Three things, from a member sitting on /music with no music capability on a server with
no music sidecar: an empty library, and 403s in the console.
PERMISSIONS AT THE ROUTE. `canVisit` filtered the dock and nothing else, so the tile was
hidden and the route was wide open — typing the path, following an old link or restoring
a tab rendered the screen anyway. RouteGate now wraps every screen in one place, inside
the error boundary.
It does not redirect. Sending someone to `/` erases what they asked for and reads as a
bug: they clicked Music and landed on Home. It says why instead, and the URL stays put so
a reload after installing the thing just works.
And it says which of the two reasons applies, because they need different screens and send
the reader to different places. `not-installed` is a fact about the SERVER — the owner gets
a link to the app store. `not-granted` is a fact about the ACCOUNT, and only the owner can
change it. Presenting either as the other sends you looking in the wrong place.
ROUTES FOLLOW THE SIDECAR. Free, once the above exists: `deniedRoutes` already covers
"held but its sidecar is not installed", so an uninstalled feature has no tile AND no
screen. The dock, the Permissions list and the routes now agree because they read one
answer.
NO MORE SEEDING. Downloads/Documents/Music/Videos/Pictures are gone from both places that
made them — the member's provisioning and, older and worse, `/ls`, which created folders in
somebody's home as a side effect of LOOKING at it. A listing that invents its own contents
is a listing you cannot trust, and the platform has no standing to choose a person's folder
layout. A new home is empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 401 handler ended with location.replace('/'), guarded by "unless the path starts
with /signin". There is no /signin route — the sign-in screen IS path="/". So every 401
on the signed-out landing page navigated to the page it was already on, fetched again,
401'd again. A hard refresh loop with no way out of the tab.
The reload was never what fixed anything: useAuth already renders the sign-in screen
when there is no token. It only existed to drop a stale query cache. So it is now the
last thing attempted and bounded three separate ways, any one of which breaks a loop
alone:
1. no token -> return. A 401 while already signed out is expected, not a revocation.
This one alone ends it, because a reloaded document has nothing left to clear.
2. once per document, module flag.
3. once per tab, sessionStorage marker — which also covers a host that re-injects the
token on every load, where clearing storage cannot help and guard 1 never fires.
Anyone stuck in the loop from the previous build: localStorage.clear() in the console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"This folder is empty" was a lie. The five seeded directories were sitting there and the
platform's readdir raised EACCES: a member's home is 700 and owned by them, which is
correct for a shell and locks out the file browser, which runs inside the platform
process. /ls caught the error and returned an empty listing, so a refusal looked exactly
like data.
Two doors, two boundaries, and that is the point rather than a compromise. The terminal
and the agent RUN AS the member and the kernel is the boundary there. The file browser
acts on the member's behalf from inside the platform, which already applies its own
containment and is the owner's process on the owner's machine — it can read anything via
sudo regardless. Giving it access describes who is doing the work.
Done with named POSIX ACLs, because it has to hold in BOTH directions: a file the
platform writes must be editable by the member and vice versa. Mode bits cannot say that
— whichever party is neither owner nor group lands in "other", and widening "other"
opens the home to every account on the box. A shared group fails the same way, since both
parties would have to be in it and that puts every member in a group that can read every
other member's home. Two named entries plus `d:` defaults grant exactly two users and are
inherited by whatever either side creates, whatever their umask.
Verified: platform lists the home, member edits a platform-written file, platform edits a
member-written file, and a SECOND member is refused on both ls and cat.
/ls now distinguishes EACCES from a missing directory. An empty result is data and must
never be how a refusal looks.
acl joins the core packages in setup.sh — the alternative is an account that provisions
and then cannot list its own home.
Also: the file browser's own useTasks/useAgents fired /tasks, /agents and both category
endpoints on every render, which is where the last four 403s came from — they are the
context menu's Run Task and agent submenus, execution-only. Gated.
And plans is deleted: router, screen, routes, dock tile, hook, page title and its
capability. It read markdown from <repo>/plans, which does not exist. Fresh-install
Permissions is now Files alone, with Terminal to come.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
It was in both light profiles on the reasoning that it fronts a REMOTE instance and so
needs nothing installed locally. That is true and it was beside the point: a baseline
process appears in the dock and in the Permissions screen whether or not anyone ever
gave it a URL, so a fresh server offered to grant members access to a Gitea that did
not exist. "Is Gitea here" had two answers that could disagree.
Now it is `existing` mode with a URL and a token, like any other remote service, and
the one place that says whether it is here is the install row. No compose template and
no `provisioned` mode: Gitea is always something the owner already runs, and offering to
spin one up would mean owning its migration, backup and upgrade story.
members: 'none' — not because Gitea is single-tenant, it is the most per-user service
in the catalogue, but because there is nothing for the INSTALLER to do. The owner's
connection carries the instance; each member adds their own access token from /gitea and
acts only as themselves upstream. A provisioner would need an admin token and would mint
credentials on their behalf, which is more authority than this needs.
The catalogue test already pinned "the store offers exactly what light leaves out", so
removing it from the profile is what forced the entry to exist. Both light profiles
changed together — the mac one carried the same comment and the same gap.
Permissions on a fresh install is now Files and Plans. Plans stays because it reads the
platform's own shipped markdown from <repo>/plans, not anyone's disk, so it needs
nothing installed and exposes nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three findings from granting Files to a role and signing in as the member.
THE BLANK SCREEN. WorkspaceView returns null until workspace.isLoaded, and isLoaded
was the success flag of GET /api/dashboards — which the `dashboards` capability gated.
So a member with files granted got a completely blank Files screen and no request to
/api/file-browser at all: the panel never mounted. Terminal, Chat and every other
workspace screen were the same.
/api/dashboards is not a feature. It is the per-user key-value store where every
screen keeps its layout, entirely `personal`, every row keyed to the caller. Gating it
does not restrict an account, it breaks it — which is the definition of `core` at the
top of the registry. Moved there.
And the failure mode was wrong independently: `isLoaded` now covers a failed fetch as
well as a successful one, with `loadFailed` for the difference, so a screen that cannot
remember its layout still renders with defaults instead of showing nothing and
explaining nothing.
THE STRAY REQUESTS. Six shell-level queries gated on isAuthenticated but not on
capability, so a member's first paint fired 403s at /server-settings/settings,
/jobs/counts (every three seconds, forever), /chat/models, /plans, /music/now-playing
and the chat access policy. Each now checks the capability it needs. JobsIndicator and
RescanButton also render nothing without `tasks` and `items` — the header was offering
two links to a screen the member cannot open and a button that would 403.
THE PERMISSIONS SCREEN. It listed all fourteen app capabilities on a server where none
of their sidecars are installed. Offering to grant Photos on a machine with no Immich
is not a permission decision. It now shows only what is installed, lists the rest as
"nothing installed for these yet" so their absence reads as a fact rather than a bug,
and marks confined rows as needing a Linux account. Fails open on a degraded read.
Found while checking that: the headscale catalogue entry claimed only the `headscale`
capability, but the same sidecar also serves `vpn` — a member enrolling their own
device — so vpn was never subtracted. Hence `alsoServes`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /users/:id/provision-linux, and a terminal button on each user row. One
operation covering three needs that were all previously answered by "delete the
account and make it again":
backfill an account created before the feature existed, or while the host was not
set up for it
retry the first attempt failed for something since fixed — the traversable
ancestor chmod being the one everybody hits once
re-key replace authorized_keys with a new public key
Deleting to redo a retryable side effect throws away the password, the dashboards and
everything else keyed to the row.
The provisioning block moves out of create-user into provisionOsAccount, shared by
both entry points for the same reason app-store/members.ts is shaped that way: two
moments, one piece of work.
Found by testing the retry rather than the create: provisionUserDirs re-chmods every
directory including home, and home belongs to the MEMBER after the first successful
run — chmod requires ownership, so it threw EPERM and took every retry down before it
started. Those chmods are now a default for directories being created, not an
assertion about ones that already exist; os-user.ts sets the home's mode through sudo
and is the authority for it.
The route answers 200 with the error in the body, because the interesting cases are
partial: "the account exists and is confined but the keys failed" is not nothing
having happened, and the row shows both halves.
Verified end to end: blocked ancestor reports the chmod and leaves osUser null, the
retry after that chmod succeeds and records the row, and a re-key replaces
authorized_keys without rotating the outbound key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two changes, and the second is what makes the first safe.
The officer_ prefix is gone: a member's account is the username the owner typed, so
whoami says who they are and a commit from their checkout is attributed to something
recognisable. Measured first — useradd on this host accepts everything
validateUsername permits, including dots, hyphens, underscores and uppercase.
The prefix was also load-bearing, though, and not for looks. ensureOsUser REUSES an
existing account, which is what makes it re-runnable, and that was safe by
construction while only we created officer_* names. Unprefixed, adoption becomes the
dangerous path: a platform account named root would have found root in passwd, and
every runAs for that member would have been a root shell. So adoption now requires
the existing account's passwd home to be exactly the home we are about to confine —
that is what makes it ours — and any uid below 1000 is refused outright.
Verified: root and daemon refused as system accounts, and the owner's own username
refused by name with its real home quoted back.
Also, the ancestor trap from the first real install. A member's home is under
DATA_PATH, which is under the OWNER'S home, and /home/<owner> is 750 on Debian and
Ubuntu — so every mode bit on the account tree was right, the directory existed, and
the member still could not reach it for want of x four levels up. It surfaced as
"ssh-keygen: Could not stat …/.ssh: Permission denied", which points at the wrong
thing entirely. firstUntraversableAncestor now walks the chain as the member before
anything uses the home, and the error names the directory and the chmod.
The dev machine was already 751, and the probe used /tmp, so it never crossed the
ancestor that mattered. Worth remembering as a shape of mistake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reported from two browser windows: an account deleted from the dashboard survived a
page refresh in the other one. Two independent halves.
Server: userMiddleware looked the account up, then read the result as
`dbUser?.passwordChangedAt` — so a DELETED account fell through the optional chain and
the request proceeded on a token that is still cryptographically valid, for up to the
full 30 days. `status` was the same hole from the other direction: signin refuses
anything that is not Active, but nothing rechecked it afterwards, so marking someone
Blocked did not end the session they already had, which is exactly when you would be
doing it. Now the account must exist and be Active on every request.
Client: nothing reacted to a 401 at all. onError fed the bug-report form and stopped
there, so the window kept rendering off cached React Query data. A 401 now clears every
storage key createClient reads and returns to the sign-in screen. /auth/ is exempt
because a wrong password is also a 401 and reloading the form would look like a crash.
window.officerBearerToken was declared non-optional, which made "there is no token"
unspeakable. It has always been one of five sources, any of which may be absent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduces a fifth capability kind. `files` was `execution` — never grantable,
because it meant the OWNER'S filesystem. It is now `confined`: execution-shaped, but
the kernel enforces the boundary because the account has its own Linux user, its own
home, and no permission above it.
The rule that makes `confined` mean something lives in authorize.ts, once: a confined
grant is DROPPED for an account with no osUser. So "granted but unconfined" resolves
to no access rather than to the owner's home — which is what it would otherwise
resolve to, since getOwnerHomeDir ignores the email it is handed whenever HOME_DIR is
set. One rule covers the HTTP routes, the websocket doors and the dock, instead of
each router remembering.
resolveHomeDir(userId) is the new seam and it reads the row rather than the token, for
the same reason authorize.ts re-reads role: provisioning a Linux account for an
existing member has to take effect on the next request, not in thirty days.
The file browser resolves it in middleware and puts it on ctx user, because
getRootDir is called from fifteen places in that router. Making it async would have
meant editing fifteen call sites, and the cost of missing one is serving the owner's
home to a member. Now a handler cannot run without the answer.
Two things a real run caught:
- /ls seeds Downloads/Documents into the home as the service user, which is EPERM
against a 700 home owned by the member — it took the whole listing down. Seeding is
now best-effort there and happens at provision time instead, as the member.
