SendOff — a file lands in a real directory in the recipient's own tree

Implements docs/sendoff.md's v2: a folder convention, one endpoint and a push.
No staging area, no transfer table, no ack, nothing to expire. Every account
already has a home, a file browser over it and a Files app on the phone, so a
delivered file is an ordinary file from the moment it arrives.

`Documents/SendOff/<machine>/` for something you sent yourself, and
`Documents/SendOff/<sender>/` for another account's files. The home is the one
that account actually browses — the owner's real login home, a member's managed
home — because the two are different directories and writing to the wrong one
makes a delivery invisible rather than wrong.

CONSENT IS THE RECIPIENT'S, held as a row per pair. Not a role grant: a grant
answers "may this role send files", and the person who should decide whether
somebody may write into your home is you. Absence denies, and a sender who was
not allowed does not see the recipient in their picker at all — the endpoint
answers 404 for "no such account" and for "did not allow you" alike, so it cannot
be used to enumerate accounts. The owner bypasses this as a SENDER only; receiving
still needs their say-so.

The sender's folder name comes from the token and never from the payload, so it
cannot lie about who put a file there. Names are sanitised to one path segment and
filenames to their basename — verified: `../../../../etc` becomes a literal
folder, and a filename of `../../../../tmp/pwned.txt` writes `pwned.txt` inside
the target. Collisions suffix ` (1)`; nothing is ever overwritten, because the
sender cannot see the directory and would have no way to know.

The push carries the folder name and a file count, and the catalogue renders
"3 file(s) from andre" on the device. That relaxes "content does not travel" by a
folder name and an integer — the owner's call, on the grounds that the file never
leaves the tailnet and a notification nobody can act on is not worth sending. A
filename would be content; whose folder it is, is addressing.

`kind: 'app'` rather than `confined` even though it writes into a home: the path
is one fixed shape chosen by the server from the caller's token, so there is
nothing to traverse and nothing to read back. Requiring a Linux user would mean an
account without one could not be sent a file, which is most of the point.

Backend and verified end to end. The web send form is next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CLAUDE.md

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ ahead of everything, and it re-verifies the token itself so it covers routes tha
 - `permissions/registry.ts` — the single enumeration of what the platform can do, in five kinds:
   `core` (every account, not deniable), `app` (**the grantable surface**), `confined` (grantable, but
   only to an account that has a Linux user), `execution` and `admin` (owner only, and `execution` is
-  never grantable at any level). **19 entries as of 2026-08-22** — verified by `bun run docs:check`, which fails if this number drifts again: 5 core, 3 app, 3 confined, 4 execution, 4 admin. It said 27 for nine days.
+  never grantable at any level). **20 entries as of 2026-08-23** — verified by `bun run docs:check`, which fails if this number drifts again: 5 core, 4 app, 3 confined, 4 execution, 4 admin. It said 27 for nine days.
 - `permissions/authorize.ts` — resolves "may this account do this". Owner short-circuits first; every
   other answer is role grants plus core, with `execution`/`admin` stripped even if a row grants them,
   and `confined` stripped for an account with no `osUser`.

src/databases/officer_db/src/index.ts

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ export * from './ai-provider-usage';
 export * from './anthropic-accounts';
 export * from './theme-favorites';
 export { forgetChatSessions, sessionKeyForTranscriptId } from './chat-session-cleanup';
+export * from './sendoff';
 export * from './command-hq';
 export * from './dashboards';
 export * from './integrations';

src/databases/officer_db/src/schema.ts

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ export * from './ai-provider-usage/schema'; // ai_provider_usage — last usage
 export * from './anthropic-accounts/schema'; // anthropic_accounts — switchable OAuth credentials
 export * from './theme-favorites/schema'; // theme_favorites — starred themes, per account
 export * from './command-hq/schema'; // command_hq_categories, command_hq_sessions, command_hq_tags, command_hq_session_tags
+export * from './sendoff/schema'; // sendoff_devices, sendoff_senders
 export * from './agent-panels/schema'; // agent_panels
 
