Author SHA1 Message Date
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5 8aaea6bfcc the cost that matters is the useless wake, not the useful one
Most waits find nothing almost always: a daily release check says no 360 days a year, and a branch
watcher wakes on every push including everyone else. So the number to optimise is the useless wake
times how many there will be.

The fix is not a cheaper wake, it is pushing the relevance test into the wait condition so that firing
implies relevance. Wait on a push THAT CONTAINS a COMMS file, not on a push. Wait on a version string
that differs, not on a page that changed. Both are shell tests with no model in them.

Three tiers, most events dying at the first: shell condition (free), fresh minimal agent (one small
cold read), escalate with real context (a full read of a long session). A context-inheriting fork that
returns nothing to the parent is tier two done well, but it is still a read, so it is the fallback for
when relevance needs judgement rather than the default.

For the platform this means a condition belongs in the declaration, not in the agent that wakes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 00:45:59 +00:00
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5 b9fce2aeb6 draft: waits as a primitive, not an agent-comms trick
The field report describes the watcher for one purpose — one agent waiting on another's push. That is
where it was discovered, not where it belongs. Same shape answers: wait for the job, wait for the
container, wait for the credential file, wait for a human to reply.

What this adds over the field report:

  the cost model as a formula   idle is free forever; a wait costs `fires x context-at-the-time`, and
                                every wake is uncached by construction because the prompt cache TTL is
                                ~5 min and nothing worth waiting for resolves that fast
  block > poll > model          most things Officer waits on can be blocked on rather than polled.
                                inotify for a file, tail --pid for a process, docker events, IMAP IDLE,
                                and — highest leverage and unbuilt — postgres LISTEN/NOTIFY, since
                                nearly everything here is already a row in one database
  an exit-code contract         0 fired / 1 timed out / 2 broke. 1 and 2 must not be conflated: "nothing
                                happened" and "I stopped being able to tell" are opposite facts, and
                                absence reads as reassurance
  lifetimes                     if the payload plus the repo is enough to act on, do not keep a session
                                alive to receive it. Event-spawned short-lived agents cost a constant
                                amount per event; resident ones cost more every time

Draft. One mechanism proven (the git poll, fired twice tonight); the contract and the Officer use-case
table are specification. Marked measured vs reasoned throughout.

On a branch, not master: the master checkout is pinned behind the remote while the server runs from it,
and pushing master would also trip the watcher currently armed on it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 00:31:07 +00:00
193 changed files with 2003 additions and 5595 deletions
+18 -16
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@@ -1,27 +1,29 @@
# What officer-setup writes. Everything below this block is optional, or is on its way out.
PORT=9000
BROWSER_RELAY_PORT=18792
POSTGRES_URL="postgres://postgres:password@localhost:5432/officer"
# Where Officer is reached from a browser — the one value the machine cannot derive. Read by
# `bun gen:index` (OpenGraph tags, which need an absolute URL), the task API host, and the CalDAV iOS
# profile builder, which additionally requires https.
#
# `bun gen:index https://other.example.com` overrides it for one run without editing this file.
PUBLIC_URL=http://localhost:9000
# ── Moving to the secret store ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Still REQUIRED — jwt.ts throws at module load without JWT_SECRET, and crypto.ts throws without
# VAULT_STORE_KEY — but officer-setup no longer writes either. They are moving into the SQLite key
# store (docs/secret-store.md), which is designed and not yet built, so an install made by the
# current script will not boot until it is. That is deliberate sequencing, not an oversight.
JWT_SECRET="<generate with: openssl rand -base64 32>"
# ── No secrets live here ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# JWT_SECRET and VAULT_STORE_KEY were here until 2026-08-13. Every encryption and signing key now
# lives in the secret store — a 0600 SQLite file at $OFFICER_ROOT/secrets/officer-keys.db, one key
# per purpose, created on first use. See docs/secret-store.md.
# NOT Vaultwarden's, despite the name and where it used to sit — it is the platform's at-rest key,
# encrypting every secret column in Postgres: Headscale admin API keys, app-store service
# credentials, Jellyfin tokens, wallet node credentials, and the wallet seed envelope on top of the
# owner passphrase that seals it.
#
# The reason is blast radius rather than secrecy: bun auto-loads this file into ALL of the pm2
# processes, so a key here is readable from /proc/<pid>/environ of twenty processes that mostly have
# no business with it — officer-music held the key that decrypts wallet seed envelopes.
#
# BACK UP THAT FILE. Losing it signs everyone out and makes every encrypted column in Postgres
# unreadable, and for the wallet seed that is unrecoverable.
# CHANGING IT MAKES ALL OF THAT UNREADABLE AT ONCE, and for the seed that is unrecoverable: the
# passphrase opens the inner envelope and this is the outer one.
VAULT_STORE_KEY="<generate with: openssl rand -base64 32>"
# ── Optional ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Where Officer is reached from a browser. Read by origin validation, the task API host check, and
# the CalDAV iOS profile builder — which is the only one that hard-requires it, and demands https.
# PUBLIC_URL=https://officer.example.com
# Guards (CORS origin checks, rate limits, password-strength rules) are ON unless this is set to
# "dev" or "development". Unset is hardened, which is why officer-setup no longer writes it — set it
# by hand, on a local machine you trust, to develop. Note that `bun dev` does NOT set it: that script
-5
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@@ -58,8 +58,3 @@ public/plugins/
# Written by officer-setup.sh; per-machine.
scripts/setup/officer-setup/.setup-progress
# Generated by officer-setup, describing THIS install's processes. Never committed:
# the repository has no ecosystem file at all any more, and the next machine
# generates its own. See scripts/setup/officer-setup/lib/services.sh.
ecosystem.config.cjs
+23 -56
View File
@@ -16,23 +16,13 @@ written: `users` holds six rows. The accurate statement is narrower and more use
- **Other accounts get only what their ROLE is granted.** Roles are `Admin`, `Member`, `Developer`;
grants live in `role_capabilities`, keyed on role, never on user. Absence denies — there is no row
meaning "no", so an empty table is a server where members reach nothing but their own profile.
- **Some things can never be shared, structurally.** Tasks, items, desktop and browser are
`kind: 'execution'`: they run as the owner's OS user in the owner's home, so there is no level of
"read" that makes them safe. They have no level at all and the grants API refuses to store one.
- **And some are shared only because the kernel enforces it.** Terminal, chat and files are
`kind: 'confined'`, added 2026-08-11 with per-user Linux accounts. They still touch the filesystem
and still run processes — but not the *owner's*, because the account has its own Linux user, its own
home, and the kernel refusing everything above it.
- **Some things can never be shared, structurally.** Terminal, chat, tasks, files, desktop and browser
are `kind: 'execution'` in the capability registry: they run as the owner's OS user in the owner's
home, so there is no level of "read" that makes them safe. They have no level at all and the grants
API refuses to store one.
The distinction earns its keep in one place: **a confined grant means nothing without that Linux
user.** `authorize.ts` drops it for an account whose `osUser` is null, so "granted but unconfined"
resolves to no access rather than to the owner's home — which is what it would otherwise resolve to,
since `getOwnerHomeDir` ignores the email it is passed. That rule lives there once and covers the
HTTP routes, the websocket doors and the dock together.
So "which user is this" has a real answer for the **app** surface (gitea, music, photos, email,
calendar…) and for the **confined** one (terminal, chat, files), and is still always "the owner" for
anything under `execution`.
So "which user is this" now has a real answer for the **app** surface (gitea, music, photos, email,
calendar…), and is still always "the owner" for anything that executes code or touches the disk.
`src/servers/capabilities/registry.ts` is the authority and reads as the design document for this.
**Mounting a router without a registry entry makes the server refuse to boot** — see "Capabilities"
@@ -52,20 +42,18 @@ One Bun process (`src/server.tsx`) serves everything:
- eight WebSocket providers — terminal, chat, task-runner, pipeline, cliamp, cliamp-audio, desktop,
vault — plus a sidecar registration socket. `terminal` is a byte relay onto the pty sidecar's own
listener, not a translating bridge; `vault` is the same shape onto Vaultwarden's notifications hub.
- ~~a browser relay on its own port~~ — switched off 2026-08-13, awaiting extraction into a plugin.
The extension and `api/browser/` stay on disk; the listener and the `/api/browser` mount do not.
- a browser relay on its own port (`BROWSER_RELAY_PORT`, default 18792)
Long-running and privileged work lives in **sidecars**: separate processes that dial back in over
`/api/sidecar/register` and are tracked in `src/servers/sidecar-registry.ts`. PM2 runs them
(the generated `ecosystem.config.cjs` — see below): `officer` (the server), `officer-anthropic-proxy`, `officer-claude-code`,
(`ecosystem.config.cjs`): `officer` (the server), `officer-anthropic-proxy`, `officer-agent`,
`officer-opencode`, `officer-email`, `officer-pty`, `officer-vnc`, `officer-music`, `officer-vault`,
`officer-slskd`, `officer-headscale`, `officer-transmission`, `officer-invoiceshelf`, `officer-wallet`,
`officer-photos`, `officer-notify`, `officer-caldav`, `officer-memos`, `officer-jellyfin`, `officer-gitea`
— twenty as of 2026-08-06, and a list that goes stale every time a sidecar lands. `pm2 jlist` is the
source of truth.
**`officer-anthropic-proxy` and `officer-claude-code` are not the same thing.** (The second was
called `officer-agent` until 2026-08-13; older docs use that name.) The proxy holds the Anthropic
**`officer-anthropic-proxy` and `officer-agent` are not the same thing.** The proxy holds the Anthropic
credential and forwards API traffic; the agent is the process that spawns `claude`. They were one entry
named `officer-claude` until the sidecar-isolation work — which is exactly how the false claim that
"restarting officer doesn't disturb the agent" survived so long. Every sidecar is a PM2 peer of
@@ -124,27 +112,16 @@ imported by their package name (`officerdev`, `hooks`, `state`, `types`, `helper
Two stores, and the split matters:
**Postgres** (`src/databases/officer_db`) holds the account, passkeys, settings, dashboards,
email accounts, queue and pipeline jobs. One directory per feature holding `schema.ts` and
`queries.ts` beside each other; `src/schema.ts` is what `db:push` reads, and it lists the core tables
with the plugin ones commented out. Types inferred from the schema in `src/types.ts`.
email accounts, queue and pipeline jobs. Schema in `src/schema/`, hand-written queries in
`src/queries/`, types inferred from the schema in `src/types.ts`.
**The filesystem** holds everything the agent authors. `OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR` (`$OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities`)
contains one directory per item under `skills/`, `tools/`, `tasks/`, `processes/`, `extensions/` — no
database rows, no scope tiers. `DATA_PATH/<email>/` holds the managed home, attachments and the
per-account email SQLite stores — those are the **email sidecar's**, and nothing in the platform opens
them.
**None of those paths is configured.** Since 2026-08-13 `src/servers/data-path.ts` derives the install
root as `resolve(process.cwd(), '..')` and hangs `data/`, `capabilities/` and `dockers/` off it. That
replaced `DATA_PATH`, `OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR` and `HOME_DIR` in `.env` — three values that had to agree with
each other and with the tree on disk. `assertInstallLayout` refuses to boot when the working directory
is not the repo, because otherwise a wrong `cwd` relocates the whole install silently rather than
failing.
Note `getHomeDir` (the managed home under `DATA_PATH`, now used only for NON-owner accounts and by
pipeline-executor) versus `getOwnerHomeDir` (the owner's real login home, where terminals, chats and
task runs execute — captured from `homedir()` once at module load, and it ignores the email it is
passed).
**The filesystem** holds everything the agent authors. `OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR` contains one directory
per item under `skills/`, `tools/`, `tasks/`, `processes/`, `extensions/` — no database rows, no
scope tiers. `DATA_PATH/<email>/` holds the managed home, attachments and the per-account email SQLite
stores — those are the **email sidecar's**, and nothing in the platform opens them. Path helpers live in
`src/servers/data-path.ts`; note `getHomeDir` (the managed home under
`DATA_PATH`) versus `getOwnerHomeDir` (the owner's real login home when `HOME_DIR` is set, which is
where terminals, chats and task runs actually execute).
### Schema changes use `push`, not migrations
@@ -186,13 +163,11 @@ valid"). It is `_middlewares/capability-gate.ts` → `capabilities/authorize.ts`
ahead of everything, and it re-verifies the token itself so it covers routes that never mount
`userMiddleware`.
- `capabilities/registry.ts` — the single enumeration of what the platform can do, in five kinds:
`core` (every account, not deniable), `app` (**the grantable surface**), `confined` (grantable, but
only to an account that has a Linux user), `execution` and `admin` (owner only, and `execution` is
never grantable at any level). 27 entries as of 2026-08-13.
- `capabilities/registry.ts` — the single enumeration of what the platform can do, in four kinds:
`core` (every account, not deniable), `app` (**the grantable surface**), `execution` and `admin`
(owner only, and `execution` is never grantable at any level).
- `capabilities/authorize.ts` — resolves "may this account do this". Owner short-circuits first; every
other answer is role grants plus core, with `execution`/`admin` stripped even if a row grants them,
and `confined` stripped for an account with no `osUser`.
other answer is role grants plus core, with `execution`/`admin` stripped even if a row grants them.
**Every catch returns deny.** Grants are cached by role and the cache's whole invalidation contract
is `invalidateRoleGrants`, called by the one writer in `api/users/capabilities-routes.ts`.
- `capabilities/totality.ts``assertCapabilityTotality` runs in `server.tsx` **before `serve()` and
@@ -219,17 +194,9 @@ bunx tsgo # typecheck (not tsc)
bun test # tests
bun format # prettier over every dirty file — see the note below before running it
bun db:push # apply the schema to Postgres
bun setup # runs scripts/install.sh — blank machine to running platform
bun setup # guided install (writes .env, incl. PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV=production)
```
`scripts/install.sh` is only an orchestrator — it runs the two halves in order and does nothing itself:
`setup/machine-setup/machine-setup.sh` (28 sections: packages, tailnet, runtimes, docker, shell) then
`setup/officer-setup.sh` (11: pre-flight, layout, repository, dependencies, database, environment, secrets,
schema, build, services, verify). Either runs alone — `--machine-only`, `--officer-only`, or by path — because
a machine you already trust needs only the second. Both are re-runnable: each records the steps it finished
and skips them, so stopping halfway costs nothing. **Run it as yourself**; it re-execs through `sudo` when it
needs to, and on macOS never does, because Homebrew refuses to run as root.
Sidecar control is PM2, not npm scripts: `pm2 restart officer-<name>`, `pm2 logs officer-<name>`.
See `docs/working-on-officer.md` for which process a given change needs restarted.
-84
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@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
# The documentation, triaged
**2026-08-13.** A map of what is in here, what it is for, and what should happen to it. Made because
there are 42 documents and 13,000 lines, and no way to tell from the filenames which describe the
system as it is and which are a record of an afternoon in July.
**How much I verified:** the classifications below are from filenames, status lines, and greps for
things that changed on 2026-08-13. Where I actually read the document or checked the code, it says
so. The rest is a starting point for a conversation, not a verdict.
---
## Living — these describe the system and must stay true
| doc | state |
| --- | --- |
| `working-on-officer.md` | **updated 2026-08-13.** Operational guide. |
| `secret-store.md` | **updated 2026-08-13.** Built; rotation still open. |
| `install-variants.md` | new. The branch tree, for discussion. |
| `http-secure-context-audit.md` | new. What breaks over plain http. |
| `install-container-testing.md` | new. First container pass and its findings. |
| `per-user-linux-accounts.md` | partly updated. `OFFICER_OS_USERS` is gone; check the rest. |
| `navigation-audit.md` | authoritative on routing. Unverified against tonight's route removals. |
| `workspace-panels.md` + `workspace-panel-todo.md` | the panel framework. 1,300 lines combined — likely the biggest cleanup here. |
| `agent-coordination.md` | the north star for panel work. |
| `deprovision-os-account.md` | implemented; the `'disabled'` stage it may mention was deleted tonight. |
## Stale — describe things that changed on 2026-08-13
Each of these references something that no longer exists. **Not yet corrected.**
- `sidecar-topology.md` — "ecosystem.config.cjs is the source of truth". It is generated now, and
holds six processes.
- `sidecar-app-store.md` — derives the catalogue from `full light`. Those files are gone, and
`catalogue.test.ts` was rewritten.
- `sidecar-bootstrapping.md` — "20 PM2 entries, 18 sidecar dirs". Six entries now.
- `mobile-api-keys.md` — partly corrected; recheck the origin-checking claims.
- `wallet-key-custody.md``VAULT_STORE_KEY` is now the per-purpose `wallet` key.
- `push-notifications.md` — "agreed design, 2026-07-31". Notify is a plugin and unmounted.
- `chat-session-lifetime.md`, `chat-ui-walkthrough.md` — reference `officer-agent`, renamed.
## Historical — a record of a moment, and should stay one
Do **not** rewrite these to match today's code. They document how a decision was reached, and
editing them destroys the reasoning. If they mislead, add a dated header pointing forward.
- `sidecar-audit-2026-07.md` (1,377 lines)
- `claude-sidecar-isolation.md` — records the `officer-claude``officer-agent` rename that
preceded tonight's `officer-agent``officer-claude-code`
- `open-threads-after-per-user-claude.md`
- `two-agent-field-report-2026-08-12.md`
- `api-method-changes-2026-08-06.md`
## The opencode cluster — nine documents for one migration
`opencode-fork-decision` · `-parity` · `-api-2-assessment` · `-phase0-review` · `-phase1-report` ·
`-phase1-review` · `-serve-migration-plan` · `-serve-path` · `-testing-checklist`
**The migration landed**`opencode serve` is in the sidecar, verified. So
`opencode-serve-migration-plan.md` saying "Nothing here is implemented" is false.
This is the clearest consolidation candidate in the whole directory: one document recording what was
decided and what shipped, replacing nine that describe stages of getting there. I did not do it
because it needs reading all nine, and deleting documents unread is not a thing to do at 4am.
## The mobile-dav thread — three documents, one conversation
`mobile-dav-provisioning` · `-feedback` · `-reply`. A correspondence. Almost certainly one document.
## Unclassified — I have not looked
`design-language-interface` · `file-sync` · `jobs-unification` · `mobile-photo-sync-api` ·
`nextcloud-replacement` · `agent-git-identity`
---
## The plugin split, which affects most of the above
A core install is six processes. **Everything else is a plugin**, switched off tonight but present on
disk. Most documents here were written when the estate was twenty processes and every one of them was
simply "there", so they describe availability that no longer holds.
The useful rewrite is usually one line, not a rewrite: say whether the thing described is **core** or
**a plugin**, and if a plugin, that it is not mounted on a fresh install.
+250
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@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
# Waits: how an agent waits for something without burning context
**Status:** draft, 2026-08-13. One mechanism proven (git remote polling, run twice); everything else here is
specification and reasoning. Claims are marked **measured** or **reasoned** — do not let that slip.
`docs/two-agent-field-report-2026-08-12.md` describes this for one purpose: one agent waiting on another's
push. That was where it was discovered, not where it belongs. This file is about the primitive itself,
because the same shape answers "wait for CI", "wait for the job to finish", "wait for the container to go
healthy", "wait for a reply", and a dozen other things Officer already needs.
---
## The primitive
> A **wait** is a harness-owned process that blocks until a condition holds, then exits — and whose exit
> re-invokes the agent.
Three properties. Drop any one and it breaks in a way that is not visible from watching it run:
1. **The waiting happens below the model.** No inference per tick. The agent is suspended.
2. **The harness owns the process**, so its exit is an event the harness delivers. A process the harness is
not tracking can finish perfectly and tell nobody.
3. **It exits when it has something to say.** The exit *is* the notification. A wait that detects and keeps
running has informed no one.
Everything below follows from those three.
---
## The cost model, which decides everything else
This is the part that is easy to get half-right, and half-right is what leads people to build the expensive
version.
| | cost |
|---|---|
| a tick while waiting | **nothing** — no model runs |
| a thousand ticks | **nothing** |
| **each wake** | a full context read, uncached |
**Measured** (field report, 2026-08-12): an idle watcher produced 85 bytes over seven minutes with zero
inference. **Measured** tonight: two fires, each costing exactly one wake.
**Reasoned, and the part usually missed:** a wake re-reads the entire conversation, and conversations only
grow. So the cost of a wait is not `duration` — it is `fires × context-at-the-time`. Idle is free forever;
the tenth notification in a long session costs several times the first.
Worse, waits are the exact workload the prompt cache cannot help. The TTL is about five minutes; anything
worth waiting for takes longer than that. **Every wake is an uncached read, by construction.**
Two consequences that should drive design:
- **Say less on wake.** The output that survives to the wake enters the context permanently. One line per
tick over 24h is 2,880 lines that land at once and then stay.
- **Prefer many short sessions to one long one.** A wait in a fresh session costs a constant amount per
event. The same wait in an immortal session costs monotonically more. This is the single strongest
argument for event-driven agents over resident ones.
---
## Prefer blocking over polling. Prefer events over both.
The git watcher polls because a git remote can only be *asked*. Most things Officer waits on are not like
that, and a poll is the worst of the three options that usually exist.
**Tier 1 — block on the kernel.** Zero syscalls while waiting, and detection is immediate rather than
average-half-an-interval late.
| waiting for | how to block |
|---|---|
| a file appearing or changing | `inotifywait -q -e close_write,create,moved_to <path>` |
| a process to exit | `tail --pid=<pid> -f /dev/null` |
| a lock to release | `flock <file> true` |
| a line on a pipe or log | `read -r line < <fifo>` |
| an inbound HTTP callback | a listener that blocks on `accept()` |
| whichever of several finishes first | `wait -n` over background pids |
**Tier 2 — block on the service.** Some services will hold a connection open and tell you.
| waiting for | how |
|---|---|
| a row to change | Postgres `LISTEN` / `NOTIFY` — the connection blocks, the database pushes |
| new mail | IMAP `IDLE` |
| a container to change state | `docker events --filter …` (streams, blocks) |
| a systemd unit | `systemctl --wait` / journal follow |
Officer keeps almost everything in one Postgres. `LISTEN`/`NOTIFY` is therefore the highest-leverage
unbuilt piece here: job completion, a new chat message, a status flip, all become blocking waits with no
polling anywhere.
**Tier 3 — poll, because the source can only be asked.** A git remote, a third-party HTTP API, a health
endpoint. Then the rules are: read-only calls (`git ls-remote`, never `git fetch` — a fetch mutates refs
under a working tree that may be mid-edit), a `timeout` on every call so a hung network call cannot leave
the wait alive and blind, and an interval matched to how fast the thing actually changes.
**Never poll in the model.** A scheduled wake-up, a `/loop 30s`, a "check every minute" — these are the same
shape wearing the same clothes and they pay a full uncached context read *per tick* to learn nothing. This
is the intuitive design and its expense is invisible, which is why it needs saying first.
---
## Make firing mean something
The rest of this file is about how to wait cheaply. This section is about the other half, and it is the one
that decides whether a fleet of these is affordable.
**Most waits find nothing, almost always.** A daily release check answers "no" 360 days a year. A branch
watcher wakes on every push, including everyone else's. So the number that matters is not the cost of a
useful wake — it is the cost of a useless one, multiplied by how many there will be.
The fix is not a cheaper wake. It is to **push the relevance test into the wait condition**, so that firing
already implies relevance:
- **Do not** wait on "a push", then wake and check whether it carries a `COMMS/<branch>/NN-*.md`. Wait on a
push *that contains one* — a filename test the shell can do with no model at all.
- **Do not** wait on "the releases page changed", then wake and read it. Wait on "the version string differs
from my cursor" — a string compare.
Three tiers, and almost everything should die at the first:
| tier | cost | for |
|---|---|---|
| **shell condition** | zero | anything expressible as a filename, a diff, a version, a status |
| **fresh minimal agent** | one small cold read | relevance genuinely needs judgement, but not history |
| **escalate with real context** | a full read of a long session | the event has to be interpreted against what came before |
A session fork that inherits context but returns nothing to it (Claude Code's `/btw`) is tier two done well.
It is still a context read, so it is the fallback when a shell test cannot express relevance — not the
default.
**Corollary for the platform:** a wait's condition should be part of its declaration, not something the agent
evaluates after waking. `wait for: push to <branch> touching COMMS/**` is a cheaper and more honest thing to
build than `wait for: push` plus an agent that decides.
## The contract a wait must honour
Specification. None of this is built yet.
**Exit codes are the vocabulary.**
```
0 fired — the condition holds; payload on stdout
1 timed out — the bounded lifetime elapsed, nothing happened
2 broke — the wait itself failed and is no longer trustworthy
```
`1` and `2` must be distinguishable. "Nothing happened" and "I stopped being able to tell" are opposite
facts and a wait that conflates them is worse than no wait, because absence reads as reassurance.
**Output is a payload, not a log.** One line on arm so there is a record of what was watched; silence while
waiting; a minimal structured payload on fire. Everything printed is permanent context.
**A cursor, persisted.** The wait is armed at a position — a SHA, a byte offset, a row id, a timestamp — and
that position belongs on disk, not only in the process. Then a re-arm after a restart neither misses events
nor re-reports old ones. The git watcher currently holds its base only in memory, which is why a session
restart loses the thread.
**Bounded lifetime, and the bound is not "forever".** `seq 1 2880` is a runaway backstop, not a policy. A
wait that times out should re-arm from its cursor rather than die silently.
**Liveness must be externally checkable.** A dead wait and a quiet one are indistinguishable, and that
ambiguity has already cost two missed pushes. Cheapest fix: touch a heartbeat file each tick, so `mtime`
answers "is it alive" without asking the process. In a UI that shows running processes — as Officer's chat
does — the chip itself is the signal, which is a real advantage and should be kept.
**Idempotent re-arm, and self-trip protection.** An agent that acts and then wakes on its own action is a
loop. Re-arm from the position *after* your own change, and never run two waits on the same condition.
---
## Where this applies in Officer
The reason to generalise. Each of these is a place something currently either blocks a turn, gets polled by
a human, or is discovered late.
| wait | tier | notes |
|---|---|---|
| a pipeline/script job finishes | 1 or 2 | `data/jobs/<id>.log` is a file — inotify. Or `NOTIFY` on the row |
| a download completes | 1 | same, and the progress sentinel already exists |
| a container becomes healthy | 2 | `docker events` |
| a member logs into `claude` for the first time | 1 | `~/.claude/.credentials.json` appearing — currently polled by `/agent-status` |
| new mail arrives | 2 | IMAP IDLE, in the email sidecar |
| CI, a deploy, a remote build | 3 | poll, with a timeout |
| a push to any repo | 3 today, **event tomorrow** | Gitea is ours: a webhook removes the wait entirely |
| a long `db:push` or migration finishes | 1 | process wait |
| disk crosses a threshold | 3 | slow-moving; poll infrequently |
| **a human replies** | 1 | an approval gate: the agent arms a wait and stops costing anything until answered |
That last row is the one worth dwelling on. An agent that needs a decision currently either blocks a session
or asks and forgets. A wait makes "stopped, pending your answer" cost nothing while it lasts.
---
## Choosing a lifetime
| shape | when | cost |
|---|---|---|
| **wait inside a live session** | the agent holds context the event needs interpreting against | free while idle, growing per fire |
| **wait, then hand off** | context matters up to the fire, not after | one growing session, then reset |
| **no wait — event spawns a fresh agent** | the event carries everything needed (a SHA, a job id) | constant per event, forever |
The third is the destination for anything recurring. The first is right for tonight's watcher, where the
value is that I already know what the commits mean.
The rule: **if the payload plus the repo is enough to act on, do not keep a session alive to receive it.**
---
## Failure modes
| pattern | what it looks like |
|---|---|
| **launched outside the harness** | `nohup … &` — runs, detects, exits, and no one is told. Looks perfect |
| **model-driven poll** | correct behaviour, full context read per tick |
| **detects but does not exit** | prints "found it" into a file nobody reads |
| **chatty** | per-tick output, deferred, all landing at once on wake |
| **silent death** | session restarts, wait dies, quiet branch and dead watcher look identical |
| **self-trip** | agent's own push wakes it, usually because an old wait was never stopped |
| **timeout mistaken for quiet** | exit 1 treated as "nothing happened" when it means "I stopped looking" |
| **mutating poll** | `git fetch` in a loop, moving refs under a working tree |
---
## Open questions
1. **Is a wait a platform feature or an agent habit?** Officer has a job runner, a Gitea instance and a
sidecar pattern. `POST /waits {condition, payload}` returning when it fires is a plausible platform
primitive — and would make waits available to capabilities, not only to agents.
2. **What arms a wait for an agent that is not running?** The webhook shape needs the platform to spawn the
agent, which is `send-claude-code` plus a trigger. Most of that exists.
3. **Should waits be declarative?** `wait for: file:<path>` / `pg:notify:<channel>` / `git:<remote>/<branch>`
— a small vocabulary compiled to the right tier, so nobody hand-writes a poll for something inotify could
have blocked on.
4. **How does a wait survive a session restart** without either missing its event or re-firing on an old
one? The cursor answers half of it; the other half is who re-arms.
5. **What is the right granularity of notification?** One wake per push, or one wake per batch after a quiet
period? Batching trades latency for context, and context is the scarce thing.
---
## Provenance
The mechanism, the three properties and the four wrong ways to launch it come from
`docs/two-agent-field-report-2026-08-12.md`, which recorded them after they were learned the hard way. What
this file adds is the cost model stated as a formula rather than an anecdote, the block-over-poll hierarchy,
the exit-code contract, and the argument that the destination is event-spawned short-lived agents rather
than resident ones.
Nothing in "the contract" or "where this applies" has been implemented. The only thing running today is a
tier-3 git poll, which is the good version of the wrong shape.
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# What breaks over plain http
**Audited 2026-08-13**, after `crypto.randomUUID` took the chat page down at the end of every turn.
Officer is reached at `http://officer-dev:9000` — a tailnet address, so **neither https nor
localhost**, and therefore not a [secure context]. A set of browser APIs are unavailable there by
specification, not by policy, and there is no flag that changes it.
The failure mode is what makes this worth a document. Two of the three shapes below are silent:
| shape | what a user sees |
| --- | --- |
| `crypto.randomUUID()` | `TypeError` — and if it is inside a `useState` initialiser, the whole tree unmounts |
| `navigator.clipboard.writeText()` | `TypeError`, killing the click handler |
| `navigator.clipboard?.writeText()` | **nothing at all** — the button reports success and copies nothing |
The optional-chained one is the worst: indistinguishable from working until somebody pastes.
---
## Fixed
### `crypto.randomUUID` — 18 call sites
Secure-context only. `crypto.getRandomValues` is **not** — it lives on `Crypto` rather than
`SubtleCrypto` — so `helpers/random-id.ts` builds the same v4 UUID from the same CSPRNG when
`randomUUID` is absent. Same entropy, same version and variant bits.
### `navigator.clipboard.writeText` — 20 call sites across 18 files
Secure-context only. `helpers/clipboard.ts` falls back to `document.execCommand('copy')` over an
off-screen textarea, which predates the secure-context rule and works on any origin. Deprecated and
working beats modern and absent.
One call site carried the comment *"Officer is always behind HTTPS"*. It was not.
---
## Cannot be fixed this way
### `navigator.clipboard.read()` — pasting a file in the file browser
No fallback exists. `document.execCommand('paste')` was never permitted from script, so on an
insecure origin there is no way to pull clipboard contents on demand — only a real paste event the
user initiates, which is a different interaction. Now guarded by `canReadClipboard()` and refuses
with an explanation instead of throwing.
### `getUserMedia` — audio recording, 4 files
`apps/Chat/useAudioRecording.ts`, `apps/FileBrowser/.../DictateDialog.tsx`,
`apps/QrTransfer/Receiver.tsx`, and a test. Requires a secure context and cannot be polyfilled — the
browser will not hand out a microphone or camera over http.
**Being removed** rather than guarded: the owner uses an external dictation app. Note `QrTransfer`
uses it for the CAMERA rather than a microphone, so removing "audio" does not cover it — that one
needs its own decision.
### `navigator.credentials` — passkeys
WebAuthn is secure-context only. `helpers/passkeys.ts` exists and cannot work over http, whatever is
done to it. Not currently reachable, so nothing is broken today.
---
## Checked and clear
- **`crypto.subtle`** — not used anywhere in the frontend. This was the one worth confirming, since
it would have had no cheap fallback.
- **`Notification`** — the six matches are type names, not the browser API. Nothing calls
`new Notification` or `requestPermission`.