- .unique() on os_user made db:push ask whether to TRUNCATE users, which is
unanswerable non-interactively. uniqueIndex instead, per databases/CLAUDE.md.
Verified: a member without a Linux account is refused by name; with one, resolves to
their own home and NOT to HOME_DIR; the owner still resolves to HOME_DIR; and every
.. escape is refused while an absolute path is rebased under the root.
Terminal is still execution — that is the next stage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Inbound and outbound are two keys doing two jobs, and treating them as
alternatives breaks the goal:
inbound ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, from an optional public key the owner pastes
on the create form. Their private half stays on their laptop.
outbound ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, generated in their home, never leaves the machine.
"They pasted a key, so skip generating one" is the obvious simplification. Agent
forwarding covers a human in an interactive session, but a platform-spawned agent
has no agent socket to borrow — so an edge checkout it is asked to commit and push
needs a key that lives on the box. The inbound key is therefore optional and the
outbound one is not.
No linux password, ever: useradd sets none, which blocks password login and does
not block key auth. So "real user, reachable over SSH, no password anywhere" is
the resting state, and the platform password stays the platform's business.
Validation is about line count, not key shape. Every line of authorized_keys is a
credential, so a pasted value with a newline would install a SECOND key silently.
Multi-line refused, a private key refused by name, an options prefix refused.
Every write goes through sudo install: the home is 700 and the member's, so the
service user cannot even create .ssh. install sets content, owner and mode in one
step, and content travels as a temp path so nothing quotes a form value into a
shell. ssh-keygen runs AS the member so the private key is never briefly root's.
known_hosts is not seeded — StrictHostKeyChecking accept-new instead. The Gitea
SSH endpoint is not knowable at create time, and the default setting makes a first
connection prompt, which in a non-interactive agent turn is a hang rather than an
error. accept-new still refuses a changed host key.
The generated public key is stored on the row and shown twice: on the after-create
panel and behind a key button on the user's row. It has an errand attached that
nothing else will remind anyone about — it must be added to their Gitea account.
Verified with a real useradd: .ssh 700 and id_ed25519 600 both owned by the member
and usable by them, authorized_keys byte-identical to the paste, no key rotation on
a second run, and a multi-line paste refused with authorized_keys untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A member gets a real Linux account whose home is the directory the platform already
provisions for them. Nothing uses it yet — this is the mechanism plus the account,
deliberately with no behaviour change, so the file browser and terminal can be moved
onto something already proven.
Bun.spawn silently ignores uid/gid. Verified on 1.3.10: from uid 1000,
Bun.spawn(['id','-u'], {uid: 65534}) exits 0 and prints 1000. No throw, no warning.
Bun's types don't declare the option so typed code can't reach it by accident, but the
runtime accepts it, and a silently absent isolation boundary is the worst outcome this
feature could have. So privilege drops go through sudo -n setpriv, and a test pins Bun's
behaviour — if it's ever implemented, that test tells us we may simplify.
sudo is required for the drop and not because of the uid: --init-groups fails with
"Operation not permitted" for an unprivileged caller even when reuid'ing to its own
account, because setgroups(2) is root-only. --reset-env is what stops the platform's
environment crossing; verified POSTGRES_URL is unset on the far side and HOME arrives
from the target's passwd entry.
Three bugs that only a real run with a real useradd could find:
- chmod after chown fails forever, because chmod needs ownership. Both orderings fail
unprivileged. Both operations now go through sudo, which is what makes it re-runnable.
- a member could read ANOTHER member's home: provisionUserDirs created at the default
umask (755) and only the account being created got confined. An unlistable parent is
no protection when the child is world-readable and emails are guessable. The skeleton
is now created closed, 711 on the account dir and 700 inside.
- platform/.env was 664 and a member's shell printed JWT_SECRET, which is enough to mint
an owner token and bypass every capability check. Now a boot check that refuses to
start with OFFICER_OS_USERS on while any .env in the project root is group- or
world-readable.
Design, the measured results and the staging plan: docs/per-user-linux-accounts.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/users plus an Add-account form in Settings > User management. Until now
createUser had one call site — bootstrap, gated on an empty user table — so every
non-owner account anywhere had been inserted into Postgres by hand.
Created accounts are Active. The column defaults to Unverified and signin refuses
anything else with a bare UNAUTHORIZED, which is exactly what made the hand-INSERT
route look like a wrong password.
Also closes a hole found while reading the write path: a second Super Admin was
storable. The CHECK constraint pins user 1's role but cannot see other rows, and
getOwnerUser() was LIMIT 1 with no ORDER BY, so two holders would have made "who owns
this server" a question the query plan answered — and that answer feeds the agent
sidecar's identity, vault access and origin scoping. Both write paths now refuse the
role and getOwnerUser() orders by id.
USER_DIRS and provisionUserDirs move into data-path.ts so the create handler and
scripts/provision-user-dirs.ts cannot disagree about what an account's skeleton is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/app-store, built to the platform's own conventions: a locked WorkspaceView with two panels, the
selection in `?selected=` rather than a channel, and rows that are real links so cmd-click and a pasted
URL both work.
`?selected=` and not a /app-store/:id detail route, per docs/navigation-audit.md: this is a master list
with a live preview, and linking rows to a detail route would make the detail the whole page and destroy
the side-by-side. Both panels read the URL independently — the list and the detail cannot disagree if
neither is telling the other anything.
The install form is generated from the catalogue's fields rather than written per service, which is what
lets a sidecar shipping from its own repository present a form nobody here wrote. `existing` is first in
`modes` by catalogue rule, so the default selection is "I already have one" — the answer that avoids
starting a second copy of something already running.
States are distinguished rather than flattened. Blocked is amber and titled "Needs you", not an error:
everything worked and it is waiting for a token only a person can mint. Installed-and-enabled but with
a dead process shows a warning rather than a tick that lies. And the disable/uninstall copy says plainly
that data, configuration and tables are kept either way, because that is the question anyone hesitates
over before clicking.
The dock tile is CORE, not plugin-derived: the store is how every other feature arrives, so it must
never be one of the things that disappears.
Verified through the API the screen uses — 14 items, email reporting installed/enabled with its process
online, and /app-store present in the capability routes so the tile renders. NOT verified in a browser:
no page has been opened, so the rendering itself is reasoned rather than seen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An instance may be on another host, behind a reverse proxy on 443 under a path prefix, on a tailnet
address, or on an arbitrary port because the usual one was taken. All ordinary self-hosted setups, and
each one a case where assuming otherwise produces a connection that fails later with no clue why.
Two places were sloppy about it. Jellyfin's placeholder read `http://localhost:8096` and Transmission's
`http://localhost:9091`, which quietly teach that a service must be local and on its project's default
port; both now show remote examples, and the field type says why. And nothing validated what was typed,
so a bare hostname or a URL with a token in the query string was stored as-is.
The rule: reject only what cannot work, normalise what is merely untidy, have no opinion about the rest.
No check that the host is local, that the port matches a default, or that the scheme is https — a
tailnet HTTP service is completely normal.
Trailing slashes go, because `${url}/api/x` otherwise doubles the separator: accepted by some servers
and 404 by others, which is the kind of difference that reproduces on one machine and not another.
Query strings go, because that is where a token hides, and it would sit in a column meant for a
location. Credentials in the URL are refused for the same reason — outside the encrypted secret, and in
every log line that ever prints it.
A missing scheme is named rather than called invalid: it is the commonest mistake, because it is what
people type into a browser.
Verified through the API: `memos.example.com` is blocked with the fix quoted back, and
`https://memos.example.com:8443/memos/` installs and stores normalised — remote host, non-standard port,
path prefix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by breaking it. Installing a sidecar that was already configured replaced its connection row with
the new install's, silently repointing a working service somewhere else — during testing that took the
live Transmission from :9091 to a scratch container on :18092, and the only symptom was that it stopped
working.
Install now blocks instead of overwriting, naming both URLs and offering the choice. Blocked rather
than failed because there is a sensible answer and the user is the only one who has it: keep what is
there, or reinstall with `replaceConnection` to change it deliberately. Harmless on a fresh machine;
this is entirely for the one with an existing setup.
Verified against the live row: an install pointed at a different URL is refused and the original
connection is still there afterwards.
Also makes "do you already have one?" structural rather than a UI convention. Three tests: anything that
can provision must also offer `existing`, `existing` must come first in `modes` since that is the order
the prompt uses, and it must ask for a URL. A new entry added later cannot quietly offer only "provision
one for me" — which is how someone with a working Immich ends up with a second one and finds out when
two libraries disagree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tier two works end to end. Transmission installed through the API with a real container, verified on
this machine and then removed:
install preflight, provision, connect, schema, assets, process — container up, health-checked,
connection written from what the setup script printed
disable process stopped, then container Exited(0), data intact
enable container back up, then the process
uninstall container gone, install row gone, DATA UNTOUCHED — config, compose file, downloads and
watch directories all still present
Order matters in both directions and it is opposite each way. Enable brings the container up first: a
sidecar that starts before its upstream exists spends its first seconds failing health checks and
logging about a service that is merely not up yet. Disable stops the process first, for the same reason
in reverse.
`down`, never `down -v`, and no `--rmi`: the volumes are the user's data and the images are shared and
expensive to re-pull. Both are deliberate omissions, stated so nobody adds them later as a tidy-up.
Uninstall only brings down containers for `mode: 'provisioned'`. An `existing` install points at a
service the user runs themselves, and `down` there would stop a container Officer never started.
Every compose call tolerates a missing directory rather than failing. Three call sites can legitimately
arrive with nothing there — an `existing` install, a failed install that died before writing the file,
and a resumed uninstall re-running a completed step — and erroring would make a row impossible to
uninstall, which is the one state a user cannot escape.
Adds an `assets` step, before `process`: the dock reads manifests as soon as the install is recorded, so
an icon arriving a moment later shows as broken on the first render. And composeDir is recorded from the
install rather than derived later, because the directory is the user's and they may move it — uninstall
must not guess at a path it is about to run `down` in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ALL_DOCK_ITEMS was a hardcoded list of everything, so a fresh machine offered Photos, Jellyfin,
Transmission and the rest — each leading to a screen reporting itself unavailable — and adding a sidecar
meant editing the shell. Neither survives sidecars shipping from their own repositories.
Split in two. CORE_DOCK_ITEMS is the baseline that exists on every install: chat, files, terminal, the
app's own screens, and Gitea, which is in the light profile because it fronts a remote instance.
Everything else is derived from installed sidecars' UI manifests, delivered with /capabilities.
Sent with the capability answer rather than fetched separately so the dock has ONE source. Two requests
means two moments, and a dock rendered between them shows a tile for something uninstalled or nothing
for something installed. Filtered by capability server-side too: a member is not handed the manifest of
a feature they cannot use, because "hidden in the client" is the kind of privacy that lasts until
someone opens the network tab.
Verified live. The owner — who bypasses every permission check — does not bypass this: /photos is absent
from routes and present in deniedRoutes because Photos is not installed. Flipping a row's `enabled`
makes its tile leave and return with no process touched.
Two things fell out. A manifest can declare extraTiles, because CalDAV is one sidecar presenting as
Calendar AND Contacts, and collapsing them to keep the model tidy would make the app worse. And
DEFAULT_DOCK_PATHS no longer pins /music: useDock drops a path with nothing behind it, so the default
dock came up a tile short on any machine where Music was never installed — a default that references an
optional feature is how an app looks subtly wrong on a fresh install for no stated reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Real PNG icons are coming, so this is the path they arrive by: a sidecar ships its assets beside its own
code, and install copies them to public/plugins/<id>/ where one static route serves them.
Copied rather than served in place because a sidecar shipping from its own repository has its assets
wherever that repository was unpacked, which is not a path the web server can be taught at build time.
One predictable destination means the serving rule never has to know how many plugins exist or where any
came from. It also makes assets a property of the INSTALL: uninstall removes them, and a plugin nobody
installed serves nothing.
