmail: string, accountEmail: string) =>
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join(getEmailAccountsDir(ownerEmail), accountEmail, 'emails.db');
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export const getEmailAttachmentCacheDir = (ownerEmail: string) =>
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join(getEmailAccountsDir(ownerEmail), 'attachment_cache');
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// Sanitises a display username or email into a bare, lowercase, shell-safe token. The name and the
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// 32-char Linux limit are the last trace of the per-container architecture, where this really did name
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// a Linux user inside the user's container. Nothing creates a Linux user now — the value is carried
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// through the websocket/job payloads and ends up only as a claim inside the signed task token, so this
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// is a sanitiser rather than an account name. Left in place because unpicking it means changing what
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// goes into that token and into WSData, which is a wider change than a cleanup.
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export const toShellUsername = (username: string, email: string): string => {
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const raw = username || email.split('@')[0]!;
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// Replace invalid chars, lowercase, truncate to 32 chars
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return (
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raw
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.replace(/@.*$/, '')
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.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]/g, '_')
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.toLowerCase()
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.slice(0, 32) || 'officer'
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);
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};
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