- **Service workers, WebUSB, WebSerial, WebBluetooth, Payment Request, Wake Lock, Storage Manager,
`SharedArrayBuffer`** — not used.
- **`navigator.geolocation`** (`widgets/Weather`) — secure-context only, but already guarded with
`if (!navigator.geolocation) return;`, so it degrades rather than throws. The widget simply cannot
locate you over http.
- **`navigator.share`** (`Headscale/InvitesView`) — already guarded with a `typeof` check, and its
comment notes it is absent on desktop browsers anyway.
- **WebSockets, IndexedDB, localStorage, EventSource** — no secure-context restriction. Chat,
terminal and the sidecar transports are unaffected.
---
## The alternative
All of this disappears with a certificate, and `tailscale cert` issues a real one for the MagicDNS
name in about one command — no public DNS, no port 80 challenge, no renewal to remember. Worth
knowing that the choice here was "make it work over http", not "http is the only option".
[secure context]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Secure_Contexts
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# Testing the installer in containers
**2026-08-13.** First pass. Ubuntu 24.04, Debian 12, Arch, Fedora 41.
## What passed
**OS and package-manager detection is correct on all four.**
| image | `OS` | `PM` |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ubuntu:24.04 | `ubuntu` | `apt` |
| debian:12 | `debian` | `apt` |
| archlinux | `arch` | `pacman` |
| fedora:41 | `fedora` | `dnf` |
**`--help` and argument handling work unprivileged** in a clean container, before any escalation.
**The install report is written**, end to end, in a container that had never seen this code. That is
task 1's mechanism confirmed outside the machine it was written on.
**Refusing beats hanging.** With no answer available the run stopped with
`FAIL: No answer. Set ASSUME_YES=1 to run without prompts.` rather than blocking forever on a prompt
nobody could see. That is the behaviour an unattended run needs, and it already exists.
---
## What it found
### 1. `--only` does not isolate a step
Running `--only "Core utils"` still **created a user account**, because `ask_username` and the
account creation happen in the preamble, above the step framework. Everything before the first
`step` call runs on every invocation.
Defensible — every step needs to know who it is installing for — but it means `--only` is not the
surgical tool it appears to be, and a first-time reader will assume it is. Either the preamble
becomes lazy, or `--only` says plainly what it will still do.
### 2. `.setup-answers` travels with a copy of the tree
It lives at `scripts/setup/machine-setup/.setup-answers`, is correctly gitignored, and is `0600`
root-owned. But it is **inside the repository directory**, so `cp -r` or a tarball of the tree
carries it — which is exactly what happened here: a container that had never run setup came up
already knowing the username `pastilhas` and created that account.
Not a leak (username and install path, nothing secret). It is a surprise, and surprises in an
installer are the expensive kind. Worth moving outside the repo, next to the progress file.
### 3. `adduser` leaks its own prompts
```
Use of uninitialized value $answer in pattern match (m//) at /usr/sbin/adduser line 848.
Try again? [y/N]
```
The account-creation path reaches an interactive `adduser` question the script does not answer.
Harmless here because the run stopped anyway, but on a real unattended install this is a hang.
---
## Coverage this cannot reach
Containers have no init by default, so **`systemctl`, netplan, ufw and the sshd drop-ins were not
exercised**. Those sections can only be verified as "wrote the right file", not "the service came
up". Running privileged containers with systemd would close most of that gap and is the obvious next
step.
**Docker-in-Docker** was not attempted, so the Docker section and Postgres provisioning are
untested. Mounting the host socket would test the section's logic while telling us nothing about the
install path.
**macOS is untestable here entirely.** The 17 skipped sections, the Homebrew paths, the Xcode
command line tools step and the refusal-to-run-as-root are all reasoned from documentation and
unverified by execution.
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# The install page, and the scripts behind it
**Status: for discussion, 2026-08-13.** Nothing here is built. It exists so tomorrow's conversation
is about real branches rather than sketched ones — every question below is one the scripts already
ask today.
## The shape agreed
- One **source** — the interactive scripts as they are.
- A **build script** that compiles them into single files, because `curl | bash` cannot fetch libs.
- The build emits **one script per leaf** of the question tree, not one script with pre-seeded
answers. A person auditing before running reads only their own path.
- Verification is of the **generator**, once: anyone regenerates the leaves from source and diffs
them against what is published. One thing to trust rather than N.
---
## The questions that actually exist
Forty-seven prompts across the two scripts. Almost none of them should become a branch — the
distinction that matters is:
**A branch** changes which *code* runs. Removing it makes a script genuinely shorter.
**A value** changes a *string*. Removing it makes a script no shorter — it just moves the answer
from a prompt to a constant.
**A consent** is a yes/no about doing a step at all. These are the interesting middle: pre-answering
one lets the build delete the section entirely.
### Branches — these change what code exists
| question | answers | what it eliminates |
| --- | --- | --- |
| operating system | macOS · Debian/Ubuntu · Arch · Fedora | 17 of 26 machine-setup sections on macOS; the whole `case $PM` ladder collapses to one arm |
| machine role | homelab · vps · dev | swap, ballast, earlyoom, sleep/suspend, boot-hang, static addressing — each is role-gated today |
| tailnet | already connected · set one up · none | the entire Tailscale section, its four sub-options and the offscale explanation |
| which half | machine + officer · officer only · machine only | one of the two scripts disappears |
### Consents — pre-answering deletes a section
Docker · fail2ban · unattended-upgrades · Neovim · agent CLIs · shell config · firewall · SSH
hardening · DNS · swap · ballast · earlyoom · inotify · boot-on-start.
Fourteen sections that a leaf script can simply not contain.
### Values — never a branch
Username · install path · git name and email · port · public URL · Postgres connection · timezone ·
locale · LAN CIDR · swap size · swappiness.
These stay as prompts even in a generated script, or arrive as environment variables. Baking them
into a published file would mean publishing somebody's hostname.
---
## Where this collides with `--unattended`
`--unattended` and a generated leaf are the *same mechanism seen twice*: both are "answer these in
advance". The difference is only whether the answer is baked in at build time or supplied at run
time.
Worth deciding tomorrow whether a leaf script is literally `base.sh --unattended` with a header of
constants, or whether the build truly strips the dead branches. The second is what makes it
auditable-by-being-short; the first is what makes it maintainable. **They are not the same artifact,
and the whole plan rests on which one we mean.**
One thing that already exists and should be preserved either way: with no tty, `install_config`
keeps the user's file rather than replacing it. Every unattended answer needs to be conservative in
that same way, and that is a property of each prompt, not of the flag.
---
## The combinatorics
4 OS × 3 roles × 3 tailnet states = **36 leaves** before any consent is considered, and consents
multiply it past anything anyone would publish.
So the tree the install page walks cannot be the full product. Two ways out, to choose between:
1. **Publish a few opinionated leaves** — "Ubuntu VPS, new tailnet", "macOS dev machine", "Ubuntu
homelab, existing tailnet" — and send everything else to the full interactive script.
2. **Generate on demand** — the page composes the leaf when the questions are answered. Stronger, but
the artifact is no longer a static file anyone can diff against the repo, which costs the
verification property the whole design was for.
My inclination is (1), because (2) quietly trades away the thing that made per-leaf scripts worth
building. But it is a real trade and it is yours.
---
## Open, for tomorrow
- Does a leaf strip dead code, or set constants and call the base?
- How many leaves get published, and what happens to the rest?
- Does the install page show the script before running it? It should — that is the moment auditing
is cheap and nobody will do it afterwards.
- The report from `install-report.md` names a script commit. A generated leaf needs to name the
source commit it was generated from, or the report cannot be checked against anything.
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bearer string into a caller. All four doors call it: `userMiddleware`, `originScopeMiddleware`, the
WebSocket upgrade in `server.tsx`, and the vault socket.
- `src/servers/api/api-keys/router.ts` — the three endpoints.
- `src/databases/officer_db/src/api-keys/schema.ts` — the table, and why it stores what it stores.
- `src/databases/officer_db/src/schema/api-keys.ts` — the table, and why it stores what it stores.
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# Offscale — the first real plugin
**Status: LIVE DOCUMENT, opened 2026-08-14.** Decisions and findings from the session that started the
plugin system. Correct it in place; it is meant to be edited, not archived.
Offscale is Headscale extracted into a plugin. It is the pilot: chosen because it is a genuine vertical
slice (schema + backend router + sidecar + frontend screen + capabilities) without being pathological.
**The name is not a rename.** Offscale is Headscale _plus the Companion_ — an API and UI that ship beside
the Headscale server and add what Headscale itself does not do, the invite flow being the first of them.
Calling it Headscale would undersell it and calling it a fork would be wrong: the server underneath is
stock. The distinct name marks a distinct product, not a badge on someone else's.
Related, and older: `sidecar-app-store.md` is the origin design and is largely implemented despite its
"Nothing implemented" header. `sidecar-topology.md` is where the runtime shape was going.
---
## The reframe
**Core is `officer` and nothing else. Everything else is a plugin**`officer-pty`, `officer-opencode`,
`officer-claude-code`, offscale. `officer-anthropic-proxy` is a known exception to think about later; the
intuition is that it is one plugin requiring two sidecars.
The old baseline was six PM2 processes. Headscale was removed from it on 2026-08-14 (`services.sh`,
the local ecosystem file, `catalogue.test.ts`'s `CORE[]` mirror, and PM2 itself), so the machine this was
written on runs five.
### Two words, because "core" was doing two jobs
- **baseline** — what a fresh install actually runs
- **first-party** — what Officer Dev publishes
They come apart immediately: offscale is first-party and no longer baseline. Saying "core" for both makes
"is X core?" a question with two answers.
---
## What a plugin is made of
Combined per plugin as needed. **Only `meta` and the ID are always required.**
- a **meta** object — id, name, dock item, backend/frontend mount, etc.
- an **ID** (see below)
- a **sidecar**
- a **backend router** and its routes
- a **db schema**
- **default permissions per user group**
- what it stores in the **secret store**, and whether that is per-user or plugin-global
- a **frontend router**, its routes, and the frontend code
- how it **mounts into the file browser context menu**
- a set of **capabilities added to officer-items**
- **plugin settings page** definitions
- an accompanying **mobile app**
A plugin is completely self-contained. The platform's installed/enabled state decides whether its routers
mount, whether its sidecar is in the ecosystem file, and so on.
### What offscale needs
db schema · backend router + routes · frontend router + routes · sidecar.
**Not** a context menu, **not** officer-items capabilities, and (probably) **not** a settings page.
---
## Identity and routing
**The app-name is the ID.** One identifier, not two — it names the plugin, prefixes its tables, and is its
route. A random ID plus a separate app-name was considered and dropped: splitting the uniqueness guarantee
across two namespaces means whichever is weaker becomes the real attack surface.
**Uniqueness comes from two mechanisms**, because one is not enough:
- **globally** — the marketplace owns the namespace for published names, with human review. A name as
generic as `notes` gets refused: it is a name Officer Dev may want later.
- **locally** — the platform refuses to install a plugin whose app-name is already taken on this machine.
Needed because a private plugin never asks the marketplace anything.
The marketplace works like the Chrome extension store. Anyone may write plugins for their own use with no
restrictions; publishing is what invites review.
### Mount prefixes
```
first-party /api/<app-name> e.g. /api/offscale
third-party /api/p/<creator>/<app-name> e.g. /api/p/alice/notes
```
`p` is a literal segment meaning "plugin". First-party plugins sit at the root because Officer Dev owns
that namespace anyway, and because provenance is then legible at a glance in a log or a route table.
**The prefix must be derived by exactly one function from the manifest.** Nothing about a first-party
plugin's code may know it is first-party. If that difference ever leaks past the one derivation — a
special case in the router, a bypassed check, a different install branch — first-party and third-party
become two systems, and only one of them gets tested.
`/p/` does **not** solve plugin-vs-plugin collisions; the marketplace and the local check do. What it
guarantees is that a plugin can never shadow a **core** route, which also means the platform can keep
adding core routes forever without breaking installs.
---
## The database
**Tables live in `public`, prefixed with the app-name**`offscale_servers`, exactly as the codebase
already does (`headscale_servers`, `music_favorites`, `vault_tokens`). No new machinery.
### A Postgres schema per plugin was tested and rejected
Not rejected on suspicion — it was built and proven to work, then dropped as more complexity than it
earns. Recorded so nobody re-runs the experiment:
| Property | Result |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------- |
| `pgSchema('offscale')` + `drizzle-kit push` creates the namespace | works |
| Cross-schema FK to `public.users` | works |
| Partial unique index preserved | works |
| Push is idempotent, no spurious re-creation | works |
| Cascade delete across the schema boundary | works |
| `DROP SCHEMA offscale CASCADE` as uninstall | works, `public` untouched |
**The finding worth keeping: `schemaFilter` is mandatory, and the docs are wrong.** Drizzle's config
documentation states that push "will by default manage all schemas". On drizzle-kit **0.31.8** that is
false. A push with the table verifiably exported reported `No changes detected` and created nothing;
naming the schema in `schemaFilter` made the identical push work.
If per-plugin schemas are ever revisited, that is the trap: **a plugin install would report success and
silently create no tables.** Same failure shape as several bugs found the same day — a refusal wearing the
costume of a normal result.
---
## Mounting is dynamic
Three options were considered:
- **A** — mounted always, refuses when not installed _(what ships today)_
- **B** — mount set decided at boot from the install table, restart `officer` on install
- **C** — genuinely dynamic, mounted and unmounted at runtime
**C is the decision.** Explicitly not an intermediate step: the platform must not need to know a plugin
exists in advance, and B still bakes the answer at boot.
This contradicts `sidecar-app-store.md`, which leans on "every API route stays mounted regardless" as a
simplification. That premise is retired.
### What has to change with it
`assertCapabilityTotality` runs before `serve()` and throws if a mounted router has no registry entry. It
exists for a real reason: a Member 403'd on `GET /api/tasks` while opening `/api/tasks/pipeline/ws` with a
101 in the same minute, because Bun's route table matches the socket before the `/api/*` catch-all.
**It does not die, it relocates.** Today it asks "does every mounted route have a permission?" once, at
boot. Under C the same question is asked **per mount**: registering a router and registering its
capability become one transaction, and an incomplete one is refused.
### Foundations that already exist
- Sidecars register at **runtime** over `/api/sidecar/register` and are found **by capability, never by
name** — which is how `officer-agent` was renamed to `officer-claude-code` without touching a caller.
- `sidecar/proxied-prefixes.ts` is already a runtime-mutable `Set`, self-registered by
`createSidecarProxy` "so a new sidecar cannot forget to add itself".
What is compile-time is only the routes and permissions, not the sidecar's existence.
---
## Permissions
A plugin declares capabilities. **A plugin may declare `app`, and nothing else.**
`CapabilityKind` is `core | app | confined | execution | admin`. `core` means _every account, not
deniable_, so a third-party manifest naming its own kind is a privilege-escalation surface: "malicious
plugin declares itself core" is an ungated grant to every user. `core`, `execution` and `admin` stay the
platform's to assign.
### Three different things are called "capability" here
A manifest needs three names, not one:
1. `capabilities/registry.ts`**permissions** (`headscale`, `vpn`)
2. `$OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities/` — the **file-based item store** (skills, tools, tasks)
3. `sidecar-registry` `capabilities: ['music']`**routing keys** for `sendCommand`
Offscale needs (1) and (3), and not (2).
---
## Secrets
Two stores, and a plugin author will reach for the wrong one unless told:
- **plugin-global keys** → the secret store (`officer_db/src/secret-store.ts`, real: `getKey(purpose)`,
`hasKey`, `retiredKeys`). Purpose-keyed encryption and signing keys, not arbitrary values.
- **per-user credentials** → `service_connections`, which already does the hard part: the row is keyed
`(userId, service)` and **a NULL `url` means "inherit the instance"**, so a member structurally cannot
see or supply the URL. `service` is free text with no namespacing yet — that needs solving before third
parties touch it.
Offscale's own coupling is small and instructive. `headscale/queries.ts` imports exactly two things from
the host:
```ts
import { db } from '../db'; // the connection
import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from '../crypto'; // at-rest encryption, 10 uses
```
A plugin cannot carry its own `db` (it must share the connection to reference `users.id`) and should not
carry its own crypto (the key lives in the platform's store). **So those two are provided to a plugin
rather than imported by it.** That is the first concrete piece of the plugin↔host API, and it fell out of
the pilot rather than being invented.
---
## `/api/vpn` is being deleted
Officer had two headscale surfaces:
| | `/api/vpn` | `/api/headscale` |
| ---------- | ---------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------- |
| capability | `vpn`, kind `app` — grantable to members | `headscale`, kind `admin` — owner only |
| purpose | enrol your own device | the tailnet: machines, routes, ACLs |
| surface | one route, `POST /enroll` | the whole admin API |
`POST /api/vpn/enroll` was one-tap enrollment for a phone already signed into Officer. **It has no caller
anywhere.** Verified against the mobile monorepo:
1. `enrollVpn()` has one call site, `useVpnScreen.ts:617`, inside `enroll()`
2. `enroll()` is reached only via `if (embedded) await enroll()`
3. `embedded` is optional and defaults to `false`
4. `VpnScreen` is rendered in exactly one place — `apps/offscale/src/App.tsx` — which never passes it
`apps/mobile` and `apps/headscale` have zero references to `enrollVpn`, `VpnScreen` or `api/vpn`. Neither
does the Officer web app. The live database holds no `vpn` grants.
**And it will never come back.** Offscale is permanently standalone: no login, no backend calls, no
dependency on Officer or the platform. The reasoning is the app's own and it is sound — _the thing that
gets you to the platform cannot itself need the platform_, or a broken tailnet locks you out of both.
### Everything collapses to one namespace
`/api/offscale/*`. The comment in `vpn/router.ts` claiming "the path is a contract" no longer binds: the
contract has no counterparty.
**The invite flow stays and does not need the mobile app changed.** `claimInvite` calls
`${invite.base}/api/v1/enroll/claim` — the **Companion** on the server, at a base URL carried in the
invite link. `/api/v1/` is Headscale's own namespace. The phone never talks to Officer for invites.
- **phone → Companion** — untouched by anything here
- **web admin → Officer → sidecar** — ours to rename freely
### There are THREE components, not two
Easy to miss, and worth stating because two of them contain the word "enroll":
| Component | Repo | Enrolment surface |
| ---------------- | ---------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ |
| Officer platform | `officerdev/platform` | `/api/offscale/*` — web admin only |
| Mobile suite | `officerdev/monorepo-mobile` | calls the Companion, never Officer |
| **Companion** | `officerdev/offscale-server` | `/api/v1/enroll/*` under basePath `/officer-api` |
The Companion ships beside each Headscale server. Confirmed against its source on 2026-08-14: zero
references to `/api/vpn/*`, and its only outbound calls are the docker socket and its sibling headscale's
`/health`. It never calls Officer and does not use `/api/offscale/*` either.
**`/api/v1/enroll/*` is the Companion's and is not ours to collapse.** The phone claims at
`${invite.base}/api/v1/enroll/claim`, where `invite.base` is the `sidecarOrigin` the Companion itself put
in the invite (`https://<domain>/officer-api`).
**Trap when deleting:** do not delete the sidecar's `enroll.ts`. Line 71 dispatches
`/enroll/invites` to `handleInvitesRoute`, so it is the invite flow's entry point. Only the bare
`POST /_officer/enroll` handler below it is dead.
**A public route is possible if ever needed.** `/api/vault` is already exempt from platform auth
(`EXEMPT_API_PREFIXES`) because Bitwarden clients carry a Vaultwarden bearer rather than a platform JWT.
The exemption must be declared with a reason or the boot check refuses. Not needed today.
**Not an open question — decided.** Removing `vpn` leaves no member-grantable headscale surface, and that
is correct. The invite flow supersedes it completely:
1. the Officer headscale app holds an admin API key for the Headscale server
2. from it the owner mints an **invite** — a URL pointing at the Companion
3. the Companion turns that into the redirect the phone app claims
4. the device joins
That path needs no per-member permission on Officer at all, and it is the one that exists and works.
`/api/vpn/enroll` was the design it replaced, not a capability still waiting for a UI — there never was
one. Do not reintroduce a member-facing enrolment route on the assumption something is missing.
---
## The state of the app store, as found
It **is** the plugin system, roughly 90% built, with one structural hole.
`ecosystem.config.cjs` is generated once at setup and **nothing appends to it on install**, so the
installer's final step runs `pm2 start ecosystem.config.cjs --only officer-jellyfin`, matches no app, and
silently does nothing. Acknowledged in `app-store/pm2.ts:23-29`:
> _"Installing a plugin has to append its entry here before starting it — that is the plugin system's job
> and it is not built."_
Net: **nothing in the catalogue installs end-to-end today.** Containers come up, `service_connections` is
written, assets publish, the dock tile appears — and the sidecar never starts.
Also found:
- The `schema` install step is a **logged no-op** (`effects.ts:117-124`). Every table still ships via
`bun db:push`.
- Of 8 entries declaring a compose template, **only 2 exist on disk** (`transmission`, `vaultwarden`).
`slskd` has an icon and nothing else. `catalogue.test.ts` asserts a template _name_ is declared but never
that the directory exists.
- `hono.ts` has **28 routers mounted and 15 commented out**; `officer_db/src/schema.ts` has **11 commented
schema exports** under "uncomment when the plugin is installed". Today, installing a plugin literally
means editing two files and rebuilding.
- `catalogue.test.ts` asserts every entry's process has a matching `src/servers/sidecar/<dir>`. A plugin in
its own repository has no such directory, so that test inverts — as `sidecar-app-store.md` predicted.
- A **dead, unrelated** plugin system still exists: `GET /server-settings/plugins` scans
`src/workspaces/plugins/`, which does not exist, so it always returns `[]`. `PluginsSection.tsx` still
renders against it. Not to be confused with any of the above.
---
## Where the code lives
`plugins/offscale` on `gitea.officer.dev` — private, default branch `main`, topic `officer-plugin`.
The `plugins` org exists because Gitea has **no nested organizations** (verified: no `parent` field on the
org object), so `<owner>/<repo>` is the only real namespace it has. Topics work and are searchable, and are
used in addition rather than instead — they span orgs, which matters because browser extensions under
`extensions/` may become plugins later.
---
## Open questions
1. **Frontend code is the hard one.** Everything else on the list is data or a process; the SPA is
compiled. `public/plugins/<id>/` exists but carries only icons. Shipping a third party's React that
shares the shell's React, router and query client is a different problem class — federation, an iframe,
or a manifest-driven generic UI. Do not design the package format as though this is solved.
2. **Migrations and versioning.** A plugin needs a version and a platform-compatibility range, and
something has to apply schema changes over time. Cheap now, miserable to retrofit.
3. **Health, distinct from enabled.** The store already renders amber for "installed and enabled but the
process is not online". That state needs a definition a plugin can satisfy.
4. **No inter-plugin dependencies.** Measured: zero sidecar-to-sidecar dependencies, and every non-core
schema references only `auth.ts`. Worth promoting from accident to rule while it is still free.
5. **`service_connections.service` namespacing** before third parties touch it.
6. **`officer-anthropic-proxy`** — one plugin, two sidecars.
7. **Gitea is installed but invisible.** Containers `gitea` and `gitea-postgres` run, `officer-gitea` is
not in PM2, and there is no `sidecar_installs` row — it predates the store. "Already there, but not by
us" needs an answer, and the store deliberately refuses to adopt directories it did not create.
+17 -43
View File
@@ -1,19 +1,11 @@
# The secret store
**Status: BUILT 2026-08-13.** `src/databases/officer_db/src/secret-store.ts`, with `jwt.ts` and
`crypto.ts` reading from it and `officer-setup.sh` section 7 bootstrapping it. Rotation is NOT built —
the schema carries `retired_at` and the API exposes `retiredKeys()`, but nothing retires or re-encrypts
yet.
**Status: DESIGN, agreed in conversation 2026-08-12. Nothing implemented.** Every fact below about the
current code was checked against the tree on that date; the file:line references are live.
A small SQLite database holding every encryption and signing key the platform uses. It replaced
`VAULT_STORE_KEY` and `JWT_SECRET` in `.env`, and it is the facility a plugin uses instead of inventing
its own.
**One change from the design below: keys are per PURPOSE, not one key for everything.** The original
plan moved a single at-rest key into the store. What shipped gives `headscale`, `wallet`, `photos`,
`jellyfin`, `invoiceshelf`, `vault` and `service-connections` a key each, so one leaked key opens one
plugin's columns rather than all seven. `jwt` is the eighth. A core install bootstraps two — `jwt` and
`headscale` — and every other purpose is created when its plugin first asks.
A small SQLite database, created during setup, holding every encryption and signing key the platform
uses. It replaces `VAULT_STORE_KEY` and `JWT_SECRET` in `.env`, and it is the facility a plugin uses
instead of inventing its own.
---
@@ -77,18 +69,7 @@ both to still exist. That is a table with `id, purpose, key, created_at, retired
as an environment variable or a single-value file. Concurrent access from several sidecars is the second
reason; SQLite's locking is the part a hand-rolled file store gets wrong.
### 2. It is NOT encrypted at rest — and that decision changed shape
**As built, the file IS the secret.** Keys are stored as they are used, with no second key unlocking
them, because a key sitting beside the store it opens buys nothing: whoever can read one can read the
other. The boundary is `0700` on the directory, `0600` on the file, owned by the service user.
That answers open question 4 below — nothing stays outside, and `.env` holds no secret at all.
The original reasoning for encrypted-values-in-a-plaintext-file is kept below because the SQLCipher
finding is still true and still the reason whole-file encryption is not on the table.
#### The original note
### 2. It is NOT encrypted at rest, for now
Checked rather than assumed, because `PRAGMA key` appears to work and does not:
@@ -113,30 +94,25 @@ trade and it is written down here so nobody later assumes the file is opaque.
### 3. Where the file goes
**`$OFFICER_ROOT/secrets/officer-keys.db`** — a sibling of `platform/` and `data/`, decided 2026-08-13.
**Not in `$OFFICER_ROOT/data/`.** That directory holds managed homes and attachments — it is the one
people back up. A key store that travels in the same tarball as a database dump rebuilds the exact
problem this design exists to avoid.
The setup script says so out loud when it creates the store, because "back this up, but not next to the
other thing you back up" is not a rule anyone infers.
`[open]` The location. It needs to be somewhere a routine backup does not sweep up, or somewhere
documented loudly enough that a backup script excludes it deliberately.
### 4. ~~One secret remains outside~~ — none does
### 4. One secret remains outside
Answered 2026-08-13: **no secret remains in `.env`.** The store file is the secret, per decision 2.
The store's own key — whatever unlocks the values inside it. That is unavoidable and is the point of the
whole exercise: **N secrets in twenty process environments becomes one secret, read on demand, by the
two processes that need it.**
The point of the exercise still holds, and it was always about blast radius rather than secrecy: **N
secrets in twenty process environments becomes a file read on demand by the few processes that need
it.** `.env` is auto-loaded by bun into every pm2 process, so a key there is readable from
`/proc/<pid>/environ` of twenty processes — `officer-music` held the key that decrypts wallet seed
envelopes. A file opened by the two or three processes that actually use a key does not.
`[open]` Whether that one secret stays in `.env` — which reintroduces the auto-load problem for exactly
one value — or comes from a file read on demand.
### 5. What moves in
- `VAULT_STORE_KEY`**split into one key per purpose**, rather than moved. See the status note at the
top: the table above is seven unrelated things, and one key for all of them meant one leak opened all
of them.
- `VAULT_STORE_KEY`the at-rest key for everything in the table above.
- `JWT_SECRET` — a signing key rather than an encryption key, but it has the same properties: must
survive restarts, must never be regenerated silently, and benefits from versioning during a rotation.
Leaving one in a store and one in `.env` would be the scattering this is meant to end.
@@ -232,10 +208,8 @@ wallet table and it cannot be interrupted safely, which argues for something tha
## What this does not change
- Secrets stay in Postgres. This moves the **keys**, not the data.
- ~~`crypto.ts`'s interface stays~~ — **it did not.** Per-purpose keys mean the purpose has to be named
at the call site, so it is `encryptSecret('headscale', plaintext)` now and all seven query modules
were touched. That was the cost of the split, and it is worth stating plainly because this line
originally promised the opposite.
- `crypto.ts`'s interface stays: `encryptSecret` / `decryptSecret`. Only where the key comes from
changes, so no caller is touched.
- The owner passphrase on wallet seeds is untouched and stays out of every store. Two independent
secrets is the property that makes a stolen `.env` insufficient, and it survives this design.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ does and does not protect against.
Authoritative for the crypto design. The code is `src/servers/sidecar/wallet/keys.ts` (sealing,
derivation, unlock sessions), `src/databases/officer_db/src/crypto.ts` (storage encryption) and
`src/databases/officer_db/src/wallet/queries.ts` (where the two meet).
`src/databases/officer_db/src/queries/wallet.ts` (where the two meet).
## The requirement
+9 -35
View File
@@ -7,53 +7,27 @@ agent sessions start.
Three directories sit there, and knowing which one a change belongs in is most of the job:
```
$OFFICER_ROOT/
officer/
├── platform/ the application — a git repo
├── capabilities/ what the agent can do — a separate git repo
── data/ runtime state — NOT version controlled
├── dockers/ containers the app store provisioned
└── secrets/ the key store — 0600, and NOT in your data backup
── data/ runtime state — NOT version controlled
```
None of those paths is configured. `src/servers/data-path.ts` derives the root as
`resolve(process.cwd(), '..')` and hangs the rest off it, which is why the pm2 `cwd` pin matters and
why `assertInstallLayout` refuses to boot from the wrong directory.
Officer is a self-hosted platform: an AI agent, a terminal, a file browser, a code editor, email, a
bitcoin wallet, a remote desktop and dashboards, behind one web app. **It is built around one owner**
— user id 1, role `Super Admin`, who bypasses every permission check — and since 2026-08-07 also
admits **additional accounts holding a strict subset of it**, governed by per-role capability grants.
So "which user" has three answers depending on the surface. For the **app** capabilities (gitea,
music, photos, email, calendar…) it is a real question with a real answer. For **confined** ones —
terminal, chat, files — it is also real, because the account has its own Linux user and the kernel
enforces the boundary; a grant there means nothing without that user, and `authorize.ts` drops it.
For **execution** — tasks, items, desktop, browser — it is still always the owner, and those can
never be granted at any level.
That is five kinds, not four: `core`, `app`, `confined`, `execution`, `admin`. Terminal, chat and
files moved from `execution` to `confined` on 2026-08-11 with per-user Linux accounts.
So "which user" has two answers depending on the surface. For the **app** capabilities (gitea, music,
photos, email, calendar…) it is a real question with a real answer. For anything that executes code or
touches the disk — terminal, chat, tasks, files, desktop, browser — it is still always the owner:
those are `kind: 'execution'` in `platform/src/servers/capabilities/registry.ts` and can never be
granted, because they run as the owner's OS user in the owner's home.
This paragraph said "there is no tenancy, no roles, no other users" until 2026-08-07. Four roles exist
and five non-owner accounts are live; treat the capability registry as the source of truth over any
prose, here or elsewhere.
## What is switched off (2026-08-13)
A core install runs **six** pm2 processes: `officer`, `officer-anthropic-proxy`,
`officer-claude-code`, `officer-opencode`, `officer-pty`, `officer-headscale`. Everything else is a
plugin, and every plugin router is commented out in `hono.ts` with its capability's `api` claim
commented beside it — they must move together or `assertCapabilityTotality` refuses to boot.
The implementations are all still on disk. Nothing was deleted; the mounts were switched off pending
extraction into the plugin system.
Also gone: the four ecosystem files (generated now, at setup, and gitignored), origin validation,
`OFFICER_OS_USERS` (per-user Linux accounts are unconditional), and the Task Logs feature.
`.env` holds three values — `PORT`, `PUBLIC_URL`, `POSTGRES_URL`. Every key lives in
`$OFFICER_ROOT/secrets/officer-keys.db`, one per purpose. See `docs/secret-store.md`.
`platform/` and `capabilities/` each have their own `CLAUDE.md` with detail. This file is the layer
above them: where things live, how to change them safely, and the things that are true of the running
system but written down nowhere else.
@@ -93,13 +67,13 @@ Commit messages: simple lowercase, no prefixes, explaining *why*.
## Running and checking your work
The server runs under pm2 as `officer`, plus sidecars (`officer-anthropic-proxy`, `officer-claude-code`,
The server runs under pm2 as `officer`, plus sidecars (`officer-anthropic-proxy`, `officer-agent`,
`officer-opencode`, `officer-email`, `officer-pty`, `officer-vnc`, `officer-music`, `officer-vault`,
`officer-slskd`, `officer-headscale`, `officer-transmission`, `officer-invoiceshelf`, `officer-wallet`).