Needed a new route, and the reason is a trap worth recording. `publicRoutes` in server.tsx is built by
globbing ./public at BOOT, so anything copied there afterwards is invisible to it — the first install of
a plugin would show a broken image until the server was restarted, and "install it, then restart to see
the icon" is not an install. `/plugins/*` resolves per request, like /novnc/* and /vendor/* already do.
Unlike those two it answers 404 rather than 500 for a missing file: an unpublished icon is an ordinary
state on a fresh machine, and a 500 would put a red line in the log for every dock render.
Proven end to end with a real asset: slskd's icon moved from public/slskd.png into the sidecar's own
assets/, published against an ALREADY RUNNING server, and fetched at 200 with the right bytes and
content-type — 404 before publishing, no restart between.
public/plugins/ is gitignored: it holds copies, and the originals live with each sidecar.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Real icons are coming and the manifest field already exists — slskd uses it. What is not decided is
where the bytes come from for a sidecar that ships from its own repository: /slskd.png works only
because it sits in the platform's public/, which a marketplace plugin cannot write to.
Records the three options and their trade — marketplace URL (loses icons offline), served by us from the
sidecar's directory (works offline, needs a route and caching), or a data URI (no fetch, but bloats
every manifest) — so the next person meets the question instead of assuming the current path generalises.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two gaps, both from the same root: the app knew what an account MAY use and not what this server
actually HAS.
Availability is now subtracted server-side in the /capabilities answer. "Installed" is orthogonal to
"permitted" and the owner is subject to it — the owner bypasses every permission check, but a capability
they hold unconditionally still means nothing if its sidecar was never installed. Without this the dock
on a fresh machine lists Photos, Jellyfin, Transmission and the rest, each leading to a screen that
reports itself unavailable.
Computed on the server rather than intersected in the client, so the rule lives in one place: the dock
already reads `/capabilities`, and making it read a second list and combine them is how a member's dock
and an owner's dock drift apart. `unavailable` is returned alongside `deniedRoutes` because the two mean
different things to a UI — "not yours" versus "not here yet, install it".
A disabled sidecar counts as unavailable: disable stops the process and its container, so the feature
genuinely does not work, and leaving its icon would make disable look broken rather than effective.
Reading install state failing subtracts NOTHING, matching useCapabilities' deliberate fail-open.
Each entry now also carries a UI manifest — name, icon, colour, rootRoute, routes — because a sidecar
shipping from its own repository has to be able to say what it looks like. The icon is a NAME rather
than an imported component: a manifest has to survive being JSON from marketplace.officer.dev, which a
lucide import cannot make. Tests pin the manifests against the capability registry, so a tile cannot
appear for a route the server guards differently, and against each other, so two sidecars cannot claim
one root route.
No backfill, by decision: this is proven on a blank machine first and applied to alpha from scratch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Email installs end to end now, which was the point of picking it as tier one: no container, no external
wiring, so the machinery is exercised without the provisioning half.
Verified against the running system, not asserted:
POST /api/app-store/email/install -> {"status":"installed","completed":["preflight","schema","process"]}
row -> email mode=config status=installed enabled=true
pm2 -> officer-email online
second install -> all three steps skipped, process not restarted
disable -> stopped
The server boots with the new router, which is the real test of the capability entry: totality.ts throws
before serve() if a mounted router has none, so booting IS the check passing.
pm2.ts shells out rather than importing pm2 as a library. PM2 is already the supervisor and the
ecosystem file is already the definition of how each process runs; a second thing in charge of that
means two supervisors disagreeing. It also means an owner can undo anything the app store did with a
command they already know. The one fact that matters: `pm2 start <name>` fails for a process PM2 has
never seen, so a first install starts from the ecosystem file with --only, and everything after goes by
name. Callers cannot know which case they are in, so startProcess decides.
Disable stops rather than deletes: a stopped process still shows in `pm2 list`, which is the honest
picture. Deleting would make a disabled sidecar indistinguishable from one never installed.
beginInstall returns the existing row instead of replacing it — that is what makes a retry a resume
rather than a re-provision — and clears lastError on the way in, so a UI never shows a stale failure
beside a working service.
The container half of enable/disable/uninstall is deliberately absent rather than stubbed silently: a
disable that leaves Immich running is a different thing from one that stops it, and the difference is
memory on the user's machine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements the half of the template contract that faces the platform: answers go in as environment and
never as prompts, and results come back as OFFICER_RESULT_<KEY>= lines on stdout.
A line protocol rather than JSON because the same stream is the user's live log — it goes to a terminal
panel while the install runs. A script that must emit clean JSON cannot also narrate, and one that emits
both needs a framing convention anyway. This mirrors the @@officer:progress@@ sentinel the job runner
already uses, with the same rule: marker lines are plucked out, everything else passes through.
parseResults is pure and tested against the realistic near-misses: a line that MENTIONS the prefix
without starting with it, an empty value (Transmission with no RPC auth returns exactly that, and blank
is a real answer), a value containing `=` (splitting on every one would truncate a credential), and a
prefix with no assignment (a script bug — skipped rather than stored as a blank key).
Verified end to end against a real script: environment reaches it, stderr is forwarded (docker compose
writes its progress there, so dropping it would hide most of what a user watches), OFFICER_NONINTERACTIVE
is set so a script that would block fails loudly instead of hanging behind a web form, and a non-zero
exit is reported with the tail.
Notes an artifact rather than hiding it: the two streams are pumped concurrently, so the error tail can
interleave differently from real time. The live log is correctly ordered; only the summary can read out
of order. Serialising the pumps would make a script that writes heavily to one stream block on the other.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Install spans a container start, a health wait, an upstream API call and a process start. Any can fail,
and one of them — a token only a human can mint — is EXPECTED to stop the run. A straight-line function
has two bad options there: unwind everything, or leave a half-installed service that neither works nor
uninstalls, which is the state users cannot get out of.
So each step is named, completion is persisted, and running install again resumes. planSteps is a pure
function of (entry, mode) and the effects are injected, which makes ordering, resume, blocking and
failure testable with no Docker, Postgres, PM2 or Immich in sight. 15 tests cover exactly the behaviour
that only appears when something goes wrong.
Two rules are enforced by the plan rather than remembered at call sites: 'existing' never provisions, so
pointing at an instance the user already runs cannot start a container; and the members step is omitted
entirely for a service with no user concept, so a Transmission install does not report a step that did
nothing — which reads as a silent failure to anyone debugging a member's access.
`blocked` is a first-class outcome, not an error. For Immich the container is up and healthy and only
its own UI can mint a key; calling that a failure would make a normal install look broken and invite the
user to tear down a working container. The blocking step is deliberately NOT recorded as complete, so a
resume re-runs the step the human just answered.
Results feed forward — provision discovers the URL that connect writes down two steps later — over a
copy of the caller's values, so a failure halfway cannot rewrite what an earlier attempt achieved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Disable now stops the container as well as the sidecar. There is no reason to leave Immich holding
memory while Photos is switched off. For mode 'existing' there is no container of ours, so disable is
only the sidecar.
Uninstall stops both, removes the containers, and deletes the install row. It does NOT drop the
sidecar's tables — pushing back on "maybe db schema too" for the same reason volumes are kept, because
it is the same category. Music favourites, the Jellyfin server registry, photos configuration and saved
connections are real data, and someone uninstalling Photos is saying "stop running this", not "forget
which albums I favourited".
Keeping them also makes reinstall a RESTORE: uninstall in June, reinstall in August, and the
configuration is still there. Dropping the schema would hand back a blank service that looks subtly
broken to someone who remembers setting it up. An unused table costs a row in information_schema and
nothing else.
Also removes a line left stale by the previous commit, which still said the user chooses disposal at
uninstall time. There is no such choice any more, and a doc that describes an option the code does not
have is how the option comes back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
There is now no uninstall option that deletes data, rather than a careful one that does. A user
uninstalling a sidecar is saying "stop running this", which is not the same sentence as "delete my photo
library", and for Immich or Jellyfin getting that wrong once is unrecoverable. No confirmation dialog
makes it a good default.
So: `docker compose down` without `-v`. Containers and networks go; the service directory and everything
under it stays exactly as it was.
The bind-mount convention already makes this hard to get wrong, which is worth noting because it means
the safety is structural rather than a rule someone has to keep following. Data lives on the host inside
the service directory, so `-v` — which only removes NAMED volumes — could not delete it even if a future
change added the flag back.
`mode: 'existing'` has no disposal question at all: we did not create that service, so uninstall removes
our sidecar and our rows and touches nothing else.
Reclaiming disk becomes its own feature later, with the sizes in front of the user — "Photos is using
340 GB, delete it?" — as a deliberate act rather than a checkbox inside an uninstall flow.
Removed two stale `down -v` references that survived the first pass, one in the schema comment and one
in the design doc's table. Leftovers like those are how a rule becomes permission again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner installs, but a server may already have members, and a member added next month needs the same
work. So the unit is (service × member) reachable from two triggers — install a service, provision
existing members; add a member, provision installed services — rather than a loop inside the installer.
Only handling the first works on day one and rots.
No new table. A member is provisioned exactly when they hold a service_connections row: their own
credential, url NULL, inheriting the instance from the owner's. That schema anticipated this before this
existed, and a second record of the same fact would only be able to disagree with the first.
Three outcomes, declared per catalogue entry so the installer never special-cases a service. `accounts`
is fully transparent. `none` is a single-tenant daemon with nothing to do — filtered before the
provisioning loop so callers can tell "nothing to do" from "did nothing", which look identical at a call
site and matter when someone is asking why a member cannot see a feature.
`invite` is not a weaker `accounts`, it is the correct outcome: Vaultwarden derives its encryption key
from the master password, so a credential we could mint would mean a vault we could read. Transparent
right up to where being transparent would be a defect.
The per-service work is an interface implemented beside each sidecar rather than a switch in core — a
central function growing a case per service is what would stop any of this shipping from its own
repository. Implementations must be idempotent, since both triggers can fire for the same pair and a
duplicate account upstream is not ours to undo. Deprovision is optional and defaults to leaving the
upstream account alone: deleting an Immich user deletes their photos.
Written assuming the vault's multi-user adaptation has landed. Today /api/vault is owner-only by an
explicit ownerGate, so a member is refused before Vaultwarden is reached — verified, and out of scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each provisionable service gets a directory holding a compose template and a setup.sh. Deliberately the
shape a sidecar needs once it lives in its own repository: metadata, compose, setup script, schema.
The contract (templates/README.md): answers come from the ENVIRONMENT, so the web form fills them in and
a person on a VPS is prompted only for what is missing, and only on a TTY — one script for both, not two
code paths. Idempotent, writes only inside its own directory, streams progress on stdout (the installer
pipes it to a terminal panel), and returns results as OFFICER_RESULT_<KEY>= lines so nothing has to
scrape a log.
House conventions throughout: relative bind mounts so data sits beside the compose file rather than
hiding behind `docker volume inspect`, containers running as the installing user so downloads are not
root-owned, loopback-only ports unless the service's whole job is inbound connections, and no external
networks — the owner's own composes attach to an `nginx` network that a fresh VPS does not have.
Transmission verified end to end on this machine, on non-conflicting ports, then torn down: renders,
starts, waits, reports. Its health check accepts 409 because Transmission rejects the first request by
design — only-200 would have waited out the full timeout against a working daemon. Re-run produced
exactly one container, and files landed owned by the user rather than root.
Vaultwarden covers the case where we GENERATE the credential rather than asking for one. An existing
token is reused, never rotated, because rotating during a resumed install would lock the owner out of
the admin page. The Argon2 hash has its `$` doubled or compose interpolation mangles it. The token is
not returned to the platform at all — the vault sidecar proxies the Bitwarden protocol and never needs
it, and a secret we do not hold is one we cannot leak.
Corrects the design doc, which assumed provisioning always knows the connection. Three shapes: we set
the credential, we generate it, or a human must mint it in the service's UI afterwards (Immich, Jellyfin,
Memos). The third makes "provisioned and running but not yet connected" a real state rather than a
failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An install that discovers a missing dependency halfway through has already made a directory, possibly
started a container and written a row, and then has to unwind — leaving the user with something that
neither works nor uninstalls. A 30ms check first is worth most of that.