 // Core because the tailnet is the perimeter — a security model resting on it cannot treat administering

src/databases/officer_db/src/sendoff/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+export { sendoffDevices, sendoffSenders } from './schema';
+export {
+  upsertSendoffDevice,
+  listSendoffDevices,
+  renameSendoffDevice,
+  deleteSendoffDevice,
+  listAllowedSenders,
+  listMyRecipients,
+  listOtherAccounts,
+  allowSender,
+  revokeSender,
+  maySendTo,
+  accountsByIds,
+  type SendoffDevice,
+  type SendoffPerson,
+} from './queries';

src/databases/officer_db/src/sendoff/queries.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+import { and, eq, inArray } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { db } from '../db';
+import { users } from '../auth/schema';
+import { sendoffDevices, sendoffSenders } from './schema';
+
+export type SendoffDevice = { id: string; name: string; platform: string | null; lastSeenAt: Date };
+
+/**
+ * Register or refresh a device. Called on every app start, so it must be idempotent on the client's own id.
+ *
+ * `lastSeenAt` is refreshed on conflict and the name is overwritten, because the client is the authority on
+ * what it calls itself — renaming on the device should show up in the picker without a second endpoint.
+ */
+export async function upsertSendoffDevice(params: {
+  id: string;
+  userId: number;
+  name: string;
+  platform?: string | null;
+}): Promise<void> {
+  await db
+    .insert(sendoffDevices)
+    .values({
+      id: params.id,
+      userId: params.userId,
+      name: params.name,
+      platform: params.platform ?? null,
+    })
+    .onConflictDoUpdate({
+      target: sendoffDevices.id,
+      set: { name: params.name, platform: params.platform ?? null, lastSeenAt: new Date() },
+    });
+}
+
+export async function listSendoffDevices(userId: number): Promise<SendoffDevice[]> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .select({
+      id: sendoffDevices.id,
+      name: sendoffDevices.name,
+      platform: sendoffDevices.platform,
+      lastSeenAt: sendoffDevices.lastSeenAt,
+    })
+    .from(sendoffDevices)
+    .where(eq(sendoffDevices.userId, userId));
+  return rows;
+}
+
+/** Scoped to the owner of the row: a device id is a client-chosen uuid and must not be a way to reach another account's. */
+export async function renameSendoffDevice(userId: number, id: string, name: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .update(sendoffDevices)
+    .set({ name })
+    .where(and(eq(sendoffDevices.id, id), eq(sendoffDevices.userId, userId)))
+    .returning({ id: sendoffDevices.id });
+  return rows.length > 0;
+}
+
+export async function deleteSendoffDevice(userId: number, id: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .delete(sendoffDevices)
+    .where(and(eq(sendoffDevices.id, id), eq(sendoffDevices.userId, userId)))
+    .returning({ id: sendoffDevices.id });
+  return rows.length > 0;
+}
+
+export type SendoffPerson = { id: number; email: string; name: string | null };
+
+/** The accounts I have allowed to send to me. */
+export async function listAllowedSenders(recipientUserId: number): Promise<SendoffPerson[]> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .select({ id: users.id, email: users.email, name: users.name })
+    .from(sendoffSenders)
+    .innerJoin(users, eq(users.id, sendoffSenders.senderUserId))
+    .where(eq(sendoffSenders.recipientUserId, recipientUserId));
+  return rows;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The accounts I may send to — the inverse question, and the one the picker asks.
+ *
+ * Absence denies, so this returns only recipients who have named me. A sender never learns that an account
+ * exists and refused them; it simply is not in the list.
+ */
+export async function listMyRecipients(senderUserId: number): Promise<SendoffPerson[]> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .select({ id: users.id, email: users.email, name: users.name })
+    .from(sendoffSenders)
+    .innerJoin(users, eq(users.id, sendoffSenders.recipientUserId))
+    .where(eq(sendoffSenders.senderUserId, senderUserId));
+  return rows;
+}
+
+/** Every account except me — what the owner's picker shows, since the owner may send to anyone. */
+export async function listOtherAccounts(exceptUserId: number): Promise<SendoffPerson[]> {
+  const rows = await db.select({ id: users.id, email: users.email, name: users.name }).from(users);
+  return rows.filter((r) => r.id !== exceptUserId);
+}
+
+export async function allowSender(recipientUserId: number, senderUserId: number): Promise<void> {
+  await db.insert(sendoffSenders).values({ recipientUserId, senderUserId }).onConflictDoNothing();
+}
+
+export async function revokeSender(recipientUserId: number, senderUserId: number): Promise<void> {
+  await db
+    .delete(sendoffSenders)
+    .where(and(eq(sendoffSenders.recipientUserId, recipientUserId), eq(sendoffSenders.senderUserId, senderUserId)));
+}
+
+/** May this sender write into this recipient's tree? The owner check is the CALLER's job — see the schema. */
+export async function maySendTo(senderUserId: number, recipientUserId: number): Promise<boolean> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .select({ id: sendoffSenders.id })
+    .from(sendoffSenders)
+    .where(and(eq(sendoffSenders.recipientUserId, recipientUserId), eq(sendoffSenders.senderUserId, senderUserId)))
+    .limit(1);
+  return rows.length > 0;
+}
+
+/** Resolve accounts by id, for naming a recipient in a response without a second round trip. */
+export async function accountsByIds(ids: number[]): Promise<SendoffPerson[]> {
+  if (!ids.length) return [];
+  return db.select({ id: users.id, email: users.email, name: users.name }).from(users).where(inArray(users.id, ids));
+}

