POST /users/:id/provision-linux, and a terminal button on each user row. One
operation covering three needs that were all previously answered by "delete the
account and make it again":
backfill an account created before the feature existed, or while the host was not
set up for it
retry the first attempt failed for something since fixed — the traversable
ancestor chmod being the one everybody hits once
re-key replace authorized_keys with a new public key
Deleting to redo a retryable side effect throws away the password, the dashboards and
everything else keyed to the row.
The provisioning block moves out of create-user into provisionOsAccount, shared by
both entry points for the same reason app-store/members.ts is shaped that way: two
moments, one piece of work.
Found by testing the retry rather than the create: provisionUserDirs re-chmods every
directory including home, and home belongs to the MEMBER after the first successful
run — chmod requires ownership, so it threw EPERM and took every retry down before it
started. Those chmods are now a default for directories being created, not an
assertion about ones that already exist; os-user.ts sets the home's mode through sudo
and is the authority for it.
The route answers 200 with the error in the body, because the interesting cases are
partial: "the account exists and is confined but the keys failed" is not nothing
having happened, and the row shows both halves.
Verified end to end: blocked ancestor reports the chmod and leaves osUser null, the
retry after that chmod succeeds and records the row, and a re-key replaces
authorized_keys without rotating the outbound key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduces a fifth capability kind. `files` was `execution` — never grantable,
because it meant the OWNER'S filesystem. It is now `confined`: execution-shaped, but
the kernel enforces the boundary because the account has its own Linux user, its own
home, and no permission above it.
The rule that makes `confined` mean something lives in authorize.ts, once: a confined
grant is DROPPED for an account with no osUser. So "granted but unconfined" resolves
to no access rather than to the owner's home — which is what it would otherwise
resolve to, since getOwnerHomeDir ignores the email it is handed whenever HOME_DIR is
set. One rule covers the HTTP routes, the websocket doors and the dock, instead of
each router remembering.
resolveHomeDir(userId) is the new seam and it reads the row rather than the token, for
the same reason authorize.ts re-reads role: provisioning a Linux account for an
existing member has to take effect on the next request, not in thirty days.
The file browser resolves it in middleware and puts it on ctx user, because
getRootDir is called from fifteen places in that router. Making it async would have
meant editing fifteen call sites, and the cost of missing one is serving the owner's
home to a member. Now a handler cannot run without the answer.
Two things a real run caught:
- /ls seeds Downloads/Documents into the home as the service user, which is EPERM
against a 700 home owned by the member — it took the whole listing down. Seeding is
now best-effort there and happens at provision time instead, as the member.
- .unique() on os_user made db:push ask whether to TRUNCATE users, which is
unanswerable non-interactively. uniqueIndex instead, per databases/CLAUDE.md.
Verified: a member without a Linux account is refused by name; with one, resolves to
their own home and NOT to HOME_DIR; the owner still resolves to HOME_DIR; and every
.. escape is refused while an absolute path is rebased under the root.
Terminal is still execution — that is the next stage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A member gets a real Linux account whose home is the directory the platform already
provisions for them. Nothing uses it yet — this is the mechanism plus the account,
deliberately with no behaviour change, so the file browser and terminal can be moved
onto something already proven.
Bun.spawn silently ignores uid/gid. Verified on 1.3.10: from uid 1000,
Bun.spawn(['id','-u'], {uid: 65534}) exits 0 and prints 1000. No throw, no warning.
Bun's types don't declare the option so typed code can't reach it by accident, but the
runtime accepts it, and a silently absent isolation boundary is the worst outcome this
feature could have. So privilege drops go through sudo -n setpriv, and a test pins Bun's
behaviour — if it's ever implemented, that test tells us we may simplify.
sudo is required for the drop and not because of the uid: --init-groups fails with
"Operation not permitted" for an unprivileged caller even when reuid'ing to its own
account, because setgroups(2) is root-only. --reset-env is what stops the platform's
environment crossing; verified POSTGRES_URL is unset on the far side and HOME arrives
from the target's passwd entry.
Three bugs that only a real run with a real useradd could find:
- chmod after chown fails forever, because chmod needs ownership. Both orderings fail
unprivileged. Both operations now go through sudo, which is what makes it re-runnable.
- a member could read ANOTHER member's home: provisionUserDirs created at the default
umask (755) and only the account being created got confined. An unlistable parent is
no protection when the child is world-readable and emails are guessable. The skeleton
is now created closed, 711 on the account dir and 700 inside.