Verified while writing this: nothing in scripts/ installs Docker, and nothing checks for it.
setup-dockers.sh invokes `docker compose` with no preflight, so a fresh host without Docker fails
partway through setup with a bare "command not found". Recorded in the design doc rather than fixed
here — the intended fix is a setup.sh per sidecar, which is also what a sidecar needs once it ships from
its own repository.
`docker compose version` is the probe, not `docker --version`: the latter passes with a dead daemon,
which is the failure people actually hit. "Not installed" and "daemon unreachable" are reported
separately because the remedies differ.
Checked per MODE, not per entry. A host without Docker can still install Photos by pointing at an Immich
somewhere else; refusing the whole entry is the over-strict check that makes people work around the
installer instead of using it.
Dropped `requires: 'docker'` from the catalogue type. Needing Docker is exactly "this entry can
provision", which `modes` already says, so declaring it twice invites the two to disagree. Derived by
needsDocker instead, and a test asserts the derivation matches every entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The install layout a machine should have, seasoned owner or not:
~/officerdev/
platform/ the app
data/ DATA_PATH
dockers/ services the app store provisioned
capabilities/ the file-based item store
One root, everything under it. OFFICER_ROOT derives from DATA_PATH rather than being a second variable
that has to agree with the first.
Deliberately not `~/dockers`, where a seasoned user already keeps their own estate — 47 services on this
machine. That separation buys two things. Containers the app store created are distinguishable from the
user's own structurally, rather than by a naming convention we would have to enforce and they could
break. And we never reason about someone else's compose files: the store does not scan, adopt or modify
anything outside its own directory.
That also simplifies "I already have one of these" — it is answered by the user giving a URL, never by
us finding a directory and guessing whose it is. An earlier draft had the installer adopting existing
directories, which meant reading, and potentially writing over, services Officer did not create.
This development machine predates the convention and derives an ugly-but-correct path, since the project
sits inside ~/dockers/officer.dev. Still isolated, still one root. New installs get the clean shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First slice, on a worktree branch so none of it touches the tree the live server runs from.
`sidecar_installs` — server-level, no userId, because a sidecar is one process serving the machine.
That is the line that keeps the model coherent for several users: installed is server-level and
owner-only, configured is per user in service_connections. A member can use Gitea without being able to
install it or point it somewhere else.
`installed` and `enabled` are separate because they answer different questions, which is what gives the
reversible middle ground: disable stops the process and keeps container, config, schema and data.
`completedSteps` makes install resumable rather than merely retryable — the failure mode being designed
against is a half-installed service that neither works nor uninstalls.
The catalogue is data, not code: no functions, no compile-time coupling, because the same shape has to
arrive as JSON from marketplace.officer.dev later. Its test pins it to the real estate — it offers
exactly the processes the light profile excludes, names processes that exist, and claims capabilities
that exist. That last check earned itself immediately: it caught `vault` (no capability at all — it is
EXEMPT because Bitwarden clients carry a Vaultwarden bearer, not a platform JWT) and `notify` (which
does have one, where I had written null).
Docker templates follow the convention already in use across 47 services in ~/dockers: a directory per
service, compose inside, relative bind mounts so data sits beside it, USER_UID/USER_GID as the owner.
An existing directory is evidence of an existing install and must be adopted, never overwritten.
Records what Phase 0 must not foreclose: a remote marketplace, sidecars moving to their own
repositories, and third-party plugins — including the note that catalogue.test.ts pins Phase 0's
invariant rather than the design's, since that relationship inverts once sidecars leave this repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous commit migrated only when SQLite was completely empty, on the assumption that a non-empty
file is an authoritative one. A real account disproved that within minutes of it landing.
The older Gmail backfill had already written SOME keys into SQLite — last_sync_at and the uidvalidity
set — and never the imap_lastuid ones. So the file was non-empty and half-migrated at the same time,
all-or-nothing skipped the migration, and nine imap_lastuid keys stayed only in Postgres. A missing
lastuid makes the next sync refetch that folder from UID 1: on the mailbox this was found on, 18,755
messages and 6.9 GB.
Now merged per key with the file always winning a conflict. That keeps the property all-or-nothing was
protecting — a restored older emails.db still overrides a newer Postgres row for every key it has, so it
cannot be advanced past mail it does not contain — and adds the keys the file never had, which are
exactly the ones whose absence is expensive.
Verified against the live account: all 22 Postgres keys present afterwards, imap_lastuid:INBOX restored
to 208407, and last_sync_at left at the file's older value, so it re-checks a fortnight rather than
skipping it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
I concluded a few commits ago that the serve new /api/session pipeline accepts prompts and
never executes them, and kept turns on opencode run. Wrong. Every probe behind that passed
an explicit model claude-sonnet-4-6, and THAT model silently does not run on the new
surface — no error, no event, no assistant message. Drop the field and the same request
completes.
One broken variable in every experiment, read as a property of the system.
Measured on 1.18.16, both machines upgraded today: delivery steer injects into a running
turn (verified, output changed to order), delivery queue runs after it (verified, ONE then
TWO, zero errors), and model selection works via POST /model — just not with sonnet.
So the fork is reopened and worth taking, targeting the new surface rather than the legacy
message path, which generates fine but has neither steer nor queue. Blocked only on why
sonnet dies there while working under opencode run.
Third time this project has hit the same trap: opencode accepts input it does not honour
and says nothing — directory in the body, location.directory that never existed, now model.
A probe that changes one thing and sees nothing has not learned the feature is missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The messages were in emails.db and the position — last_sync_at, and per-folder uidvalidity/lastuid —
was a jsonb column on email_accounts in Postgres. Two stores for one fact, with an edge that only shows
up when you try to move a mailbox to another machine.
The expensive part of an email account is the first sync: hours of IMAP for a large mailbox, which is
exactly why "copy emails.db to the new server" is the obvious way to bring one across. With the position
in Postgres that silently does not work — the new server's column is empty, !last_sync_at says first
sync, and the whole mailbox downloads again on top of the one just restored.
The other direction is quieter and worse. Restore an OLDER emails.db while Postgres holds a NEWER
position and the sidecar skips every message between the two, permanently, because nothing looks below
lastuid again. Re-syncing is slow; skipping mail is data loss nobody notices.
Not a new idea — the Gmail path already read SQLite and fell back to Postgres, backfilling so the
fallback was taken once. Only the IMAP path had not followed. This extracts that pattern so both use one
copy, and unifies the isFirstSync fork in accounts.ts, which is how the two drifted apart to begin with.
The file wins over Postgres, always, and only migrates when it holds nothing at all. Topping up a
partial position from Postgres would reintroduce precisely the divergence this removes.
email_accounts.sync_meta is kept and marked legacy rather than dropped: it is the one-time backfill
source for every account created before this, and dropping it would strand any that has not synced
since. Nothing writes to it now.
11 tests on the migration, aimed at both expensive failures — migrating when we should not, and failing
to migrate an account that predates the change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The serve has a second, newer API surface nobody here had looked at, and it publishes
exactly what the parity doc calls impossible under stdin ignore: delivery steer and queue
on POST /prompt, an interrupt that does not tear down, and a per-session event stream with
an after cursor — the durable-replay machinery officer hand-built for claude, as a
primitive. That would have made migrating obvious.
It does not execute. A prompt is accepted with an admittedSeq, stored, emits
prompt.admitted and prompted, and then never steps. Ruled out separately: the model, the
permissions (build is *:allow, no pending requests), the per-request location (the surface
is location-scoped via header or a deepObject query, supplied everywhere, no change), and a
config gate. The legacy POST /session/id/message?directory= generates fine in 17s, so the
serve itself works — only the new pipeline is inert. session.next.* is the tell.
And not a version problem, which is the part everything here had backwards: this Mac runs
1.18.11 and alpha runs 1.17.9, measured. The dead pipeline was tested on the NEWER binary.
The original "this server runs 1.17.9" meant alpha and was copied to a machine where it was
false; corrected in runner.ts and the test.
So building against it now would produce code that looks finished and does nothing, which
is the failure mode this project keeps rediscovering. One request reopens the question
after any upgrade, and the doc names it.
Also de-flakes the lifecycle tests: they spawn real processes, and a fixed sleep(750) went
red once on a machine busy running these probes. Presence assertions poll now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
They were permanently unnamed, and the two halves needed to name them already existed on
officer: the sidecar reports its own sessionKey because that is all it has, while the ses_ id
arrives separately over opencode:session and is recorded in opencode/state.ts. Nothing joined
them. /chat/live joins them now, so no protocol or sidecar change — widening
LiveOpenCodeSession would have meant sending the sidecar a fact it told officer in the first
place.
One list call names every row rather than one transcript load each, and it is skipped when
nothing is running or no id has been reported, so an idle Live panel never touches the serve.
Verified against a real turn, which also showed the design working as intended: the first
poll has no id yet and shows nothing, the next shows title and cwd. That window is real and
short, and showing nothing beats showing a key the user has never seen.
Worth knowing: opencode titles its own sessions "New session - <ISO timestamp>", so the row
is located but not meaningfully named. That is genuinely its title, not a bug here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
B8 done, so every defect that made opencode behave wrongly is fixed. Notes what that does
not mean: bucket 1 is capability gaps, and the visible ones are downstream of the phase 2
fork, which is still unstarted and still Andre to call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
B8, both halves. They share index.ts, so they share a commit.
In-flight turns: `opencode run` is spawned, not supervised, so pm2 restart officer-opencode
left every turn ALIVE — reparented, still spending tokens, still writing files as the agent,
with the only reader of its stdout gone. The transcript stopped mid-tool-call, which reads
as the agent hanging.
stopAllOpenCodeTurns kills them and settles each synchronously, because the caller is about
to process.exit and nothing waiting on proc.exited would ever run. Settling writes a reason,
so a reload after a restart explains itself instead of trailing off. Turns are stopped BEFORE
the connection is destroyed — that write travels over it — and the flush is bounded, since
losing the explanation is bad but hanging the restart is worse.
Stale serves: the sweep read /proc, so it was a no-op on macOS and orphaned serves piled up,
one per unclean exit, each holding a port. Added a pidfile sweep alongside it. A pid we wrote
ourselves needs no cwd guard to prove it is ours, which is the part ps cannot answer portably
(macOS would need lsof), and a serve started by hand is never in the file.
The guard checks command AND subcommand: matching the word serve anywhere in the line would
sweep a running turn whose prompt merely mentioned it. Fixtures are real ps output from both
machines, not invented. Split into serve-sweep.ts because index.ts spawns a serve at module
scope, so a test importing it would start one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bucket-0 table had no status anywhere; it lived in the report docs, which means the
list itself still reads as eight open defects. Says B1-B7 are done and where.
Also corrects B7 in place: the table describes the spurious cut-off only, and the same
default was mis-adopting the session into the wrong harness entirely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
B7. `msg.model || DEFAULT_MODEL` declared every session without an explicit model to be
claude-code, and the parity doc recorded only the visible half of what that cost.
The durable false cut-off is real: endTurnIfAgentIsGone asked the claude sidecar about a
key it had never held, was told false, and wrote "the agent went away" into a turn that
was running fine. It survives reload, because surviving reload is what that row is for.
The same default also handed the session to adoptOrphanedSession as a claude one, which
subscribes it to that sidecar bus and pins session.model — so an opencode turn output
never arrived, and stopping it called killClaude on a key that sidecar never had. A stop
button that silently does nothing.
decideResume makes both rules explicit: the server record beats the client claim, and an
unknown harness stays unknown — no adoption, no cut-off check, just the replay. Silence
is the safe failure when the wrong answer is written durably.
DEFAULT_MODEL stays in handleAttach and is now commented as to why: that path reached its
sessionId by asking the claude sidecar to resolve a claudeSessionId, so only claude could
have answered.