`pm2 list` shows them; `pm2 logs officer` follows.
Two of those names are worth knowing apart: **`officer-anthropic-proxy` holds the Anthropic credential
and proxies API traffic; `officer-claude-code` is the process that actually runs `claude`.**
and proxies API traffic; `officer-agent` is the process that actually runs `claude`.**
**Which process to restart.** A change under `src/servers/sidecar/<name>/` needs that sidecar restarted;
a change anywhere else needs `officer`. Both, if you changed the wire between them. Restarting `officer`
+3 -3
View File
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ and the rename sequence leaves `workspaces` with no zombie.
- [x] **`ws-terminals-{id}: null` on a live dashboard is a 500.** Same file, `:61-66` — the
`ws-layout-*` branch has a `value === null``deleteDashboard` case (`:42`); the terminals
branches do not. A null falls to the UPDATE branch and sets a `NOT NULL` column
(`databases/officer_db/src/dashboards/queries.ts:70`) → 23502.
(`databases/officer_db/src/queries/dashboards.ts:70`) → 23502.
**Resolved.** A null on either terminals branch is now a no-op: it means "forget this key", and it
only ever arrives paired with `ws-layout-{id}: null` on a rename, by which point the row is gone.
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ these.
> which uuid ids would not.
- [ ] **`dashboards.id` is a global primary key but ids are `slugify(name)`.**
`databases/officer_db/src/dashboards/schema.ts` declares `id: text('id').primaryKey()`. Live:
`databases/officer_db/src/schema/dashboards.ts` declares `id: text('id').primaryKey()`. Live:
`"dashboards_pkey" PRIMARY KEY, btree (id)` plus a redundant
`"uq_dashboards_user_id" UNIQUE, btree (user_id, id)` — evidence per-user ids were intended and
half-built. Ids come from `DashboardPreview.tsx:300` (`slugify(trimmed) || generateSlug()`) and the
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ these.
(see `databases/CLAUDE.md` → "Composite keys") — harmless churn, but read the plan.
- [x] **`upsertDashboard`'s UPDATE has no `userId` predicate.**
`databases/officer_db/src/dashboards/queries.ts:73` —
`databases/officer_db/src/queries/dashboards.ts:73` —
`db.update(dashboards).set(set).where(eq(dashboards.id, id))`. The `existing` lookup above it _is_
scoped, so it cannot reach another user's row today, but it is a non-transactional read-then-write.
**It becomes a live cross-user overwrite the moment the PK above is made composite.**
+157
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
module.exports = {
apps: [
{
name: 'officer',
script: 'bun',
args: 'start',
watch: false,
},
// The Anthropic credential proxy. Despite the old name (`officer-claude`) this process does NOT
// run agents — it holds the proxy secret and forwards to api.anthropic.com. The process that runs
// agents is `officer-agent` below.
{
name: 'officer-anthropic-proxy',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/claude/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
// The process that actually runs `claude`. It used to be spawned on demand by the main server,
// which made every agent session a grandchild of `officer` and killed it on every restart. As a PM2
// peer it survives them. It resolves the owner from the database and the proxy secret from the
// proxy's state file, so it needs nothing from `officer` in order to start.
{
name: 'officer-agent',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/claude/user-instance.ts',
watch: false,
},
{
name: 'officer-opencode',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/opencode/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
{
name: 'officer-email',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/email/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
// The only sidecar run by `node` rather than `bun`, and the only one that is not TypeScript: node-pty
// is a native addon. It also does not use sidecar/connect.ts, and carries its own copy of the
// reconnect loop.
{
name: 'officer-pty',
script: 'node',
args: 'src/servers/sidecar/pty/index.mjs',
watch: false,
},
{
name: 'officer-vnc',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/vnc/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
{
name: 'officer-music',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/music/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
{
name: 'officer-vault',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/vault/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
{
name: 'officer-slskd',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/slskd/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
{
name: 'officer-headscale',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/headscale/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
{
name: 'officer-transmission',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/transmission/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
// The books. Wraps a self-hosted InvoiceShelf. Instances, their Sanctum tokens and the company each one
// is pinned to are set by the owner from /invoices/settings and stored encrypted in
// `invoiceshelf_accounts` — read here, never from the environment, because Bun auto-loads `.env` into
// every process in this directory and `officer` would hold the token too.
{
name: 'officer-invoiceshelf',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/invoiceshelf/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
// Video. Wraps a self-hosted Jellyfin. Servers, and the access token each one is signed in with, are set
// by the owner from /jellyfin and stored encrypted in `jellyfin_servers` — read here, never from the
// environment. Video only: Officer's own player owns audio.
{
name: 'officer-jellyfin',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/jellyfin/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
// Notes. Wraps a self-hosted Memos. The instance URL and its personal access token are set by the
// owner from the UI and stored in `service_connections` — read here, never from the environment.
{
name: 'officer-memos',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/memos/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
// Code hosting. Wraps a self-hosted Gitea. The instance URL and its personal access token are set by
// the owner from /gitea and stored in `service_connections` — read here, never from the environment.
{
name: 'officer-gitea',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/gitea/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
// Calendar and contacts. Supervises Radicale (CalDAV/CardDAV) on a loopback port and owns the
// collections under DATA_PATH/dav. Two doors: /dav for phones (DAVx5, iOS, Thunderbird — HTTP Basic
// against a scoped app password) and /api/caldav for Officer's own UI. The protocol is Radicale's;
// the platform authenticates and forwards. See docs/nextcloud-replacement.md.
{
name: 'officer-caldav',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/caldav/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
// The photo library. Wraps a self-hosted Immich. The instance and its key are set by the owner from
// /photos/settings and stored encrypted in `photos_config` — read here, never from the environment,
// because Bun auto-loads `.env` into every process in this directory and `officer` would hold it too.
{
name: 'officer-photos',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/photos/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
// The bitcoin wallet. Holds seed material (sealed under an owner passphrase) and node credentials, so
// it is the one sidecar whose restart has a security-relevant side effect: every wallet relocks.
// The one place anything leaves this machine to tell the owner something: push (APNs + FCM) and the
// Discord webhook, behind one interface. A sidecar rather than platform code because the producers
// are spread across sidecars, and a platform-owned notifier would make every one of them call back in.
{
name: 'officer-notify',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/notify/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
{
name: 'officer-wallet',
script: 'bun',
args: 'run src/servers/sidecar/wallet/index.ts',
watch: false,
},
],
};
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
// Linux light profile — the platform without the self-hosted estate around it.
//
// For a machine that should run the file browser, the terminal and Claude/opencode chat, and nothing
// else. Paired with `OFFICER_PROFILE=light bash scripts/setup/setup.sh`, which installs only what these
// processes need: node, bun, ffmpeg, Postgres, pm2 and the two agent CLIs.
//
// This is a subset of ecosystem.config.cjs, not a copy of it — see ecosystem.profile.cjs for why, and
// for the two checks that make a drifted profile fail loudly instead of silently starting less than it
// claims. To change what runs, edit INCLUDE. To change HOW something runs, edit ecosystem.config.cjs
// and every profile follows.
//
// The app itself is unchanged: every API route stays mounted, so features whose sidecars are absent
// report themselves unavailable rather than disappearing. A profile decides which processes start, not
// which code ships.
//
// Start with: pm2 startOrRestart ecosystem.light.config.cjs
const { defineProfile } = require('./ecosystem.profile.cjs');
module.exports = defineProfile({
file: 'ecosystem.light.config.cjs',
include: [
'officer', // the app: SPA, /api, websockets
'officer-anthropic-proxy', // holds the Anthropic credential, forwards upstream
'officer-agent', // spawns `claude` — chat is dead without it
'officer-opencode', // the alternative agent
'officer-pty', // the terminal
],
// Excluded by CHOICE rather than by platform limits — every one of these would run on a Linux host.
// A light install simply is not running the thing behind it.
excluded: {
// Was in the baseline until 2026-08-11, on the reasoning that it fronts a REMOTE instance and so needs
// nothing installed locally. True, and beside the point: a baseline process appears in the Permissions
// screen and the dock whether or not anyone has given it a URL, so a fresh server offered to grant Gitea
// access to an instance that did not exist. It is installable now — `existing` mode, URL and token — which
// makes "is Gitea here" one question with one answer instead of two that disagree.
'officer-gitea': 'fronts a remote instance; installed from the app store with its URL and token',
'officer-vnc': 'no desktop to mirror on a light install',
'officer-email': 'needs the mbsync/IMAP stack the light profile does not install',
'officer-music': 'the ffprobe indexer works, but a full library index is not a light-install concern',
'officer-vault': 'reverse-proxies a self-hosted Vaultwarden container',
'officer-slskd': 'supervises the slskd daemon',
'officer-headscale': 'fronts a headscale server',
'officer-transmission': 'fronts a transmission daemon',
'officer-invoiceshelf': 'fronts an InvoiceShelf container',
'officer-jellyfin': 'fronts a Jellyfin container',
'officer-memos': 'needs an owner-configured Memos instance URL and token',
'officer-photos': 'needs an owner-configured Immich instance URL and API key',
'officer-caldav': 'supervises Radicale, which the light profile does not install',
'officer-notify': 'its producers are the queue and the email/agent sidecars; nothing to notify about',
'officer-wallet': 'holds seed and node credentials',
},
});
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
// macOS light profile — the same process set as the Linux light profile, on a laptop.
//
// Paired with scripts/setup/setup_mac_light.sh. Runs the file browser, the terminal and Claude/opencode
// chat; nothing else.
//
// This is a subset of ecosystem.config.cjs, not a copy of it. That distinction is here because of this
// file specifically: written on 2026-07-28 as a hand-copied process list, it was broken within days by
// two changes it could not see. It ran `officer-claude` against the Anthropic proxy's entry point
// while the process that actually spawns `claude` was never started, and it pointed at a pty sidecar
// that had moved. Both failures were silent — the processes simply did not come up. See
// ecosystem.profile.cjs for the checks that now make that loud.
//
// WHY THIS IS SEPARATE FROM ecosystem.light.config.cjs, given both currently run the same five apps:
// the exclusions mean different things. On macOS officer-vnc cannot run — there is no Xorg to mirror.
// On a Linux light install it could run perfectly well; you have chosen not to. Those diverge as soon
// as one profile gains something the other cannot have, and collapsing them would lose the reason.
//
// Start with: pm2 startOrRestart ecosystem.mac.light.config.cjs
const { defineProfile } = require('./ecosystem.profile.cjs');
module.exports = defineProfile({
file: 'ecosystem.mac.light.config.cjs',
include: [
'officer', // the app: SPA, /api, websockets
'officer-anthropic-proxy', // holds the Anthropic credential, forwards to api.anthropic.com
// Spawns `claude`. Reads the proxy secret from disk, so it needs no ordering against the proxy
// above: if the secret is not written yet it warns and re-reads before the next spawn.
'officer-agent',
'officer-opencode', // the alternative agent
// The terminal. Runs under node rather than bun — node-pty binds a native addon built against
// node's ABI. That detail lives in ecosystem.config.cjs, not here.
'officer-pty',
],
excluded: {
// Cannot run on macOS at all.
'officer-vnc': 'mirrors an Xorg display with x11vnc; macOS has no Xorg',
// Left the baseline on 2026-08-11, on both light profiles together. It genuinely needs nothing installed
// locally — it points at a remote instance over the network — but a baseline process shows up in the dock
// and the Permissions screen whether or not a URL was ever given, so "is Gitea here" had two answers. It
// is an app-store install now: `existing` mode, URL and token, same as any other remote service.
'officer-gitea': 'fronts a remote instance; installed from the app store with its URL and token',
// Would run, but needs something setup_mac_light.sh deliberately does not install.
'officer-email': 'needs the mbsync/IMAP stack setup_mac_light.sh does not install',
'officer-caldav': 'supervises Radicale, which setup_mac_light.sh does not install',
'officer-music': 'the ffprobe indexer works, but a full ~/Music index is expensive to start by default',
// Fronts a container or daemon a laptop is not running.
'officer-vault': 'reverse-proxies a self-hosted Vaultwarden container',
'officer-slskd': 'supervises the slskd daemon',
'officer-headscale': 'fronts a headscale server',
'officer-transmission': 'fronts a transmission daemon',
'officer-invoiceshelf': 'fronts an InvoiceShelf container',
'officer-jellyfin': 'fronts a Jellyfin container',
// Needs an owner-configured external service.
'officer-memos': 'needs an owner-configured Memos instance URL and token',
'officer-photos': 'needs an owner-configured Immich instance URL and API key',
// Deliberate, for what it holds or who feeds it.
'officer-notify': 'its producers are the queue and the email/agent sidecars; nothing to notify about',
'officer-wallet': 'holds seed and node credentials; not on a laptop',
},
});
+85
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
// Shared machinery for the pm2 install profiles (ecosystem.light.config.cjs,
// ecosystem.mac.light.config.cjs).
//
// A profile is a SUBSET of ecosystem.config.cjs, declared as names plus reasons. It never restates how
// a process is launched — `script` and `args` are read from the host file at load — because a
// hand-copied process list is exactly what failed here: the macOS list was written on 2026-07-28 and
// within days was starting a sidecar that had been split in two and pointing at a pty entry point that
// had moved. Neither failure said anything; the processes simply did not come up.
//
// So the rule is: ecosystem.config.cjs is the only place a launch command is written down, and a
// profile only decides which of them to run.
//
// Two consistency checks, both of which turn a silent breakage into a loud one at load:
// 1. a name the profile INCLUDES that the host no longer defines — the app was renamed or removed
// 2. an app the host defines that the profile neither includes nor excludes — a new sidecar, which
// must be classified deliberately rather than defaulting to absent because nobody noticed
//
// The second is the one that matters over time. Without it, every sidecar added to the host silently
// stays out of every profile, and the profiles quietly stop meaning what their comments claim.
/**
* @param {object} spec
* @param {string} spec.file this profile's filename, for error messages
* @param {string[]} spec.include app names to run, in start order
* @param {Record<string,string>} spec.excluded app name → why it is not in this profile
*/
// The directory holding the platform's package.json, found by walking up from this file. Independent of
// where in the tree this config is kept, and of where pm2 was invoked from.
function repoRoot() {
const { existsSync, readFileSync } = require('node:fs');
const { dirname, join } = require('node:path');
let dir = __dirname;
for (;;) {
const manifest = join(dir, 'package.json');
if (existsSync(manifest)) {
try {
if (JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, 'utf8')).name === 'officer') return dir;
} catch {
// Unparseable is not ours; keep walking.
}
}
const up = dirname(dir);
if (up === dir) throw new Error("ecosystem.profile.cjs: could not find the platform's package.json above " + __dirname);
dir = up;
}
}
function defineProfile({ file, include, excluded }) {
const full = require('./ecosystem.config.cjs');
const byName = new Map(full.apps.map((app) => [app.name, app]));
const missing = include.filter((name) => !byName.has(name));
if (missing.length) {
throw new Error(
`${file}: ${missing.join(', ')} not found in ecosystem.config.cjs — the app was renamed or ` +
`removed. Update this profile's include list.`,
);
}
const unclassified = full.apps
.map((app) => app.name)
.filter((name) => !include.includes(name) && !(name in excluded));
if (unclassified.length) {
throw new Error(
`${file}: ${unclassified.join(', ')} is in ecosystem.config.cjs but neither included nor ` +
`excluded here. Add it to the include list, or to the excluded map with a reason.`,
);
}
// `cwd` is pinned because Bun auto-loads .env from the working directory (and the pty sidecar does
// `import 'dotenv/config'`). Without it, starting pm2 from anywhere but the repo root silently falls
// back to the default PORT with no POSTGRES_URL.
//
// It also decides where the install is. src/servers/data-path.ts derives OFFICER_ROOT as the PARENT of
// the working directory, and data/, capabilities/ and dockers/ hang off that — so a wrong cwd does not
// fail, it relocates the whole install. `assertInstallLayout` is the boot check that catches it.
//
// This was `__dirname`, with a comment asserting "__dirname is the repo root — this file sits beside
// ecosystem.config.cjs". That stopped being true the moment these files were moved into
// ecosystem-files/, and nothing said so. Found by walking up to the package.json instead, which is
// true wherever this file ends up living.
return { apps: include.map((name) => ({ ...byName.get(name), cwd: repoRoot() })) };
}
module.exports = { defineProfile };
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
"format": "{ git diff --name-only HEAD -- 'src/**/*.ts' 'src/**/*.tsx'; git ls-files --others --exclude-standard -- 'src/**/*.ts' 'src/**/*.tsx'; } | xargs -r prettier --write",
"format:all": "prettier --write \"src/**/*.{ts,tsx}\"",
"format:check": "prettier --check \"src/**/*.{ts,tsx}\"",
"setup": "bash scripts/install.sh"
"setup": "bash scripts/setup/officer-setup.sh"
},
"dependencies": {
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.41",
+4 -25
View File
@@ -16,39 +16,18 @@ const root = resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..');
const template = join(root, 'src/apps/officer-web/index.html');
const output = join(root, 'src/apps/officer-web/index.gen.html');
// Where the URL comes from, most specific first:
//
// 1. the first argument `bun gen:index https://officer.example.com`
// 2. PUBLIC_URL in the environment
// 3. PUBLIC_URL in .env (this script runs standalone; the server gets it via --env-file)
//
// The argument exists so changing the public address is one command rather than an edit plus a
// regenerate — and so a second address can be generated for without touching the install's own .env.
const argUrl = process.argv[2]?.trim();
// The server reads .env through --env-file, but this script runs standalone.
const envPath = join(root, '.env');
if (!argUrl && !process.env.PUBLIC_URL && existsSync(envPath)) {
if (!process.env.PUBLIC_URL && existsSync(envPath)) {
for (const line of (await Bun.file(envPath).text()).split('\n')) {
const match = line.match(/^\s*PUBLIC_URL\s*=\s*(.*)$/);
if (match) process.env.PUBLIC_URL = match[1]!.trim().replace(/^["']|["']$/g, '');
}
}
const publicUrl = (argUrl || process.env.PUBLIC_URL || '').replace(/\/+$/, '');
const publicUrl = (process.env.PUBLIC_URL ?? '').replace(/\/+$/, '');
if (!publicUrl) {
console.error('[gen-index] no public URL. Pass one — `bun gen:index https://officer.example.com` —');
console.error('[gen-index] or set PUBLIC_URL in .env.');
process.exit(1);
}
// Caught here rather than left to a crawler: a relative or scheme-less value substitutes without
// complaint and produces OpenGraph tags nothing can resolve, which is invisible until someone shares a
// link and the preview is blank.
try {
const parsed = new URL(publicUrl);
if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') throw new Error('not http(s)');
} catch {
console.error(`[gen-index] "${publicUrl}" is not an absolute http(s) URL — OpenGraph tags need one.`);
console.error('[gen-index] PUBLIC_URL is not set — set it in .env (e.g. https://officer.example.com)');
process.exit(1);
}
-185
View File
@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# =============================================================================
# Officer — install
# =============================================================================
#
# One command, blank machine to running platform. It runs the two halves in
# order and does nothing else itself:
#
# setup/machine-setup/machine-setup.sh a usable machine — packages, tailnet,
# runtimes, docker, shell
# setup/officer-setup.sh the platform on top of it — repo,
# dependencies, postgres, .env, secret
# store, schema, build, pm2
#
# They stay two scripts because they answer two different questions and are worth
# running separately: a machine you already trust needs only the second, and a
# machine you are rebuilding needs only the first. This is the wrapper for the
# case where you want both, which is most first runs.
#
# Both are re-runnable. Each remembers the steps it finished and skips them, so
# stopping halfway and coming back costs nothing.
#
# Run it as yourself — it asks for administrator rights when it needs them.
#
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
MACHINE="$SCRIPT_DIR/setup/machine-setup/machine-setup.sh"
OFFICER="$SCRIPT_DIR/setup/officer-setup.sh"
BOLD='\033[1m'
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
NC='\033[0m'
say() { echo -e "$*"; }
die() {
echo -e "${YELLOW}error:${NC} $*" >&2
exit 1
}
[[ -r "$MACHINE" ]] || die "missing $MACHINE"
[[ -r "$OFFICER" ]] || die "missing $OFFICER"
# Which halves to run. Both by default.
RUN_MACHINE=true
RUN_OFFICER=true
# Kept before the loop below eats them: this script re-executes itself through sudo
# further down, and `shift` would otherwise leave it re-running with no arguments —
# silently dropping --officer-only and turning a platform-only run into a full one.
#
# The `${x[@]+"${x[@]}"}` form is for `set -u`: expanding an empty array unquoted-safe
# is an error on bash before 4.4, and this runs on whatever the machine came with.
ORIGINAL_ARGS=(${@+"$@"})
# A `while`/`shift` loop rather than `for arg in "$@"`, because --repo takes a value
# and a for-loop cannot consume the argument after it.
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
--machine-only) RUN_OFFICER=false ;;
--officer-only) RUN_MACHINE=false ;;
--repo)
[[ -n "${2:-}" ]] || die "--repo needs a URL"
OFFICER_REPO="$2"
shift
;;
--repo=*) OFFICER_REPO="${1#--repo=}" ;;
# Every question that HAS a default answers itself. The ones with no possible
# default still ask — see the note above the run below.
--unattended | -y)
export UNATTENDED=1 ASSUME_YES=1
;;
-h | --help)
say "usage: install.sh [--machine-only | --officer-only] [--repo <url>]"
say ""
say " no flags both halves, machine first"
say " --machine-only stop after the machine is provisioned"
say " --officer-only the platform only, on a machine you already trust"
say " --repo <url> clone the platform from here instead of the default"
say " --unattended take the default for every question that has one (-y)"
say ""
say " The default is a private Gitea over SSH, which only authenticates on a"
say " machine whose key it already knows. Pass an https URL on a fresh box."
say ""
say " --unattended still asks the questions that have no possible default:"
say " the username, the Tailscale control plane / login server / auth key,"
say " an SSH public key when the account has none, and the git identity."
say " Answer those ahead of time with SETUP_USERNAME, TS_LOGIN_SERVER,"
say " TS_AUTHKEY and TIMEZONE to reduce it further."
exit 0
;;
*) die "unknown option: $1" ;;
esac
shift
done
# Exported so `officer-setup.sh` reads it from the environment and this script does
# not have to forward arguments it does not own. `lib/repo.sh` takes it as
# `${OFFICER_REPO:-<default>}`, so unset here still means the default there.
[[ -n "${OFFICER_REPO:-}" ]] && export OFFICER_REPO
KERNEL="$(uname -s)"
case "$KERNEL" in
Darwin)
[[ "$EUID" -eq 0 ]] && die "do not run this with sudo on macOS — Homebrew refuses to run as root. Run it as yourself."
;;
Linux) ;;
*) die "unsupported system: $KERNEL. Officer installs on Linux and macOS." ;;
esac
SELF="$SCRIPT_DIR/install.sh"
# One report for the whole run, not one per half. Both scripts append to this
# file, so the person reviewing it sees a single account of what happened rather
# than two they have to stitch together and hope are complete.
#
# Exported before either half starts, and timestamped once here — if each script
# made its own name they would differ by however long the first one took.
export REPORT_FILE="${REPORT_FILE:-${HOME}/officer-install-report-$(date '+%Y%m%d-%H%M%S').md}"
# ── Privileges: asked for, not demanded ──
#
# Run this as YOURSELF. On Linux it needs root for apt, systemd units, useradd,
# netplan, ufw and for creating directories owned by the service account — so it
# asks, once, through sudo, and re-executes itself. Typing `sudo` yourself works
# too and changes nothing, but it should not be the price of starting.
#
# Variables are passed to sudo explicitly rather than with -E. `env_reset` is the
# sudoers default and strips the environment, which is how DATA_PATH was lost
# once already; naming them on the command line survives it.
#
# macOS never escalates. Homebrew refuses to run as root, and nothing in the
# macOS path needs it — the account running this IS the owner, so there is
# nothing to chown and nothing to drop privileges to.
if [[ "$KERNEL" != "Darwin" && "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "this needs root and sudo is not installed — run it as root"
say ""
say " This needs administrator rights. You will be asked for your password."
say ""
exec sudo \
OFFICER_ROOT="${OFFICER_ROOT:-}" \
SETUP_USERNAME="${SETUP_USERNAME:-}" \
MACHINE_ROLE="${MACHINE_ROLE:-}" \
REPORT_FILE="${REPORT_FILE:-}" \
UNATTENDED="${UNATTENDED:-}" \
ASSUME_YES="${ASSUME_YES:-}" \
OFFICER_REPO="${OFFICER_REPO:-}" \
bash "$SELF" ${ORIGINAL_ARGS[@]+"${ORIGINAL_ARGS[@]}"}
fi
say ""
say "${BOLD}Officer install${NC}"
say " system: $KERNEL"
$RUN_MACHINE && say " 1/2 machine setup"
$RUN_OFFICER && say " $($RUN_MACHINE && echo 2/2 || echo 1/1) officer setup"
say ""
say " Either half can be run on its own later:"
say " scripts/setup/machine-setup/machine-setup.sh"
say " scripts/setup/officer-setup.sh"
say ""
# Not `set -e`'s job: a half that exits non-zero should say which half, and stop
# before the next one starts on a machine that is not ready for it.
# ── Who says "you are still root" ──
#
# Both halves end as root and both need to say so, but only the LAST one to run
# should — otherwise a full install says it twice, once in the middle where it is
# wrong, because officer-setup is about to run and still needs the privilege.
#
# So the rule is "say it if nothing follows you", and this is the only place that
# knows whether anything does.
if $RUN_MACHINE; then
$RUN_OFFICER && export OFFICER_SETUP_FOLLOWS=1
bash "$MACHINE" || die "machine setup did not finish — fix what it reported, then run this again"
unset OFFICER_SETUP_FOLLOWS
fi
if $RUN_OFFICER; then
bash "$OFFICER" || die "officer setup did not finish — fix what it reported, then run this again"
fi
say ""
say "${GREEN}Done.${NC}"
+1 -3
View File
@@ -10,9 +10,7 @@
import type { BrowsedFile } from 'officerdb';
import { eq, asc } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db, finishSoulseekBrowse } from 'officerdb';
// soulseek is a plugin, so its tables are commented out of officerdb's schema aggregator —
// import them from the feature directly.
import { soulseekBrowseSnapshots, soulseekBrowseDirs } from 'officerdb/soulseek/schema';
import { soulseekBrowseSnapshots, soulseekBrowseDirs } from 'officerdb/schema';
import { buildTree } from '../src/servers/sidecar/slskd/browse';
const snapshots = await db
-86
View File
@@ -150,54 +150,8 @@ load_answers() {
# file — the point of asking for a single step is to run that step.
ONLY_STEP="${ONLY_STEP:-}"
# ── Steps that do not exist on macOS ──
#
# A Mac running Officer is a DEV MACHINE, never a server. That is not a
# simplification to revisit: nobody puts a laptop behind a public hostname and
# hands it a tailnet exit node, and the sections below are all about being a
# server that is on all the time.
#
# Most would fail rather than misbehave — there is no systemd, no ufw, no
# netplan, no useradd, no /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d. But a few would SUCCEED and be
# wrong, which is worse: stopping a laptop from sleeping, or freezing its address
# on a network it moves between every day.
#
# Keyed on the step title, so the sections themselves stay Linux code with no
# `if macos` branches threaded through them. The reason is printed, because a
# silent skip and a missing step look identical.
declare -A MACOS_SKIP=(
["User account"]="accounts are System Settings' business on a Mac, not a script's"
["Disk space"]="ballast and swap tuning are server concerns"
["Locale"]="macOS manages locale itself"
["Timezone"]="macOS manages the timezone itself"
["Swap"]="macOS sizes its own swap dynamically"
["Emergency disk ballast"]="a server trick for a machine nobody is sitting at"
["earlyoom"]="Linux OOM killer tuning; macOS has its own memory pressure handling"
["inotify watch limit"]="Linux inotify; macOS watches files through FSEvents"
["Sleep and suspend"]="a laptop SHOULD sleep — this stops a server from doing it"
["Boot hang"]="a systemd boot ordering fix"
["SSH access"]="hardening a door a dev machine should not be opening"
["DNS"]="systemd-resolved"
["Network address"]="netplan, and a laptop moves between networks by design"
["fail2ban"]="brute-force protection for an exposed SSH port"
["Unattended upgrades"]="apt; macOS updates through Software Update"
["Firewall"]="ufw; macOS has its own application firewall"
["Shell"]="zsh is already the default, and tmux is a choice you make yourself"
)
step() {
CURRENT_STEP="$1"
# The report follows the step, rather than each section remembering to say
# which one it is. Twenty-six sections, one place.
declare -F report_section >/dev/null && report_section "$1"
if [[ "${OS:-}" == "macos" && -n "${MACOS_SKIP[$1]:-}" ]]; then
echo ""
echo -e "${BOLD}── $1 ──${NC}"
echo -e " ${GREEN}SKIP${NC}: not on macOS — ${MACOS_SKIP[$1]}"
SKIP_STEP=true
return
fi
if [[ -n "$ONLY_STEP" ]]; then
if [[ "${1,,}" == "${ONLY_STEP,,}" ]]; then
@@ -285,37 +239,6 @@ page() {
# deliberate keystroke would train people to hold the y key down.
#
# ASSUME_YES=1 answers all of them, for an unattended run.
# A numbered menu's answer, or its own default when running unattended.
#
# menu_answer DNS_CHOICE " Which one? (1-5) [1]: "
#
# ── Why empty, rather than a default passed in ──
#
# Every menu in this script reads its choice and then consumes it as
# `${CHOICE:-<n>}`, so the default already lives at the point of use — which is the
# right place, next to the options it selects between. Setting the variable EMPTY is
# therefore exactly what pressing Enter does, and it cannot drift from the default
# the prompt advertises the way a second copy passed in here would.
#
# `read <<<''` rather than `eval` or `declare -g`: no eval, and `declare -g` is bash
# 4.2+, which rules out the bash 3.2 that macOS still ships.
#
# The prompt is still printed, with the reason, because a transcript that silently
# skips a question reads as a question that was never asked.
menu_answer() {
local var="$1" prompt="$2"
if [[ "${UNATTENDED:-}" == "1" ]]; then
printf '%s%s\n' "$prompt" "— unattended, taking the default"
read -r "$var" <<<''
return 0
fi
read -rp "$prompt" "$var" || {
echo ""
fail "No answer."
