the .part-then-rename rule was applied at two upload routes yesterday and
by this morning the platform had a dozen other writes putting files in the
same folders — an OCR result beside its image, a TTS clip, a download
landing, a save from the editor — every one straight to the final name. a
guarantee that holds for two of fourteen paths is not a guarantee, and the
next person adding a fifteenth had nothing to copy.
so it is a function now, and every durable write goes through it: the file
browser, sendoff, task definitions, skill and tool files, bug reports,
scraped attachments, the chat provider config.
the failure it prevents is silent rather than loud. a truncated m4a decodes
fine, it is simply short — a commander transcribing recordings as they land
would produce a clean transcript of the first few seconds of a two-minute
memo and report success.
two things learned writing it. Bun.write creates the parent chain itself,
so the mkdir option i added was dead weight and several callers were doing
it twice. and Parameters<typeof Bun.write>[1] resolves to the first
overload only — BunFile — which rejects the string and Buffer every caller
actually passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
to send one message to four accounts an hour ago i found the sidecar's
ephemeral port and POSTed to it directly, once per user, with no
authentication of any kind. that worked, which was the problem: the same
door was open to anything else on the machine, including a commander with
a shell.
two changes.
POST /api/notify/broadcast, owner only via `ownerOnly` on the permission —
the supported way to say one thing to everyone. teams will narrow it later;
today the choice is everyone or one person.
and the sidecar now requires a secret on everything under /_officer/. it
is generated per boot, held in memory, announced to the platform over the
registration socket beside the port, and never written to disk.
X-Officer-User could not carry this on its own, and my first attempt got
that wrong: it says WHO is asking, and a caller on loopback can write it
itself. only the secret says the PLATFORM is asking. so the check covers
the whole /_officer/ surface rather than just the send route — /_officer/
devices takes the same header to decide whose phones are listed and
deleted.
what it bounds, honestly: a MEMBER's commander runs as its own Linux user
and cannot read this process, so for every account but the owner's this is
kernel-enforced. the owner's own commander runs as the owner, same as the
platform, and is not bounded by this and cannot be — the same reason
`execution` permissions are never grantable. the owner's decision, and
this is a real improvement rather than a boundary.
`bun run notify:test` posts to that port and will now be refused. it is a
developer CLI on a box where the platform is running; left to fail loudly
rather than given a way in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
Bun.write(filePath, file) streams to the name the file will end up with, so for
as long as an upload takes, that name exists holding a partial file and nothing
watching the folder can tell. The failure is silent rather than loud — a
truncated m4a decodes fine, it is just short — so a watcher transcribing voice
memos as they arrive would produce a clean transcript of the first few seconds
of a two-minute recording and report success.
Writing to <name>.part and renaming makes the final name either absent or
complete. Every consumer gets that for free: the phone's own uploadVerified, a
watcher, an agent reading the folder. The alternative was each of them inventing
"the size stopped changing", which cannot tell a finished upload from a stalled
one.
SendOff had the same shape and it matters more there, because that is a folder
things arrive in unattended — neither a recipient watching it nor the push
notification may name a file still being written.
.part rather than a dotfile, deliberately: a leftover should be VISIBLE, named
for what it was going to be, beside where it belongs. A failed write cleans up
after itself; only an interrupted process leaves a fragment, which is the case
worth being able to see. Nothing sweeps them — a job deleting files it did not
create is a worse trade than a fragment somebody can spot.
Server-side only. The phone uploads exactly as before and its verification read
happens after the response, by which time the rename has landed. No new build.
Verified: a watcher polling every millisecond through a 40 MB write never saw a
partial file under the final name, and a real 8 MB upload through the live route
left the file complete with no .part behind. 1422 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
Mobile asked for `/targets` to carry each person's display name as the folder will
be named, so a picker can honestly say where files will appear. Right request: the
writer already computes that exact string to create a directory, and any client
computing its own would eventually disagree with it — which means telling somebody
the wrong place to look.
So `displayNameFor` is the one definition and the writer calls it too. `/targets`
gains `displayName` per person, and `myFolder` for the whole response: files land
in the RECIPIENT's tree under the SENDER's name, so that is one value rather than
a field on each row. The two are easy to confuse and the distinction matters — a
picker showing `displayName` as the destination folder would name the wrong one.
The web panel now uses both instead of its own copy of the fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements docs/sendoff.md's v2: a folder convention, one endpoint and a push.
No staging area, no transfer table, no ack, nothing to expire. Every account
already has a home, a file browser over it and a Files app on the phone, so a
delivered file is an ordinary file from the moment it arrives.
`Documents/SendOff/<machine>/` for something you sent yourself, and
`Documents/SendOff/<sender>/` for another account's files. The home is the one
that account actually browses — the owner's real login home, a member's managed
home — because the two are different directories and writing to the wrong one
makes a delivery invisible rather than wrong.
CONSENT IS THE RECIPIENT'S, held as a row per pair. Not a role grant: a grant
answers "may this role send files", and the person who should decide whether
somebody may write into your home is you. Absence denies, and a sender who was
not allowed does not see the recipient in their picker at all — the endpoint
answers 404 for "no such account" and for "did not allow you" alike, so it cannot
be used to enumerate accounts. The owner bypasses this as a SENDER only; receiving
still needs their say-so.
The sender's folder name comes from the token and never from the payload, so it
cannot lie about who put a file there. Names are sanitised to one path segment and
filenames to their basename — verified: `../../../../etc` becomes a literal
folder, and a filename of `../../../../tmp/pwned.txt` writes `pwned.txt` inside
the target. Collisions suffix ` (1)`; nothing is ever overwritten, because the
sender cannot see the directory and would have no way to know.
The push carries the folder name and a file count, and the catalogue renders
"3 file(s) from andre" on the device. That relaxes "content does not travel" by a
folder name and an integer — the owner's call, on the grounds that the file never
leaves the tailnet and a notification nobody can act on is not worth sending. A
filename would be content; whose folder it is, is addressing.
`kind: 'app'` rather than `confined` even though it writes into a home: the path
is one fixed shape chosen by the server from the caller's token, so there is
nothing to traverse and nothing to read back. Requiring a Linux user would mean an
account without one could not be sent a file, which is most of the point.
Backend and verified end to end. The web send form is next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5