src/databases/officer_db/src/sendoff/schema.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+import { pgTable, serial, integer, text, timestamp, uniqueIndex } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
+import { users } from '../auth/schema';
+
+/**
+ * A named machine, so "send it to my laptop" has something to pick from.
+ *
+ * Separate from `push_devices` deliberately, and the two are not the same population. A push device is a
+ * token: iOS or Android only, no human name, and it exists to be pushed AT. This is a name a person chose,
+ * for a machine that may never receive a push at all — a desktop, a browser, a box with no app on it. The
+ * name's only job is to become a folder.
+ *
+ * The id is the client's own uuid rather than a serial, because registration happens on every app start and
+ * has to be idempotent without the client remembering a number we gave it.
+ */
+export const sendoffDevices = pgTable('sendoff_devices', {
+  id: text('id').primaryKey(),
+  userId: integer('user_id')
+    .notNull()
+    .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+  /** What the owner calls it. Becomes a directory name, so it is sanitised before it touches the disk. */
+  name: text('name').notNull(),
+  platform: text('platform'),
+  lastSeenAt: timestamp('last_seen_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+});
+
+/**
+ * Who may send files to whom — held by the RECIPIENT, one row per sender they have allowed.
+ *
+ * This is the whole cross-user permission model and it is deliberately not a role grant. A grant answers
+ * "may this role send files", which is the wrong question: the person who should decide whether Fedra can
+ * put a file in your home directory is you, not whoever administers roles. So consent is data, it is
+ * per-pair, and absence denies — a sender who has not been allowed does not see the recipient as a target
+ * at all, rather than seeing one and being refused.
+ *
+ * The owner is exempt as a SENDER and only as a sender: they bypass every other check on this platform and
+ * there is no version of this where they cannot reach a home directory they already own. Receiving still
+ * needs their say-so, so nobody lands files in the owner's tree uninvited.
+ */
+export const sendoffSenders = pgTable(
+  'sendoff_senders',
+  {
+    id: serial('id').primaryKey(),
+    /** The account granting permission — the one whose tree gets written to. */
+    recipientUserId: integer('recipient_user_id')
+      .notNull()
+      .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+    /** The account allowed to send to them. */
+    senderUserId: integer('sender_user_id')
+      .notNull()
+      .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+    createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+  },
+  // uniqueIndex, never unique().on() — drizzle-kit re-creates named composite constraints on every push.
+  (table) => [uniqueIndex('uq_sendoff_senders').on(table.recipientUserId, table.senderUserId)],
+);

src/servers/api/sendoff/paths.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { getHomeDir, getOwnerHomeDir } from '@@/data-path';
+
+/** `Documents/SendOff` under whichever home this account actually browses. */
+export const SENDOFF_SUBPATH = join('Documents', 'SendOff');
+
+/**
+ * The SendOff directory for an account, in the home its own file browser shows.
+ *
+ * The two homes are not interchangeable and picking the wrong one makes a delivery invisible: the owner
+ * browses their real login home (`/home/pastilhas`), while another account browses the managed home under
+ * `DATA_PATH/<email>/home`. `getOwnerHomeDir` ignores the email it is passed and always answers the owner,
+ * so it can only be used once the role has been checked — which is why this takes the role rather than
+ * working it out from the email.
+ */
+export function sendoffDirFor(account: { email: string; isOwner: boolean }): string {
+  const home = account.isOwner ? getOwnerHomeDir(account.email) : getHomeDir(account.email);
+  return join(home, SENDOFF_SUBPATH);
+}
+
+/**
+ * A folder name safe to create, from a name a person or a device chose.
+ *
+ * Anything that is not a letter, digit, dash, underscore or dot becomes a dash, and leading dots go — so a
+ * name cannot produce `..`, a hidden directory, or a path with a separator in it. Empty after that is
+ * refused by the caller rather than silently becoming a directory called `-`.
+ */
+export function safeSegment(name: string): string {
+  return name
+    .trim()
+    .replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+/g, '-')
+    .replace(/^\.+/, '')
+    .replace(/^-+|-+$/g, '')
+    .slice(0, 64);
+}
+
+/**
+ * A filename safe to write, preserving the extension.
+ *
+ * Same rules as a segment, with the basename taken first: a browser will happily send `../../etc/passwd`
+ * as a filename and the multipart spec does not forbid it.
+ */
+export function safeFilename(name: string): string {
+  const base = name.split(/[/\\]/).pop() ?? '';
+  const cleaned = base
+    .trim()
+    .replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+/g, '-')
+    .replace(/^\.+/, '')
+    .slice(0, 200);
+  return cleaned || 'file';
+}