}
}
confirm() {
local message="${1:-Proceed?}"
# Second argument flips the default. Most questions here are "do the thing you
@@ -662,15 +585,6 @@ default_iface() {
# firewall open on one. Every branch downstream is about what this machine is
# exposed to, so it is worth one deliberate keystroke rather than an Enter.
ask_machine_role() {
# Not a question on a Mac. Officer on macOS is a dev helper on a machine
# somebody sits at — there is no homelab or VPS answer that would make sense,
# and every section that branches on the role branches toward "server".
if [[ "${OS:-}" == "macos" && -z "$MACHINE_ROLE" ]]; then
MACHINE_ROLE="dev"
info "macOS — treated as a dev machine. The server-only sections are skipped."
return
fi
if [[ -n "$MACHINE_ROLE" ]]; then
case "$MACHINE_ROLE" in
homelab | vps | dev) return ;;
+11 -20
View File
@@ -92,36 +92,27 @@ oh_my_zsh_installed() { [[ -d "${USER_HOME}/.oh-my-zsh" ]]; }
install_oh_my_zsh() {
# The installer refuses to run unattended over an existing install, so this is
# only ever called when there is none.
#
# ── `|| true` is what makes this non-fatal, NOT the `return 0` below ──
#
# It used to be `return 0` alone, with a comment claiming the function returned
# zero whatever happened. It did not. Under `set -e` a failing command inside a
# function aborts the SHELL at that line when the function is called plainly —
# `return 0` is never reached. So a machine where this curl or the installer
# failed died here, silently, because the output is redirected: the run just
# stopped after apt finished installing zsh, with nothing said. Observed on a
# fresh Hetzner VPS, 2026-08-14.
sudo -H -u "$USERNAME" sh -c \
"$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ohmyzsh/ohmyzsh/master/tools/install.sh)" "" --unattended >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
true
# Belt and braces: `|| true` above already makes the last command succeed, and
# this states the contract for anyone adding a line beneath it.
"$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ohmyzsh/ohmyzsh/master/tools/install.sh)" "" --unattended >/dev/null 2>&1
# Returns 0 whatever happens. This is an optional improvement, and a
# function that ends on a failing command is fatal under `set -e` when it
# is called as a plain command — which would abort the remaining sections
# over something the run could simply report. The caller checks the outcome.
return 0
}
# `chsh` is what actually changes the login shell. Asked separately from
# installing zsh, because having a shell available and being handed it at every
# login are different decisions.
# Reports whether chsh worked, rather than swallowing it. The same `set -e` trap as
# install_oh_my_zsh applies — a bare `chsh` that fails kills the run at this line —
# but here the answer matters: the caller announces the new login shell, and `|| true`
# would have it announce one that was never set. So the status comes back and the
# CALLER guards the call, which is also what keeps set -e out of it.
set_login_shell() {
local shell="$1"
grep -qxF "$shell" /etc/shells || echo "$shell" >>/etc/shells
chsh -s "$shell" "$USERNAME" >/dev/null 2>&1
chsh -s "$shell" "$USERNAME"
# Returns 0 whatever happens. This is an optional improvement, and a
# function that ends on a failing command is fatal under `set -e` when it
# is called as a plain command — which would abort the remaining sections
# over something the run could simply report. The caller checks the outcome.
return 0
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+1 -29
View File
@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@ docker_repo_distro() {
}
install_docker_engine() {
# Linux only, and never reached on macOS: the Docker step there checks for
# Docker Desktop and tells the owner to install it rather than doing it — a GUI
# app that wants opening, permissions and a running window is not a shell
# script's job, and colima/lima are not worth the evening they cost.
local distro codename
distro="$(docker_repo_distro)"
codename="$(docker_repo_codename)"
@@ -72,30 +67,7 @@ install_docker_engine() {
>/etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list
pkg_refresh >/dev/null
# ── The rootless prerequisites go in HERE, not in the rootless branch ──
#
# They used to be installed only when the owner picked "[2] rootless Docker for
# me" in section 22. But the OWNER's choice is not the only one that matters:
# every Developer account the platform provisions gets its own rootless daemon,
# whatever the owner picked for themselves. So on a machine where the owner chose
# the docker group, the host never got these and every member's daemon failed
# with `rootless Docker needs these packages on the host: uidmap`.
#
# `src/servers/os-user-docker.ts` → checkDockerPrerequisites is the authority on
# this list, and it wants both:
#
# uidmap /usr/bin/newuidmap, /usr/bin/newgidmap
# docker-ce-rootless-extras /usr/bin/dockerd-rootless-setuptool.sh
#
# docker-ce only RECOMMENDS rootless-extras. That is installed by default, so it
# is usually there by luck — and is not on a host configured with
# --no-install-recommends. Named explicitly so it does not depend on that.
#
# dbus-user-session is what lets a member's systemd --user survive without a
# login session, which is how the daemon stays up.
pkg_install_now docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io docker-buildx-plugin docker-compose-plugin \
docker-ce-rootless-extras uidmap dbus-user-session
pkg_install_now docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io docker-buildx-plugin docker-compose-plugin
}
# A shared network so containers from different compose files can reach each
+1 -47
View File
@@ -43,17 +43,10 @@ install_config() {
if [[ ! -f "$dest" ]]; then
install -D -m 0644 -o "$owner" -g "$(user_group "$owner")" "$src" "$dest"
# Recorded here rather than at the call site: "which files did it write" is
# the question a reviewer asks first, and a per-section report would drift
# from what this function actually did.
declare -F report_changed >/dev/null && report_changed "wrote ${dest} (0644, owner ${owner}) — did not exist"
return 0
fi
if cmp -s "$src" "$dest"; then
declare -F report_kept >/dev/null && report_kept "${dest} already identical to the shipped version — not touched"
return 1
fi
cmp -s "$src" "$dest" && return 1
echo ""
warn "${dest} already exists here, and differs from the one this script ships."
@@ -63,7 +56,6 @@ install_config() {
# was present to defend.
if [[ "${ASSUME_YES:-}" == "1" ]] || [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then
echo " keeping yours (nothing was asked, so nothing is replaced)"
declare -F report_kept >/dev/null && report_kept "${dest} differs from ours and was KEPT — unattended run, nothing replaced"
return 2
fi
@@ -75,20 +67,17 @@ install_config() {
if ! read -rp " Which one? (1/2/3) [1]: " answer; then
echo ""
echo " keeping yours"
declare -F report_kept >/dev/null && report_kept "${dest} differs from ours and was KEPT — no answer available"
return 2
fi
case "${answer:-1}" in
1)
echo " keeping yours"
declare -F report_kept >/dev/null && report_kept "${dest} differs from ours and was KEPT by choice"
return 2
;;
2)
cp -a "$dest" "${dest}.before-machine-setup"
install -D -m 0644 -o "$owner" -g "$(user_group "$owner")" "$src" "$dest"
ok "replaced — yours is at ${dest}.before-machine-setup"
declare -F report_changed >/dev/null && report_changed "REPLACED ${dest} by choice — previous kept at ${dest}.before-machine-setup"
return 0
;;
3)
@@ -136,38 +125,3 @@ append_once() {
echo "$end"
} >>"$file"
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Where tmux actually reads its config
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# tmux 3.1 added an XDG location and it takes PRECEDENCE. Verified on 3.4 by
# creating both and asking tmux which marker it ended up with:
#
# both present -> ~/.config/tmux/tmux.conf
# only ~/.tmux.conf -> ~/.tmux.conf
# only the XDG one -> the XDG one
#
# So installing to ~/.tmux.conf on a machine that has the XDG file writes a file
# tmux will never read, and the script would report success having changed
# nothing anybody can see. That is the failure this exists to prevent.
#
# Rules, in order:
# 1. an existing XDG config wins -> that is their real config, target it
# 2. an existing ~/.tmux.conf -> target it, since it is what tmux reads
# 3. neither -> ~/.tmux.conf, the path every guide names
tmux_config_target() {
local home="$1"
local xdg="${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$home/.config}/tmux/tmux.conf"
if [[ -f "$xdg" ]]; then
echo "$xdg"
else
echo "$home/.tmux.conf"
fi
}
# True when a ~/.tmux.conf would be shadowed by an XDG config that already exists.
tmux_dot_conf_is_shadowed() {
local home="$1"
[[ -f "${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$home/.config}/tmux/tmux.conf" && -f "$home/.tmux.conf" ]]
}
+10 -49
View File
@@ -84,35 +84,28 @@ LAST_SKIPPED=()
pkgs_core() {
case "$PM" in
apt)
# apt-transport-https and lsb-release are not tools — they are what lets a
# later step add the Docker repository. They have no counterpart on the
# other systems.
#
# software-properties-common is still here and is no longer needed by
# anything: it provides `add-apt-repository`, and the fastfetch PPA was its
# only caller until that was removed on 2026-08-14 (Docker writes its own
# sources.list.d entry by hand). Left in deliberately rather than dropped
# in the same change — it is one small package, and pulling it is a
# separate decision from removing the tool that wanted it.
# apt-transport-https, lsb-release and software-properties-common are not
# tools — they are what lets later steps add the Docker repository and the
# fastfetch PPA. They have no counterpart on the other systems.
echo curl ca-certificates gnupg git jq unzip \
apt-transport-https lsb-release software-properties-common \
wget zip build-essential python3 btop htop tree tmux ripgrep fd-find net-tools eza \
wget zip build-essential python3 btop htop tree tmux ripgrep fd-find net-tools \
fail2ban unattended-upgrades
;;
pacman)
echo curl ca-certificates gnupg git jq unzip \
wget zip base-devel python btop htop tree tmux ripgrep fd net-tools eza \
wget zip base-devel python btop htop tree tmux ripgrep fd net-tools \
fail2ban
;;
dnf)
echo curl ca-certificates gnupg2 git jq unzip \
wget zip python3 btop htop tree tmux ripgrep fd-find net-tools eza \
wget zip python3 btop htop tree tmux ripgrep fd-find net-tools \
fail2ban
;;
brew)
# curl, unzip and the TLS roots ship with macOS; the compilers come from
# the Xcode command line tools, which is not a formula — see xcode_clt_*.
echo gnupg git jq wget btop htop tree ripgrep fd eza
# the Xcode command line tools, which is not a formula.
echo gnupg git jq wget btop htop tree tmux ripgrep fd
;;
esac
}
@@ -218,20 +211,8 @@ pkg_install() {
LAST_INSTALLED=("${missing[@]}")
LAST_KEPT=("${present[@]}")
announce_plan "$label" present missing || {
# Declining is a fact a reviewer wants: it explains a package being absent
# later without having to guess whether the script failed or was refused.
declare -F report_skipped >/dev/null && report_skipped "${label}: declined — ${#missing[@]} package(s) not installed"
return 0
}
if pkg_install_now "${missing[@]}"; then
declare -F report_installed >/dev/null && ((${#missing[@]})) && report_installed "${PM}: ${missing[*]}"
declare -F report_kept >/dev/null && ((${#present[@]})) && report_kept "already present, untouched: ${present[*]}"
else
declare -F report_failed >/dev/null && report_failed "${PM} install failed: ${missing[*]}"
return 1
fi
announce_plan "$label" present missing || return 0
pkg_install_now "${missing[@]}"
}
# Print what a section is about to do and ask permission for it.
@@ -281,23 +262,3 @@ summarise_last() {
SUMMARY+=("$label installed: ${LAST_INSTALLED[*]} (${#LAST_KEPT[@]} already present)")
fi
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The Xcode command line tools
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# macOS's build-essential, and not installable as a formula. It matters here for
# one specific reason: node-pty ships no prebuilt binary for any platform, so
# `bun install` always falls through to node-gyp and needs a working compiler.
# Without this the platform install fails deep inside a dependency tree with an
# error that names neither Xcode nor node-pty.
#
# `xcode-select --install` opens a GUI dialogue and returns immediately — it does
# not block until the download finishes. So this asks, and then says to come back,
# rather than pretending to have waited.
xcode_clt_installed() { xcode-select -p &>/dev/null; }
xcode_clt_install() {
xcode-select --install 2>/dev/null || true
}
+1 -12
View File
@@ -190,18 +190,7 @@ tailscale_control_url() {
tailscale debug prefs 2>/dev/null | awk -F'"' '/"ControlURL"/ { print $4; exit }'
}
# The official install.sh is a Linux package-manager script. macOS gets the same
# daemon wrapped in a GUI app, and the cask is the version with a CLI at
# /Applications/Tailscale.app/Contents/MacOS/Tailscale — the Mac App Store build
# is sandboxed and ships no usable `tailscale` binary, which is the difference
# that matters to a script.
tailscale_install() {
if [[ "${OS:-}" == "macos" ]]; then
brew install --cask tailscale
return
fi
curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
}
tailscale_install() { curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh; }
# Tailscale's own coordination server, spelled out.
#
+20 -9
View File
@@ -20,17 +20,10 @@
MACHINE_SETUP_TOOLS_LOADED=1
# The set installed on every machine, in the order they are fetched.
#
# fastfetch was here until 2026-08-14 and was removed after it stopped a real
# install. It is the only one of these with no source but a third-party PPA on
# Ubuntu 24.04 and older, and the failure was in the half that was not guarded:
# a PPA that ADDS cleanly but carries no package for the running codename gets
# past the `|| skip` and dies on the install instead. A neofetch clone is not
# worth a branch in a script that has to survive on machines nobody has seen.
tools_default() { echo lazydocker lazygit starship; }
tools_default() { echo lazydocker lazygit starship fastfetch; }
# The command that proves a tool is already here. Same as the tool name for all
# three today, but kept as a mapping because that is not a rule — a package and
# four today, but kept as a mapping because that is not a rule — a package and
# the binary it provides disagree often enough (fd-find/fdfind) to be worth the
# indirection.
tool_command() {
@@ -38,6 +31,7 @@ tool_command() {
lazydocker) echo lazydocker ;;
lazygit) echo lazygit ;;
starship) echo starship ;;
fastfetch) echo fastfetch ;;
*) echo "$1" ;;
esac
}
@@ -86,6 +80,23 @@ tool_install_starship() {
curl -fsSL https://starship.rs/install.sh | sh -s -- -y -b /usr/local/bin >/dev/null
}
# A distribution package everywhere, but not always one the distribution ships:
# Ubuntu only picked fastfetch up in 24.10, so on noble and older the PPA is the
# only source. Checked rather than assumed, so the PPA stops being added the
# moment the archive has it.
tool_install_fastfetch() {
if [[ "$PM" == "apt" ]] && ! apt-cache policy fastfetch 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'Candidate: [0-9]'; then
info " fastfetch is not in this release's archive — adding the upstream PPA"
add-apt-repository -y ppa:zhangsongcui3371/fastfetch >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
{
warn "could not add the fastfetch PPA — skipping"
return 0
}
pkg_refresh >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
pkg_install_now fastfetch
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Acting
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+54 -253
View File
@@ -18,12 +18,6 @@ ANSWERS_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/.setup-answers"
# still runs, because every section needs what it establishes — the system, the
# role, the account and its home.
ONLY_STEP=""
# Kept before the loop consumes them: this script re-executes itself through sudo
# below and was passing `"$@"`, which `shift` had already emptied — so `--only` and
# `--reask` silently stopped existing the moment it escalated.
ORIGINAL_ARGS=(${@+"$@"})
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
--only)
@@ -38,25 +32,12 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
RE_ASK=1
shift
;;
# Every question that HAS a default answers itself; the ones with none still ask.
# ASSUME_YES drives confirm(), UNATTENDED drives the numbered menus and the
# free-text prompts that carry a default.
--unattended | -y)
export UNATTENDED=1 ASSUME_YES=1
shift
;;
-l | --list)
grep -oP '^step "\K[^"]+' "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"
exit 0
;;
-h | --help)
echo "usage: machine-setup.sh [--only <step>] [--reask] [--list] [--unattended]"
echo ""
echo " --unattended take the default for every question that has one (-y)."
echo " Still asks the ones with no possible default: the"
echo " username, the Tailscale control plane / login server /"
echo " auth key, an SSH public key when the account has none,"
echo " and the git identity."
echo "usage: machine-setup.sh [--only <step>] [--reask] [--list]"
exit 0
;;
*) echo "unknown option: $1" >&2 && exit 2 ;;
@@ -67,7 +48,6 @@ done
# lib/ so a step can eventually be read — or run — on its own without dragging the
# whole script in. Definitions only; nothing in there acts.
# shellcheck source=lib/base.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../report.sh"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib/base.sh"
# shellcheck source=lib/packages.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/lib/packages.sh"
@@ -107,7 +87,6 @@ echo -e "${BOLD}╚════════════════════
[[ -n "${RE_ASK:-}" ]] && rm -f "$ANSWERS_FILE"
load_answers
trap report_flush EXIT
detect_os
echo ""
info "Machine: ${OS_NAME} (${ARCH})"
@@ -140,58 +119,15 @@ else
echo " so coming back costs nothing."
fi
# ── root on Linux, NOT root on macOS ──
#
# The two are opposites and it is not a preference. On Linux nearly every section
# needs root — apt, systemd units, useradd, netplan, ufw. On macOS Homebrew
# REFUSES to run as root and says so; running the whole script under sudo there
# would fail at the first `brew install` having already asked for a password.
#
# It works out because the macOS path skips everything that needed root in the
# first place (see MACOS_SKIP in lib/base.sh). What is left — brew, the Xcode
# command line tools, the agent CLIs, bun — is all per-user by design.
# ── Privileges: asked for, not demanded ──
#
# Run this as YOURSELF. Linux needs root for apt, systemd units, useradd, netplan
# and ufw, so it asks through sudo and re-executes itself rather than making you
# type it. Variables go to sudo by name rather than with -E: `env_reset` is the
# sudoers default and strips the environment, which is how DATA_PATH was lost
# once already.
#
# macOS never escalates — Homebrew refuses to run as root, and the sections that
# needed root are the ones the macOS path skips.
if [[ "$OS" == "macos" ]]; then
if [[ "$EUID" -eq 0 ]]; then
fail "Do not run this with sudo on macOS — Homebrew refuses to run as root. Run it as yourself."
fi
elif [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "This needs root and sudo is not installed — run it as root."
echo ""
echo " This needs administrator rights. You will be asked for your password."
echo ""
exec sudo \
OFFICER_ROOT="${OFFICER_ROOT:-}" \
SETUP_USERNAME="${SETUP_USERNAME:-}" \
MACHINE_ROLE="${MACHINE_ROLE:-}" \
REPORT_FILE="${REPORT_FILE:-}" \
UNATTENDED="${UNATTENDED:-}" \
ASSUME_YES="${ASSUME_YES:-}" \
bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/machine-setup.sh" ${ORIGINAL_ARGS[@]+"${ORIGINAL_ARGS[@]}"}
if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
fail "Please run as root: sudo ./machine-setup.sh"
fi
# On macOS the account running the script IS the account, and there is nothing to
# create — the User account step is skipped entirely.
if [[ "$OS" == "macos" ]]; then
USERNAME="$(id -un)"
USER_HOME="$HOME"
info "Account: ${USERNAME} (you — macOS creates no accounts here)"
ask_username
if id "$USERNAME" &>/dev/null; then
info "Account: ${USERNAME} (exists, home ${USER_HOME})"
else
ask_username
if id "$USERNAME" &>/dev/null; then
info "Account: ${USERNAME} (exists, home ${USER_HOME})"
else
info "Account: ${USERNAME} (will be created, home ${USER_HOME})"
fi
info "Account: ${USERNAME} (will be created, home ${USER_HOME})"
fi
ask_officer_root
@@ -204,9 +140,9 @@ fi
save_answers
# Always, and outside any step: everything below reads this index — core utils,
# the Docker repo — and `step` skips a step whose name is already in the progress
# file. With the refresh inside one of those, a resumed run installed against
# whatever the index happened to say hours or days ago.
# the fastfetch PPA, the Docker repo — and `step` skips a step whose name is
# already in the progress file. With the refresh inside one of those, a resumed
# run installed against whatever the index happened to say hours or days ago.
echo ""
info "Refreshing the package index..."
pkg_refresh >/dev/null
@@ -438,34 +374,6 @@ fi
# What the distribution provides: the six this script would break without, and
# the command-line tools that make a machine worth sitting at.
# macOS's compilers, before anything that might need to build a native module.
if [[ "$OS" == "macos" ]]; then
step "Xcode command line tools"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
if xcode_clt_installed; then
ok "already installed ($(xcode-select -p))"
SUMMARY+=("Xcode CLT: already installed")
else
info "Xcode command line tools — macOS's compilers"
echo " Needed because node-pty ships no prebuilt binary and compiles"
echo " from source on every machine, so 'bun install' cannot finish"
echo " without a compiler."
echo ""
if confirm "Start the install?"; then
xcode_clt_install
warn "a macOS dialogue has opened — finish it there, then re-run this step"
echo " ./machine-setup.sh --only 'Xcode command line tools'"
SUMMARY+=("Xcode CLT: install started in a GUI dialogue — finish it, then re-run")
else
warn "skipped — 'bun install' will fail on node-pty without it"
SUMMARY+=("Xcode CLT: SKIPPED by request")
fi
fi
step_ok
fi
fi
step "Core utils"
if ! skip; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2046 # word splitting is how the list is passed
@@ -782,9 +690,10 @@ if ! skip; then
echo ""
while [[ -z "${TIMEZONE:-}" ]]; do
# Unattended keeps the current zone, which is what Enter does here. TIMEZONE=<zone>
# in the environment answers it ahead of time and skips this block entirely.
menu_answer TZ_CHOICE " Pick a number, or type a zone name — Enter keeps ${CURRENT_TZ:-the current one}: "
if ! read -rp " Pick a number, or type a zone name — Enter keeps ${CURRENT_TZ:-the current one}: " TZ_CHOICE; then
echo ""
fail "No answer. Set TIMEZONE=<zone> to answer this ahead of time."
fi
if [[ -z "$TZ_CHOICE" ]]; then
TIMEZONE="$CURRENT_TZ"
@@ -938,7 +847,10 @@ elif ! skip; then
BALLAST_FILE=""
while [[ -z "$BALLAST_FILE" ]]; do
menu_answer BALLAST_WHERE " Which one? (1/2/3) [1]: "
if ! read -rp " Which one? (1/2/3) [1]: " BALLAST_WHERE; then
echo ""
fail "No answer."
fi
case "${BALLAST_WHERE:-1}" in
1) BALLAST_FILE="${USER_HOME}/${BALLAST_NAME}" ;;
2) BALLAST_FILE="${OFFICER_ROOT}/${BALLAST_NAME}" ;;
@@ -978,7 +890,10 @@ elif ! skip; then
BALLAST_PCT=""
while [[ -z "$BALLAST_PCT" ]]; do
menu_answer BALLAST_SIZE_CHOICE " Which one? (1/2/3) [2]: "
if ! read -rp " Which one? (1/2/3) [2]: " BALLAST_SIZE_CHOICE; then
echo ""
fail "No answer."
fi
case "${BALLAST_SIZE_CHOICE:-2}" in
1) BALLAST_PCT=5 ;;
2) BALLAST_PCT=10 ;;
@@ -1353,7 +1268,10 @@ if ! skip; then
DNS_FALLBACK=""
DNS_CHOSEN=""
while [[ -z "$DNS_CHOSEN" ]]; do
menu_answer DNS_CHOICE " Which one? (1-5) [1]: "
if ! read -rp " Which one? (1-5) [1]: " DNS_CHOICE; then
echo ""
fail "No answer."
fi
case "${DNS_CHOICE:-1}" in
1) DNS_CHOSEN="keep" ;;
2)
@@ -1460,7 +1378,10 @@ elif ! skip; then
NET_CHOICE=""
while [[ -z "$NET_CHOICE" ]]; do
menu_answer NET_ANSWER " Which one? (1/2/3) [1]: "
if ! read -rp " Which one? (1/2/3) [1]: " NET_ANSWER; then
echo ""
fail "No answer."
fi
case "${NET_ANSWER:-1}" in
1 | 2 | 3) NET_CHOICE="${NET_ANSWER:-1}" ;;
*) warn "Pick 1, 2 or 3." ;;
@@ -1723,47 +1644,12 @@ if ! skip; then
info "Docker — containers, and how ${USERNAME} is allowed to talk to them"
echo " engine: $(docker_is_installed && docker --version 2>/dev/null | cut -d, -f1 || echo 'not installed')"
echo " daemon: $(docker_daemon_ok && echo 'reachable' || echo 'not reachable from here')"
if [[ "$OS" != "macos" ]]; then
echo " ${USERNAME}: $(user_in_docker_group && echo 'in the docker group' || echo 'not in the docker group')"
fi
echo " ${USERNAME}: $(user_in_docker_group && echo 'in the docker group' || echo 'not in the docker group')"
# ── macOS: we do not install Docker, we check for it ──
#
# Docker Desktop is the only thing that works here without a fight. Lima and
# colima both technically run containers on a Mac and both cost an evening the
# first time something does not resolve, so this asks for Desktop by name
# rather than installing an alternative that will disappoint later.
#
# Not installed by the script either: it is a GUI app that wants to be opened,
# granted permissions and left running, none of which a shell script should be
# doing on somebody's laptop.
if [[ "$OS" == "macos" ]]; then
if docker_daemon_ok; then
ok "Docker Desktop is running"
SUMMARY+=("Docker: Docker Desktop running")
elif docker_is_installed; then
warn "the docker CLI is here but the daemon is not answering"
echo " Open Docker Desktop from Applications and let it finish starting."
SUMMARY+=("Docker: installed but not running — open Docker Desktop")
else
warn "Docker is not installed"
echo ""
echo " Officer needs it for Postgres and for anything the app store"
echo " installs. Get Docker Desktop:"
echo ""
echo " https://www.docker.com/products/docker-desktop/"
echo ""
echo " Open it once after installing, then run this step again:"
echo " ./machine-setup.sh --only Docker"
SUMMARY+=("Docker: NOT installed — install Docker Desktop, then re-run this step")
fi
step_ok
elif ! docker_is_installed; then
if ! docker_is_installed; then
echo ""
echo " to install: docker-ce, the CLI, containerd, buildx and compose,"
echo " from Docker's own repository — plus uidmap,"
echo " dbus-user-session and docker-ce-rootless-extras,"
echo " which every member's own rootless daemon needs"
echo " from Docker's own repository"
if confirm "Install it?"; then
if install_docker_engine; then
ok "$(docker --version 2>/dev/null | cut -d, -f1) installed"
@@ -1779,10 +1665,7 @@ if ! skip; then
fi
fi
# The group-vs-rootless choice below is Linux only: Docker Desktop runs
# containers in a VM owned by whoever is logged in, so there is no group to
# join and no rootless variant to pick.
if [[ "$OS" != "macos" ]] && docker_is_installed; then
if docker_is_installed; then
# ── how this account reaches the daemon ──
if user_in_docker_group || docker_rootless_installed; then
echo ""
@@ -1827,7 +1710,10 @@ if ! skip; then
DOCKER_ACCESS=""
while [[ -z "$DOCKER_ACCESS" ]]; do
menu_answer DOCKER_CHOICE " Which one? (1/2/3) [1]: "
if ! read -rp " Which one? (1/2/3) [1]: " DOCKER_CHOICE; then
echo ""
fail "No answer."
fi
case "${DOCKER_CHOICE:-1}" in
1 | 2 | 3) DOCKER_ACCESS="${DOCKER_CHOICE:-1}" ;;
*) warn "Pick 1, 2 or 3." ;;
@@ -1935,7 +1821,10 @@ if ! skip; then
NVIM_REPO=""
NVIM_PICK=""
while [[ -z "$NVIM_PICK" ]]; do
menu_answer NVIM_CHOICE " Which one? (1/2/3) [1]: "
if ! read -rp " Which one? (1/2/3) [1]: " NVIM_CHOICE; then
echo ""
fail "No answer."
fi
case "${NVIM_CHOICE:-1}" in
1)
NVIM_REPO="https://github.com/LazyVim/starter"
@@ -2095,7 +1984,7 @@ if ! skip; then
echo ""
info "Agent CLIs — the programs Officer's chat actually runs"
echo " claude $(agent_version claude || echo 'not installed')"
echo " spawned by officer-claude-code; chat does not work without it."
echo " spawned by officer-agent; chat does not work without it."
echo " opencode $(agent_version opencode || echo 'not installed')"
echo " the alternative agent, run by officer-opencode."
echo ""
@@ -2221,20 +2110,10 @@ if ! skip; then
echo ""
echo " ${USERNAME}'s login shell is ${SHELL_NOW}. Changing it to zsh takes"
echo " effect at the next login, and does not affect this session."
# Guarded, not bare: `chsh` can refuse — a PAM policy, a shell missing from
# /etc/shells, an account whose password field blocks it — and a bare call would
# end the run there under `set -e`. Reported instead, because a machine with the
# right shell installed and the wrong one at login still works.
if confirm "Make zsh the login shell?"; then
if set_login_shell "$(command -v zsh)"; then
ok "login shell is now $(user_login_shell)"
SUMMARY+=("Shell: login shell set to zsh")
else
warn "chsh refused — login shell is still $(user_login_shell)"
echo " Change it later with: chsh -s $(command -v zsh) ${USERNAME}"
ERRORS+=("Shell: chsh refused, login shell left as $(user_login_shell)")
SUMMARY+=("Shell: login shell NOT changed")
fi
set_login_shell "$(command -v zsh)"
ok "login shell is now $(user_login_shell)"
SUMMARY+=("Shell: login shell set to zsh")
else
warn "left as ${SHELL_NOW}"
SUMMARY+=("Shell: login shell left as ${SHELL_NOW}")
@@ -2258,29 +2137,11 @@ if ! skip; then
esac
fi
# scripts/setup/tmux.conf, one level up — the shell templates live together
# beside starship.toml, which has to be there because the PLATFORM reads it
# too (os-user-shell.ts, for every member's Linux account). Keeping them in
# one directory means "where do the dotfile templates live" has one answer.
#
# No leading dot on any of them: they are templates in a repository, not
# dotfiles in a home directory, and tmux's destination is increasingly
# ~/.config/tmux/tmux.conf, which has no dot either.
if [[ -r "$SCRIPT_DIR/../tmux.conf" ]]; then
# Not always ~/.tmux.conf — see tmux_config_target. tmux 3.1+ prefers
# ~/.config/tmux/tmux.conf, so writing the old path on a machine that has
# the new one produces a file tmux never reads and a success message that
# means nothing.
TMUX_TARGET="$(tmux_config_target "$USER_HOME")"
if tmux_dot_conf_is_shadowed "$USER_HOME"; then
warn "you have BOTH ~/.tmux.conf and ~/.config/tmux/tmux.conf — tmux reads the second"
echo " Targeting the one it actually reads: ${TMUX_TARGET}"
fi
install -d -m 0755 -o "$USERNAME" -g "$(user_group)" "$(dirname "$TMUX_TARGET")"
install_config "$SCRIPT_DIR/../tmux.conf" "$TMUX_TARGET" "$USERNAME" && RC=0 || RC=$?
if [[ -r "$SCRIPT_DIR/.tmux.conf" ]]; then
install_config "$SCRIPT_DIR/.tmux.conf" "${USER_HOME}/.tmux.conf" "$USERNAME" && RC=0 || RC=$?
case $RC in
0) ok "tmux config installed${TMUX_TARGET}" ;;
1) echo " tmux config already matches (${TMUX_TARGET})" ;;
0) ok "tmux config installed" ;;
1) echo " tmux config already matches" ;;
esac
fi
@@ -2311,41 +2172,8 @@ EOF
ok "~/.local/bin and ~/.opencode/bin added to PATH"
fi
# The eza aliases are GUARDED and the rest are not, for one reason: these
# replace `ls`. An unguarded `alias ls='eza --icons'` on a machine where eza
# failed to install leaves the owner with no working `ls` at all, in every new
# shell, which reads as a broken machine rather than a missing package. The
# others degrade honestly — `alias ld=lazydocker` without lazydocker is one
# command-not-found when you type it, not a core utility gone.
#
# Same principle shell-skel/zshrc already holds to: every optional tool is used
# only if present, so one file works on a minimal VPS and a full workstation.
if append_once "$ZSHRC" aliases <<'EOF'
if command -v eza >/dev/null 2>&1; then
alias ls='eza --icons'
alias la='eza --icons -la'
alias ll='eza --icons -l'
alias lll='eza --icons -lA'
alias lh='eza --icons -lhA'
alias ltr='eza --icons -ltr'
alias l='eza --icons -la'
fi
alias grep='grep --color=auto'
alias less='less -R'
alias diff='diff --color=auto'
alias cp='cp -iv'
alias mv='mv -iv'
alias rm='rm -i'
alias mkdir='mkdir -p'
alias which='which -a'
alias history='fc -l 1'
alias n="nvim"
alias vim="n"
alias sz="source ~/.zshrc"
alias ld="lazydocker"
alias httpserver="python3 -m http.server 8888"
EOF
then
ok "shell aliases added"
@@ -2374,7 +2202,10 @@ EOF
EDITOR_PICK=""
while [[ -z "$EDITOR_PICK" ]]; do
menu_answer EDITOR_CHOICE " Which one? (1-${#EDITORS[@]}) [1]: "
if ! read -rp " Which one? (1-${#EDITORS[@]}) [1]: " EDITOR_CHOICE; then
echo ""
fail "No answer."
fi
EDITOR_CHOICE="${EDITOR_CHOICE:-1}"
if [[ "$EDITOR_CHOICE" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] && ((EDITOR_CHOICE >= 1 && EDITOR_CHOICE <= ${#EDITORS[@]})); then
EDITOR_PICK="${EDITORS[$((EDITOR_CHOICE - 1))]}"
@@ -2566,35 +2397,5 @@ echo " Officer: $OFFICER_ROOT"
[[ -n "${TS_IP:-}" && "$TS_IP" != "unknown" ]] && echo " Tailscale: $TS_IP"
echo ""
# ── Who you are when this exits ──
#
# Root. This script never becomes ${USERNAME} — it cannot, since a process cannot
# change its own uid — so it stays root and drops privileges per command instead.
# Everything written into their home was written that way.
#
# Worth saying out loud because the two things a fresh session fixes are both
# invisible until they bite: group membership is fixed at LOGIN, so the `docker`
# group just granted does not exist in this session, and their shell configuration
# lives in their home and is not loaded in root's.
#
# Suppressed when officer-setup is about to run — install.sh sets the variable. It
# would be wrong advice in the middle of an install, because the half that follows
# still needs the root session this would tell you to leave.
if [[ "$EUID" -eq 0 && -z "${OFFICER_SETUP_FOLLOWS:-}" ]]; then
echo -e "${BOLD} You are still root.${NC}"
echo ""
echo " This machine is set up for ${USERNAME}. To carry on as them:"
echo ""
echo -e " ${BOLD}su - ${USERNAME}${NC} from this session"
echo -e " ${BOLD}ssh ${USERNAME}@<this machine>${NC} or log in fresh"
echo ""
echo " A new session is what makes their docker group membership and their"
echo " shell configuration take effect — neither applies to the session you"
echo " are in now."