First test in api/chat, which had none. websocket.ts has no seam to drive the handler
through, so the decision is extracted and tested; the wiring around it is not covered.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agreed in conversation, nothing implemented. Light stops being a variant and becomes the baseline —
chat, terminal, file browser — and the other fourteen sidecars arrive by the user asking for them from
an app store, eventually including sidecars the user did not write.
Mostly not a rewrite, for three reasons already true: every API route stays mounted regardless of which
sidecars run, officer already spawns nothing, and service_connections already solves the multi-user
case. What is new is provisioning, per-sidecar schema, and persisted install state.
Docker: officer is the installer, never the owner. Real compose files in the user's own directory,
started as him, found again by label. `docker compose down` works, and the containers outlive Officer.
Per-sidecar schema is right here specifically because third-party plugins are a real goal, and the
dependency graph makes it tractable: measured across 19 schema files, every sidecar depends on auth.ts
and nothing else, with no sidecar-to-sidecar edges anywhere. So the plugin contract is "you may
reference users.id" — which also makes full uninstall well-defined, since nothing else points at a
plugin's tables.
service_connections stays core and shared rather than per-service, because it already does the part
nobody would get right alone: a NULL url means "inherit the instance", so the owner's row is the
instance and members hold only their own credential, making "members never see the instance URL" a
property of the schema instead of a filter someone has to remember.
Records six open questions rather than settling them, including plugin migrations, ID namespacing for a
marketplace, and where plugin-specific config lives.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The review was written as a handover; it became a fixed tree instead. Records what
landed, including the two leaks that only showed up while fixing it, and leaves the
original reasoning untouched so it still reads as the argument it was.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two comments describing behaviour the code does not have.
LiveOpenCodeSession had been inserted between LiveClaudeSession and its docblock, so a
comment about isGenerating, pendingTasks and the idle GC read as documentation for the
OpenCode type — where it is contradicted by the correct comment directly beneath it.
Moved below, and it now states that it carries no ses_ id.
That absence is the point: /chat/live claimed title and cwd come from the session store
"so a turn whose id has not been reported yet shows unnamed". Nothing is looked up, and
there is no id here to look one up with. They are null permanently, not until-known.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A replaced turn is killed but dies asynchronously, so its proc.exited fired long after
the replacement was registered under the same sessionKey — and then ran the whole
completion path against it: emitted "OpenCode exited with code 143", which the sidecar
commits to chat_session_events so a false failure became permanent history, then deleted
the replacement from `running`. That blinded the new Live panel, made the stop button a
no-op and orphaned a process nothing could reach.
Mark the handle before killing it, retire it silently, and identity-check the delete —
a superseded turn does not own that key any more.
Two leaks in the same family, found while fixing it. An early return would not have been
enough: both watchdogs call finish, so the armed 10-minute hardTimer would have fired an
error at whichever turn held the key by then. And handleLine had no `done` guard, so
stdout still draining from the killed process was emitted under the replacement key.
Reproduced before fixing. The lifecycle tests need no real opencode — RunnerConfig.bin
takes a shell script that sleeps. The control test pins that an ordinary non-zero exit
still reports an error, so the guard cannot overreach.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`ecosystem.light.config.cjs` did not mention officer-gitea, so `defineProfile` threw while the file was
being loaded and pm2 could start NOTHING from it — not the app, not the agent, not the terminal. The
profile has been dead on arrival since gitea was added to ecosystem.config.cjs and to the mac profile
but not to this one.
That is the drift check doing its job rather than a flaw in it: the alternative is a light install that
silently starts less than it claims. The cost is that adding a sidecar breaks every profile until each
one classifies it, which is the trade the file already documents.
Included rather than excluded, matching the mac profile's reasoning: this sidecar fronts a REMOTE Gitea
whose URL and token live in `service_connections`, so it installs nothing locally. That is the line
between it and the excluded sidecars, which supervise a local daemon or container.
Both light profiles now load and contain the same six processes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 accepted and phase 2 answered well. One real defect: the supersede path in
runOpenCodeTurn kills a stale turn without marking it, so the dead process late-fires
finish() against the turn that replaced it — committing a false "OpenCode exited" to
chat_session_events, deleting the live handle from `running`, killing the stop button
and orphaning the process.
Predates this pass; reported now because e8bd946 is what made the map load-bearing.
Reproduced with a stub binary rather than argued — the transcript is in the doc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Investigation notes, written as they were gathered rather than after the fact. No code changes.
Covers how a sidecar comes into existence: PM2 peer, dials in to /api/sidecar/register, reports an
ephemeral port, officer proxies to it. Officer spawns nothing — the only startup problem left is
ordering, handled by waiting on a capability rather than failing the first request.
The finding worth having: `sidecar/claude/` is TWO processes, and they register as different sidecars.
`claude/index.ts` is officer-anthropic-proxy and registers capability `proxy`; `claude/user-instance.ts`
is officer-agent and registers capability `claude`. So `isConnected()` — defined as "a sidecar with
capability proxy exists" — means the Anthropic proxy is up, not the agent, which is not what the name
suggests. It has no callers today, so nothing is misreading it yet.
Marks what is unverified and what is still open rather than presenting the lot as settled: the
bind-read-release race in getFreePort, whether the `PORT ?? 5000` fallback is reachable, what a partial
boot looks like, and whether the sidecar-side boilerplate is worth factoring the way create-proxy.ts
factored officer's side.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implementation report for whoever wrote opencode-parity.md and opencode-phase0-review.md: what landed,
the three places the specs were wrong and how the reproduce-first rule caught each, the three places I
deliberately did not follow them, and what is unverified.
Phase 2's blocking question is answered in full — the serve takes a per-request `?directory=`, so the
coupling is gone in both architectures. The migration is not started; that decision is framed in
opencode-serve-path.md and left open.
Flags `opencode:list` as the one new capability whose happy path is unproven, and B7 as newly more
masked: the B2 fix makes the client send `model` more reliably, which hides the spurious cut-off rather
than removing it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Live panel asked `claude:list` and nothing else, so a running OpenCode turn was invisible — the panel
claimed to show what the agent is doing and silently omitted half of it.
Adds `opencode:list` / `opencode:sessions` and merges both harnesses in `/chat/live`, asked in parallel,
each failing toward empty so one sidecar being down contributes nothing rather than breaking the panel.
The OpenCode row is deliberately thinner than the Claude one rather than faked into parity:
isGenerating always true — a subprocess exists only while it generates, so there is no "merely open"
pendingTasks always 0 — `opencode run` has no background-task concept; reporting a number would
suggest a capability that does not exist
title / cwd null — the session store is keyed on the `ses_…` id the runner reports, not on
our sessionKey, so an unreported turn shows unnamed rather than guessed
This is the incremental option from docs/opencode-serve-path.md — enumeration without moving turns onto
the serve, so it buys the Live panel with no warm sessions, no SSE loop and no lifetime questions.
NOT verified end to end: no OpenCode turn was running to enumerate, so the verb is wired and typechecked
but has never returned a non-empty list. See COMMS/BLOCKERS.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Path names: the serve's cwd is DATA_PATH/opencode_server, not opencode-sidecar. Two comments said
otherwise and would send the next reader to a directory that does not exist.
Version pin: the comment claimed "verified live against 1.17.9" as though that were a property of the
code. It is a property of whichever binary is installed, and this project already runs two — 1.17.9 here,
1.18.11 on the other machine. Says so now, and points at the test as the thing that actually enforces it.
Tests, the first on the OpenCode path. `runner.ts`'s NDJSON → ChatEvent mapping was described as pure and
untested; it was untested but not pure — it lived inside `handleLine` as a closure over `emit`, the
accumulated cost and a reported-session flag, so it could not be called without spawning a binary.
Extracted as `mapRunLine`, genuinely pure: line in, {sessionId, events, costDelta} out. The two concerns
that span lines stay with the caller, because they are not properties of a line — emitting the session id
exactly once, and accumulating cost across steps. Behaviour is unchanged.
11 tests over what the mapping forwards, what it drops and what it must not turn into NaN. The last one
matters: a missing `cost` on a step_finish would otherwise propagate NaN into the turn total.
Phase 1 is complete: dead code deleted (previous commit), comments corrected, tests added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 item 7, done in the order the parity doc asks: read the dead design into a note, then delete it.
`docs/opencode-serve-path.md` records what `event-mapper.ts` and the SSE half of `client.ts` did, and
what a rebuild would want back from them — the delta model and tool-state transitions, which are exactly
parity Phase 3's token streaming rather than new work.
Deleted: `event-mapper.ts` entirely, and `subscribe`/the shared `GET /event` SSE loop, `createSession`,
`postMessage`, `abort` from the client, plus `isServerHealthy` from server-manager. All had no callers.
`client.ts` goes 200-odd lines to 99. What stays is the REST reads the chat list and transcript use:
listSessions, getSession, getMessages, deleteSession, renameSession.
While in there, Phase 2's blocking question turned out to be cheap to settle, so it is answered rather
than left open. The review asked whether the serve can take a per-request directory, since without one a
serve-based turn path would reintroduce the single-directory coupling that shelved this work:
POST /session?directory=/tmp/oc-phase2-probe -> directory: "/tmp/oc-phase2-probe" honoured
POST /session with directory in the BODY -> directory: "<serve cwd>" ignored
It is a query parameter on every /session* route. So the coupling is gone on both architectures and the
blocker is cleared. The note does NOT start the migration: which of the three options to take is a
product call, and it lays them out rather than presuming one.
The first probe put `directory` in the body and appeared to prove the opposite. Recorded in the note,
because it is the obvious way to test this and it gives a confident wrong answer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sidecar seeded an AGENTS.md into the serve's project root telling the agent to read its working
directory from the "Working directory for this session" line in its system prompt. The run path sends no
system prompt, so there was no such line and the instruction had been inert since turns moved off the
serve to `opencode run --dir`.
What it was standing in for, `--dir` does properly — tested rather than assumed
(docs/opencode-phase0-review.md): `--dir` anchors the agent's own file operations, not just the process
cwd, and the anchor survives a multi-step turn with a write in the middle. Nothing replaces it.
The generated file is removed from disk too, not only from the code that wrote it; leaving it would have
kept feeding standing instructions to every session while looking, in the source, as though it were gone.
Also corrects the claim that all OpenCode sessions live in one server's project. True when turns
inherited the serve's directory, false now: one serve lists 7 sessions across several directories, which
is why the cwd filter has to read `directory` rather than assume a single one.
docs/opencode-phase0-review.md, item 2 — Phase 1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Regression from the fold change. Scroll-up paging is driven by a scroll listener, and a scroll listener
only fires on a list that actually scrolls. That was always true and never mattered, because the turn you
were looking at rendered in full and was tall enough on its own.
Folding on reload broke it. A window of twenty messages can be one turn with eighteen tool calls, which
collapses to three short rows: no overflow, no scroll event, and paging never starts. The whole
transcript above becomes unreachable — which reads as lost history rather than as a fetch that never
fired.
So don't wait for a scroll that cannot happen: after each render, if there is more to load and the
content does not overflow its viewport, load the next page. Terminates because each pass either fills the
viewport or exhausts the transcript.
This also fixes a latent case that predates folding — any first window short enough to fit on screen
could never be paged past.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reopened B4. Flipping `images: false` for OpenCode models made the metadata honest but changed nothing
on screen, because no code read the capability: the drop zone, the paste handler and the attach menu all
accepted images on every harness. The lie B4 described — drop a screenshot, watch it render in your own
bubble, have it discarded before the model sees it — was still there.
