Files
platform/docs/sidecar-bootstrapping.md
T
pastilhas 027b10bd6e step 4/4: the docs say permissions too, and capability means one thing again
44 files of prose — CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, TODO.md, 20 docs, both plugin design
documents, and the comment surface the earlier steps could not reach.

Applied against an explicit keep-list, not swept, because the word turned out to
have SIX meanings in this repository rather than the three the offscale doc
recorded:

  permissions          renamed (steps 1–2)
  $OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities/  KEPT — the item store, and now the only thing
                               the word means that is ours
  sidecar routing keys renamed to `handles` (step 3)
  Lightning wallet     KEPT — a domain term, and on the wire to the mobile apps
  terminfo queries     KEPT — XTGETTCAP, in the pty sidecar
  InvoiceShelf         KEPT — per-resource { write, bulkDelete } flags

The sweep still falsified two things, both caught by checking rather than by
review, and both in prose that discusses more than one meaning at once:

CLAUDE.md began claiming the item store lives at `$OFFICER_ROOT/permissions`.
It does not; that directory is on disk and full of skills and tools.

And the offscale doc's own note about the collision became
"Named `permissions`, NOT `permissions`" — a sentence that had eaten the thing
it existed to warn about.

Both restored, and the note rewritten to say what is now true: capability means
one thing of ours, and three that belong to somebody else's vocabulary.

Verified live after restart: self and admin permission endpoints 200, gated
route 200, agent-status 200, 9 grants intact with 6 permissions offered.
tsgo clean, 797 tests, 787 pass, same 7.

The rename is done. Four steps, no data lost, no client break that survived
the step it was introduced in.
2026-08-15 16:31:11 +00:00