echo ""
fi
# Clean up progress file on success
rm -f "$PROGRESS_FILE"
report_mark_complete
+13 -465
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
PROGRESS_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/.setup-progress"
ONLY_STEP=""
# Kept before the loop consumes them. This script re-executes itself through sudo
# further down and was passing `"$@"`, which `shift` had already emptied — so
# `officer-setup.sh --only build` run as a normal user silently became a FULL run
# the moment it escalated. Nothing said so; the flag just stopped existing.
ORIGINAL_ARGS=(${@+"$@"})
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
--only)
@@ -31,46 +24,19 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
ONLY_STEP="${1#*=}"
shift
;;
# Set before lib/repo.sh is sourced below, which reads it as
# `${OFFICER_REPO:-<default>}` — so this wins and an absent flag still defaults.
--repo)
[[ -n "${2:-}" ]] || {
echo "--repo needs a URL" >&2
exit 2
}
OFFICER_REPO="$2"
shift 2
;;
--repo=*)
OFFICER_REPO="${1#*=}"
shift
;;
--unattended | -y)
export UNATTENDED=1 ASSUME_YES=1
shift
;;
-l | --list)
grep -oP '^step "\K[^"]+' "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"
exit 0
;;
-h | --help)
echo "usage: officer-setup.sh [--only <step>] [--list] [--repo <url>] [--unattended]"
echo ""
echo " --only <step> run one step; --list names them"
echo " --unattended take the default for every question that has one (-y)"
echo " --repo <url> clone from here instead of the default, which is a"
echo " private Gitea over SSH and only authenticates on a"
echo " machine whose key it already knows. Same as exporting"
echo " OFFICER_REPO. Ignored once the repo is checked out."
echo "usage: officer-setup.sh [--only <step>] [--list]"
exit 0
;;
*) echo "unknown option: $1" >&2 && exit 2 ;;
esac
done
export OFFICER_REPO="${OFFICER_REPO:-}"
# shellcheck source=officer-setup/lib/base.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/report.sh"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/lib/base.sh"
# shellcheck source=officer-setup/lib/preflight.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/lib/preflight.sh"
@@ -82,14 +48,6 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/lib/layout.sh"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/lib/postgres.sh"
# shellcheck source=officer-setup/lib/env.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/lib/env.sh"
# shellcheck source=officer-setup/lib/secrets.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/lib/secrets.sh"
# shellcheck source=officer-setup/lib/build.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/lib/build.sh"
# shellcheck source=officer-setup/lib/services.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/lib/services.sh"
# shellcheck source=officer-setup/lib/proxy.sh
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup/lib/proxy.sh"
trap 'echo ""; echo -e "${RED}╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════╗${NC}"; echo -e "${RED}║ OFFICER SETUP FAILED${NC}"; echo -e "${RED}║ Step: ${CURRENT_STEP:-unknown}${NC}"; echo -e "${RED}║ Line: $LINENO${NC}"; echo -e "${RED}║ Command: $BASH_COMMAND${NC}"; echo -e "${RED}╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════╝${NC}"' ERR
@@ -102,37 +60,10 @@ echo -e "${BOLD}╔════════════════════
echo -e "${BOLD}║ Officer Setup ║${NC}"
echo -e "${BOLD}╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════╝${NC}"
# ── Privileges: asked for, not demanded ──
#
# Run this as YOURSELF. It needs root on Linux, so it asks through sudo and
# re-executes itself rather than making you type it. Variables are passed to sudo
# by name rather than with -E, because `env_reset` is the sudoers default and
# strips the environment — which is how DATA_PATH was lost once already.
#
# macOS never escalates: Homebrew refuses to run as root, and the account running
# this IS the owner, so there is nothing to chown and nothing to drop to.
if [[ "$(uname -s)" == "Darwin" ]]; then
if [[ "$EUID" -eq 0 ]]; then
fail "Do not run this with sudo on macOS — run it as yourself."
fi
elif [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "This needs root and sudo is not installed — run it as root."
echo ""
echo " This needs administrator rights. You will be asked for your password."
echo ""
exec sudo \
OFFICER_ROOT="${OFFICER_ROOT:-}" \
SETUP_USERNAME="${SETUP_USERNAME:-}" \
MACHINE_ROLE="${MACHINE_ROLE:-}" \
REPORT_FILE="${REPORT_FILE:-}" \
UNATTENDED="${UNATTENDED:-}" \
ASSUME_YES="${ASSUME_YES:-}" \
OFFICER_REPO="${OFFICER_REPO:-}" \
bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/officer-setup.sh" ${ORIGINAL_ARGS[@]+"${ORIGINAL_ARGS[@]}"}
if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
fail "Please run as root: sudo ./officer-setup.sh"
fi
trap report_flush EXIT
# ── what machine-setup already established ──
echo ""
if load_machine_answers; then
@@ -183,26 +114,6 @@ info "Account: ${USERNAME} (home ${USER_HOME})"
info "Officer: ${OFFICER_ROOT}"
[[ -n "$MACHINE_ROLE" ]] && info "Role: ${MACHINE_ROLE}"
# ── recover what earlier runs already decided ──
#
# A skipped section leaves its variables unset, and later sections read them. On
# a resume that is every section before the one it stopped at, so Build announced
# "PUBLIC_URL <not set — run the Environment section first>" on a machine whose
# .env had been written twenty minutes earlier.
#
# Read back here, once, from the file that already holds the answers, rather than
# per-section — three variables cross a section boundary (ENV_PORT and
# ENV_PUBLIC_URL from Environment, POSTGRES_URL from Database) and the next one
# added would have to remember to do this again.
#
# Only fills what is EMPTY, so a variable passed in on the command line still
# wins, and a section that runs for real still overwrites it with its own answer.
if [[ -f "$(env_file)" ]]; then
ENV_PORT="${ENV_PORT:-$(env_get PORT)}"
ENV_PUBLIC_URL="${ENV_PUBLIC_URL:-$(env_get PUBLIC_URL)}"
POSTGRES_URL="${POSTGRES_URL:-$(env_get POSTGRES_URL)}"
fi
# ── is the machine actually ready ──
#
# Checked and reported together. Finding out about a missing bun three sections
@@ -256,7 +167,6 @@ fi
#
# Before the repository, because the repository is cloned into it.
report_section "Layout"
step "Layout"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
@@ -300,7 +210,6 @@ fi
# 3. Repository
# =============================================================================
report_section "Repository"
step "Repository"
if ! skip; then
PLATFORM_DIR="$(platform_dir)"
@@ -373,7 +282,6 @@ fi
# 4. Dependencies
# =============================================================================
report_section "Dependencies"
step "Dependencies"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
@@ -428,7 +336,6 @@ fi
#
# POSTGRES_URL is set here and written by the environment section below.
report_section "Database"
step "Database"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
@@ -546,7 +453,6 @@ fi
# 6. Environment
# =============================================================================
report_section "Environment"
step "Environment"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
@@ -554,7 +460,7 @@ if ! skip; then
# Read back before anything is asked; existing values become the defaults.
ENV_PORT="$(env_get PORT)"
ENV_PUBLIC_URL="$(env_get PUBLIC_URL)"
ENV_BROWSER_RELAY_PORT="$(env_get BROWSER_RELAY_PORT)"
if env_exists; then
echo " exists — its values are the defaults below"
@@ -565,23 +471,11 @@ if ! skip; then
# ── what is asked ──
echo ""
ask_required ENV_PORT "Port Officer listens on" "${ENV_PORT:-9000}"
echo ""
echo " PUBLIC_URL is where Officer is reached from a browser. It is the one"
echo " thing this machine cannot work out for itself, and three things need"
echo " it: the OpenGraph tags baked into the page by 'bun gen:index', the"
echo " host the task API hands to scripts, and the CalDAV profile an iPhone"
echo " installs — that last one requires https."
echo ""
echo " Defaulting to this machine's tailnet address, not localhost: the"
echo " tailnet is where Officer is actually reached from, and localhost"
echo " works from here and nowhere else."
ask_required ENV_PUBLIC_URL "Public URL" "${ENV_PUBLIC_URL:-$(default_public_url "$ENV_PORT")}"
ENV_BROWSER_RELAY_PORT="${ENV_BROWSER_RELAY_PORT:-18792}"
echo ""
echo " to write:"
echo " PORT=${ENV_PORT}"
echo " PUBLIC_URL=${ENV_PUBLIC_URL}"
echo " PORT=${ENV_PORT} BROWSER_RELAY_PORT=${ENV_BROWSER_RELAY_PORT}"
echo " POSTGRES_URL=${POSTGRES_URL%%:*}://…"
echo ""
echo " the install root is not written here — the platform derives it as the"
@@ -592,7 +486,6 @@ if ! skip; then
if confirm "Write it?"; then
write_env
ok "written, 0600, owned by ${USERNAME}"
report_changed "wrote $(env_file) (0600, owner ${USERNAME}) — PORT, PUBLIC_URL, POSTGRES_URL. No secrets: every key lives in the secret store."
[[ -f "$(env_file).before-officer-setup" ]] && echo " previous kept as $(env_file).before-officer-setup"
SUMMARY+=("Environment: $(env_file)")
else
@@ -603,358 +496,13 @@ if ! skip; then
fi
# =============================================================================
# 7. Secrets
# NOT BUILT YET
# =============================================================================
#
# The store creates keys on demand, so this section is not strictly required —
# the first `sign()` would mint the jwt key by itself. It runs anyway for two
# reasons: the file should exist with the right owner and mode before anything
# races to create it, and an install that finishes without ever saying the words
# "back this up" is one where nobody learns the file matters until it is gone.
report_section "Secrets"
step "Secrets"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
info "Secret store — $(secret_store_path)"
echo " Every encryption and signing key the platform holds, one SQLite file,"
echo " one key per purpose. Nothing goes in .env."
echo ""
echo " bootstrapped now:"
echo " jwt signs every session token"
echo " headscale encrypts the Headscale admin API key in Postgres"
echo ""
echo " Every other purpose — wallet, photos, jellyfin, invoiceshelf, vault,"
echo " service-connections — is created when its plugin is installed. A"
echo " plugin cannot read another plugin's key."
echo ""
if confirm "Create it?"; then
if bootstrap_secret_store; then
ok "created, 0600, owned by ${USERNAME}"
report_changed "created $(secret_store_path) (0600, dir 0700, owner ${USERNAME}) with keys for: jwt, headscale. Generated locally, never transmitted."
echo ""
warn "back up $(secret_store_path) — and keep it OUT of the backup that holds your database dump."
echo " Losing it signs everyone out and makes every encrypted column in"
echo " Postgres unreadable. For the wallet seed that is unrecoverable:"
echo " the passphrase opens the inner envelope, this is the outer one."
echo ""
echo " Keeping it beside a dump defeats it — the dump is the ciphertext"
echo " and this is the key. Separate backups, or it is one theft."
SUMMARY+=("Secrets: $(secret_store_path)")
else
warn "could not create the store — the platform will create it on first use"
SUMMARY+=("Secrets: NOT created; the platform will do it on first use")
fi
else
warn "skipped by request — the platform will create it on first use"
SUMMARY+=("Secrets: SKIPPED; the platform will create it on first use")
fi
step_ok
fi
# =============================================================================
# 8. Schema
# =============================================================================
report_section "Schema"
step "Schema"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
# Counted from the aggregator rather than hardcoded, so the number is the truth
# even when a plugin line is uncommented. It was written as ${SCHEMA_TABLES:-?}
# and never assigned, so the section said "? tables" — a placeholder that looked
# like the count could not be determined rather than like nobody had set it.
SCHEMA_TABLES="$(schema_table_count)"
info "Database schema"
echo " ${SCHEMA_TABLES:-?} tables, applied with 'bun db:push' — drizzle-kit"
echo " diffs the schema code against Postgres and alters it directly. There"
echo " are no migration files and no migration table; the code is the source"
echo " of truth."
echo ""
echo " Only the CORE tables. Every plugin's tables are commented out in"
echo " src/databases/officer_db/src/schema.ts and get created when the"
echo " plugin is installed."
echo ""
if confirm "Push it?"; then
if OUT="$(push_schema)"; then
ok "schema applied"
report_changed "applied ${SCHEMA_TABLES} tables to Postgres with 'bun db:push' (drizzle-kit; no migration files)"
SUMMARY+=("Schema: ${SCHEMA_TABLES:-?} tables pushed")
else
warn "db:push failed"
echo "$OUT" | tail -12 | sed 's/^/ /'
SUMMARY+=("Schema: FAILED — see the output above")
fi
else
warn "skipped by request — the platform will not start without it"
SUMMARY+=("Schema: SKIPPED by request")
fi
step_ok
fi
# =============================================================================
# 9. Build
# =============================================================================
report_section "Build"
step "Build"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
info "index.gen.html"
echo " 'bun gen:index' substitutes your public URL into index.html and"
echo " writes index.gen.html, which is the file the server imports. It is"
echo " gitignored, so a fresh clone never has one and the server has no page"
echo " to serve until this runs."
echo ""
echo " URL: ${ENV_PUBLIC_URL:-<not set — run the Environment section first>}"
echo ""
echo " To change it later: bun gen:index https://your.new.url"
echo ""
if [[ -z "$ENV_PUBLIC_URL" ]]; then
warn "PUBLIC_URL is not in $(env_file) — run the Environment section, then this one"
SUMMARY+=("Build: SKIPPED — no PUBLIC_URL")
elif confirm "Generate it?"; then
if OUT="$(gen_index)"; then
ok "$(gen_index_output)"
report_changed "generated $(gen_index_output) from index.html, substituting PUBLIC_URL=${ENV_PUBLIC_URL}"
SUMMARY+=("Build: index.gen.html for ${ENV_PUBLIC_URL}")
else
warn "gen:index failed"
echo "$OUT" | tail -8 | sed 's/^/ /'
SUMMARY+=("Build: FAILED — see the output above")
fi
else
warn "skipped by request — the server has no page to serve without it"
SUMMARY+=("Build: SKIPPED by request")
fi
step_ok
fi
# =============================================================================
# 10. Services
# =============================================================================
report_section "Services"
step "Services"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
info "pm2 — $(ecosystem_file)"
echo " The ecosystem file is GENERATED, not checked in. It describes this"
echo " install and nothing else, so nothing in git can drift from it."
echo ""
echo " six processes:"
for entry in "${CORE_PROCESSES[@]}"; do
IFS='|' read -r _name _script _args <<<"$entry"
printf " %-24s %s %s\n" "$_name" "$_script" "$_args"
done
echo ""
echo " Nothing else. Every plugin adds its own entry when it is installed."
echo ""
if confirm "Write it and start them?"; then
write_ecosystem
ok "written — $(ecosystem_file)"
report_changed "wrote $(ecosystem_file) — six pm2 apps: $(printf '%s ' "${CORE_PROCESSES[@]%%|*}")"
# Starting against a database that is not answering is not fatal — the server
# waits and the agent retries forever — but it makes the Verify section below
# report a failure that is really just a race, and that is the kind of noise
# that teaches people to ignore a red line.
if pg_container_running && ! pg_wait_ready 30; then
warn "Postgres is not answering — starting anyway, but Verify may report failures"
fi
if OUT="$(pm2_start)"; then
ok "processes started"
report_started "pm2 startOrRestart: $(printf '%s ' "${CORE_PROCESSES[@]%%|*}")"
pm2_save >/dev/null 2>&1 && ok "process list saved (survives a pm2 restart)"
echo ""
if confirm "Start them on boot too?"; then
if pm2_enable_startup; then
ok "pm2 will resurrect them at boot"
report_ran "pm2 startup systemd — installed a systemd unit so pm2 resurrects these at boot"
SUMMARY+=("Services: 6 processes started, enabled at boot")
else
warn "could not enable the boot hook — run 'pm2 startup' yourself and follow it"
SUMMARY+=("Services: 6 processes started; boot hook NOT enabled")
fi
else
SUMMARY+=("Services: 6 processes started; not enabled at boot")
fi
else
warn "pm2 did not start cleanly"
echo "$OUT" | tail -12 | sed 's/^/ /'
SUMMARY+=("Services: FAILED to start — see the output above")
fi
else
warn "skipped by request"
SUMMARY+=("Services: SKIPPED by request")
fi
step_ok
fi
# =============================================================================
# 11. Verify
# =============================================================================
report_section "Verify"
step "Verify"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
info "Are the processes actually up?"
echo ""
VERIFY_BAD=0
while IFS='|' read -r vname vstatus vrestarts; do
[[ -z "$vname" ]] && continue
if [[ "$vstatus" == "online" ]]; then
if (( vrestarts > 3 )); then
warn "$(printf '%-24s online, but restarted %s times — check: pm2 logs %s' "$vname" "$vrestarts" "$vname")"
VERIFY_BAD=$((VERIFY_BAD + 1))
else
ok "$(printf '%-24s online' "$vname")"
fi
else
warn "$(printf '%-24s %s — check: pm2 logs %s' "$vname" "$vstatus" "$vname")"
VERIFY_BAD=$((VERIFY_BAD + 1))
fi
done < <(pm2_status_lines)
echo ""
# A process can be `online` and still be failing to serve — a restart loop takes
# a few seconds to show up in the counter, and the app can be up with a broken
# database. So the port is asked directly.
if curl -fsS --max-time 5 "http://127.0.0.1:${ENV_PORT:-9000}/api" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ok "the API answers on 127.0.0.1:${ENV_PORT:-9000}"
SUMMARY+=("Verify: API answering on port ${ENV_PORT:-9000}")
else
warn "nothing answered on 127.0.0.1:${ENV_PORT:-9000}/api"
echo " pm2 logs officer is where the reason will be."
VERIFY_BAD=$((VERIFY_BAD + 1))
SUMMARY+=("Verify: the API did NOT answer on port ${ENV_PORT:-9000}")
fi
if (( VERIFY_BAD == 0 )); then
echo ""
ok "Officer is running. Open ${ENV_PUBLIC_URL:-http://localhost:${ENV_PORT:-9000}} and the"
echo " first-run screen will create the owner account."
fi
step_ok
fi
# =============================================================================
# 12. Proxy
# =============================================================================
#
# Optional, and last, because it is the only step that needs Officer to be already
# running: NPM proxies to it, and the gate below checks the bind address rather than
# taking a curl to loopback as proof.
#
# ── Why this section ignores --unattended ──
#
# Every other question in this script has a defensible default. None of these do — a
# domain name, a DNS provider and that provider's API credentials cannot be guessed —
# and the step is opt-in besides. So its prompts read stdin directly instead of going
# through confirm()/ask_required(), which honour ASSUME_YES.
#
# The valve is a TTY check, not the flag: with no terminal there is nobody to ask, so
# it skips and prints the manual instructions. That keeps a cron-driven install working
# without letting --unattended silently agree to publishing a public hostname.
report_section "Proxy"
step "Proxy"
if ! skip; then
echo ""
info "Reverse proxy — a real hostname and an HTTPS certificate"
echo " Optional. Skip it if you already run a proxy elsewhere, or if you"
echo " reach this instance over the tailnet and are happy with that."
echo ""
PROXY_PORT="${ENV_PORT:-9000}"
if [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then
warn "no terminal — skipping the proxy, which cannot be answered unattended"
proxy_skip_instructions "$PROXY_PORT"
SUMMARY+=("Proxy: skipped (no terminal)")
elif ! proxy_require_listening "$PROXY_PORT"; then
warn "skipping the proxy — Officer is not reachable the way NPM would reach it"
echo " Fix the bind address, then: officer-setup.sh --only Proxy"
SUMMARY+=("Proxy: skipped (Officer not listening on 0.0.0.0)")
elif ! proxy_confirm "Set up Nginx Proxy Manager now?"; then
proxy_skip_instructions "$PROXY_PORT"
SUMMARY+=("Proxy: skipped by request")
else
# One failure path for all of it: every function warns and returns non-zero rather
# than exiting, so a proxy that does not come up leaves a finished Officer install
# behind rather than a failed one. It is the last section for that reason.
PROXY_DOMAIN="$(proxy_ask 'Domain for this instance (e.g. officer.example.com)')"
if [[ -z "$PROXY_DOMAIN" ]]; then
warn "no domain given — skipping"
SUMMARY+=("Proxy: skipped (no domain)")
elif
proxy_detect_target &&
proxy_ensure_network &&
proxy_order_docker_after_tailscaled &&
proxy_write_compose &&
proxy_start &&
proxy_claim_admin &&
proxy_get_token &&
{ [[ "$CHALLENGE" != "dns" ]] || proxy_prompt_dns_credentials; } &&
proxy_wait_for_dns "$PROXY_DOMAIN" "$TARGET_IP" &&
proxy_allow_bridge_to_host "$PROXY_PORT" &&
proxy_create_host "$PROXY_DOMAIN" "$PROXY_PORT" &&
proxy_issue_certificate "$PROXY_DOMAIN" &&
proxy_attach_certificate
then
proxy_verify "$PROXY_DOMAIN"
echo ""
ok "Officer is published at https://${PROXY_DOMAIN}"
echo " NPM admin: http://127.0.0.1:81$([[ "$CHALLENGE" == "dns" ]] && echo " or http://${TARGET_IP}:81")"
SUMMARY+=("Proxy: https://${PROXY_DOMAIN}")
else
warn "the proxy did not finish — Officer itself is unaffected and still running"
echo " Retry just this part with: officer-setup.sh --only Proxy"
ERRORS+=("Proxy: did not finish")
SUMMARY+=("Proxy: FAILED — retry with --only Proxy")
fi
fi
step_ok
fi
# ── Who you are when this exits ──
#
# Root, and that surprises people — reasonably, because everything this script just
# installed belongs to somebody else. The platform runs as ${USERNAME}: the checkout,
# node_modules, .env, the secret store and all six pm2 processes are theirs. Root was
# the installer's privilege, never the platform's.
#
# Saying so matters for two things that are invisible until they bite:
#
# - group membership is fixed at login. ${USERNAME} was added to `docker` during
# machine setup, and a session that started before that does not have it — so
# `docker ps` fails for a reason that has nothing to do with docker.
# - the shell config was written into THEIR home. Staying as root means none of it
# is loaded, and the machine looks unconfigured.
if [[ "$EUID" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo ""
echo -e "${BOLD} One more thing — you are still root.${NC}"
echo ""
echo " Officer runs as ${USERNAME}, and everything it installed is theirs."
echo " Nothing here needs root any more. To carry on as them:"
echo ""
echo -e " ${BOLD}su - ${USERNAME}${NC} from this session"
echo -e " ${BOLD}ssh ${USERNAME}@<this machine>${NC} or log in fresh"
echo ""
echo " Either gives a new session, which is what makes their docker group"
echo " membership and their shell configuration take effect. Staying as root"
echo " means neither does, and the machine will look half-configured."
fi
# 6 Schema db:push
# 7 Build gen:index
# 8 Services pm2 startOrRestart · save · startup
# 9 Verify are the processes actually up
echo ""
report_mark_complete
echo -e "${BOLD} Pre-flight complete.${NC} The remaining sections are not built yet."
echo ""
-8
View File
@@ -113,14 +113,6 @@ confirm() {
ask_required() {
local __var="$1" message="$2" default="$3" answer=""
# Unattended takes the default where there IS one. Where there is not — the owning
# account on a machine that machine-setup never ran on — it still asks, because
# there is nothing to fall back to and a guess would install as the wrong user.
if [[ "${UNATTENDED:-}" == "1" && -n "$default" ]]; then
printf ' %s [%s] — unattended, taking the default\n' "$message" "$default"
printf -v "$__var" '%s' "$default"
return 0
fi
while [[ -z "$answer" ]]; do
if ! read -rp " ${message}${default:+ [$default]}: " answer; then
echo ""
-49
View File
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# =============================================================================
# officer-setup — schema and build
# =============================================================================
#
# Definitions only.
#
# Both run AS the owner, from the repo. Neither is idempotent in the sense of
# "does nothing the second time" — both are safe to repeat, which is not the same
# thing and is the property that matters for a script people re-run.
[[ -n "${OFFICER_SETUP_BUILD_LOADED:-}" ]] && return 0
OFFICER_SETUP_BUILD_LOADED=1
# `bun db:push` — drizzle-kit diffs the schema code against the live database.
#
# No migrations here and no __drizzle_migrations table: the schema code IS the
# source of truth (src/databases/CLAUDE.md). On the empty database section 5 just
# created there is nothing to drop, so the prompt drizzle-kit shows for a
# destructive change cannot appear.
#
# It can still appear on a RE-RUN against a database with data, and a prompt
# nobody sees would hang the script forever — so stdin is closed rather than left
# attached. drizzle-kit then fails instead of waiting, which is the outcome you
# want at 3am.
push_schema() {
sudo -u "$USERNAME" bash -c "cd '$(platform_dir)' && bun db:push </dev/null" 2>&1
}
# What tables the schema will create, read from the aggregator rather than
# guessed. This is what makes the section able to say what it is about to do.
schema_table_count() {
local dir
dir="$(platform_dir)/src/databases/officer_db/src"
grep -oP "^export \* from '\./\K[\w-]+(?=/schema')" "$dir/schema.ts" 2>/dev/null | while read -r f; do
grep -c "pgTable(" "$dir/$f/schema.ts" 2>/dev/null || true
done | awk '{s+=$1} END {print s+0}'
}
# `bun gen:index` — substitutes PUBLIC_URL into index.html and writes
# index.gen.html, which is what the server actually imports.
#
# Not optional and not cosmetic: without it the server has no page to serve. It
# is gitignored, so a fresh clone never has one.
gen_index() {
sudo -u "$USERNAME" bash -c "cd '$(platform_dir)' && bun gen:index '$ENV_PUBLIC_URL'" 2>&1
}
gen_index_output() { echo "$(platform_dir)/src/apps/officer-web/index.gen.html"; }
+10 -54
View File
@@ -5,14 +5,16 @@
#
# Definitions only.
#
# ── No secrets are written here ──
# ── What is NOT here ──
#
# Every encryption and signing key lives in the secret store — a 0600 SQLite file
# at $OFFICER_ROOT/secrets/officer-keys.db, one key per purpose, created on first
# use. See docs/secret-store.md and the Secrets section of officer-setup.sh.
# JWT_SECRET and VAULT_STORE_KEY are not written. They are moving into the SQLite
# key store (docs/secret-store.md), and writing them here in the meantime would
# mean generating a value that the store then has to be reconciled with — two
# origins for one secret, which is the failure the store exists to end.
#
# So this file holds no credential except POSTGRES_URL, which is a connection
# string to a database bound to loopback.
# The consequence is honest and deliberate: jwt.ts throws at module load without
# JWT_SECRET, so an install made by this script does not boot until the store
# lands. That sequencing was chosen rather than stumbled into.
#
# ── Derived, not asked ──
#
@@ -63,8 +65,8 @@ write_env() {
PORT="${ENV_PORT}"
# Where Officer is reached from a browser. Not derivable — see the section.
PUBLIC_URL="${ENV_PUBLIC_URL}"
# The browser relay listens on its own port, separate from the app.
BROWSER_RELAY_PORT="${ENV_BROWSER_RELAY_PORT}"
POSTGRES_URL="${POSTGRES_URL}"
@@ -76,49 +78,3 @@ ENVF
chmod 600 "$dest"
return 0
}
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# A sensible default for PUBLIC_URL
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# localhost is the wrong default on a machine with a tailnet, and quietly so:
# it works from the machine itself and from nowhere else, so the mistake shows up
# on the first phone, not during setup.
#
# The tailnet is where Officer is actually reached — it is the perimeter the
# whole security model rests on — so its address is the honest default.
#
# The SHORT MagicDNS name — `officer-dev`, not `officer-dev.ts.example.dev` and
# not the raw 100.x address. All three resolve inside the tailnet; the short one
# is the one anybody actually types, and PUBLIC_URL ends up baked into the page's
# OpenGraph tags by `bun gen:index`, so it is read by people as well as machines.
#
# It relies on the tailnet's search domain, which every Tailscale client sets when
# MagicDNS is on. A device that has somehow lost it resolves the FQDN and not the
# short name — the fix there is to type the longer one, not to default to it.
#
# Falls back to localhost when there is no tailnet, which is correct rather than
# merely tolerable: a machine with no private network has no other address that
# is any better a guess.
tailnet_hostname() {
local dns ip
dns="$(tailscale status --json 2>/dev/null | grep -oP '"DNSName":\s*"\K[^"]+' | head -1)"
dns="${dns%.}" # MagicDNS reports it fully qualified, with a trailing dot
dns="${dns%%.*}" # and we want the short name
if [[ -n "$dns" ]]; then
echo "$dns"
return 0
fi
ip="$(tailscale ip -4 2>/dev/null | head -1)"
[[ -n "$ip" ]] && echo "$ip"
}
default_public_url() {
local host
host="$(tailnet_hostname)"
if [[ -n "$host" ]]; then
echo "http://${host}:${1}"
else
echo "http://localhost:${1}"
fi
}
-492
View File
@@ -1,492 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# officer-setup — Nginx Proxy Manager, the optional last step.
#
# Publishes the running instance on a real hostname with a Let's Encrypt certificate.
# Entirely optional: someone with a proxy elsewhere declines and is printed the values
# they need instead.
#
# PRECONDITION: Officer is running and bound to 0.0.0.0. Checked, not assumed — see
# proxy_require_listening.
#
# ── Why this section ignores --unattended ──
#
# Every other question in this script has a defensible default. None of these do: a
# domain name, a DNS provider and that provider's API credentials cannot be guessed,
# and the whole step is opt-in besides. So the prompts here read stdin directly rather
# than going through confirm()/ask_required(), which honour ASSUME_YES.
#
# The safety valve is a TTY check rather than the flag: with no terminal there is
# nobody to ask, so the section skips itself and prints the manual instructions. That
# covers a cron-driven install without making --unattended silently agree to a proxy.
[[ -n "${OFFICER_SETUP_PROXY_LOADED:-}" ]] && return 0
OFFICER_SETUP_PROXY_LOADED=1
# `${OFFICER_ROOT}/dockers`, matching src/servers/data-path.ts, which derives that
# directory from the install root. The draft used $HOME/dockers, which is a different
# place on every machine and not the one the app store provisions into.
proxy_dir() { echo "${OFFICER_ROOT}/dockers/nginx-proxy-manager"; }
# The network machine-setup already created. It defaults to `services` there, so a
# second name would leave two bridges on the same box with containers unable to see
# each other by name.
PROXY_NET="${SETUP_DOCKER_NETWORK:-services}"
PROXY_API="http://127.0.0.1:81/api"
# ── prompts that always ask ──
#
# Deliberately not confirm()/ask_required(): see the header. Named apart so nobody
# later "fixes" them into the shared helpers and quietly makes --unattended agree to
# provisioning a public hostname.
proxy_confirm() {
local answer
read -rp " $1 [y/N]: " answer || return 1
[[ "$answer" =~ ^[Yy] ]]
}
proxy_ask() {
local answer
read -rp " $1: " answer || return 1
printf '%s' "$answer"
}
# ── 0. is Officer reachable the way NPM will reach it? ──
#
# `curl 127.0.0.1:$PORT` succeeds even when the process binds loopback ONLY, which is
# exactly the case NPM cannot reach: it dials from inside a container, where 127.0.0.1
# is the container itself. Passing this gate on a curl check produces a 504 later that
# reads like a firewall fault. So the bind ADDRESS is what gets checked.
proxy_require_listening() {
local port="$1" listen
listen="$(ss -ltnH "sport = :$port" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $4}')"
[[ -n "$listen" ]] || {
warn "nothing is listening on port ${port} — start Officer first"
return 1
}
if ! grep -qE '(^|\s)(0\.0\.0\.0|\*):'"$port"'$' <<<"$listen"; then
warn "Officer is listening on: ${listen}"
info "NPM runs in a container, so 127.0.0.1 there is the container itself."
info "A loopback-only listener is invisible to it and yields a 504."
return 1
fi
ok "Officer is listening on 0.0.0.0:${port}"
}
# ── 1. where will the hostname point? ──
#
# Tailnet DNS-01 is mandatory. Let's Encrypt cannot reach 100.64.0.0/10, so HTTP-01
# always fails. The A record is not needed to ISSUE (validation is a TXT
# record) but is needed to USE the name.
# Public HTTP-01 works with no API keys, but the A record must already resolve here.
proxy_detect_target() {
local ts=""
command -v tailscale >/dev/null 2>&1 && ts="$(tailscale ip -4 2>/dev/null | head -1 || true)"
if [[ -n "$ts" ]]; then
TARGET_IP="$ts"
CHALLENGE="dns"
ok "Tailscale detected — ${TARGET_IP}"
info "Tailnet addresses are unreachable from Let's Encrypt, so the certificate"
info "needs a DNS-01 challenge, which needs your DNS provider's API credentials."
else
TARGET_IP="$(curl -sf --max-time 10 https://api.ipify.org || true)"
[[ -n "$TARGET_IP" ]] || {
warn "could not determine this machine's public IP"
return 1
}
CHALLENGE="http"
ok "No Tailscale — public IP ${TARGET_IP} (HTTP-01, no API keys needed)"
fi
}
# Read by indirect expansion — `${!hint}` where hint is "DNS_HINT_${DNS_PROVIDER}" —
# which shellcheck cannot follow, hence the disable rather than a rewrite. Naming them
# this way is what lets a provider with no hint simply not have one.
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
DNS_HINT_godaddy="Create an API key at https://developer.godaddy.com/keys (Production).