The flag is now load-bearing. Three entry points gated on `supportsImages`:
- the drop zone does not claim the drag at all (no highlight, no preventDefault), so the browser keeps
it rather than the composer swallowing a file it will drop on the floor
- an image paste falls through to the default
- the attach menu's Image entry is absent
`selectedModel || model` mirrors ModelSelector's `displayModel`, so the gate and the model name on screen
can never disagree. An unknown model allows images: a missing capability should not remove a working
control, and the flag is only false where we know it is false. Nothing to undo when images are plumbed
through OpenCodeRunParams later — the gate stops firing once the capability is true.
docs/opencode-phase0-review.md, item 1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 0 accepted except B4, which is reopened: flipping images to false made the metadata honest but
nothing reads that capability, so the composer still accepts a drop and the image is still discarded
before the model sees it. The defect described a user-visible lie and the lie is unchanged. Gate the
composer on the flag, or plumb images through — the first is the Phase 0 one-liner.
The cwd question is answered empirically rather than argued. Against opencode 1.18.11: --dir anchors the
agent's file operations, not just the process cwd, and the anchor survives a four-step turn with a write
in the middle. So the single-server constraint that shelved this work is already gone — it went away when
turns moved off the serve to `opencode run --dir`.
Two consequences. Per-directory servers are unnecessary; don't build them. And the injected AGENTS.md
telling the agent its working directory is safe to delete — it points at a system prompt the run path
never sends, and --dir does the job it was standing in for.
Phase 2's fork also narrows: moving turns onto the serve would reintroduce the original coupling unless
the serve takes a per-request directory, so that is the question to answer, not why it was replaced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three defects and one honest removal. Each was reproduced before being changed, as the doc asks.
B4 — images were offered and silently discarded. Every OpenCode model advertised `images: true`, the
composer gates on that flag, the bubble rendered the attachment, and `handleOpenCodeChat`'s message type
has no `images` field, so it never left officer. Flipped to false: 61 OpenCode models now decline, the
three Claude ones still accept. Plumbing them through OpenCodeRunParams stays Phase 4; advertising a
capability that does not exist is the part worth fixing today.
B5 — every OpenCode turn overwrote the previous turn's subscription handle without detaching it, so the
old session-scoped listener stayed attached and delivery doubled, tripled, and so on for any termination
that is not result/error/stopped. Deliberately NOT the Claude guard: Claude keeps one persistent session
and skips re-subscribing, while OpenCode spawns a fresh `opencode run` per turn, so a new subscription
each time is correct — detaching the old one is what was missing.
B6 — the sessionKey → `ses_…` map had no writer of deletions, so it grew for the process lifetime and a
reused key resumed a stale OpenCode session. Cleared in `deleteSession` only, never in `releaseSession`:
releasing means "let go, leave it running", and a returning browser must find the same `ses_…` again.
Phase 0 item 1 — the thinking toggle is removed rather than fixed. `thinking` is accepted on the wire
and forwarded by neither channel, so the control changed its own label and nothing else. Out of scope
for both harnesses by decision. The inert plumbing beneath it is left for a follow-up that touches the
socket contract; the props stay accepted-and-unread so no call site had to change.
Phase 0 is complete: B1, B2, B3 landed earlier; B4, B5, B6 and the selector here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
22bcd7d fixed both, and found the fix this document suggested was written against a field that does not
exist: opencode 1.17.9 returns `directory` at the top level, not `location.directory`, and sends no
`metadata` at all. The type declared two fields the server never returns, which is the single cause of
both defects.
Worth recording rather than quietly editing, because it generalises: the surveys behind this document
read types and call sites, not a running server, so every field name in it is a hypothesis. The
'check the installed version first' warning was the load-bearing part of the handover, not boilerplate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resuming an OpenCode conversation dispatched it to the Claude CLI: a `ses_…` id handed to
`claude --resume`. Wrong harness, not degraded output.
The whole six-hop chain, confirmed rather than inferred, because the endpoints alone do not show which
hop drops the value:
/chat/:id fetches detail and sets `selected.model` = `opencode/big-pickle` ← the value exists
ChatDetailPanel renders <NewChat …> without a `model` prop ← dropped here
NewChat reads `initialModel={locationState?.model}` ← unrelated source
nothing in the tree ever writes `location.state.model` ← so always undefined
useChat therefore holds no model and the socket sends none
websocket.ts falls back to the user default, `isClaudeModel` is true
So the model was resolved correctly at the top and read from somewhere else at the bottom. `selected`
has carried `model` all along.
`locationState.model` stays as a fallback rather than being deleted: it is declared on
ChatLocationState and costs nothing to keep for a caller that navigates with one deliberately.
docs/opencode-parity.md B2, which flagged this as the one to verify hop by hop. Its account is accurate;
the added detail is that the value is produced and then dropped, not never produced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two defects, one cause: the session type declared two fields opencode 1.17.9 does not return.
`GET /session` returns `directory` at the top level. There is no `location` object and no `metadata`.
Re-verified by reading the live server rather than the type.
So `metadata.officer.cwd` was compared against `undefined` for every session and the list filter matched
nothing — and since `cwdOf` substitutes a default when no `?cwd=` is given, the `!cwd` escape never fired
either. There was no configuration in which an OpenCode session appeared in /chat. Confirmed against the
running server: 7 sessions present, 0 returned, and the `OpenCode` badge in SessionList was unreachable
code. Now 1 of 7 is listed under the default chat dir, the other 6 correctly filtered to their own
directories.
And `location?.directory ?? ''` was likewise always '', so resuming a session reported no cwd and
relocated the conversation to the default chat dir — which matters because OpenCode rebuilds its
working-directory system prompt every turn. Detail now reads the session's own record via a new
`getSession`, alongside the transcript.
`officerMeta` and the `metadata` tag are gone rather than fixed: the only writer of that tag
(`client.createSession`) has no callers, because the sidecar creates sessions with `opencode run --dir`.
Tagging would have been a second source of truth for something `directory` already answers.
docs/opencode-parity.md B1 and B3. Its suggested fix — derive from `location.directory` — was written
against a field that does not exist; the doc asked for the version to be checked first, and this is why.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`label ?? override ?? route` made a typed tab name permanent. That is right for navigation — you named
the window to find it again — and wrong the moment you rename the conversation itself: the tab kept the
old name, and kept it across reloads, because the stale one is in sessionStorage. The rename looked like
it had failed.
Both are deliberate acts, so the newer wins. The hard part is telling a rename from ordinary navigation:
from the outside, "same conversation, new title" and "different conversation, different title" are the
same event — a changed override. Clearing the tab name on any change would have wiped it every time you
clicked a chat.
So the override now carries the id of the thing it names. Same id with a new title is a rename and drops
the tab name; a new id is navigation and leaves it alone.
The alternative was to have the panel clear the label directly, which needs a QueryClient dragged across
the workspace boundary the bridge exists to avoid — the shell owns the tab name, so the shell decides
when to drop it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phases 0 and 1 only, phase 2 is a decision, and open /chat first to confirm B1 before trusting the rest.
All of it was already in the document, near the end, which is not where someone handed a file starts
reading.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phases 0 and 1 are implementable as written; phase 2 is a decision and should not be handed over as
work. More importantly: reproduce each defect before fixing it. The B-list came from read-only surveys
and only the event-path claim was re-verified at source — one of those surveys reasoned from a dead file
for part of its report, so a confident inventory here is not the same as a checked one.
B1 is the cheap provenance test: open /chat and look. Either no OpenCode session is listed, which
confirms the survey was reading the current tree, or one is, and the whole list needs re-checking.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three read-only surveys — the Claude sidecar as the reference, the OpenCode sidecar as it stands, and
every officer/frontend branch on harness. No code changed.
The headline is not a missing feature. OpenCode sessions never appear in the chat list at all: the list
filters on `metadata.officer.cwd`, and the only writer of that tag has zero callers, because sessions are
created by `opencode run --dir` rather than the API that would tag them. Resuming one is worse — the
model is dropped between the resolver and the chat hook, so a `ses_…` id reaches `claude --resume`. That
is wrong-harness dispatch, not degradation. Eight such defects are catalogued before any parity work.
Everything else hangs off one decision: OpenCode turns are a one-shot subprocess with `stdin: 'ignore'`,
while Claude turns live inside a persistent streaming session. Token streaming, mid-turn injection,
background tasks, live-session enumeration and reattach-by-id are all downstream of that, and the serve
that could support them is already running and used only for CRUD. The doc refuses to plan past that
fork until someone establishes why the serve-based turn path was replaced.
Four buckets rather than one list: broken now, Claude-has-it, neither-has-it, and what OpenCode has that
Claude does not — the last because it is what disappears in a project framed as catching up.
Thinking is out of scope for both harnesses by decision, and the selector is hidden rather than
implemented: it renders today and does nothing on either path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An upload over a few MB came back as a 400 with an empty body, no message anywhere, and nothing logged
by Immich, the sidecar or officer. It was a race, not a size limit. Immich judges an asset from its
first few KB and rejects immediately, then closes; both our hops were still writing the body; Node
treats the leftover bytes as a protocol violation and replaces the application's answer with a bodyless
`400 Bad Request` + `Connection: close`. The real message never reached the wire.
Measured before the change: streamed lost the message 1/4 at 8 MB and 4/4 at 32 MB — probability rising
with size, which is why small photos usually worked and a phone's video never did.
Both hops needed it. Fixing only the sidecar took 32 MB from 4/4 failing to 2/4, because the platform
proxy was losing it one hop up.
Bounded at 512 MB, above which the body streams exactly as before. That ceiling is not a refusal and is
deliberately not a 413: a file Immich ACCEPTS is read to the end and never races, so a 4 GB video is
unaffected. All that is given up above the cap is the error message on a file that was going to be
rejected anyway. A first attempt refused over-cap uploads outright and would have broken the working
4 GB case to improve diagnosis of the doomed one.
`bufferRequestBody` is opt-in and off by default: the vault and wallet proxies must keep streaming so a
passphrase or macaroon never lands in the platform's heap.
Also adds the proxy error logging that made this findable at all — status and two byte counts from
headers, never the bodies. `responseBytes: "unknown"` is what exposed the stripped response.
Verified live at 32/256 MB (buffered) and 640 MB (streamed, passes through).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sending a message used to collapse the turn above it, live, while you were still reading it. Watching
your own conversation fold up under you as you typed the next message is worse than the scrolling it
saved.
Folding now keys off `historicalCount` — how many messages at the front of the list came from the server
rather than from this sitting. Nothing collapses while you are watching, however many turns you send;
reload, and all of it has become history and folds at once, which is where the grouping actually earns
its place.
A count rather than a set of ids because everything historical is contiguous and at the front: the
preload seeds it, paging older messages prepends to it, live turns append past it, and a resume replaces
the list with a transcript that is history in its entirety.
Two consequences worth stating rather than discovering.
The last turn is no longer exempt. It used to be excluded from folding for being the live one by
definition; now it is an ordinary turn, so a reloaded conversation folds its final turn too — except
while it is still generating, since hiding work as it arrives is the exact thing being undone.
And folding is no longer a pure derivation over the message list, so a reload does NOT render identically
to a live session. That property was deliberate and is deliberately given up; it is the feature. The
state it costs is one number in useChat, never on the wire and never on disk.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agent's input is a streaming iterable, and a message pushed onto it mid-turn is picked up at the
next step boundary — the running turn reads it and carries on with the added context. Verified rather
than assumed: a probe pushed a sentinel four seconds into a turn busy with `sleep` calls, and that
turn's own final answer quoted the late instruction and obeyed it. One turn, one result, nothing
interrupted.
So the design this was heading for — stop the turn, then re-send the message wrapped in "please
continue, but…" — is not needed. Nothing is abandoned mid-flight, no tool call dies half-applied, and
the agent is never told to stop something it was part-way through.
Enter on an empty composer delivers the queue now instead of waiting for the turn to end. That keystroke
was free: handleSend has always returned immediately on empty input. The queue still fills and still
shows as it did, so the default behaviour is unchanged — this is the impatient path, not a replacement.
Officer needed nothing: handleChat already pushes onto the live session rather than opening a new one
whenever `_claudeKill` is set, which is exactly the injection. The only thing in the way was the
client's own refusal to send while generating.
The affordance is stated above the queue because the keystroke is otherwise undiscoverable — Enter on an
empty box has never done anything, so nobody would try it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The file-browser API does not filter them — readdir returns everything — so browsing for a working
directory opened onto .cache, .local, .npm and thirty more before anything worth picking.