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# Sidecar setup and bootstrapping
**Status: LIVE — this document is being written as the investigation runs.** Sections marked
`[unverified]` are read from code but not exercised; sections marked `[open]` are questions I have not
answered yet. Nothing here proposes a change yet.
Started 2026-08-10. Scope: how a sidecar comes into existence, how it finds officer, how officer finds
it, and what a new one has to do. Everything below was read from the tree or measured on the running
machine, not recalled.
---
## The shape, in one pass
A sidecar is a **PM2 peer of `officer`** — never a child. It dials _in_; officer never spawns it.
```
PM2 starts it → it binds its own ephemeral port (if it serves HTTP)
→ it opens a WS to officer at /api/sidecar/register
→ it sends { type:'register', name, permissions[] }
→ officer replies { type:'registered', id }
→ it sends { type:'<name>:server', port } (HTTP sidecars only)
→ officer remembers the port and proxies <prefix>/* to it
```
Officer's side of that is `src/servers/sidecar-registry.ts`; the sidecar's side is
`src/servers/sidecar/connect.ts`.
**Nothing in this path is officer starting a process.** `waitForPermission` in the registry says so
explicitly — it replaced ~77 lines of spawn-and-poll (`ensureClaudeSidecar`,
`spawnAndWaitForRegistration`, and per-email process maps). The only startup problem left is _ordering_,
handled by waiting up to 15s for a permission to appear rather than failing the first request after boot.
---
## The two kinds
Counted across 18 sidecar directories:
| Kind | How it is reached | Count |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------- | ------------------- |
| **HTTP-proxied** — binds a port, officer forwards `<prefix>/*` | `createSidecarProxy` | 16 |
| **Command-vocabulary** — no HTTP, answers typed commands over the registration socket | `sendCommand` | 2 (`claude`, `vnc`) |
The 16 that report a port each declare a `'<name>:server'` event in `protocol.ts` (verified: exactly 16
such declarations). `claude` and `vnc` report no port — they are driven entirely by commands.
`pty` is the odd one out and is worth stating plainly: it is `index.mjs`, run by **node** rather than
bun, because `node-pty` is a native addon. It does **not** use `connect.ts` and carries its own copy of
the reconnect loop. The ecosystem file says so in a comment, which is the right place for it.
---
## What officer requires of a new sidecar
Four things, and three of them fail loudly if missed.
1. **A PM2 entry** in `ecosystem.config.cjs` (`script: 'bun'`, `args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/<n>/index.ts'`).
2. **A registration** with a `name` and `permissions[]`. Officer indexes by permission, not by name —
`findSidecarByPermission` is how every caller reaches one.
3. **A `'<name>:server'` event in `protocol.ts`**, if it serves HTTP. Without it the type does not exist
and `createSidecarProxy`'s listener never matches.
4. **A permission-registry entry**, if it mounts a router. `assertPermissionTotality` runs in
`server.tsx` _before_ `serve()` and **throws**, so a missing entry means the server refuses to boot,
naming what is missing. Alternatively an `EXEMPT_API_PREFIXES` entry _with a stated reason_.
Item 4 is the one that is a deliberate wall rather than a convention, and the reasoning is recorded in
`totality.ts`: a Member could 403 on `GET /api/tasks` and open `/api/tasks/pipeline/ws` with a 101 in the
same minute, because Bun's route table matches the socket before the `/api/*` catch-all. Refusing to boot
survives the next door being added; a patch does not.
---
## Details worth knowing before changing any of this
**Ports are ephemeral and re-reported on every reconnect.** A sidecar binds `port: 0`, reads the port
back, then releases and rebinds (`getFreePort` — bind, read, `stop(true)`). Officer stores whatever was
last reported. Observed live: the photos sidecar moved 33891 → 34349 → 36337 → 41829 → 33637 across
restarts tonight, and officer followed each time. **A stale port is a 502, not a hang**`getHttpUrl()`
returns null before first registration and the proxy answers 503.
`[unverified]` The bind-read-release in `getFreePort` is a classic TOCTOU: another process can take the
port between release and rebind. Never seen it happen here; noting it because it is a real race, not
because it has bitten.
**Re-registration replaces, it does not duplicate.** `registerSidecar` unregisters any existing sidecar
with the same _name_ first, so a sidecar that reconnects without officer noticing the old socket die
does not leave a ghost.
**Reconnect is the sidecar's job, with backoff**`[200, 500, 1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 15000]`ms in
`connect.ts`. Officer does nothing to bring a sidecar back; PM2 restarts the process, the process
re-dials.
**`API_URL` is derived, not configured.** Every sidecar computes
`process.env.API_URL ?? ws://127.0.0.1:${process.env.PORT ?? '5000'}`. Note the fallback port is **5000**
while this machine runs officer on **9010** — so the default is wrong here and it works only because
`.env` supplies `PORT`. `[open]` Is that fallback ever exercised, and should it be a hard failure
instead of a wrong guess?
**One directory, two processes — and this is the easiest thing here to get wrong.** `sidecar/claude/`
contains two entrypoints that register as _different sidecars_:
| File | PM2 entry | Registers as | What it is |
| ------------------------- | ------------------------- | ------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------- |
| `claude/index.ts` | `officer-anthropic-proxy` | name `proxy`, permission `['proxy']` | Holds the Anthropic credential, forwards API traffic |
| `claude/user-instance.ts` | `officer-agent` | permission `['claude']` | The process that actually spawns `claude` |
So **permission `proxy` is the Anthropic proxy, and permission `claude` is the agent.** Nothing named
"claude" registers the `claude` permission from `claude/index.ts`, which is exactly the sort of thing
that reads as a bug in a grep and is not one.
That resolves the special-casing: `isConnected()` returns "a sidecar with permission `proxy` exists" —
i.e. **the Anthropic proxy is up**, which is _not_ the same as "the agent is up", though the name reads
that way. `[verified]` It currently has **no callers** outside the registry itself, so nothing is
misreading it today. Worth either renaming or deleting before something starts trusting the name.
`registerSidecar` also fires a notification when a registration includes permission `claude`
(`sidecar-registry.ts:75`) — "a new agent process has come up". That one is correctly aimed at the agent.
---
## Duplication, measured
Each HTTP sidecar's `index.ts` independently contains: the `API_URL` line, `getFreePort`, a `Bun.serve`,
an `X-Officer-User` check, a `createSidecarConnector` call, and an `onConnected` that reports the port.
Sizes range 73505 lines (`email` smallest at 73, `music` largest at 505).
`createSidecarProxy` factored out officer's side of this — the comment records that eight copies of the
port capture were byte-identical once the app name was normalised away. **The sidecar side has had no
equivalent factoring.** `[open]` Is a `createSidecarServer` worth it, or is the duplication load-bearing
because each sidecar's routes differ enough that a shared shell would grow options faster than it saved
lines?
---
## Open questions, in the order I would answer them
1. ~~What provides the `proxy` permission~~**answered above**: the Anthropic proxy, not the agent.
`isConnected()` has no callers; rename or delete it before its name misleads someone.
2. **Is the sidecar-side boilerplate worth factoring**, given `create-proxy.ts` already proved the
officer side was?
3. **What happens on a partial boot** — officer up, a sidecar permanently down. `waitForPermission`
throws after 15s; who catches it, and what does the user see?
4. **Is the `PORT ?? '5000'` fallback reachable**, and should it fail loudly instead?
5. **`sweepStaleServes` is `/proc`-based and a no-op on macOS** (already noted in the OpenCode parity
doc as B8). Does any other sidecar have a Linux-only assumption?
---
## Verified facts this document rests on
| Claim | How |
| ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 20 PM2 entries, 18 sidecar dirs | `ecosystem.config.cjs`, `ls src/servers/sidecar/` |
| 16 sidecars report a port, 2 do not | `grep` for `':server'` in each `index.ts`, cross-checked against 16 declarations in `protocol.ts` |
| `pty` is node + `.mjs` + its own reconnect loop | `ecosystem.config.cjs` comment and `ls sidecar/pty/` |
| Officer spawns nothing | `waitForPermission` comment; no spawn call in the registry |
| Ports change across restarts and officer follows | observed live tonight across five photos restarts |
| Boot fails on a missing permission entry | `assertPermissionTotality` throws before `serve()` |
| `sidecar/claude/` is two processes with different permissions | `ecosystem.config.cjs` args + the two `createSidecarConnector` calls |
| `isConnected()` has no callers outside the registry | grep across `src/servers` |