You need both the Key and the Secret. Scope it to DNS only if offered."
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
DNS_HINT_cloudflare="Create a token at https://dash.cloudflare.com/profile/api-tokens
Use template 'Edit zone DNS'. Permissions: Zone:DNS:Edit for the zone."
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
DNS_HINT_digitalocean="Create a Personal Access Token with WRITE scope at
https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/tokens"
# The exact credential file format per provider ships INSIDE the NPM image, so it is
# read from there rather than hardcoded — that keeps working as certbot plugins change.
proxy_prompt_dns_credentials() {
echo ""
info "Supported providers include: cloudflare, godaddy, digitalocean, route53,"
info "namecheap, ovh, linode, vultr, hetzner, gandi, google, azure …"
DNS_PROVIDER="$(proxy_ask 'DNS provider')"
[[ -n "$DNS_PROVIDER" ]] || {
warn "no provider given"
return 1
}
local hint="DNS_HINT_${DNS_PROVIDER}"
[[ -n "${!hint:-}" ]] && {
echo ""
info "${!hint}"
}
echo ""
info "Credential format this provider expects:"
docker exec npm python3 -c \
"import json;d=json.load(open('/app/certbot/dns-plugins.json'));print(d['${DNS_PROVIDER}']['credentials'])" \
2>/dev/null | sed 's/^/ /' ||
warn "could not read the template — check the provider name is spelled correctly"
echo ""
info "Paste the credential lines exactly as shown above (blank line to finish):"
DNS_CREDENTIALS=""
local line
while IFS= read -r line; do
[[ -z "$line" ]] && break
DNS_CREDENTIALS+="$line"$'\n'
done
[[ -n "$DNS_CREDENTIALS" ]] || {
warn "no credentials entered"
return 1
}
}
# ── 2. wait for DNS ──
#
# `getent hosts` rather than `dig`: dig comes from dnsutils, which this platform does
# not install, so the draft's version was command-not-found on a fresh VPS — and since
# an empty answer is indistinguishable from "not resolving yet", it waited the full
# thirty minutes before failing. getent is in libc and always there.
#
# The cost is that it reads the system resolver rather than a public one, so a stale
# local cache can satisfy it. Worth it against a check that cannot run at all.
proxy_wait_for_dns() {
local domain="$1" want="$2" got elapsed=0 interval=15 timeout=1800
echo ""
info "Point this DNS record at the machine now:"
echo ""
info " ${domain}. A ${want}"
echo ""
[[ "$CHALLENGE" == "dns" ]] &&
info "(Tailnet: the certificate can issue without this, but the name will not resolve until it exists.)"
while ((elapsed < timeout)); do
got="$(getent hosts "$domain" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}' | head -1)"
if [[ "$got" == "$want" ]]; then
ok "${domain} resolves to ${want}"
return 0
fi
printf '\r waiting — %s (%ss) ' "${got:-not resolving yet}" "$elapsed"
sleep "$interval"
elapsed=$((elapsed + interval))
done
echo ""
warn "${domain} still does not resolve to ${want} after $((timeout / 60)) minutes"
[[ "$CHALLENGE" == "dns" ]] && proxy_confirm "Continue anyway and issue the certificate?" && return 0
warn "cannot issue an HTTP-01 certificate until DNS resolves here"
return 1
}
proxy_ensure_network() {
docker network inspect "$PROXY_NET" >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
docker network create "$PROXY_NET" >/dev/null && ok "created docker network ${PROXY_NET}"
}
# NPM binds its admin UI to the tailnet IP. If docker starts before tailscaled that
# address does not exist yet and the WHOLE container fails to start, not just that port.
proxy_order_docker_after_tailscaled() {
[[ "$CHALLENGE" == "dns" ]] || return 0
local f=/etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d/10-after-tailscaled.conf
[[ -f "$f" ]] && return 0
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$f")"
cat >"$f" <<'EOF'
# NPM binds its admin UI to the tailnet IP. If docker starts before tailscaled, that
# address does not exist and the container fails to start entirely.
[Unit]
After=tailscaled.service
Wants=tailscaled.service
EOF
systemctl daemon-reload
ok "docker ordered after tailscaled"
report_changed "$f" "docker ordered after tailscaled so NPM can bind the tailnet IP"
}
# Admin UI (81) is NEVER published on 0.0.0.0. Until it is claimed, anyone who reaches
# it can take the instance; afterwards it can issue certificates and re-point every
# proxied service on the box. 80/443 are public only when they need to be.
proxy_write_compose() {
local dir admin_binds public_binds
dir="$(proxy_dir)"
install -d -o "$USERNAME" -g "$(user_group)" "$dir" "$dir/npm_data" "$dir/letsencrypt"
admin_binds=" - \"127.0.0.1:81:81\""
if [[ "$CHALLENGE" == "dns" ]]; then
admin_binds+=$'\n'" - \"${TARGET_IP}:81:81\""
public_binds=" - \"${TARGET_IP}:80:80\""$'\n'" - \"${TARGET_IP}:443:443\""
else
public_binds=" - \"80:80\""$'\n'" - \"443:443\""
fi
cat >"${dir}/docker-compose.yaml" <<EOF
# Generated by officer-setup. Reverse proxy for this Officer instance.
#
# The admin UI (81) is bound to loopback$([[ "$CHALLENGE" == "dns" ]] && echo " and the tailnet") only, never
# 0.0.0.0 — it can issue certificates and re-point every proxied service on this box.
#
# NOTE: ufw does NOT filter docker-published ports. Exposure is decided by the bind
# addresses below and by the DOCKER-USER chain in /etc/ufw/after.rules.
name: npm
services:
npm:
image: jc21/nginx-proxy-manager:latest
container_name: npm
restart: always
networks: [${PROXY_NET}]
ports:
${public_binds}
${admin_binds}
volumes:
- ./npm_data:/data
- ./letsencrypt:/etc/letsencrypt
networks:
${PROXY_NET}:
external: true
EOF
chown "${USERNAME}:$(user_group)" "${dir}/docker-compose.yaml"
ok "wrote ${dir}/docker-compose.yaml"
report_changed "${dir}/docker-compose.yaml" "nginx-proxy-manager compose file"
}
proxy_start() {
as_owner "docker compose --project-directory '$(proxy_dir)' up -d" / >/dev/null
local i
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
curl -sf "$PROXY_API/" >/dev/null 2>&1 && {
ok "NPM answered after ${i}s"
report_started "npm" "nginx-proxy-manager container"
return 0
}
sleep 1
done
warn "NPM did not become ready — check: docker logs npm"
return 1
}
# ── claim the admin account immediately ──
#
# NPM 2.15 replaced the fixed default login with a first-run wizard: while the user
# count is zero, ANYONE who reaches port 81 can claim admin. Done in the same breath as
# starting the container. The bind addresses above already make that window unreachable
# from outside, but this does not rely on that alone.
#
# The re-run path is the half the draft was missing: it returned early on an already
# claimed instance WITHOUT setting NPM_EMAIL/NPM_PASSWORD, and the next function
# dereferenced both under `set -u`. So the second run of a "re-runnable" script died on
# an unbound variable. An existing instance asks for the credentials instead.
proxy_claim_admin() {
if curl -sf "$PROXY_API/" | grep -q '"setup":true'; then
ok "NPM admin is already claimed"
echo ""
info "This instance already has an admin account. Its credentials are needed to"
info "add the proxy host below."
NPM_EMAIL="$(proxy_ask 'NPM admin email')"
NPM_PASSWORD="$(proxy_ask 'NPM admin password')"
[[ -n "$NPM_EMAIL" && -n "$NPM_PASSWORD" ]] || {
warn "both are needed to continue"
return 1
}
return 0
fi
echo ""
info "Create the NPM admin account."
NPM_EMAIL="$(proxy_ask 'Admin email')"
[[ -n "$NPM_EMAIL" ]] || {
warn "no email given"
return 1
}
NPM_PASSWORD="$(openssl rand -base64 24 | tr -d '/+=' | cut -c1-20)"
curl -sf -X POST "$PROXY_API/users" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$(jq -nc --arg e "$NPM_EMAIL" --arg p "$NPM_PASSWORD" \
'{name:"Admin",nickname:"Admin",email:$e,roles:["admin"],is_disabled:false,auth:{type:"password",secret:$p}}')" \
>/dev/null || {
warn "failed to create the NPM admin user"
return 1
}
curl -sf "$PROXY_API/" | grep -q '"setup":true' || {
warn "admin creation did not take"
return 1
}
ok "NPM admin claimed: ${NPM_EMAIL}"
# ── the admin password ──
#
# Deliberately NOT written to a file. The platform's shape is that
# secrets/officer-keys.db holds ENCRYPTION KEYS, one per purpose, and the credential
# itself lives encrypted in Postgres. A third plaintext location is the pattern
# headscale/schema.ts calls "debt to avoid copying, not a precedent to follow".
#
# Nothing programmatic needs this after setup — only a human logging into the admin
# UI — so not storing it is a legitimate outcome rather than a gap.
#
# The DNS API credentials are deliberately never handled either: NPM must keep a
# plaintext copy in npm_data/database.sqlite for certbot to auto-renew, so copying
# them anywhere else adds exposure without adding protection.
echo ""
warn "This password is shown ONCE and is not stored anywhere:"
echo ""
echo " ${NPM_EMAIL}"
echo " ${NPM_PASSWORD}"
echo ""
info "Put it in your password manager now."
proxy_confirm "Saved it?" || {
warn "stopping so the password is not lost — the container is running and claimed"
return 1
}
}
proxy_api() {
local method="$1" path="$2" body="${3:-}"
if [[ -n "$body" ]]; then
curl -sf -X "$method" "${PROXY_API}${path}" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$body"
else
curl -sf -X "$method" "${PROXY_API}${path}" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
fi
}
proxy_get_token() {
TOKEN="$(curl -sf -X POST "$PROXY_API/tokens" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$(jq -nc --arg i "$NPM_EMAIL" --arg s "$NPM_PASSWORD" '{identity:$i,secret:$s}')" |
jq -r '.token')" || {
warn "could not authenticate to the NPM API"
return 1
}
[[ -n "$TOKEN" && "$TOKEN" != "null" ]] || {
warn "NPM rejected those admin credentials"
return 1
}
}
# ── let the bridge reach the host process ──
#
# Officer runs on the HOST under pm2, not in a container. Bridge → host traffic DOES
# traverse INPUT, so ufw's default-deny drops it — unlike docker-published ports, which
# bypass ufw entirely. The symptom is a 504 that looks like a network fault. A container
# upstream would need none of this, which is why container upstreams are preferable when
# there is a choice.
proxy_allow_bridge_to_host() {
local port="$1" subnet
subnet="$(docker network inspect "$PROXY_NET" -f '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Subnet}}')"
if ufw status 2>/dev/null | grep -q "${port}.*${subnet%%/*}"; then
ok "ufw already allows the bridge to reach port ${port}"
else
ufw allow from "$subnet" to any port "$port" proto tcp >/dev/null
ok "ufw: allowed ${subnet} → :${port}"
report_changed "ufw" "allowed ${subnet} to reach port ${port} (bridge to host)"
fi
BRIDGE_GATEWAY="$(docker network inspect "$PROXY_NET" -f '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}')"
}
# Created WITHOUT ssl first, deliberately. Enabling force-SSL before a certificate
# exists gives a host that 301s to https and then fails the handshake — curl reports
# 000, which reads like a network fault rather than a config mistake.
proxy_create_host() {
local domain="$1" port="$2" existing
existing="$(proxy_api GET /nginx/proxy-hosts | jq -r --arg d "$domain" \
'map(select(.domain_names | index($d))) | .[0].id // empty')"
if [[ -n "$existing" ]]; then
HOST_ID="$existing"
ok "proxy host already exists (id ${HOST_ID})"
return 0
fi
HOST_ID="$(proxy_api POST /nginx/proxy-hosts "$(jq -nc \
--arg d "$domain" --arg h "$BRIDGE_GATEWAY" --argjson p "$port" \
'{domain_names:[$d],forward_scheme:"http",forward_host:$h,forward_port:$p,
access_list_id:0,certificate_id:0,block_exploits:true,caching_enabled:false,
allow_websocket_upgrade:true,ssl_forced:false,http2_support:false,
hsts_enabled:false,hsts_subdomains:false,meta:{},advanced_config:"",locations:[]}')" |
jq -r '.id')"
[[ -n "$HOST_ID" && "$HOST_ID" != "null" ]] || {
warn "could not create the proxy host"
return 1
}
ok "proxy host created (id ${HOST_ID}) → ${BRIDGE_GATEWAY}:${port}"
}
# NPM 2.15 REMOVED letsencrypt_email and letsencrypt_agree from the certificate schema.
# Sending them returns: 400 data/meta must NOT have additional properties.
proxy_issue_certificate() {
local domain="$1" meta
CERT_ID="$(proxy_api GET /nginx/certificates | jq -r --arg d "$domain" \
'map(select(.domain_names | index($d))) | .[0].id // empty')"
[[ -n "$CERT_ID" ]] && {
ok "certificate already exists (id ${CERT_ID})"
return 0
}
if [[ "$CHALLENGE" == "dns" ]]; then
meta="$(jq -nc --arg p "$DNS_PROVIDER" --arg c "$DNS_CREDENTIALS" \
'{dns_challenge:true,dns_provider:$p,dns_provider_credentials:$c,propagation_seconds:120}')"
info "Requesting the certificate via DNS-01 — about two minutes, for the plugin"
info "install and DNS propagation."
else
meta='{"dns_challenge":false}'
info "Requesting the certificate via HTTP-01"
fi
CERT_ID="$(proxy_api POST /nginx/certificates "$(jq -nc \
--arg d "$domain" --argjson m "$meta" \
'{provider:"letsencrypt",nice_name:$d,domain_names:[$d],meta:$m}')" | jq -r '.id')"
[[ -n "$CERT_ID" && "$CERT_ID" != "null" ]] || {
warn "the certificate request failed — see: docker logs npm"
return 1
}
ok "certificate issued (id ${CERT_ID})"
}
proxy_attach_certificate() {
proxy_api PUT "/nginx/proxy-hosts/${HOST_ID}" "$(jq -nc --argjson c "$CERT_ID" \
'{certificate_id:$c,ssl_forced:true,http2_support:true,hsts_enabled:false,hsts_subdomains:false}')" \
>/dev/null || {
warn "could not attach the certificate"
return 1
}
ok "certificate attached, force-SSL and HTTP/2 on"
}
proxy_verify() {
local domain="$1" code
code="$(curl -so /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 20 \
--resolve "${domain}:443:${TARGET_IP}" "https://${domain}/" || echo 000)"
case "$code" in
200 | 30[0-9]) ok "https://${domain}${code}" ;;
000) warn "TLS handshake failed — certificate not attached, or force-SSL set before it existed" ;;
502) warn "502 — nothing listening on the upstream port" ;;
504) warn "504 — upstream unreachable: ufw dropping bridge→host, or the wrong forward_host" ;;
*) warn "unexpected response: ${code}" ;;
esac
}
proxy_skip_instructions() {
local port="$1" gw
gw="$(docker network inspect "$PROXY_NET" -f '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}' 2>/dev/null || echo '<bridge-gateway>')"
cat <<EOF
To put Officer behind your own proxy, point it at:
http://<this-machine>:${port}
If that proxy runs in a container ON this machine, use ${gw}:${port} — inside a
container 127.0.0.1 is the container itself — and let it through ufw:
ufw allow from <container-subnet> to any port ${port} proto tcp
Officer must bind 0.0.0.0, not 127.0.0.1, or the proxy cannot reach it.
EOF
}
-16
View File
@@ -14,22 +14,6 @@
[[ -n "${OFFICER_SETUP_REPO_LOADED:-}" ]] && return 0
OFFICER_SETUP_REPO_LOADED=1
# Public HTTPS, which is what this needed all along.
#
# It was ssh://git@gitea.pastilhas.dev:2222/... until 2026-08-14, and the reason was
# that the repository was private: an HTTPS clone of a private repo prompts for a
# username, and under sudo with no interactive terminal that hangs or dies with
# "could not read Username". The note here said "back to HTTPS when the repository is
# public", and it now is — verified with an anonymous `git ls-remote`.
#
# The change matters more than a URL swap. An SSH default cannot clone on a genuinely
# fresh machine: the key machine-setup generates there is brand new and Gitea has
# never seen it, so `--repo` was effectively mandatory on a first install. HTTPS needs
# no key and no agent, so the default now works on a blank box.
#
# If this ever goes private again, SSH is the answer and the constraint above is the
# reason — plus one more: the clone runs as the OWNER, and sudo drops SSH_AUTH_SOCK,
# so a passphrase-protected key has no agent to answer it.
OFFICER_REPO="${OFFICER_REPO:-https://gitea.officer.dev/officerdev/platform.git}"
platform_dir() { echo "${OFFICER_ROOT}/platform"; }
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# =============================================================================
# officer-setup — the secret store
# =============================================================================
#
# Definitions only.
#
# The store is $OFFICER_ROOT/secrets/officer-keys.db, deliberately a sibling of
# the repo and NOT under data/ — that directory holds the managed homes and
# attachments people back up, and a key store travelling in the same tarball as a
# database dump rebuilds the exact problem it exists to avoid.
#
# Bootstrapping runs the platform's own module rather than reimplementing the
# schema in bash. There is exactly one writer of this file's format, and a second
# one in shell would drift the first time a column is added.
[[ -n "${OFFICER_SETUP_SECRETS_LOADED:-}" ]] && return 0
OFFICER_SETUP_SECRETS_LOADED=1
secret_store_dir() { echo "${OFFICER_ROOT}/secrets"; }
secret_store_path() { echo "$(secret_store_dir)/officer-keys.db"; }
# Create the store and the two purposes a core install needs.
#
# Run AS the owner, not as root: the platform runs as them, and a store root
# created would be a store they cannot write. `install -d -o` sets the owner in
# one step rather than mkdir-then-chown, so it is never briefly root's.
bootstrap_secret_store() {
install -d -m 0700 -o "$USERNAME" -g "$(user_group)" "$(secret_store_dir)" || return 1
# From the repo, because the module derives the install root as the parent of
# the working directory — the same rule as src/servers/data-path.ts.
sudo -u "$USERNAME" bash -c "cd '$(platform_dir)' && bun --eval \"
const { getKey } = await import('officerdb/secret-store');
getKey('jwt');
getKey('headscale');
\"" >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
[[ -f "$(secret_store_path)" ]]
}
-114
View File
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# =============================================================================
# officer-setup — the pm2 ecosystem file, and starting the processes
# =============================================================================
#
# Definitions only.
#
# ── The ecosystem file is GENERATED, and is not in git ──
#
# There used to be four of them — ecosystem.config.cjs, .light., .mac.light. and
# a .profile. that the others derived from. A profile deriving from a full list
# means the full list has to exist, which means every plugin's process is
# described in the repository whether or not anybody installed it, and a test had
# to assert that the two files still agreed with each other.
#
# One generated file removes all of that. It describes exactly the processes this
# install runs, it is written once at setup, and nothing in git can drift from
# it. A plugin adds its own entry when it is installed.
#
# ── Why .cjs and not .js ──
#
# PM2's own convention is ecosystem.config.js, and it would be wrong here:
# package.json declares "type": "module", so a .js file in this directory is ESM
# and `module.exports` throws "module is not defined in ES module scope". PM2
# require()s the config, so the extension has to say CommonJS out loud.
[[ -n "${OFFICER_SETUP_SERVICES_LOADED:-}" ]] && return 0
OFFICER_SETUP_SERVICES_LOADED=1
ecosystem_file() { echo "$(platform_dir)/ecosystem.config.cjs"; }
# The processes a core install runs. Everything else is a plugin.
#
# `officer-pty` is node rather than bun, and that is not an oversight: it loads
# node-pty, a native module built against Node's ABI. Everything else is bun.
#
# `officer-claude-code` was `officer-agent` until 2026-08-13. The old name said
# nothing about what it runs, and it sits beside officer-anthropic-proxy — which
# is a different process doing a different job — so "the agent" was ambiguous
# exactly where it mattered. It spawns `claude`; the name says so now.
CORE_PROCESSES=(
"officer|bun|start"
"officer-anthropic-proxy|bun|run src/servers/sidecar/claude/index.ts"
"officer-claude-code|bun|run src/servers/sidecar/claude/user-instance.ts"
"officer-opencode|bun|run src/servers/sidecar/opencode/index.ts"
"officer-pty|node|src/servers/sidecar/pty/index.mjs"
)
write_ecosystem() {
local dest entry name script args
dest="$(ecosystem_file)"
{
cat <<'HEADER'
// Generated by officer-setup. Not in git, and not meant to be — it describes THIS
// install, and the next machine generates its own.
//
// `cwd` is pinned on every app for two reasons. Bun auto-loads .env from the
// working directory (and the pty sidecar does `import 'dotenv/config'`), so
// without it a process started from anywhere else comes up with no POSTGRES_URL.
// And src/servers/data-path.ts derives the install root as the PARENT of the
// working directory, so a wrong cwd does not fail — it relocates data/,
// capabilities/ and dockers/ somewhere else entirely. `assertInstallLayout`
// refuses to boot when that happens.
//
// To add a plugin later, add its entry here. Nothing derives this file from
// anything, so there is no second list to keep it agreeing with.
module.exports = {
apps: [
HEADER
for entry in "${CORE_PROCESSES[@]}"; do
IFS='|' read -r name script args <<<"$entry"
printf " { name: '%s', script: '%s', args: '%s', cwd: '%s', watch: false },\n" \
"$name" "$script" "$args" "$(platform_dir)"
done
cat <<'FOOTER'
],
};
FOOTER
} >"$dest"
chown "${USERNAME}:$(user_group)" "$dest"
return 0
}
pm2_start() {
sudo -u "$USERNAME" bash -c "cd '$(platform_dir)' && pm2 startOrRestart '$(ecosystem_file)' --update-env" 2>&1
}
pm2_save() { sudo -u "$USERNAME" pm2 save 2>&1; }
# Survive a reboot. `pm2 startup` PRINTS a command for root to run rather than
# doing it — so this runs what it prints, which is the whole point of already
# being root here.
pm2_enable_startup() {
local cmd
cmd="$(sudo -u "$USERNAME" bash -c "cd '$(platform_dir)' && pm2 startup systemd -u '$USERNAME' --hp '$USER_HOME'" 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^sudo ' | tail -1)"
[[ -z "$cmd" ]] && return 1
eval "${cmd#sudo }"
}
# One line per process: name, status, restarts.
pm2_status_lines() {
sudo -u "$USERNAME" pm2 jlist 2>/dev/null |
node -e '
let s = ""; process.stdin.on("data", (d) => (s += d)).on("end", () => {
let apps = []; try { apps = JSON.parse(s); } catch { }
for (const a of apps) {
const st = a.pm2_env?.status ?? "?";
console.log(`${a.name}|${st}|${a.pm2_env?.restart_time ?? 0}`);
}
});'
}
-184
View File
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# =============================================================================
# The install report
# =============================================================================
#
# Every run writes a timestamped markdown file recording what it installed, what
# it changed, what it left alone, and what it ran as root.
#
# ── Who it is for ──
#
# Not us. It exists so the person who just ran a setup script off the internet
# can hand the result to an agent of THEIR choosing and ask "did this do anything
# it should not have". That is an adversarial read by someone who does not trust
# us, which decides almost every choice below:
#
# Facts, not narration. "installed docker-ce" is checkable. "set up Docker" is
# a claim. Every entry names the thing precisely enough to verify against the
# machine afterwards.
#
# Recorded by the HELPERS, not by the sections. A section that has to remember
# to report is a section that will forget, and an incomplete report is worse
# than none — it reads as a full account. `pkg_install` and `install_config`
# record themselves, so anything installed or written through them appears
# whether or not the section author thought about it.
#
# Kept and skipped are recorded too. "Left your .zshrc alone" is the claim a
# reviewer most wants substantiated, and it is invisible unless stated.
#
# NO SECRETS. The whole point is that this file gets shared. Passwords, keys
# and connection strings are redacted at the moment of recording rather than
# filtered later — see `report_redact`.
#
# ── Shape ──
#
# Facts accumulate in an array during the run and the file is rendered at the
# end, so a crash halfway leaves no half-written report claiming to be complete.
# `report_flush` is called by the exit trap, which marks it INCOMPLETE and says
# where it stopped.
[[ -n "${OFFICER_REPORT_LOADED:-}" ]] && return 0
OFFICER_REPORT_LOADED=1
REPORT_FACTS=()
REPORT_SECTION="(start)"
REPORT_STARTED="$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z')"
REPORT_COMPLETE=false
# Where it goes. install.sh exports REPORT_FILE so both halves land in ONE file;
# a half run on its own makes its own.
report_path() {
if [[ -n "${REPORT_FILE:-}" ]]; then
echo "$REPORT_FILE"
return
fi
local base="${OFFICER_ROOT:-${USER_HOME:-$HOME}}"
[[ -d "$base" ]] || base="${USER_HOME:-$HOME}"
echo "${base}/install-report-$(date '+%Y%m%d-%H%M%S').md"
}
# Redact anything that looks like a credential.
#
# Applied when the fact is RECORDED, not when it is rendered, so a secret never
# sits in memory formatted for printing and cannot be leaked by a future change
# to the renderer. Deliberately blunt: a password that survives is a leak, a URL
# over-redacted is an inconvenience.
report_redact() {
sed -E \
-e 's#(://[^:/@[:space:]]+):[^@[:space:]]+@#\1:REDACTED@#g' \
-e 's#((password|passwd|secret|token|key|apikey|api_key)[[:space:]]*[=:][[:space:]]*)[^[:space:]]+#\1REDACTED#gI'
}
report_section() { REPORT_SECTION="$1"; }
# One fact. `kind` is what a reviewer scans for: installed, kept, changed,
# skipped, ran, started, failed.
report_fact() {
local kind="$1" text="$2"
REPORT_FACTS+=("${REPORT_SECTION}|${kind}|$(printf '%s' "$text" | report_redact | tr '\n' ' ')")
}
report_installed() { report_fact installed "$1"; }
report_kept() { report_fact kept "$1"; }
report_changed() { report_fact changed "$1"; }
report_skipped() { report_fact skipped "$1"; }
report_started() { report_fact started "$1"; }
report_failed() { report_fact failed "$1"; }
# A command run with privilege. The reviewer's first question is "what did it run
# as root", and the honest answer is a list rather than a promise.
report_ran() { report_fact ran "$1"; }
report_mark_complete() { REPORT_COMPLETE=true; }
# Render. Safe to call twice; the trap and a normal finish both reach it.
report_flush() {
local dest kinds k
dest="$(report_path)"
[[ -n "${REPORT_WRITTEN:-}" ]] && return 0
REPORT_WRITTEN=1
{
echo "# Officer install report"
echo ""
if $REPORT_COMPLETE; then
echo "**Status:** finished."
else
echo "**Status: INCOMPLETE — the run stopped during \`${REPORT_SECTION}\`.**"
echo "Everything below still happened; what comes after it did not."
fi
echo ""
echo "| | |"
echo "| --- | --- |"
echo "| started | ${REPORT_STARTED} |"
echo "| finished | $(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z') |"
echo "| host | $(hostname 2>/dev/null || echo unknown) |"
echo "| system | $(uname -srm) |"
echo "| account | ${USERNAME:-$(id -un)} |"
echo "| script commit | $(git -C "${SCRIPT_DIR:-.}" rev-parse --short HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo 'not a git checkout') |"
echo ""
echo "---"
echo ""
echo "## How to review this"
echo ""
echo "This file exists so you can hand it to someone — or something — that does"
echo "not trust the script that wrote it. It is a list of facts, each meant to be"
echo "checkable against the machine rather than taken on faith."
echo ""
echo "Worth asking of it:"
echo ""
echo "- Does anything under **installed** come from somewhere other than your"
echo " distribution's repositories, Homebrew, or a vendor's documented installer?"
echo "- Does anything under **changed** touch a file outside this install, your"
echo " home directory, or the system configuration a setup script would be"
echo " expected to touch?"
echo "- Does anything under **ran** do more than the section it sits under claims?"
echo "- Is anything **started** that you did not ask for?"
echo ""
echo "Credentials are redacted where they were recorded. If you find one that is"
echo "not, that is a bug worth reporting — this file is meant to be shareable."
echo ""
echo "What this report does NOT cover: anything a package's own post-install"
echo "script did. Reviewing \`docker-ce\` itself is a different exercise from"
echo "reviewing the script that installed it."
echo ""
echo "---"
echo ""
if ((${#REPORT_FACTS[@]} == 0)); then
echo "_Nothing was recorded — no section made a change._"
else
local last=""
local line section kind text
for line in "${REPORT_FACTS[@]}"; do
section="${line%%|*}"
kind="${line#*|}"; kind="${kind%%|*}"
text="${line#*|*|}"
if [[ "$section" != "$last" ]]; then
[[ -n "$last" ]] && echo ""
echo "## ${section}"
echo ""
last="$section"
fi
printf -- '- **%s** — %s\n' "$kind" "$text"
done
fi
echo ""
echo "---"
echo ""
echo "## Summary by kind"
echo ""
for k in installed changed kept skipped started ran failed; do
local n
n="$(printf '%s\n' "${REPORT_FACTS[@]}" | grep -c "|${k}|" || true)"
printf -- '- %-10s %s\n' "$k" "$n"
done
} >"$dest" 2>/dev/null
[[ -n "${USERNAME:-}" ]] && chown "${USERNAME}:$(id -gn "$USERNAME" 2>/dev/null || echo "$USERNAME")" "$dest" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 0644 "$dest" 2>/dev/null || true
echo ""
echo " Install report: ${dest}"
}
-46
View File
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
# Officer — the owner's shell configuration.
#
# EMPTY ON PURPOSE, for now. Created 2026-08-13 so there is somewhere to put the
# things the owner actually wants, and it is not wired into the Shell section yet.
#
# ── What this replaces, and the decision still to make ──
#
# The Shell section does not install a .zshrc today. It APPENDS four
# marker-wrapped blocks to whatever is already there — `starship`, `agent`,
# `aliases` and `editor` — via `append_once`, which recognises its own work so a
# second run does not duplicate it. That was the right call for a machine whose
# .zshrc already belongs to somebody.
#
# Installing a whole file is a different promise, and the two do not compose: a
# template that gets installed AND appended to ends up with the same lines twice,
# once from the file and once from a block. So when this is wired in, the four
# append_once blocks either move INTO this file or stay out of it — not both.
#
# `install_config` already handles the careful half: it writes only when the
# destination is missing or still byte-for-byte the template, and offers a diff
# otherwise, so an owner's own edits are never overwritten.
#
# ── Where the shell templates live ──
#
# scripts/setup/{starship.toml, tmux.conf, zshrc}, together. starship.toml has to
# be here rather than inside machine-setup/, because the PLATFORM reads it too —
# os-user-shell.ts:34 deploys it to every member's Linux account — so it is not
# machine-setup's private file. The other two joined it so there is one answer to
# "where do the dotfile templates live".
#
# No leading dot on any of them: templates in a repository, not dotfiles in a
# home directory. src/servers/shell-skel/zshrc has been spelled that way all
# along.
#
# `[open]` TOMORROW. There are now two zshrc templates — this one for the owner
# and shell-skel/zshrc for members — while starship.toml is deliberately ONE file
# for both audiences. Either the owner genuinely needs different shell config
# from a member, or these should be the same file the way starship is. The tmux
# config has the same question waiting, since it is going into provisioning too.
#
# ── The one thing worth keeping when this is filled in ──
#
# shell-skel/zshrc depends on nothing but zsh: starship, eza, nvim and bun are
# each used only if present, so the same file works on a minimal VPS and on a
# fully equipped workstation. Worth holding to here, since this file will be read
# on machines that have had none of the optional sections run.
+2
View File
@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ export function App() {
<Route path="/tasks/:dirName" element={<Dashboard.Tasks />} />
<Route path="/processes" element={<Dashboard.Processes />} />
<Route path="/processes/:dirName" element={<Dashboard.Processes />} />
<Route path="/task-logs" element={<Dashboard.TaskLogs />} />
<Route path="/task-logs/:id" element={<Dashboard.TaskLogs />} />
<Route path="/jobs" element={<Dashboard.JobsPage />} />
<Route path="/jobs/:id" element={<Dashboard.JobsPage />} />
<Route path="/dashboards" element={<Dashboard.DashboardsScreen />} />
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import { Card } from '@/components/Card';
import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { WorkspaceLayout } from 'officerdev';
import type { LayoutNode, PanelComponents } from 'officerdev';
import { randomId } from 'helpers/random-id';
type Cost = { inputTokens: number; outputTokens: number; totalUSD: number };
@@ -572,7 +571,7 @@ export const PipelineJobDetail = () => {
const key = outputKey(msg.stepIndex, msg.iterationLabel);
const text = msg.text || streamBuffers.current.get(key) || '';
if (text) {
appendOutput(key, { id: randomId(), type: 'text', text });
appendOutput(key, { id: crypto.randomUUID(), type: 'text', text });
}
streamBuffers.current.delete(key);
setStreamingMap((prev) => { const n = new Map(prev); n.delete(key); return n; });
@@ -584,7 +583,7 @@ export const PipelineJobDetail = () => {
// Flush any streaming text before the tool call
flushStreamBuffer(key);
appendOutput(key, {
id: randomId(),
id: crypto.randomUUID(),
type: 'tool',
toolCallId: msg.toolCallId,
toolName: msg.toolName,
@@ -631,7 +630,7 @@ export const PipelineJobDetail = () => {
const flushStreamBuffer = useCallback((key: string) => {
const text = streamBuffers.current.get(key);
if (text) {
appendOutput(key, { id: randomId(), type: 'text', text });
appendOutput(key, { id: crypto.randomUUID(), type: 'text', text });
streamBuffers.current.delete(key);
setStreamingMap((prev) => { const n = new Map(prev); n.delete(key); return n; });
}
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ import {
FolderOpen,
Code,
LayoutGrid,
ScrollText,
FolderKanban,
Monitor,
Mail,
@@ -169,15 +170,12 @@ export const CORE_DOCK_ITEMS: DockItem[] = [
{ label: 'Gitea', to: '/gitea', icon: GitBranch, color: '#609926' },
{ label: 'Editor', to: '/code-editor', icon: Code, color: '#a78bfa' },
{ label: 'Jobs', to: '/jobs', icon: Workflow, color: '#14b8a6' },
{ label: 'Logs', to: '/task-logs', icon: ScrollText, color: '#94a3b8' },
{ label: 'Terminal', to: '/terminal', icon: Monitor, color: '#f97316' },
{ label: 'Browser', to: '/browser', icon: Globe, color: '#06b6d4' },
{ label: 'Monitor', to: '/system-monitor', icon: Activity, color: '#0ea5e9' },
{ label: 'Activity', to: '/activity', icon: Radio, color: '#f59e0b' },
{ label: 'Dashboards', to: '/dashboards', icon: LayoutGrid, color: '#8b5cf6' },
// Core because the tailnet is the perimeter — origin checking was removed on the grounds that the
// tailnet stands in its place, so administering it cannot be an optional extra. It is `kind: 'admin'`,
// and DashboardLayout filters every tile through canVisit(), so a member never sees this one.