- platform/.env was 664 and a member's shell printed JWT_SECRET, which is enough to mint
an owner token and bypass every capability check. Now a boot check that refuses to
start with OFFICER_OS_USERS on while any .env in the project root is group- or
world-readable.
Design, the measured results and the staging plan: docs/per-user-linux-accounts.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/users plus an Add-account form in Settings > User management. Until now
createUser had one call site — bootstrap, gated on an empty user table — so every
non-owner account anywhere had been inserted into Postgres by hand.
Created accounts are Active. The column defaults to Unverified and signin refuses
anything else with a bare UNAUTHORIZED, which is exactly what made the hand-INSERT
route look like a wrong password.
Also closes a hole found while reading the write path: a second Super Admin was
storable. The CHECK constraint pins user 1's role but cannot see other rows, and
getOwnerUser() was LIMIT 1 with no ORDER BY, so two holders would have made "who owns
this server" a question the query plan answered — and that answer feeds the agent
sidecar's identity, vault access and origin scoping. Both write paths now refuse the
role and getOwnerUser() orders by id.
USER_DIRS and provisionUserDirs move into data-path.ts so the create handler and
scripts/provision-user-dirs.ts cannot disagree about what an account's skeleton is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first iteration gave every user their own Docker container: the user's whole
world lived inside it, and only the super admin could see the real filesystem.
That model is gone, but its scaffolding was still in the tree, and it had already
cost time today — the /usr/local/bin/claude symlink removed a few commits ago
existed only because the bwrap jail ro-bound /usr and could not see the
installer's target.
Deleted:
generate-container-context.ts built the CLAUDE.md and settings.json that told
an agent what its container looked like. Its
only importer was the provisioning removed in
the previous commit, so it had zero consumers.
getUserPiConfigDir pointed into the managed container home. No
consumers anywhere in the tree.
Renamed:
DATA_PATH/<email>/.container-context -> agent-config. It holds one file, the
MCP server config handed to the CLI, and has nothing to do with containers. The
path is written and consumed through a return value, so nothing else reads it;
an old directory left on disk is inert.
Documented rather than removed, because both still have live callers and pulling
them out is a refactor rather than a cleanup:
getHomeDir the container's home. Nothing executes there now — terminals,
chats and task runs all use getOwnerHomeDir — but it survives
as that function's fallback and in pipeline-executor.
toShellUsername named for deriving a Linux username inside the container,
32-char limit and all. Nothing creates a Linux user now; the
value ends up only as a claim in the signed task token, so it
is a sanitiser wearing an old name. Unpicking it means
changing that token and WSData.
Nothing to clean on disk: DATA_PATH/<email> has no home/ tree and no
.container-context/. The docs that still mention any of this are the two marked
"Historical" at the top, which are records of what was true then and should keep
saying so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Second half of c69cda4. The agents router imports getAgentRunsDir from data-path, which was still
an uncommitted edit, so a clone got past the missing-module error only to fail on a missing export:
SyntaxError: Export named 'getAgentRunsDir' not found in module '.../src/servers/data-path.ts'
My check before c69cda4 verified that every module the agents files import is TRACKED, but not that
the SYMBOLS they import actually EXIST in the committed version of those modules. Module resolution
and named-export resolution are separate failures and the first check only covered the former.
The whole diff to this file is one feature — 'agents' joins ItemType/ITEM_TYPES, and
getAgentRunsDir is added — so it goes in whole rather than split.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
deletes the last of the projects/apps cluster: the published-app store
(/api/apps + /api/app-serve), the project dev-server and its websocket
proxy (/api/dev-server + /api/dev-server-proxy), the shared html-rewrite
they were the only consumers of, and their frontend — the Preview panel,
the UserApp panel/header, useUserApps and the /settings/apps screen.
also drops getUserProjectsDir and getUserAppsDir, the ProjectType and
ProjectDefinition types, and the 'dev-server' websocket provider from
server.tsx. nothing on disk is touched.
1440 deletions, 31 insertions. tsgo clean.
Officer is single-user: the server owner is the only account, created once by
/auth/bootstrap. Everything that existed to serve additional users was
unreachable, so it is gone rather than left looking like it does something.
Accounts: drop the invite / resend-invite / delete / list-users routes and the
Users settings screen, the inert /auth/signup handler, and the account
verification chain it fed (verify, resend-verification, VerifyScreen, the
UserInvite + VerifyAdmin + VerifyRegistration templates). /auth/verify-token
survives for password resets only, and now requires a reset-password token
rather than accepting any signed JWT.