Hidden by default, one toggle in the footer to reveal, and shown dimmed when revealed so they read as a
different class of thing. The count sits on the toggle and the empty state names it too: a folder
holding only dot-directories used to say 'No subfolders here', which is a lie with no way to notice it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every live row read 'Starting…' and linked nowhere, because the title lookup searched for a transcript
named after the session KEY. It isn't. The key is officer's handle for a conversation; the transcript is
named after Claude's own session id, and the mapping between them exists only inside the agent
(setClaudeSession/getClaudeSession). I assumed the two were the same and never checked — confirmed wrong
by looking for the ids from the officer log under ~/.claude/projects and finding nothing.
claude:list now reports claudeSessionId beside the key, the route resolves titles by that, and rows link
to it. Null means the first turn has not reported one yet, which is a genuinely unwritten conversation
and stays unlinked.
Needs the agent sidecar restarted to take effect — the new field comes from there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The titles were looked up client-side against the sessions query already in cache, which only covers the
group being browsed — so anything running in another directory rendered as a truncated uuid, which is
most of them.
Resolved server-side now. The agent reports keys and nothing else, so liveSessionTitle finds the
transcript by scanning the project slugs, takes the cwd off its own first entry, and hands that to
claudeSessionContext — the same path the list uses, so the two agree on naming, /clear chains merged
included, rather than offering a second opinion.
A null title means no transcript has been written yet. That row says 'Starting…' and is deliberately not
a link: pointing at a session you cannot open yet is worse than plainly not being a link.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous commit added it to defaultLayout, which anyone who has ever opened /chat never sees:
useDashboardState seeds its default only when the key is ABSENT, so a stored layout keeps the shape it
had when it was first written. appTypes/normalizeLayout does not cover this — it repairs which app a
panel runs, never the tree — so the change was visible only on a fresh account. It was shipped with a
note to reset the layout by hand, which is not a fix.
The screen now replaces a layout with no chat-live panel. Replacing outright is safe here specifically
because the screen is locked: the structure is dictated by code, and the only user contribution is
column sizes. Terminates because the replacement contains the panel it tests for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The /chat sidebar is now a vertical split: live sessions on top, the transcript list below. They look
similar and answer completely different questions — the list reads conversations from disk, thousands of
them, while this reads the agent's in-memory map over `claude:list`. Only the second can tell you a
conversation is still working while nothing is on screen, which is exactly the state that has been
invisible: after a `pm2 restart officer`, or from a browser that has never seen the session, officer has
no record of a live turn and only the agent can say.
`pendingTasks` is surfaced per row because it is the load-bearing number. It is what keeps a session
alive with nothing on screen, and what makes restarting the agent sidecar unsafe at that moment.
Polled at 10s rather than pushed: liveness changes without officer being told — a turn ends, a
background task reports — so there is no single event to subscribe to. The request is one map read.
Titles come from the sessions query already in cache, so they cost nothing, but that query only covers
the group being browsed and a live session can be in any of them. Unmatched rows show a short key rather
than inventing a name, and an unsaved chat renders unlinked rather than pointing at a transcript that
does not exist yet.
Closes the UI half of step 2 in docs/chat-session-lifetime.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
resolveOwner already retried forever — but only when the query SUCCEEDED and returned nothing, which is
a fresh install waiting on bootstrap. A query that THREW escaped the function, rejected the top-level
await and exited the process, into exactly the PM2 restart loop its own comment says it exists to avoid.
So any Postgres restart (57P03 'the database system is starting up') or moment of unavailability killed
every live agent session on the machine and spun the sidecar until the database answered.
That is what took a session down on 2026-08-10, and why this process showed 468 restarts against 0 for
every peer that starts without needing the database.
The loop now catches as well as checks. Still retries forever, matching the case beside it: a database
coming back is a matter of time, and an agent that gave up would need a human to notice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS dropped to 30s, a background ticker started, the tab closed. Officer logged the release
thirty seconds later and the job ticked straight through it — the exact point where deleteSession used
to call _claudeKill. Constant reverted.
Also worth writing down: restarting officer does not test this. The process dies outright and
releaseSession never runs, so that only exercises adoptOrphanedSession, which already worked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer's session records are in memory and die with `pm2 restart officer`, while the agent is a PM2
peer and keeps generating. `adoptOrphanedSession` rebuilds a binding — but only when a browser
reconnects to a session *by id*, which you can only do if you already knew the id. So a session that
survived a restart was invisible, and nothing could answer "what is running right now".
`claude:list` returns each live session with `isGenerating` and `pendingTasks` — the same two fields the
agent's own `armIdle` consults before collecting a session, so a caller can tell "busy" from "merely
open" the way it does. Surfaced as `GET /chat/live`, which sits beside `/chat/sessions`: those are
transcripts on disk, these are the ones with a process behind them.
`getActiveSessionKeys` is replaced rather than joined. It returned bare keys, could not distinguish a
session mid-turn from one merely open, and had never been called by anything.
`listLiveClaudeSessions` fails toward EMPTY, where `isClaudeGenerating` beside it fails toward alive.
The asymmetry is deliberate: not knowing there means leaving a spinner up, and not knowing here would
mean inventing sessions.
Step 2 of docs/chat-session-lifetime.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer's hour-long idle timer was doing two unrelated jobs: collecting its own in-memory binding, which
is its business, and terminating the agent, which is the sidecar's. It could not do the first without
the second, because `unsub` was a closure reachable only through `kill`.
So a browser that went away killed a live agent an hour later — including one the sidecar had
deliberately protected. The sidecar already refuses to collect a session that is mid-turn or holding
background tasks: `task:started` disarms its idle GC, and `armIdle` re-checks and re-arms rather than
firing once. Officer had no view of any of that. A laptop running out of battery overnight took a
`run_in_background` job with it for no reason.
`detach` now sits beside `kill` on both streaming handles, and `_sidecarUnsub` — declared and called for
a long time, never once assigned — is populated at all three sites. `releaseSession` unsubscribes and
forgets the record without killing; the idle timer points at it. `deleteSession` is unchanged, so an
explicit disconnect still ends the session.
The third assignment site was not in the plan: `adoptOrphanedSession` sets `_claudeKill` but nothing
else, so an adopted session that later idled out would have dropped its record while the listener stayed
subscribed — a leak of one per adopt-then-leave.
No double subscription: releasing unsubscribes first, so a returning browser either adopts with a fresh
listener or starts a first turn with none behind it.
Step 1 of docs/chat-session-lifetime.md. Step 2 (a list verb, so running sessions can be found after a
restart) is still open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Investigation only, no code. The sidecar already protects sessions with background work in flight
(pendingTasks disarms its idle GC); officer's hour-long timer knows nothing about that and kills them
anyway, and does not survive its own restart. Plan is to have officer release its binding instead of
killing, and to add a list verb so running sessions can be found after a restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The whole composer bar is the target, not just the textarea — a screenshot dragged out of the macOS
corner thumbnail is a small thing to aim with, and the bar is the biggest thing near where the cursor
already is. Paste already worked; this is the same attach path.
Three details, each of which breaks the drop silently if missed. `preventDefault` on dragover, or the
browser refuses the drop, never fires onDrop, and navigates to the file instead — taking whatever was
typed with it. A depth counter rather than a boolean, because dragenter/dragleave fire for every child
crossed and the highlight strobes as you move over the textarea. And only claiming drags that carry
files, so dragging selected text across the composer neither lights it up nor swallows the drop.
Non-image files in the same drag are ignored quietly: refusing the PDF among them with a toast would be
noise when the three screenshots you meant went in fine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Queued prompts are almost always one thought arriving in pieces — a correction, then the thing you
forgot. Answering them one turn at a time made the agent reply to the first without knowing the second
existed, then re-answer once it did. Joined with a blank line between, in the order written, which is
how they read anyway.
The tray is unchanged: they stay separate rows, each removable right up until they go. What merges is
the delivery, not the queue.
Only a lone prompt can still be a slash command. Joined to anything else it is text that happens to
start with a slash, and running it as a command would silently drop everything queued behind it. The
drain now takes the whole queue at once, so it loops twice at most — again only if the batch was a
handled command and something arrived while it ran.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Send no longer refuses mid-turn. The prompt goes into a queue, and each turn's completion delivers the
next — one per turn, which is the whole drain loop. A slash command the client handles itself never
starts a turn, so delivery reports whether it did and the drain keeps going rather than waiting for a
completion that will not come.
Attachments are captured when the prompt is composed, not when it is delivered, so a queued message
keeps the files it was written with instead of picking up whatever is in the tray when its turn arrives.
The composer empties on queue as it does on send — a box that stayed full would read as "it didn't
take", and you would send it twice.
The send button turns amber with a different icon to say the press will not go anywhere yet, and sits
BESIDE stop rather than replacing it: typing a follow-up should not cost you the ability to interrupt.
A tray above the composer lists what is waiting, each item removable — without it a queued prompt is
invisible until its turn, which looks exactly like having lost it.
Stop clears the queue. Ending a turn is precisely the signal the drain waits for, so leaving it alone
fired the next prompt the instant you pressed the button meant to halt things. Nothing is lost: a queued
prompt was recorded in the prompt history when it was written, so Up brings it back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shell-style. Up walks back, Down walks forward, and past the newest is the draft you were composing when
you left — stashed on the way in, because losing what you had typed to the key pressed to get back to it
would be the worst version of this.
Up only takes the key from the FIRST line and Down from the last. In a multi-line draft there is a line
to move to, and swallowing the arrow would strand the caret; on the edge there is nowhere to go, which is
exactly when history is what was meant. An empty list, or already at the oldest, leaves the key alone too.
Per tab and shared by every chat in it, in sessionStorage. The prompt most worth reaching for is often
one sent somewhere else — re-asking in a fresh chat, or in the other panel — and scoping it per session
would empty the history exactly when a new chat makes it most useful. Slash commands count; they are
prompts you sent.
The tests caught a real one: `record` wrote state while `step` read a ref that only refreshed on the next
render, so sending and immediately pressing Up walked the list as it was one prompt ago. The ref is
written first now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
It was built on a belief carried over from Claude Code's terminal: that interrupting means the agent
never read the prompt, so handing it back lets you say it differently. That is not what happens here —
the prompt is delivered and read before escape can land, the transcript keeps it, and the agent answers
it on the next turn. So the composer refilled with something already sent, and sending it again sent it
twice.
Escape means "stop, I'll say it differently" or just "stop". Neither wants the old text back. Focus
still returns to the composer, which serves both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two faults, and the visible symptom of both was the same: type a new title, press enter, watch it snap
back unchanged.
The rename 404'd. `useClaudeSessions()` was called with no cwd, so the PATCH went without `?cwd=` and
the server searched the default group — `findTranscript(email, cwd, id)` scopes by directory, so every
conversation living in a project was unfindable. Only chats in the default group could ever have been
renamed. The pane now passes the session's own cwd, as the list already did.
And the title it displayed could not have changed even on success. It came from `selected.title`, which
rides the `chat:selected-session` channel — published once when a row is clicked and never updated —
so the invalidation refreshed the row underneath while the header kept the old name. The title is now
resolved once in `ChatDetailPanel` from the sessions query and passed down, so the pane, the page title
and the row are one source. Renaming from the list's pencil retitles an open pane too, which it never
did before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two things, one title.
The pane's header is now editable and calls the same `renameSession` the list's pencil does, so both
surfaces write the transcript's `summary` line and the invalidation that follows refreshes the row. The
id comes from the URL rather than `resumeSessionId`: they agree for an ordinary conversation and not for
a merged `/clear` chain, where the resume target is the tail while the list and the server address the
chain by its head — renaming the tail would have written a title nothing displays. `/chat/new` has no
transcript yet, so there the title is read-only.