{ label: 'Headscale', to: '/headscale', icon: Network, color: '#818cf8' },
// Core by necessity: the store is how every other feature arrives, so it can never be one of the
// things that disappears when uninstalled.
{ label: 'App store', to: '/app-store', icon: Store, color: '#64748b' },
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import { useClient } from 'hooks/useClient';
import { Input } from '@/components/ui/input';
import { Label } from '@/components/ui/label';
import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { copyToClipboard } from 'helpers/clipboard';
// Your own API keys: one per app or device, so a phone holds a credential you can revoke on its own
// instead of a session everything shares.
@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ const formatDate = (value: string | null) =>
const copy = async (text: string) => {
try {
await copyToClipboard(text);
await navigator.clipboard.writeText(text);
toast.success('Key copied');
} catch {
toast.error('Could not copy — select and copy manually');
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import { Copy, Check, Download, ExternalLink, RefreshCw, Trash2 } from 'lucide-r
import { toast } from 'sonner';
import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { useClient } from 'hooks/useClient';
import { copyToClipboard } from 'helpers/clipboard';
type RelayToken = {
token: string;
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ export const BrowserRelay = () => {
const handleCopy = async (value: string, field: string) => {
try {
await copyToClipboard(value);
await navigator.clipboard.writeText(value);
setCopiedField(field);
toast.success('Copied to clipboard');
setTimeout(() => setCopiedField(null), 2000);
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import { Input } from '@/components/ui/input';
import { Label } from '@/components/ui/label';
import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { useClient } from 'hooks/useClient';
import { copyToClipboard } from 'helpers/clipboard';
// Per-device credentials for calendar and contacts sync (DAVx5, iOS, macOS, Thunderbird).
//
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ const formatDate = (value: string | null) =>
const copy = async (text: string, what: string) => {
try {
await copyToClipboard(text);
await navigator.clipboard.writeText(text);
toast.success(`${what} copied`);
} catch {
toast.error('Could not copy — select and copy manually');
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import { Input } from '@/components/ui/input';
import { Label } from '@/components/ui/label';
import { Textarea } from '@/components/ui/textarea';
import { Select, SelectContent, SelectItem, SelectTrigger, SelectValue } from '@/components/ui/select';
import { copyToClipboard } from 'helpers/clipboard';
// The owner creating an account. Until this existed the only way to add one was an INSERT in Postgres.
//
@@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ export const CreateUserForm = ({ roles, usersKey }: CreateUserFormProps) => {
};
const copy = (value: string, what: string) => {
void copyToClipboard(value);
void navigator.clipboard.writeText(value);
toast.success(`${what} copied`);
};
@@ -284,7 +283,7 @@ export const CreateUserForm = ({ roles, usersKey }: CreateUserFormProps) => {
size="icon"
disabled={!form.password}
onClick={() => {
void copyToClipboard(form.password);
void navigator.clipboard.writeText(form.password);
toast.success('Password copied');
}}
>
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
import { useState } from 'react';
import { useQuery, useQueryClient } from '@tanstack/react-query';
import { toast } from 'sonner';
import { Crown, Trash2, Loader2, KeyRound, RotateCcw, Copy, SquareTerminal as TerminalIcon } from 'lucide-react';
import { Crown, Trash2, Loader2, KeyRound, SquareTerminal as TerminalIcon } from 'lucide-react';
import { useClient } from 'hooks/useClient';
import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
import { Select, SelectContent, SelectItem, SelectTrigger, SelectValue } from '@/components/ui/select';
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import {
AlertDialogTitle,
} from '@/components/ui/alert-dialog';
import { CreateUserForm } from './CreateUserForm';
import { copyToClipboard } from 'helpers/clipboard';
type ManagedUser = {
id: number;
@@ -47,9 +46,6 @@ export const UsersSection = () => {
const queryClient = useQueryClient();
const [pendingId, setPendingId] = useState<number | null>(null);
const [confirmDelete, setConfirmDelete] = useState<ManagedUser | null>(null);
const [confirmReset, setConfirmReset] = useState<ManagedUser | null>(null);
/** The one and only sighting of a generated password. Cleared when the dialog closes, and gone for good. */
const [newPassword, setNewPassword] = useState<{ email: string; password: string } | null>(null);
const { data, isLoading, isError } = useQuery<UsersResponse>({
queryKey: USERS_KEY,
@@ -109,27 +105,6 @@ export const UsersSection = () => {
}
};
/**
* A new platform password, generated by the server and shown once.
*
* Generated rather than typed because the failure this exists for is "I forgot to copy it down", and an
* owner typing a replacement can lose it the same way twice. Only the argon2 hash is stored, so the
* dialog below really is the only time anyone sees it which is why it is a dialog and not a toast.
*/
const resetPassword = async (user: ManagedUser) => {
setPendingId(user.id);
setConfirmReset(null);
try {
const result = await client.post<{ email: string; password: string }>(`/users/${user.id}/password`, {});
setNewPassword(result);
await queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: USERS_KEY });
} catch (ex) {
toast.error(ex instanceof Error ? ex.message : 'Could not reset the password');
} finally {
setPendingId(null);
}
};
const remove = async (user: ManagedUser) => {
setPendingId(user.id);
setConfirmDelete(null);
@@ -234,7 +209,7 @@ export const UsersSection = () => {
aria-label={`Copy ${user.email}'s SSH public key`}
title="Copy their SSH public key (add it to their Gitea account)"
onClick={() => {
void copyToClipboard(user.osSshPublicKey!);
void navigator.clipboard.writeText(user.osSshPublicKey!);
toast.success('Public key copied');
}}
>
@@ -242,22 +217,6 @@ export const UsersSection = () => {
</Button>
)}
{/* The owner is excluded because they have change-password, which asks for the current one
and resetting themselves from here would sign them out of the session doing it. */}
{!user.isOwner && (
<Button
variant="ghost"
size="icon"
className="shrink-0 text-muted-foreground"
disabled={busy}
aria-label={`Reset ${user.email}'s password`}
title="Generate a new password — shown once, and signs them out everywhere"
onClick={() => setConfirmReset(user)}
>
{busy ? <Loader2 className="h-4 w-4 animate-spin" /> : <RotateCcw className="h-4 w-4" />}
</Button>
)}
<Button
variant="ghost"
size="icon"
@@ -295,69 +254,6 @@ export const UsersSection = () => {
</AlertDialogFooter>
</AlertDialogContent>
</AlertDialog>
{/* Confirmed rather than immediate: this ends every session the account has, including one they may
be in the middle of using. Not destructive enough for the red button, so it keeps the default. */}
<AlertDialog open={!!confirmReset} onOpenChange={(open) => !open && setConfirmReset(null)}>
<AlertDialogContent>
<AlertDialogHeader>
<AlertDialogTitle>Reset the password for {confirmReset?.email}?</AlertDialogTitle>
<AlertDialogDescription>
A new password is generated and shown to you once it is not stored anywhere and cannot be looked up
afterwards. Their existing password stops working immediately, and they are signed out everywhere.
{confirmReset?.osUser ? (
<>
{' '}
Their Linux account ({confirmReset.osUser}) is not affected: it has no password, and SSH keys are
unchanged.
</>
) : null}
</AlertDialogDescription>
</AlertDialogHeader>
<AlertDialogFooter>
<AlertDialogCancel>Cancel</AlertDialogCancel>
<AlertDialogAction onClick={() => confirmReset && void resetPassword(confirmReset)}>
Generate a new password
</AlertDialogAction>
</AlertDialogFooter>
</AlertDialogContent>
</AlertDialog>
{/* The only time this password is ever visible. A dialog rather than a toast for exactly that reason:
a toast that times out while somebody is finding a pen loses the thing they came for. */}
<AlertDialog open={!!newPassword} onOpenChange={(open) => !open && setNewPassword(null)}>
<AlertDialogContent>
<AlertDialogHeader>
<AlertDialogTitle>New password for {newPassword?.email}</AlertDialogTitle>
<AlertDialogDescription>
Copy it now and give it to them. Only its hash is stored, so closing this dialog is the last anyone sees
of it if it is lost, generate another one.
</AlertDialogDescription>
</AlertDialogHeader>
<div className="flex items-center gap-2 rounded-md border bg-muted/50 p-3">
<code className="flex-1 select-all break-all font-mono text-sm">{newPassword?.password}</code>
<Button
variant="ghost"
size="icon"
className="shrink-0"
aria-label="Copy the new password"
onClick={() => {
if (!newPassword) return;
void copyToClipboard(newPassword.password).then((ok) =>
ok ? toast.success('Password copied') : toast.error('Could not copy — select it and copy by hand'),
);
}}
>
<Copy className="h-4 w-4" />
</Button>
</div>
<AlertDialogFooter>
<AlertDialogAction onClick={() => setNewPassword(null)}>Done</AlertDialogAction>
</AlertDialogFooter>
</AlertDialogContent>
</AlertDialog>
</div>
);
};
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
import { useState, useEffect } from 'react';
import { Link, useParams } from 'react-router';
import { Search, AlertCircle, CheckCircle2, Clock, ArrowLeft } from 'lucide-react';
import { useClient } from 'hooks/useClient';
import { Card } from '@/components/Card';
import { MessageBubble, type ChatMessage } from 'officerdev';
type LogMetadata = {
id: number;
taskName: string;
taskDirName: string;
entryName: string;
entryType: string;
provider: string;
model: string;
isError: boolean;
startedAt: string;
completedAt: string | null;
};
type FullLog = LogMetadata & {
messages: ChatMessage[];
};
const formatDate = (iso: string) => {
const d = new Date(iso);
return d.toLocaleDateString(undefined, { month: 'short', day: 'numeric', hour: '2-digit', minute: '2-digit' });
};
const ProviderBadge = ({ provider }: { provider: string }) => (
<span
className={`text-[10px] font-medium px-1.5 py-0.5 rounded-full ${provider === 'claude' ? 'bg-orange-100 dark:bg-orange-900/40 text-orange-700 dark:text-orange-300' : 'bg-blue-100 dark:bg-blue-900/40 text-blue-700 dark:text-blue-300'}`}
>
{provider}
</span>
);
// Which run is open is `/task-logs/:id`. No redirect guard — the bare route is the list with nothing
// open, and an id that no longer exists gets the empty pane rather than a rewritten address.
export const TaskLogs = () => {
const client = useClient();
const [logs, setLogs] = useState<LogMetadata[]>([]);
const selectedId = useParams<{ id: string }>().id ?? null;
const [selectedLog, setSelectedLog] = useState<FullLog | null>(null);
const [search, setSearch] = useState('');
const [isLoading, setIsLoading] = useState(true);
useEffect(() => {
client
.get<LogMetadata[]>('/task-logs')
.then((data) => {
setLogs(data);
setIsLoading(false);
})
.catch(() => setIsLoading(false));
}, []);
useEffect(() => {
if (!selectedId) {
setSelectedLog(null);
return;
}
client
.get<FullLog>(`/task-logs/${selectedId}`)
.then(setSelectedLog)
.catch(() => setSelectedLog(null));
}, [selectedId]);
const filtered = search
? logs.filter((l) => {
const q = search.toLowerCase();
return (
l.taskName.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||
l.entryName.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||
l.provider.toLowerCase().includes(q)
);
})
: logs;
return (
<div className="flex h-full p-3 md:p-6 gap-4">
{/* Left panel: list */}
<Card
className={`md:w-80 shrink-0 flex flex-col overflow-hidden ${selectedId ? 'hidden md:flex' : 'flex-1 md:flex-none'}`}
>
<div className="p-3 border-b border-duck-dark/10">
<div className="relative">
<Search className="absolute left-2.5 top-1/2 -translate-y-1/2 h-3.5 w-3.5 text-duck-dark/40" />
<input
type="text"
placeholder="Search logs..."
value={search}
onChange={(ev) => setSearch(ev.target.value)}
className="w-full pl-8 pr-3 py-1.5 text-sm rounded-md border border-duck-dark/15 bg-background/60 text-duck-dark placeholder:text-duck-dark/30 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-duck-teal/40"
/>
</div>
</div>
<div className="flex-1 overflow-y-auto">
{isLoading && (
<div className="flex items-center justify-center h-32 text-duck-dark/30 text-sm">Loading...</div>
)}
{!isLoading && filtered.length === 0 && (
<div className="flex items-center justify-center h-32 text-duck-dark/30 text-sm">No logs found</div>
)}
{filtered.map((log) => (
<Link
key={log.id}
to={`/task-logs/${log.id}`}
className={`block w-full text-left px-3 py-2.5 border-b border-duck-dark/5 hover:bg-duck-dark/5 transition-colors cursor-pointer ${selectedId === String(log.id) ? 'bg-duck-teal/10' : ''}`}
>
<div className="flex items-center gap-2 mb-0.5">
{log.isError ? (
<AlertCircle className="h-3.5 w-3.5 text-red-500 shrink-0" />
) : log.completedAt ? (
<CheckCircle2 className="h-3.5 w-3.5 text-green-500 shrink-0" />
) : (
<Clock className="h-3.5 w-3.5 text-amber-500 shrink-0" />
)}
<span className="text-sm font-medium text-duck-dark truncate">{log.taskName}</span>
</div>
<div className="flex items-center gap-2 ml-5.5">
<span className="text-xs text-duck-dark/50 truncate">{log.entryName}</span>
<ProviderBadge provider={log.provider} />
</div>
<div className="text-[10px] text-duck-dark/40 ml-5.5 mt-0.5">{formatDate(log.startedAt)}</div>
</Link>
))}
</div>
</Card>
{/* Right panel: log viewer */}
<Card className={`flex-1 min-w-0 flex flex-col overflow-hidden ${selectedId ? 'flex' : 'hidden md:flex'}`}>
{!selectedLog && (
<div className="flex flex-col items-center justify-center h-full text-duck-dark/30 text-sm gap-2">
Select a log to view
<Link to="/task-logs" className="md:hidden text-duck-teal text-xs cursor-pointer">
<ArrowLeft className="h-4 w-4 inline mr-1" />
Back to list
</Link>
</div>
)}
{selectedLog && (
<>
<div className="shrink-0 px-4 py-3 border-b border-duck-dark/10 flex items-center gap-3">
<Link to="/task-logs" className="md:hidden p-1 -ml-1 rounded hover:bg-duck-dark/10 cursor-pointer">
<ArrowLeft className="h-4 w-4 text-duck-dark/60" />
</Link>
<div className="flex-1 min-w-0">
<div className="flex items-center gap-2">
<span className="text-sm font-semibold text-duck-dark">{selectedLog.taskName}</span>
<ProviderBadge provider={selectedLog.provider} />
</div>
<div className="text-xs text-duck-dark/50 mt-0.5">
{selectedLog.entryName} &middot; {selectedLog.model} &middot; {formatDate(selectedLog.startedAt)}
{selectedLog.completedAt && `${formatDate(selectedLog.completedAt)}`}
</div>
</div>
{selectedLog.isError && (
<span className="text-xs text-red-600 dark:text-red-400 bg-red-50 dark:bg-red-950/50 px-2 py-0.5 rounded-full">
Error
</span>
)}
</div>
<div className="flex-1 overflow-y-auto p-4 space-y-3">
{selectedLog.messages.map((msg, i) => (
<MessageBubble key={i} message={msg} />
))}
</div>
</>
)}
</Card>
</div>
);
};
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ export * from './Processes';
export * from './CapabilityPage';
export * from './Settings';
export * from './Skills';
export * from './TaskLogs';
export * from './Tasks';
export * from './Files';
+2 -2
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import { useLocation } from 'react-router';
import type { PageTitleOverride } from 'officerdev';
import { usePageTitleOverride } from 'officerdev';
import { useSessionState, writeSessionValue } from 'hooks/useSessionState';
import { randomId } from 'helpers/random-id';
type TitleRule = { match: (p: string) => boolean; title: string };
@@ -35,6 +34,7 @@ const RULES: TitleRule[] = [
{ match: (p) => p.startsWith('/qr-transfer'), title: 'QR Transfer' },
{ match: (p) => p.startsWith('/activity'), title: 'Activity' },
{ match: (p) => p.startsWith('/code-editor'), title: 'Code Editor' },
{ match: (p) => p.startsWith('/task-logs'), title: 'Task Logs' },
{ match: (p) => p.startsWith('/tasks'), title: 'Tasks' },
{ match: (p) => p.startsWith('/jobs'), title: 'Jobs' },
{ match: (p) => p.startsWith('/skills'), title: 'Skills' },
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ function claimTabIdentity(): void {
/** `randomUUID` needs a secure context; the id only has to be unique among open tabs. */
function newTabId(): string {
return randomId();
return crypto.randomUUID?.() ?? `${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)}`;
}
// Once per document, before React reads the stored name.
+12 -32
View File
@@ -9,38 +9,18 @@ describing a different codebase.
```
src/databases/officer_db/
├── src/
│ ├── db.ts # the connection
│ ├── index.ts # public surface: one `export * from './<feature>'` per line
│ ├── schema.ts # what db:push creates — see below
── types.ts # every type export (Select / Insert / extended)
├── crypto.ts # at-rest encryption, one key per purpose
├── secret-store.ts # the key store itself (SQLite, outside Postgres)
│ └── <feature>/
│ ├── index.ts # what this feature exports — declared here, not in a list three levels up
│ ├── schema.ts # its tables
│ └── queries.ts # everything that reads or writes them
└── package.json # exports ".", "./types", "./db", "./schema", "./secret-store", "./*"
│ ├── db.ts # the connection
│ ├── index.ts # public surface: re-exports queries, schema and drizzle helpers
│ ├── types.ts # every type export (Select / Insert / extended)
── schema/
├── index.ts # re-exports all schema files
└── *.ts # table definitions, grouped by domain
└── package.json # exports "." and "./types"
```
**A feature owns its own public surface.** `src/index.ts` is one `export *` per feature and nothing
else; what a feature exports is declared in its own `index.ts`, beside the code it describes. Adding a
query function is one file in one directory, rather than that file plus a hand-written list of every
symbol in the package. That list was 297 lines until 2026-08-13 and it had already drifted — twelve
features listed twice, `db` and `schema` buried at line 270 with three feature blocks after them.
**One directory per feature, holding both halves.** Restructured 2026-08-13 from parallel `schema/` and
`queries/` trees, where the two sides had drifted: four features were named differently on each side
(`app-store`/`sidecar-installs`, `email`/`email-accounts`, `server`/`server-config`), `operations` had no
query file at all, and `integrations` had no schema file.
One directory is still lopsided and says so by its contents: `integrations/` has only queries, because it
spans `server` and `user-data`. (`operations/` was the other, and was deleted on 2026-08-13 along with the
Task Logs feature — see below.)
**`src/schema.ts` is drizzle-kit's view, not the runtime's.** `drizzle.config.ts` points at it, so a
commented line there removes a table from the DATABASE without removing a line of code — every query
imports its tables from `./schema` inside its own feature directory. That is what lets a fresh install
create only the core tables, with the plugin ones commented out until their plugin is installed.
Schema files are grouped by domain, not by table: `auth`, `chat-events`, `dashboards`, `email`,
`headscale`, `music`, `operations`, `pipeline-jobs`, `server`, `soulseek`, `user-data`, `vault`,
`wallet`.
## Schema changes use `push`, not migrations
@@ -134,8 +114,8 @@ Organise `types.ts` by domain with section comments, mirroring the schema files.
## Queries
Hand-written, one `queries.ts` per feature directory, importing tables from `./schema` beside it and
types from `../types`:
Hand-written, one file per domain under `src/queries/`, importing tables from `../schema` and types from
`../types`:
```ts
import { eq, and } from 'drizzle-orm';
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ try {
} catch {}
export default defineConfig({
schema: './src/schema.ts',
schema: './src/schema/index.ts',
out: './migrations',
dialect: 'postgresql',
dbCredentials: {
+1 -3
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@
".": "./src/index.ts",
"./types": "./src/types.ts",
"./db": "./src/db.ts",
"./schema": "./src/schema.ts",
"./secret-store": "./src/secret-store.ts",
"./*": "./src/*.ts"
"./schema": "./src/schema/index.ts"
},
"scripts": {
"generate": "drizzle-kit generate --config=drizzle.config.ts",
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
export {
listAgentPanels,
getAgentPanelByPanelId,
getAgentPanelByName,
getAgentPanelByHandoffToken,
createAgentPanel,
updateAgentPanel,
markAgentPanelIntroduced,
deleteAgentPanel,
toAgentPanelView,
} from './queries';
export type { AgentPanel, AgentPanelView, CreateAgentPanelInput, UpdateAgentPanelInput } from './queries';
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
export {
findLiveApiKeyByHash,
createApiKey,
listApiKeys,
revokeApiKey,
touchApiKey,
type ApiKeyIdentity,
} from './queries';
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
// App store — what the owner has installed, and whether it should be running.
export {
listSidecarInstalls,
getSidecarInstall,
beginInstall,
recordSteps,
markInstalled,
markFailed,
markBlocked,
setEnabled,
removeInstall,
type SidecarInstall,
} from './queries';
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
export {
getUsers,
getUserById,
getUserByEmail,
getUserByUsername,
getOwnerUser,
getUserCount,
createUser,
updateUser,
deleteUser,
getPasskeysByUserId,
getPasskeysByUserIdAndOrigin,
getPasskeyByCredentialId,
createPasskey,
updatePasskey,
storeChallenge,
consumeChallenge,
blacklistToken,
isTokenBlacklisted,
cleanupExpiredTokens,
} from './queries';
// Exported as a value, not just a type: the API and the UI need to enumerate the roles, and the
// column definition is the only place that list should exist.
export { USER_ROLES, OWNER_USER_ID } from './schema';
export type { UserRole } from './schema';
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
export {
getAllRoleGrants,
getRoleGrants,
setRoleGrant,
revokeRoleGrant,
replaceRoleGrants,
} from './queries';
export type { RoleGrant } from './queries';
export type { CapabilityLevelValue } from './schema';
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
export {
appendChatEvent,
getChatEventsSince,
getLastChatEventSeq,
pruneChatEventsOlderThan,
} from './queries';
+20 -31
View File
@@ -1,51 +1,40 @@
import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
import { getKey } from './secret-store';
// AES-256-GCM at-rest encryption for every secret column in Postgres. The property this exists to hold is
// that a database dump must not hand over the credentials in it, so these columns are never plaintext.
// AES-256-GCM at-rest encryption for vault secrets (the brokered Vaultwarden token set + the Officer-app
// protector key). The whole point of the vault store is that a DB dump must not hand over the keys to the
// vault, so these columns are never stored plaintext.
//
// Format = base64(iv[12] | authTag[16] | ciphertext).
//
// ── One key per purpose ──
//
// This took a single VAULT_STORE_KEY from the environment until 2026-08-13. That key encrypted seven
// unrelated things — the Headscale admin credential, the wallet seed, Vaultwarden's token set, Jellyfin,
// Immich, InvoiceShelf, and every app-store upstream secret — so one leak opened all of them, and its
// name pointed at whichever plugin happened to need it first.
//
// `purpose` is now the first argument everywhere, and the caller passes the one that owns the data. A
// plugin's key is created on first use and cannot decrypt another plugin's column, because the AES key
// derives from a different stored secret. See ./secret-store.ts and docs/secret-store.md.
//
// SHA-256 over the stored key rather than using its bytes directly, so the store is free to change how it
// represents a key without every ciphertext in the database becoming unreadable.
// Key = SHA-256(VAULT_STORE_KEY) so any sufficiently strong secret works (mirrors the JWT_SECRET style).
// Format = base64(iv[12] | authTag[16] | ciphertext). The key is read LAZILY so the platform still boots
// without a vault configured — vault storage ops then throw a clear error instead of crashing startup.
const cache = new Map<string, Buffer>();
function key(purpose: string): Buffer {
const hit = cache.get(purpose);
if (hit) return hit;
const derived = createHash('sha256').update(getKey(purpose)).digest();
cache.set(purpose, derived);
return derived;
let cachedKey: Buffer | null = null;
function key(): Buffer {
if (cachedKey) return cachedKey;
const secret = process.env.VAULT_STORE_KEY;
if (!secret || secret.length < 16) {
throw new Error('VAULT_STORE_KEY must be set (>=16 chars) to store vault secrets');
}
cachedKey = createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest();
return cachedKey;
}
/** Encrypt a UTF-8 secret for at-rest storage → base64(iv|tag|ciphertext). */
export function encryptSecret(purpose: string, plaintext: string): string {
export function encryptSecret(plaintext: string): string {
const iv = randomBytes(12);
const cipher = createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key(purpose), iv);
const cipher = createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key(), iv);
const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
return Buffer.concat([iv, tag, ct]).toString('base64');
}
/** Decrypt a value produced by encryptSecret under the SAME purpose. Throws if it does not verify. */
export function decryptSecret(purpose: string, blob: string): string {
/** Decrypt a value produced by encryptSecret. Throws if the ciphertext/tag/key don't verify. */
export function decryptSecret(blob: string): string {
const buf = Buffer.from(blob, 'base64');
const iv = buf.subarray(0, 12);
const tag = buf.subarray(12, 28);
const ct = buf.subarray(28);
const decipher = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key(purpose), iv);
const decipher = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key(), iv);
decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ct), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8');
}
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
export {
getAllDashboardState,
upsertDashboard,
updateDashboard,
deleteDashboard,
setDashboardPanelState,
upsertScreen,
deleteScreen,
upsertDefaults,
setDefaultsPanelState,
} from './queries';
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
export {
listDavAppPasswords,
createDavAppPassword,
revokeDavAppPassword,
deleteDavAppPassword,
verifyDavAppPassword,
} from './queries';
export type { DavAppPassword, DavAppPasswordView } from './queries';
-44
View File
@@ -10,47 +10,3 @@ if (!POSTGRES_URL) {
const client = postgres(POSTGRES_URL);
export const db = drizzle(client, { schema });
/**
* Block until Postgres answers, or give up after `timeoutMs`.
*
* `postgres()` above is LAZY it opens no socket until the first query so nothing here fails at
* import time when the database is not up yet. That is the right default and it has a cost: startup
* work that queries fires, fails once, and is swallowed by whatever `.catch()` it was written with.
*
* That is not hypothetical. `server.tsx` runs `initQueue()` and `cleanupOnStartup()` as
* fire-and-forget promises, and the second marks jobs that were interrupted by the last restart and
* promotes the queued backlog. If Postgres is a few seconds behind which is exactly what happens on
* a reboot, when pm2's resurrect races Docker starting the container both log a line and do nothing.
* Interrupted jobs then stay marked running forever, because the only thing that would have corrected
* them already ran.
*
* So: wait, rather than try once. Callers that genuinely cannot proceed without the database await
* this first; request handlers do not, since by then it is either up or the request fails honestly.
*
* Bounded, and it resolves false rather than throwing on timeout. An unbounded wait here would hold a
* process open with no way to tell whether it is starting or hung, and the caller is better placed to
* decide what "gave up" means than this function is.
*/
export async function waitForDatabase(timeoutMs = 60_000): Promise<boolean> {
const started = Date.now();
let announced = false;
for (;;) {
try {
await client`select 1`;
if (announced) console.log('[db] Postgres is up');
return true;
} catch (err) {
if (Date.now() - started >= timeoutMs) {
console.error(`[db] Postgres did not answer within ${Math.round(timeoutMs / 1000)}s:`, err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);
return false;
}
if (!announced) {
console.log('[db] waiting for Postgres…');
announced = true;
}
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 1_000));
}
}
}
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
export {
getEmailAccounts,
getEmailAccount,
createEmailAccount,
deleteEmailAccount,
updateEmailAccountStatus,
updateEmailAccountSyncMeta,
getAllSyncedAccounts,
} from './queries';
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
export {
listHeadscaleServers,
getActiveHeadscaleCredentials,
getHeadscaleCredentials,
createHeadscaleServer,
updateHeadscaleServer,
setActiveHeadscaleServer,
deleteHeadscaleServer,
recordHeadscaleProbe,
} from './queries';
export type { HeadscaleServer, HeadscaleServerCredentials } from './queries';
+293 -55
View File
@@ -1,59 +1,297 @@
// The package's public surface.
//
// One line per feature, and nothing else. What each feature exports is stated in its own index.ts,
// beside the schema and queries it exports — so adding a query function means editing one file in one
// directory, not that file plus a list three levels up that nobody remembers to update.
//
// This was 297 lines of hand-written named exports until 2026-08-13. Every symbol was listed here, twice
// for most features (values, then types, repeating the path), and `db` and `schema` sat at line 270 with
// three feature blocks appended after them.
//
// The surface is unchanged: the same names are exported, they are just declared next to what they
// describe. 107 files import from 'officerdb' and none of them notice.