Roles: drop the users.role column and the four-value USER_ROLES enum. The
permissions table granted every role identical methods, and every
role === 'Super Admin' check was permanently true. The JWT no longer carries a
role claim.
Sandbox: remove sidecar/sandbox.ts and its five call sites. bwrap was selected
only for non-Super-Admin users, so it never ran. It was also not a usable agent
jail as written — --share-net, the project root (with .env) bound read-only,
and runuser dropping to the server's own uid. Rebuilding it for agent
containment would be a different construction, and git history keeps this one.
getHomeDir keeps its DATA_PATH meaning; the new getOwnerHomeDir resolves the
owner's real login home, which is what terminals, chats and task runs use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The default /chat working directory is used by both the Claude and OpenCode harnesses
now, so its Claude-specific name was misleading.
- Rename the dir + accessors: getClaudeSessionsCwd → getGeneralChatSessionsCwd,
ensureClaudeSessionsCwd → ensureGeneralChatSessionsCwd, path segment claude_sessions
→ general_chat_sessions (data-path on disk + code + UI labels/comments). No history
migration — the old Claude transcript slug is orphaned (intentionally).
- Remove the vestigial chat_sessions dir (leftover from the retired session store):
it only ever held empty claude/archived/ dirs, recreated by a signin hook. Drop that
hook (+ its dead imports) and the 4 unused data-path accessors (getUserSessionsDir,
getClaudeDir, getSessionDir, getArchivedSessionDir), and delete the dir.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reorganizes email storage: the DB moves from DATA_PATH/<user>/emails.db to
DATA_PATH/<user>/email_accounts/<accountEmail>/emails.db, with a shared
email_accounts/attachment_cache/ (was Gmail/emails/attachments). openEmailDb now
takes (owner, account); a new openUserEmailDb(owner, userId) resolves the user's
configured account (first enabled) for read paths. Threads the account through
email.ts, accounts, resync, queue sync, channel handlers, and the email_db MCP
tool path. Drops the dead getUserEmailDir helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the marketplace service dependency and the native/global/user
scope tiers with a single external directory ($OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR) holding
skills, tools, tasks, processes and extensions as plain files.
- tasks move from Postgres to TASK.md files (new file-backed task layer);
task editing now works, which the DB path never supported
- skills/tools/processes collapse into one shared file router (single dir)
- remove the marketplace client (sync-marketplace/sync-version) and the
boot-time sync; pi-bridge/pi-manager/sandbox point at the flat store
- drop the dead tasks + vestigial skills/tools/processes/extensions +
item_chats tables (migration 0004)
- one-time migration script exports DB tasks and consolidates disk items
Migration verified: all 6 tasks round-trip through the runtime parser
identically to their DB rows (pipeline steps, triggers, script impls and
agentic bodies all intact).
NOTE: not yet functionally tested end-to-end — every item (each task mode,
tool, skill, extension) still needs to be run/exercised in the app before
this is trusted. To be done manually.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First sync still uses IMAP with app password. Subsequent syncs use
Gmail API history.list + messages.get with OAuth for faster, more
reliable incremental sync. Dispatch gmail-sync handler for gmail
accounts instead of generic email-sync. Show sync button for synced
accounts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add saved_sessions table and CRUD endpoints (save, list, resume, update, delete)
- Save is instant (no LLM summarization), stores exact conversation with tool calls
- Resume loads full message history into chat UI, sends transcript to agent on first message
- Auto-save updates DB after every agent response once a session is saved
- Delete old filesystem-based session/group management (sessions router, useChatSessions, useChatGroups)
- Clean up ChatHeader, SessionList, ChatDetailPanel for saved sessions flow
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace JSON file storage with DB tables for dashboard layouts,
screens, projects, and terminal defaults. Fresh drizzle migration
with dashboardDefaults table and new columns on screens/projects.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- rewrite gmail-sync handler: mbsync downloads to local Maildir, then import to sqlite
- add app password field to google integration config and API
- gmail sync section independent from oauth in settings UI
- live mbsync progress streaming to job status
- recoverable failure email with instructions for overquota/auth errors
- sync meta persisted to job on failure for richer notifications
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
auth.json stores api keys, models.json stores local providers directly.
no more copies, sync layers, or per-user config generation.
docker containers mount pi config read-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5