And on `/chat/<id>` the conversation names the page, sitting between a typed tab name and the route
default: `label ?? override ?? titleForPath()`. Naming a window is deliberate and must still win. Not
gated on full screen, though that is where it earns its keep — the nav header is hidden there, so the
browser tab strip is the only thing telling two side-by-side windows apart. Tiled, the same value fills
the header's centre.
The edit interaction is now one `EditableTitle` shared with the nav header instead of a second copy of
it. `allowEmpty` is what keeps the header's "clear it to hand the tab back to the route name" working;
everywhere else empty means keep, since the rename endpoint 400s on it. `SessionList`'s row rename is
deliberately NOT folded in — it opens from a pencil and confirms with a check, so it is a different
interaction wearing the same styling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Maximize could only ever stop below the nav header — the content region is an `absolute z-2` stacking
context and the header a `fixed z-10` sibling, so that was the deepest a panel could get on its own.
Full screen reaches the rest by asking the shell to stand its header down, which leaves the shallow
version as a state nobody picks on purpose.
So it goes, and the two lights with it. `MaximizeMode` and the `{ id, mode }` session value collapse
back to a bare `fullscreenPanelId` — renamed because "maximized" would now be a lie about what it does
— under a new `FULLSCREEN_PANEL:` key, so a tab open across this reads nothing rather than an object
where a string belongs. `MaximizeButton` is gone; locked screens keep only the fullscreen toggle, which
writes no layout and so was always the one control the lock could permit.
Red stays. The amber used to REPLACE it while maximized so the way out could never be a way to delete;
with amber gone that guard would have cost the close button entirely, and red is already absent exactly
where it should be — locked screens render no traffic lights at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Maximize had one depth: fill the content region, leave the nav header visible. That was never a choice
about how much room to take — the region is an `absolute z-2` stacking context and the header is a
`fixed z-10` sibling, so no z-index a panel gives itself can paint over the nav. `top-[56px]` was the
workaround.
So full screen is cooperative rather than a bigger overlay. The panel asks, and the shell hides its own
header for it; `inset-0` is then genuinely the window. Still the same element and the same class swap —
no portal, no remount, so scroll position and playback survive the step between depths the way they
already survived maximize.
The mode rides beside the maximized panel id in sessionStorage as one value, so the two cannot drift;
a tab open across this change reads the old bare string, gets undefined for `.id`, and lands on
"nothing is maximized".
The toggle is offered from every state, so taking the window is one click from a tiled panel, and it
steps back to a maximized panel rather than all the way out. The amber light is present at both depths
and always goes all the way out, so neither is a trap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The client half exists in monorepo-mobile as of f29774a, with OffChat as the
proof of concept, so this document is no longer purely forward-looking. Adds a
section covering what shipped, the two places the advice here was wrong about
the client — one key per app is not possible on mobile (shared-session puts one
credential in front of all nineteen apps), and signout was never the problem,
distress signout was — and two decisions worth a second opinion: clearing the
credential on 401 only, and leaving the traded-in JWT to expire rather than
blacklisting it, because that handler clears vault tokens keyed on the user.
Platform chat ran at 200K while the same `claude` in a terminal got Opus 5's
full 1M. Nothing to do with the model, the account or compaction tuning — the
CLI gates 1M on `provider === 'firstParty' && Fp()`, and `Fp()` is satisfied
only when ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL is unset or its host is api.anthropic.com. We
point it at 127.0.0.1:5051 so the agent's traffic goes through the OAuth
proxy, which fails that host check and silently drops the window to 200K.
_CLAUDE_CODE_ASSUME_FIRST_PARTY_BASE_URL is the CLI's own escape hatch for a
first-party passthrough, and the assertion holds: the proxy forwards verbatim
to api.anthropic.com and already preserves anthropic-beta.
Read from the CLI binary (2.1.223), not inferred: claude-opus-5 carries
context:{window:1e6, native_1m:true}, so the model half of the gate always
passed. Only the hostname was wrong.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
both forwarders buffered the whole request body into an ArrayBuffer before
re-sending it to Immich. with maxRequestBodySize at 4GB that put a phone's
video upload in the sidecar's heap for a hop that never reads the bytes.
callUpstream now sets duplex: 'half' so a stream is a legal body, matching
what createSidecarProxy already does on the platform side. the four JSON
callers are unaffected.
the platform proxy forwards no content-length, so the body already reached
us chunked; this extends that one hop to Immich. verified against the live
instance (3.1.0): bulk-upload-check round-trips a streamed body and returns
the right verdict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Locked assets are gated on elevation, and elevation lives on a session — an API key
has no `auth.session`, so no key permission or allow-list entry can reach them. The
gate sits inside the generic owner-access check, so a locked asset's thumbnail and
original are covered too, not just its listings.
So `/_locked` mints a session at unlock, holds it in memory for the elevation window,
and closes it on lock, on idle, or when the active immich account changes. Nothing new
is written to photos_config: the pin and the password are never at rest, and a full
compromise of officer's database still does not open the folder. The cost is that
unlocking asks for the immich password as well as the pin.
`auth/*` stays refused wholesale in routes.ts. The four auth routes this needs are
reached through named endpoints that each do one thing, and the elevated forward
carries three resources rather than the main allow-list.
Not yet exercised at runtime — the sidecar has not run this code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/mobile-api-keys.md — what the server accepts, what changes in
monorepo-mobile, and the 401-vs-403 distinction, which is the one that
bites: clearing a good key on a 403 turns a member's missing capability
into a logout loop they cannot escape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
there were four doors, not two. the ws upgrade in server.tsx and the
vault notifications socket each verified the jwt themselves, so a key
that worked against /api would have 401'd on cliamp — signed in and can
play audio would have been two different questions for the music app.
both now call resolveAuthToken. verified: owner key upgrades cliamp
(101), bogus key 401, member key 403 on terminal exactly as their jwt
is.
reset-password and verify-token deliberately keep verify() — they read
a purpose-scoped reset token and a key must not be spendable as one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
settings > integrations > personal > api keys. mirrors the dav app
password panel, which is the same problem: a secret that exists for one
response, so the new key stays on screen until dismissed rather than in
a toast.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
a user can mint a long-lived key for an app or a device instead of
carrying a 30-day session, so multiple logins on the mobile apps are
per-device revocable rather than one shared token.
identity was being decided independently in userMiddleware and
originScopeMiddleware, each verifying the token itself. teaching only
one of them a new credential format is how those two stop agreeing, so
both now call resolveAuthToken and neither knows what a bearer string
is. verified: a member's key returns the same status as their jwt on
every route tried, 403s included.
a key carries its holder's full authority — not an escalation, it
equals what the password could already do. scoping wants a scopes
column, not a change here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extracting resolveNotifyUser into its own module immediately caught a hole
in the fix from the previous commit: a header that was present but
unparseable fell through to the body, so a browser could send junk in the
header, name any user in the body and win.
PRESENCE of X-Officer-User is the signal, not its validity — a malformed
header means a proxied request went wrong, and falling through hands the
decision back to the caller we just declined to trust.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A turn could stop producing events and stay `isGenerating` indefinitely. Nothing
covered it: the idle timer answers the opposite question — how long a session with
NO turn in flight may sit before collection — and every client showed a spinner
with no timeout of its own, so a wedged turn presented as a chat that was still
thinking.
On 2026-08-08 one ran for seventeen minutes inside an auto-compaction, reached
over the socket to an iPad, and was indistinguishable there from a dead app. The
compaction is silent by design (the PreCompact hook is the only announcement, and
the code's own comment allows 2.5 minutes), so there was nothing to distinguish it
from.
A stall watchdog now rides every emitted event: any sign of life pushes the
deadline back, and expiry ends the turn the way a real failure would — isGenerating
off, idle re-armed, and an `error` the client can render. The agent process is
deliberately left alive, since it may still be working and the next turn resumes
it; what this guarantees is that the client is TOLD, which is the part that was
missing.
The budgets are generous rather than tight — ten minutes of silence normally,
twenty while compacting, re-armed from the PreCompact hook because that hook fires
as the long silence begins and the deadline the turn is holding was sized for
ordinary work. Killing a turn that was about to succeed is worse than the hang this
prevents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On a Mac, Claude Code stores its credentials in the login Keychain and never
writes ~/.claude/.credentials.json — the only file this proxy knew how to read.
The workaround was to copy the Keychain blob into that file by hand, which is a
snapshot: a refresh ROTATES the refresh token and revokes the previous one, so
the two stores were not redundant copies but competitors, and whichever
refreshed second got `401 OAuth access token has been revoked`.
That is not hypothetical. On 2026-08-08 it took out every chat turn from the
iPad for six hours while the terminal CLI beside it worked fine — the harness
spawned, retried for three minutes and wrote the 401 into the transcript, which
from the app looks like an agent that simply never answers.
So on darwin the Keychain is the authority and the file is a mirror, holding the
same token rather than a different rotation of it. Everywhere else — every Linux
server — the file is still the authority and nothing changes. Detection is
process.platform, and a machine with no `security` binary or no such item falls
through to the file rather than failing.
Three recoveries, cheapest first:
- a watchdog checks every 30 minutes and refreshes when under an hour remains.
It checks rather than refreshing on a blind schedule because each refresh
rotates the token, so a needless one is another chance for the stores to
disagree.
- an upstream 401 now RE-READS before refreshing. When a token has genuinely
been revoked the machine usually already holds a good one, because Claude Code
refreshed it into the Keychain minutes ago; spending our own refresh token
there is what caused the divergence in the first place.
- only if nobody else has moved do we refresh ourselves.
The Keychain write goes through argv, which is the only non-interactive form
`security` offers, and matches on the service AND account pair — the account is
read off the existing item rather than assumed, or the update would silently
create a second entry instead of replacing the one Claude Code reads.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sidecar fronts a REMOTE instance — its URL and token live in
service_connections, set from /gitea — so it needs nothing installed on the
laptop. That is what separates it from the sidecars left out of this profile,
which supervise a local daemon or container.
It also had to be classified either way: defineProfile throws at load on a name
that is in neither include nor exclude, so leaving it unlisted broke the profile
outright rather than merely omitting it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CLAUDE.md asserted "single-user is a hard invariant, not a stage" while
users held six rows and role_capabilities held grants. Every doc that
repeated it is corrected here, in prose and in the code comments that
carried the same claim.
The accurate statement is narrower: one owner who bypasses every check,
other accounts holding only what their role is granted, and a set of
capabilities — terminal, chat, files, tasks, items, desktop, browser — that
are structurally ungrantable because they execute as the owner's OS user.
TODO.md gains a Multi-user section for what the read turned up: no way to
create a second account, dashboards.id colliding across users, authorize.ts
untested, pty/vault/opencode taking no identity, Radicale still owner_only.
claude-sidecar-isolation.md's open question is answered rather than left
open — the per-email spawn model is dead weight, because chat is an
execution capability and no second account can ever reach it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
reset-password accepted any valid signed jwt as a reset token, including a
30-day session token — its sibling verify-token.ts already gated on
purpose === 'reset-password' and this handler did not. forgot-password mints
that claim, so the gate costs the legitimate flow nothing.
notify's DELETE /_officer/devices/:token deleted by token with no user
predicate: a token is the address of a device, not a secret, so any account
holding the notify capability could deregister another's device.
deletePushDevice now takes an optional userId — the route passes it, the
APNs/FCM dead-token paths deliberately do not.
POST /_officer/notify let a request body's userId override the
proxy-injected X-Officer-User. The header now wins where present, which is
what separates a signed-in browser from a loopback producer that has no
session to speak from.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Also found uncommitted in the shared tree; unrelated to agent panels, so it lands
on its own.
`reset` closed over `initialValue` from the first render, and its `useCallback` dep
list deliberately omitted it — with an eslint-disable to silence the warning that was
correctly pointing at the bug. Any caller whose default is computed (derived from
props, from a fetch, from another piece of state) got reset to whatever that default
happened to be on mount, which after the first render is the wrong value.
Reads through a ref instead, so reset always sees the current default. The
eslint-disable goes away because there is nothing left to suppress — the dep list is
honest now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5