pastilhasandClaude Opus 5 2273941e71 give each member a postgres role instead of a docker daemon
A Postgres login role named the same as their Linux account, with CREATEDB, plus a
~/.pgpass so psql never prompts. This is what replaces rootless Docker: the case it
was really there for was "let me run a database to develop against", and a container
per member answered it with a daemon, an image cache and a subuid range each.

Measured on postgres:18-alpine before writing any of it, because three things I
asserted turned out to be wrong:

  - a fresh LOGIN role CAN connect to `officer` (datacl NULL = PUBLIC has CONNECT),
    but CANNOT read any application table — privileges are owner-only, so
    has_table_privilege('users','UPDATE') is false. The capability model was never
    reachable from here.
  - the `trust` line in pg_hba does not cover host connections: Docker's NAT rewrites
    the source, so they fall through to scram-sha-256. Verified with a wrong password.
  - revoking from the ROLE does nothing. Privileges are additive and there is no DENY;
    only revoking from PUBLIC is a lock.

So ensureAppDatabaseClosed revokes CONNECT+TEMPORARY on the platform's own database
from PUBLIC, and it runs inside provisionPostgresRole rather than in the setup script
— an install set up before today, or restored from a dump, then still cannot end up
with a member who can connect to `officer`.

Password is generated per member, 40 chars, rejection-sampled over an alphanumeric
alphabet: CREATE ROLE is a utility statement and cannot take a bind parameter, so the
safety comes from the alphabet rather than from escaping. Not stored anywhere — it
lives in their 600 ~/.pgpass, the same posture as their SSH key, where we keep only
the public half. Only (re)set when .pgpass is missing, so a reprovision does not
rotate a credential they may have pasted into an app config.

KNOWN RESIDUE, not handled: a database one member creates is metadata-readable by
another. datacl is not inherited from the template (measured: closing template1 and
creating from it still produced NULL), and CREATE DATABASE fires no event trigger, so
nothing can close it at creation. A second member can read table and column NAMES from
the catalogue. They cannot read a row and cannot create anything. Closing it needs a
sweep or a pg_hba rule per member; both are decisions, not details.

Verified live against the running cluster: role creation, refusal on `officer`,
creating and using two databases, and the DROP ... WITH (FORCE) teardown. All probe
roles and databases dropped afterwards.

NOT verified: bunx tsgo, still — node_modules is empty in this tree. The drizzle
return shape was checked by reading PostgresJsQueryResultHKT (RowList<T[]>, extends
Array) rather than by running it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 12:14:02 +00:00
2026-02-16 19:34:35 +00:00
2026-02-16 19:34:35 +00:00
2026-02-16 19:34:35 +00:00
2026-02-22 03:35:26 +00:00
2026-02-16 19:34:35 +00:00
2026-02-16 19:34:35 +00:00

The documentation, triaged

2026-08-13. A map of what is in here, what it is for, and what should happen to it. Made because there are 42 documents and 13,000 lines, and no way to tell from the filenames which describe the system as it is and which are a record of an afternoon in July.

How much I verified: the classifications below are from filenames, status lines, and greps for things that changed on 2026-08-13. Where I actually read the document or checked the code, it says so. The rest is a starting point for a conversation, not a verdict.


Living — these describe the system and must stay true

doc state
working-on-officer.md updated 2026-08-13. Operational guide.
secret-store.md updated 2026-08-13. Built; rotation still open.
install-variants.md new. The branch tree, for discussion.
http-secure-context-audit.md new. What breaks over plain http.
install-container-testing.md new. First container pass and its findings.
per-user-linux-accounts.md partly updated. OFFICER_OS_USERS is gone; check the rest.
navigation-audit.md authoritative on routing. Unverified against tonight's route removals.
workspace-panels.md + workspace-panel-todo.md the panel framework. 1,300 lines combined — likely the biggest cleanup here.
agent-coordination.md the north star for panel work.
deprovision-os-account.md implemented; the 'disabled' stage it may mention was deleted tonight.

Stale — describe things that changed on 2026-08-13

Each of these references something that no longer exists. Not yet corrected.

  • sidecar-topology.md — "ecosystem.config.cjs is the source of truth". It is generated now, and holds six processes.
  • sidecar-app-store.md — derives the catalogue from full light. Those files are gone, and catalogue.test.ts was rewritten.
  • sidecar-bootstrapping.md — "20 PM2 entries, 18 sidecar dirs". Six entries now.
  • mobile-api-keys.md — partly corrected; recheck the origin-checking claims.
  • wallet-key-custody.mdVAULT_STORE_KEY is now the per-purpose wallet key.
  • push-notifications.md — "agreed design, 2026-07-31". Notify is a plugin and unmounted.
  • chat-session-lifetime.md, chat-ui-walkthrough.md — reference officer-agent, renamed.

Historical — a record of a moment, and should stay one

Do not rewrite these to match today's code. They document how a decision was reached, and editing them destroys the reasoning. If they mislead, add a dated header pointing forward.

  • sidecar-audit-2026-07.md (1,377 lines)
  • claude-sidecar-isolation.md — records the officer-claudeofficer-agent rename that preceded tonight's officer-agentofficer-claude-code
  • open-threads-after-per-user-claude.md
  • two-agent-field-report-2026-08-12.md
  • api-method-changes-2026-08-06.md

The opencode cluster — nine documents for one migration

opencode-fork-decision · -parity · -api-2-assessment · -phase0-review · -phase1-report · -phase1-review · -serve-migration-plan · -serve-path · -testing-checklist

The migration landedopencode serve is in the sidecar, verified. So opencode-serve-migration-plan.md saying "Nothing here is implemented" is false.

This is the clearest consolidation candidate in the whole directory: one document recording what was decided and what shipped, replacing nine that describe stages of getting there. I did not do it because it needs reading all nine, and deleting documents unread is not a thing to do at 4am.

The mobile-dav thread — three documents, one conversation

mobile-dav-provisioning · -feedback · -reply. A correspondence. Almost certainly one document.

Unclassified — I have not looked

design-language-interface · file-sync · jobs-unification · mobile-photo-sync-api · nextcloud-replacement · agent-git-identity


The plugin split, which affects most of the above

A core install is six processes. Everything else is a plugin, switched off tonight but present on disk. Most documents here were written when the estate was twenty processes and every one of them was simply "there", so they describe availability that no longer holds.

The useful rewrite is usually one line, not a rewrite: say whether the thing described is core or a plugin, and if a plugin, that it is not mounted on a fresh install.

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