//
// ── Core above, plugins below ──
//
// The split mirrors schema.ts, where the plugin TABLES are commented out so db:push does not create
// them. These lines are NOT commented, and the difference is worth stating: commenting them would break
// nothing at runtime — hono.ts no longer mounts a single plugin router, so none of this is ever
// reached — but `bunx tsgo` checks every file under src/ whether it runs or not, and the plugin
// sidecars still import these symbols. So they stay exported until each plugin is extracted, and the
// blank line below is the only thing marking the boundary.
export {
getUsers,
getUserById,
getUserByEmail,
getUserByUsername,
getOwnerUser,
getUserCount,
createUser,
updateUser,
deleteUser,
getPasskeysByUserId,
getPasskeysByUserIdAndOrigin,
getPasskeyByCredentialId,
createPasskey,
updatePasskey,
storeChallenge,
consumeChallenge,
blacklistToken,
isTokenBlacklisted,
cleanupExpiredTokens,
} from './queries/auth';
// The connection, and drizzle-kit's view of the schema. See ./schema.ts for the core/plugin split.
export { db, waitForDatabase } from './db';
export {
findLiveApiKeyByHash,
createApiKey,
listApiKeys,
revokeApiKey,
touchApiKey,
type ApiKeyIdentity,
} from './queries/api-keys';
export { readServerSettings, writeServerSettings, readConfigValue, writeConfigValue } from './queries/server-config';
export {
getUserSettings,
setUserSettings,
getUserState,
patchUserState,
getDockPaths,
setDockPaths,
} from './queries/user-data';
export {
getServerIntegrations,
getServerIntegration,
upsertServerIntegration,
deleteServerIntegration,
getUserIntegrations,
getUserIntegration,
getIntegrationsByProvider,
upsertUserIntegration,
deleteUserIntegration,
findUserByIntegrationConfig,
} from './queries/integrations';
export {
getEmailAccounts,
getEmailAccount,
createEmailAccount,
deleteEmailAccount,
updateEmailAccountStatus,
updateEmailAccountSyncMeta,
getAllSyncedAccounts,
} from './queries/email-accounts';
export {
getAllDashboardState,
upsertDashboard,
updateDashboard,
deleteDashboard,
setDashboardPanelState,
upsertScreen,
deleteScreen,
upsertDefaults,
setDefaultsPanelState,
} from './queries/dashboards';
export {
createPipelineJob,
getPipelineJob,
updatePipelineJob,
getPipelineJobsForUser,
getOldestPendingJob,
getPendingJobs,
countPendingJobs,
deletePipelineJob,
deleteTerminalJobsForUser,
markInterruptedJobs,
} from './queries/pipeline-jobs';
export {
appendChatEvent,
getChatEventsSince,
getLastChatEventSeq,
pruneChatEventsOlderThan,
} from './queries/chat-events';
export {
listAgentPanels,
getAgentPanelByPanelId,
getAgentPanelByName,
getAgentPanelByHandoffToken,
createAgentPanel,
updateAgentPanel,
markAgentPanelIntroduced,
deleteAgentPanel,
toAgentPanelView,
} from './queries/agent-panels';
export type { AgentPanel, AgentPanelView, CreateAgentPanelInput, UpdateAgentPanelInput } from './queries/agent-panels';
export {
getMusicFavorites,
addMusicFavorite,
removeMusicFavorite,
getNowPlaying,
setNowPlaying,
clearNowPlaying,
getPlaylists,
getPlaylist,
createPlaylist,
renamePlaylist,
deletePlaylist,
addPlaylistItems,
setPlaylistItems,
} from './queries/music';
export type {
FavoriteKind,
GroupedFavorites,
NowPlaying,
NowPlayingInput,
PlaylistSummary,
Playlist,
} from './queries/music';
export { getSoulseekFavorites, addSoulseekFavorite, removeSoulseekFavorite } from './queries/soulseek';
export {
getSoulseekBrowseSnapshots,
getSoulseekBrowseSnapshot,
startSoulseekBrowse,
finishSoulseekBrowse,
failSoulseekBrowse,
resetStaleSoulseekBrowses,
getSoulseekBrowseLevel,
searchSoulseekBrowseTree,
getSoulseekBrowseDirFiles,
getSoulseekBrowseDownload,
deleteSoulseekBrowse,
} from './queries/soulseek';
export type {
BrowseDownloadFile,
BrowsedFile,
BrowseDirInput,
BrowseDirRow,
BrowseTreeNode,
BrowseLevel,
BrowseTreeSearch,
SoulseekBrowseSnapshot,
} from './queries/soulseek';
export {
listHeadscaleServers,
getActiveHeadscaleCredentials,
getHeadscaleCredentials,
createHeadscaleServer,
updateHeadscaleServer,
setActiveHeadscaleServer,
deleteHeadscaleServer,
recordHeadscaleProbe,
} from './queries/headscale';
export type { HeadscaleServer, HeadscaleServerCredentials } from './queries/headscale';
export {
listInvoiceshelfAccounts,
getActiveInvoiceshelfCredentials,
getInvoiceshelfCredentials,
createInvoiceshelfAccount,
updateInvoiceshelfAccount,
setActiveInvoiceshelfAccount,
deleteInvoiceshelfAccount,
recordInvoiceshelfProbe,
} from './queries/invoiceshelf';
export type { InvoiceshelfAccount, InvoiceshelfCredentials } from './queries/invoiceshelf';
export {
listJellyfinServers,
getActiveJellyfinCredentials,
getJellyfinCredentials,
createJellyfinServer,
updateJellyfinServer,
setActiveJellyfinServer,
deleteJellyfinServer,
recordJellyfinProbe,
} from './queries/jellyfin';
export type { JellyfinServer, JellyfinCredentials } from './queries/jellyfin';
export {
listPhotosAccounts,
getActivePhotosCredentials,
getPhotosCredentials,
createPhotosAccount,
updatePhotosAccount,
setActivePhotosAccount,
deletePhotosAccount,
recordPhotosProbe,
} from './queries/photos';
export type { PhotosAccount, PhotosCredentials } from './queries/photos';
export {
listDavAppPasswords,
createDavAppPassword,
revokeDavAppPassword,
deleteDavAppPassword,
verifyDavAppPassword,
} from './queries/dav';
export type { DavAppPassword, DavAppPasswordView } from './queries/dav';
export {
getServiceConnection,
getServiceCredentials,
saveServiceConnection,
deleteServiceConnection,
recordServiceProbe,
getServiceInstanceUrl,
getResolvedServiceCredentials,
} from './queries/service-connections';
export type { ServiceName, ServiceConnection, ServiceCredentials } from './queries/service-connections';
export {
getAllRoleGrants,
getRoleGrants,
setRoleGrant,
revokeRoleGrant,
replaceRoleGrants,
} from './queries/capabilities';
export type { RoleGrant } from './queries/capabilities';
export type { CapabilityLevelValue } from './schema/capabilities';
export {
getVaultTokens,
setVaultTokens,
updateVaultAccess,
clearVaultTokens,
getVaultUnlockKey,
setVaultUnlockKey,
clearVaultUnlockKey,
} from './queries/vault';
export type { VaultTokenSet } from './queries/vault';
export {
listWallets,
getWallet,
getActiveWallet,
getWalletSecrets,
getSealedSeed,
createWallet,
updateWallet,
replaceSealedSeed,
setActiveWallet,
deleteWallet,
getWalletLabels,
setWalletLabel,
getFrozenOutpoints,
setUtxoFrozen,
getWalletChainCache,
saveWalletChainCache,
recordWalletChainError,
} from './queries/wallet';
export type {
WalletKind,
WalletSummary,
WalletSecrets,
WalletLabel,
CreateWalletParams,
WalletChainCache,
} from './queries/wallet';
export type { WalletChainSnapshot } from './schema/wallet';
// Exported as a value, not just a type: the API and the UI need to enumerate the roles, and the
// column definition is the only place that list should exist.
export { USER_ROLES, OWNER_USER_ID } from './schema/auth';
export type { UserRole } from './schema/auth';
export { db } from './db';
export * as schema from './schema';
// ── Core ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export {
upsertPushDevice,
getPushDevices,
deletePushDevice,
recordPushFailure,
markPushDeviceSeen,
} from './queries/notify';
export type { PushDeviceSelect, PushDeviceInsert } from './types';
export * from './agent-panels';
export * from './api-keys';
export * from './app-store';
export * from './auth';
export * from './capabilities';
export * from './chat-events';
export * from './dashboards';
export * from './headscale';
export * from './integrations';
export * from './pipeline-jobs';
export * from './server';
export * from './service-connections';
export * from './user-data';
// ── Plugins — exported only so tsgo stays clean; nothing mounts them ──────────────────────────────
export * from './dav';
export * from './email';
export * from './invoiceshelf';
export * from './jellyfin';
export * from './music';
export * from './notify';
export * from './photos';
export * from './soulseek';
export * from './vault';
export * from './wallet';
// `operations` is absent because it no longer exists: it held task_logs, and the Task Logs feature was
// deleted end to end on 2026-08-13 after `task-logger.ts` turned out to have no callers — a full read
// path over a table nothing could write to.
// App store — what the owner has installed, and whether it should be running.
export {
listSidecarInstalls,
getSidecarInstall,
beginInstall,
recordSteps,
markInstalled,
markFailed,
markBlocked,
setEnabled,
removeInstall,
type SidecarInstall,
} from './queries/sidecar-installs';
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
export {
getServerIntegrations,
getServerIntegration,
upsertServerIntegration,
deleteServerIntegration,
getUserIntegrations,
getUserIntegration,
getIntegrationsByProvider,
upsertUserIntegration,
deleteUserIntegration,
findUserByIntegrationConfig,
} from './queries';
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
export {
listInvoiceshelfAccounts,
getActiveInvoiceshelfCredentials,
getInvoiceshelfCredentials,
createInvoiceshelfAccount,
updateInvoiceshelfAccount,
setActiveInvoiceshelfAccount,
deleteInvoiceshelfAccount,
recordInvoiceshelfProbe,
} from './queries';
export type { InvoiceshelfAccount, InvoiceshelfCredentials } from './queries';
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
export {
listJellyfinServers,
getActiveJellyfinCredentials,
getJellyfinCredentials,
createJellyfinServer,
updateJellyfinServer,
setActiveJellyfinServer,
deleteJellyfinServer,
recordJellyfinProbe,
} from './queries';
export type { JellyfinServer, JellyfinCredentials } from './queries';
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
export {
getMusicFavorites,
addMusicFavorite,
removeMusicFavorite,
getNowPlaying,
setNowPlaying,
clearNowPlaying,
getPlaylists,
getPlaylist,
createPlaylist,
renamePlaylist,
deletePlaylist,
addPlaylistItems,
setPlaylistItems,
} from './queries';
export type {
FavoriteKind,
GroupedFavorites,
NowPlaying,
NowPlayingInput,
PlaylistSummary,
Playlist,
} from './queries';
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
export {
upsertPushDevice,
getPushDevices,
deletePushDevice,
recordPushFailure,
markPushDeviceSeen,
} from './queries';
export type { PushDeviceSelect, PushDeviceInsert } from '../types';
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
export {
listPhotosAccounts,
getActivePhotosCredentials,
getPhotosCredentials,
createPhotosAccount,
updatePhotosAccount,
setActivePhotosAccount,
deletePhotosAccount,
recordPhotosProbe,
} from './queries';
export type { PhotosAccount, PhotosCredentials } from './queries';
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
export {
createPipelineJob,
getPipelineJob,
updatePipelineJob,
getPipelineJobsForUser,
getOldestPendingJob,
getPendingJobs,
countPendingJobs,
deletePipelineJob,
deleteTerminalJobsForUser,
markInterruptedJobs,
} from './queries';
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
import { and, asc, eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { agentPanels } from './schema';
import type { AgentPanelRow } from './schema';
import { agentPanels } from '../schema';
import type { AgentPanelRow } from '../schema/agent-panels';
export type AgentPanel = AgentPanelRow;
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, isNull, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { apiKeys } from './schema';
import { users } from '../auth/schema';
import { apiKeys, users } from '../schema';
import type { ApiKeySelect } from '../types';
// Every read here is scoped by userId except `findLiveApiKeyByHash`, which cannot be: authentication is
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, lt, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { users, passkeys, passkeyChallenges, tokenBlacklist, OWNER_USER_ID } from './schema';
import { users, passkeys, passkeyChallenges, tokenBlacklist, OWNER_USER_ID } from '../schema';
import type { UserSelect, UserInsert, PasskeySelect, PasskeyInsert } from '../types';
// ── Users ──
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
import { eq, and } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { roleCapabilities } from './schema';
import type { UserRole } from '../auth/schema';
import type { CapabilityLevelValue } from './schema';
import { roleCapabilities } from '../schema';
import type { UserRole } from '../schema/auth';
import type { CapabilityLevelValue } from '../schema/capabilities';
// Grants, keyed on role. Absence denies — see the table comment.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, gt, asc, desc, lt } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { chatSessionEvents } from './schema';
import { chatSessionEvents } from '../schema';
/** Append one outbound event to a session's durable log; returns its global cursor id. */
export async function appendChatEvent(sessionId: string, event: unknown): Promise<number> {
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { dashboards, screens, dashboardDefaults } from './schema';
import { dashboards, screens, dashboardDefaults } from '../schema';
// ── Full state read ──
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { and, desc, eq, isNull } from 'drizzle-orm';
import argon2 from 'argon2';
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
import { db } from '../db';
import { davAppPasswords } from './schema';
import { davAppPasswords } from '../schema/dav';
export type DavAppPassword = typeof davAppPasswords.$inferSelect;
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { emailAccounts } from './schema';
import { emailAccounts } from '../schema';
import type { EmailAccountInsert, EmailAccountSelect } from '../types';
export async function getEmailAccounts(userId: number): Promise<EmailAccountSelect[]> {
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, desc } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { headscaleServers } from './schema';
import { headscaleServers } from '../schema';
import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from '../crypto';
// Headscale server registry access for the officer-headscale sidecar. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT —
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ export async function getActiveHeadscaleCredentials(userId: number): Promise<Hea
.from(headscaleServers)
.where(and(eq(headscaleServers.userId, userId), eq(headscaleServers.isActive, true)));
if (!row) return null;
return { id: row.id, name: row.name, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret('headscale', row.apiKey) };
return { id: row.id, name: row.name, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret(row.apiKey) };
}
/** One server's credentials by id — for probing a specific server rather than the active one. */
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ export async function getHeadscaleCredentials(userId: number, id: number): Promi
.from(headscaleServers)
.where(and(eq(headscaleServers.userId, userId), eq(headscaleServers.id, id)));
if (!row) return null;
return { id: row.id, name: row.name, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret('headscale', row.apiKey) };
return { id: row.id, name: row.name, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret(row.apiKey) };
}
type CreateHeadscaleServerParams = {
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ export async function createHeadscaleServer(params: CreateHeadscaleServerParams)
userId,
name,
url,
apiKey: encryptSecret('headscale', apiKey),
apiKey: encryptSecret(apiKey),
version,
sshHost,
isActive: activate,
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ export async function updateHeadscaleServer(
const set: Record<string, unknown> = { updatedAt: new Date() };
if (params.name !== undefined) set.name = params.name;
if (params.url !== undefined) set.url = params.url;
if (params.apiKey !== undefined) set.apiKey = encryptSecret('headscale', params.apiKey);
if (params.apiKey !== undefined) set.apiKey = encryptSecret(params.apiKey);
if (params.sshHost !== undefined) set.sshHost = params.sshHost;
const [row] = await db
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
import { eq, and, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { serverIntegrations } from '../server/schema';
import { userIntegrations } from '../user-data/schema';
import { users } from '../auth/schema';
import { serverIntegrations, userIntegrations } from '../schema';
import { users } from '../schema/auth';
import type { ServerIntegrationSelect, UserIntegrationSelect } from '../types';
// ── Server Integrations ──
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, desc } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { invoiceshelfAccounts } from './schema';
import { invoiceshelfAccounts } from '../schema';
import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from '../crypto';
// InvoiceShelf account registry for the officer-invoiceshelf sidecar. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT — encryption
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ export async function getActiveInvoiceshelfCredentials(userId: number): Promise<
.from(invoiceshelfAccounts)
.where(and(eq(invoiceshelfAccounts.userId, userId), eq(invoiceshelfAccounts.isActive, true)));
if (!row) return null;
return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, token: decryptSecret('invoiceshelf', row.token), companyId: row.companyId };
return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, token: decryptSecret(row.token), companyId: row.companyId };
}
/** One account's credentials by id — for probing a specific account rather than the active one. */
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ export async function getInvoiceshelfCredentials(userId: number, id: number): Pr
.from(invoiceshelfAccounts)
.where(and(eq(invoiceshelfAccounts.userId, userId), eq(invoiceshelfAccounts.id, id)));
if (!row) return null;
return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, token: decryptSecret('invoiceshelf', row.token), companyId: row.companyId };
return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, token: decryptSecret(row.token), companyId: row.companyId };
}
type CreateInvoiceshelfAccountParams = {
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ export async function createInvoiceshelfAccount(params: CreateInvoiceshelfAccoun
userId,
label,
url,
token: encryptSecret('invoiceshelf', token),
token: encryptSecret(token),
companyId,
companyName,
version,
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ export async function updateInvoiceshelfAccount(
const set: Record<string, unknown> = { updatedAt: new Date() };
if (params.label !== undefined) set.label = params.label;
if (params.url !== undefined) set.url = params.url;
if (params.token !== undefined) set.token = encryptSecret('invoiceshelf', params.token);
if (params.token !== undefined) set.token = encryptSecret(params.token);
if (params.companyId !== undefined) set.companyId = params.companyId;
if (params.companyName !== undefined) set.companyName = params.companyName;
if (params.version !== undefined) set.version = params.version;
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, desc } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { jellyfinServers } from './schema';
import { jellyfinServers } from '../schema';
import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from '../crypto';
// Jellyfin server registry for the officer-jellyfin sidecar. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT — encryption to and
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ const toCredentials = (row: typeof jellyfinServers.$inferSelect): JellyfinCreden
id: row.id,
label: row.label,
url: row.url,
accessToken: decryptSecret('jellyfin', row.accessToken),
accessToken: decryptSecret(row.accessToken),
jellyfinUserId: row.jellyfinUserId,
deviceId: row.deviceId,
});
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ export async function createJellyfinServer(params: CreateJellyfinServerParams):
.values({
userId,
...rest,
accessToken: encryptSecret('jellyfin', accessToken),
accessToken: encryptSecret(accessToken),
isActive: activate,
lastSeenAt: rest.version ? new Date() : null,
})
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ export async function updateJellyfinServer(
.update(jellyfinServers)
.set({
...rest,
...(accessToken ? { accessToken: encryptSecret('jellyfin', accessToken) } : {}),
...(accessToken ? { accessToken: encryptSecret(accessToken) } : {}),
updatedAt: new Date(),
})
.where(and(eq(jellyfinServers.userId, userId), eq(jellyfinServers.id, id)))
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, desc, asc, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { musicFavorites, musicNowPlaying, musicPlaylists, musicPlaylistItems } from './schema';
import { musicFavorites, musicNowPlaying, musicPlaylists, musicPlaylistItems } from '../schema';
export type FavoriteKind = 'track' | 'album' | 'artist';
export type GroupedFavorites = { tracks: string[]; albums: string[]; artists: string[] };
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { pushDevices } from './schema';
import { pushDevices } from '../schema';
import type { PushDeviceSelect, PushDeviceInsert } from '../types';
// The push device registry. Only the officer-notify sidecar uses these.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, desc } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { photosConfig } from './schema';
import { photosConfig } from '../schema';
import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from '../crypto';
// Immich account registry for the officer-photos sidecar. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT — encryption to and from
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export async function getActivePhotosCredentials(userId: number): Promise<Photos
.from(photosConfig)
.where(and(eq(photosConfig.userId, userId), eq(photosConfig.isActive, true)));
if (!row) return null;
return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret('photos', row.apiKey) };
return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret(row.apiKey) };
}
/** One account's credentials by id — for probing a specific account rather than the active one. */
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ export async function getPhotosCredentials(userId: number, id: number): Promise<
.from(photosConfig)
.where(and(eq(photosConfig.userId, userId), eq(photosConfig.id, id)));
if (!row) return null;
return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret('photos', row.apiKey) };
return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret(row.apiKey) };
}
type CreatePhotosAccountParams = {
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ export async function createPhotosAccount(params: CreatePhotosAccountParams): Pr
userId,
label,
url,
apiKey: encryptSecret('photos', apiKey),
apiKey: encryptSecret(apiKey),
version,
isActive: activate,
lastSeenAt: version ? new Date() : null,
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ export async function updatePhotosAccount(
const set: Record<string, unknown> = { updatedAt: new Date() };
if (params.label !== undefined) set.label = params.label;
if (params.url !== undefined) set.url = params.url;
if (params.apiKey !== undefined) set.apiKey = encryptSecret('photos', params.apiKey);
if (params.apiKey !== undefined) set.apiKey = encryptSecret(params.apiKey);
if (params.version !== undefined) set.version = params.version;
const [row] = await db
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { eq, and, inArray, asc, desc } from 'drizzle-orm';
const TERMINAL_STATUSES = ['completed', 'failed', 'stopped', 'interrupted'] as const;
import { db } from '../db';
import { pipelineJobs } from './schema';
import { pipelineJobs } from '../schema/pipeline-jobs';
import type { PipelineJobInsert } from '../types';
export async function createPipelineJob(data: PipelineJobInsert) {
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { serverConfig } from './schema';
import { serverConfig } from '../schema';
const SETTINGS_KEY = 'server-settings';
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
import { eq, and } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { serviceConnections } from './schema';
import { getOwnerUser } from '../auth/queries';
import { serviceConnections } from '../schema';
import { getOwnerUser } from './auth';
import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from '../crypto';
// Single-connection services (transmission, slskd) for their sidecars. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT —
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ export async function getServiceCredentials(userId: number, service: ServiceName
id: row.id,
url: row.url,
username: row.username,
secret: row.secret ? decryptSecret('service-connections', row.secret) : null,
secret: row.secret ? decryptSecret(row.secret) : null,
path: row.path,
};
}
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ export async function saveServiceConnection(params: SaveServiceConnectionParams)
const set: Partial<Row> = { url, updatedAt: now };
if (username !== undefined) set.username = username;
if (secret !== undefined) set.secret = secret === null ? null : encryptSecret('service-connections', secret);
if (secret !== undefined) set.secret = secret === null ? null : encryptSecret(secret);
if (path !== undefined) set.path = path;
if (version !== undefined) {
set.version = version;
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ export async function saveServiceConnection(params: SaveServiceConnectionParams)
service,
url,
username: username ?? null,
secret: secret ? encryptSecret('service-connections', secret) : null,
secret: secret ? encryptSecret(secret) : null,
path: path ?? null,
version: version ?? null,
lastSeenAt: version ? now : null,
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { sidecarInstalls } from './schema';
import { sidecarInstalls } from '../schema';
// What the owner has installed from the app store. See ../schema/app-store.ts for why there is no
// userId and why `installed` and `enabled` are separate.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq, and, asc, isNull, inArray, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { soulseekFavorites, soulseekBrowseSnapshots, soulseekBrowseDirs } from './schema';
import { soulseekFavorites, soulseekBrowseSnapshots, soulseekBrowseDirs } from '../schema';
/** A user's favourited Soulseek peers, alphabetical (the order the UI lists them in). */
export async function getSoulseekFavorites(userId: number): Promise<string[]> {
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { dockConfigs, userSettings, userState } from './schema';
import { dockConfigs, userSettings, userState } from '../schema';
// ── User Settings ──
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { vaultTokens, vaultUnlockKeys } from './schema';
import { vaultTokens, vaultUnlockKeys } from '../schema';
import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from '../crypto';
// Vault store access. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT — encryption to/from at-rest ciphertext happens here, so
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ export async function getVaultTokens(userId: number): Promise<VaultTokenSet | nu
const [row] = await db.select().from(vaultTokens).where(eq(vaultTokens.userId, userId));
if (!row) return null;
return {
accessToken: decryptSecret('vault', row.accessToken),
refreshToken: decryptSecret('vault', row.refreshToken),
accessToken: decryptSecret(row.accessToken),
refreshToken: decryptSecret(row.refreshToken),
expiresAt: row.expiresAt,
deviceIdentifier: row.deviceIdentifier,
clientId: row.clientId,
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ export async function getVaultTokens(userId: number): Promise<VaultTokenSet | nu
export async function setVaultTokens(userId: number, t: VaultTokenSet): Promise<void> {
const values = {
userId,
accessToken: encryptSecret('vault', t.accessToken),
refreshToken: encryptSecret('vault', t.refreshToken),
accessToken: encryptSecret(t.accessToken),
refreshToken: encryptSecret(t.refreshToken),
expiresAt: t.expiresAt,
deviceIdentifier: t.deviceIdentifier,
clientId: t.clientId,
@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ export async function updateVaultAccess(
await db
.update(vaultTokens)
.set({
accessToken: encryptSecret('vault', accessToken),
refreshToken: encryptSecret('vault', refreshToken),
accessToken: encryptSecret(accessToken),
refreshToken: encryptSecret(refreshToken),
expiresAt,
updatedAt: new Date(),
})
@@ -80,12 +80,12 @@ export async function clearVaultTokens(userId: number): Promise<void> {
/** The owner's stored protector key (decrypted), or null. Officer-app unlock path only. */
export async function getVaultUnlockKey(userId: number): Promise<string | null> {
const [row] = await db.select().from(vaultUnlockKeys).where(eq(vaultUnlockKeys.userId, userId));
return row ? decryptSecret('vault', row.wrappedKey) : null;
return row ? decryptSecret(row.wrappedKey) : null;
}
/** Store/replace the protector key (encrypted). Set once at setup; persists across normal logout. */
export async function setVaultUnlockKey(userId: number, wrappedKey: string): Promise<void> {
const values = { userId, wrappedKey: encryptSecret('vault', wrappedKey), updatedAt: new Date() };
const values = { userId, wrappedKey: encryptSecret(wrappedKey), updatedAt: new Date() };
await db
.insert(vaultUnlockKeys)
.values(values)
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
import type { WalletChainSnapshot } from './schema';
import type { WalletChainSnapshot } from '../schema/wallet';
import { eq, and, desc } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { db } from '../db';
import { walletWallets, walletLabels, walletFrozenUtxos, walletChainCache } from './schema';
import { walletWallets, walletLabels, walletFrozenUtxos, walletChainCache } from '../schema';
import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from '../crypto';
// Wallet access for the officer-wallet sidecar. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT — the at-rest layer ('wallet'
// purpose in the secret store) is
// Wallet access for the officer-wallet sidecar. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT — the VAULT_STORE_KEY layer is
// applied and stripped here, so route handlers never touch crypto. See ../crypto.ts, ../schema/wallet.ts.
//
// Note what "plaintext" means for `seedEnvelope`: it is the passphrase-sealed envelope, which is itself
@@ -118,7 +117,7 @@ export async function getWalletSecrets(userId: number, id: number): Promise<Wall
id: row.id,
kind: row.kind as WalletKind,
network: row.network,
config: row.config ? (JSON.parse(decryptSecret('wallet', row.config)) as Record<string, unknown>) : null,
config: row.config ? (JSON.parse(decryptSecret(row.config)) as Record<string, unknown>) : null,
};
}
@@ -132,7 +131,7 @@ export async function getSealedSeed(userId: number, id: number): Promise<string
.from(walletWallets)
.where(and(eq(walletWallets.userId, userId), eq(walletWallets.id, id)));
if (!row?.seedEnvelope) return null;
return decryptSecret('wallet', row.seedEnvelope);
return decryptSecret(row.seedEnvelope);
}
export type CreateWalletParams = {
@@ -165,8 +164,8 @@ export async function createWallet(params: CreateWalletParams): Promise<WalletSu
name: params.name,
kind: params.kind,
network: params.network,
config: params.config ? encryptSecret('wallet', JSON.stringify(params.config)) : null,
seedEnvelope: params.sealedSeed ? encryptSecret('wallet', params.sealedSeed) : null,
config: params.config ? encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(params.config)) : null,
seedEnvelope: params.sealedSeed ? encryptSecret(params.sealedSeed) : null,
fingerprint: params.fingerprint ?? null,
xpubs: params.xpubs ?? null,
defaultBip: params.defaultBip ?? 84,
@@ -189,7 +188,7 @@ export async function updateWallet(
const set: Record<string, unknown> = { updatedAt: new Date() };
if (patch.name !== undefined) set.name = patch.name;
if (patch.defaultBip !== undefined) set.defaultBip = patch.defaultBip;
if (patch.config !== undefined) set.config = encryptSecret('wallet', JSON.stringify(patch.config));
if (patch.config !== undefined) set.config = encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(patch.config));
const [row] = await db
.update(walletWallets)
@@ -213,7 +212,7 @@ export async function updateWallet(
export async function replaceSealedSeed(userId: number, id: number, sealedSeed: string): Promise<void> {
await db
.update(walletWallets)
.set({ seedEnvelope: encryptSecret('wallet', sealedSeed), updatedAt: new Date() })
.set({ seedEnvelope: encryptSecret(sealedSeed), updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(and(eq(walletWallets.userId, userId), eq(walletWallets.id, id)));
}
-54
View File
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
// What `db:push` creates.
//
// This barrel is drizzle-kit's view of the schema — `drizzle.config.ts` points `schema` straight at
// this file. It is NOT the runtime's view: every query imports its table object from the schema file
// directly and calls `db.select().from(table)`, and nothing uses drizzle's relational API (`db.query.X`),
// which is the only thing the `schema` passed to `drizzle()` in db.ts is for.
//
// So a commented line here removes a table from the DATABASE without removing a line of code. That is
// deliberate and it is what makes the split below possible.
//
// ── Core, and plugins ──
//
// A fresh install creates the core tables only. Everything under "plugins" is a table belonging to a
// sidecar that a light install does not run — `ecosystem.light.config.cjs` plus `officer-headscale`,
// which is core because the tailnet is the perimeter (see docs/secret-store.md).
//
// The plugin lines are kept, commented, rather than deleted. They are the record of what a table is
// called and which file defines it, and the plugin-install story is going to need exactly that. Nothing
// creates them yet: installing a plugin will have to uncomment its line and push, and building that is
// still ahead of us.
// ── Core ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export * from './auth/schema'; // users, passkeys, passkey_challenges, token_blacklist
export * from './capabilities/schema'; // role_capabilities — what each ROLE may reach
export * from './api-keys/schema'; // api_keys
export * from './user-data/schema'; // user_settings, user_state, user_integrations, dock_configs
export * from './dashboards/schema'; // dashboards, screens, dashboard_defaults
export * from './server/schema'; // server_config (SMTP lives here), server_integrations
export * from './pipeline-jobs/schema'; // pipeline_jobs
export * from './chat-events/schema'; // chat_session_events
export * from './agent-panels/schema'; // agent_panels
// Core because the tailnet is the perimeter — a security model resting on it cannot treat administering
// it as an optional extra. The secret store bootstraps a `headscale` key on this basis.
export * from './headscale/schema'; // headscale_servers
// The app store itself, and the credentials it stores for what it installs. `app-store/effects.ts`
// reads service_connections, so this is core however few plugins are installed.
export * from './app-store/schema'; // sidecar_installs
export * from './service-connections/schema'; // service_connections
// ── Plugins — uncomment when the plugin is installed ─────────────────────────────────────────────
// export * from './email/schema'; // email_accounts officer-email
// export * from './music/schema'; // music_favorites, _playlists, _playlist_items, _now_playing
// export * from './notify/schema'; // push_devices officer-notify
// export * from './dav/schema'; // dav_app_passwords officer-caldav
// export * from './photos/schema'; // photos_config officer-photos
// export * from './jellyfin/schema'; // jellyfin_servers officer-jellyfin
// export * from './invoiceshelf/schema'; // invoiceshelf_accounts officer-invoiceshelf
// export * from './soulseek/schema'; // soulseek_favorites, _browse_snapshots, _browse_dirs
// export * from './vault/schema'; // vault_tokens, vault_unlock_keys officer-vault
// export * from './wallet/schema'; // wallet_wallets, _labels, _frozen_utxos, _chain_cache
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { pgTable, serial, text, integer, timestamp, uniqueIndex, index } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
import { users } from '../auth/schema';
import { users } from './auth';
/**
* One named agent living in one dashboard panel the address book that lets two chat panels on the

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