src/servers/api/sendoff/router.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+import { mkdir } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { extname, join } from 'node:path';
+import { createRouter } from '../../create-router';
+import * as errors from '@@/custom-errors';
+import {
+  accountsByIds,
+  allowSender,
+  deleteSendoffDevice,
+  listAllowedSenders,
+  listMyRecipients,
+  listOtherAccounts,
+  listSendoffDevices,
+  maySendTo,
+  renameSendoffDevice,
+  revokeSender,
+  upsertSendoffDevice,
+} from 'officerdb';
+import { getNotifyServerUrl } from '../notify/router';
+import { safeFilename, safeSegment, sendoffDirFor } from './paths';
+
+/*
+  SendOff — files land in a real directory in the recipient's own tree.
+
+  There is no staging area, no transfer record and nothing to expire. Every account already has a home, a
+  file browser over it and a Files app on the phone, so a delivered file is an ordinary file: visible in
+  every UI that exists, and managed like anything else its owner owns.
+
+  Two things are worth knowing before changing anything here.
+
+  **This is the only sanctioned door into another account's filesystem.** `/file-browser` and `/upload`
+  write exclusively into the caller's own tree and that must stay true. So this route writes ONLY under
+  `Documents/SendOff/<sender>/`, and `<sender>` comes from the token — never from the payload — so a folder
+  name cannot lie about who put a file there.
+
+  **Consent belongs to the recipient.** A role grant would answer "may this role send files", which is the
+  wrong question; the person who decides whether somebody may write into your home is you. So it is a row,
+  per pair, held by the recipient, and absence denies. A sender who has not been allowed does not see the
+  recipient in their picker at all rather than seeing one and being refused — which also means this endpoint
+  never confirms that an account exists.
+*/
+
+export const sendoffRouter = createRouter();
+
+const MAX_FILE_SIZE = 512 * 1024 * 1024; // 512 MB — this is a file transfer, not an avatar upload
+const isOwnerRole = (role: string | null | undefined): boolean => role === 'Super Admin';
+
+/**
+ * A path that does not exist yet, suffixing ` (1)`, ` (2)`, … before the extension.
+ *
+ * Never overwrite. A second send of the same name is a second file: the sender cannot see the recipient's
+ * directory, so they have no way to know they are about to destroy something, and silently replacing a file
+ * somebody was sent is the one outcome with no recovery.
+ */
+function freePath(dir: string, filename: string): string {
+  const first = join(dir, filename);
+  if (!existsSync(first)) return first;
+  const ext = extname(filename);
+  const stem = filename.slice(0, filename.length - ext.length);
+  for (let n = 1; n < 1000; n++) {
+    const candidate = join(dir, `${stem} (${n})${ext}`);
+    if (!existsSync(candidate)) return candidate;
+  }
+  return join(dir, `${stem} (${Date.now()})${ext}`);
+}
+
+/*
+  The push, and why it carries what it does.
+
+  `id` is the FOLDER NAME — a username or a machine name — and `n` is a file count. Both are interpolated by
+  the catalogue on the device ("3 file(s) from andre") and both are what the route needs to open the right
+  directory. No filename and no path travels: the folder name plus the count is what the owner accepted as
+  the line, and it is enough for the tap to land somewhere useful.
+
+  Never fatal. A delivery that succeeded must not be reported as a failure because a notification did not
+  go out — the file is already in their tree, and the file browser shows it either way.
+*/
+async function pushLanded(recipientUserId: number, folder: string, count: number): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const base = getNotifyServerUrl();
+    if (!base) return;
+    await fetch(`${base}/_officer/notify`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', 'X-Officer-User': String(recipientUserId) },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ code: 'officer/core:sendoff.landed', userId: recipientUserId, id: folder, n: count }),
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('[sendoff] could not push:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * POST /sendoff/send — multipart: any number of `file` parts, plus `toUser` or `machine`.
+ *
+ * `toUser` is an account id and writes into THEIR tree under `SendOff/<my-username>/`. `machine` is a name
+ * of my own and writes into MY tree under `SendOff/<machine>/`. Exactly one of the two.
+ */
+sendoffRouter.post('/send', async (ctx) => {
+  const me = ctx.get('user');
+  const body = ctx.get('body') as Record<string, unknown>;
+
+  // `parseBody({ all: true })` gives an array when a part repeats and a single value when it does not, so
+  // both shapes have to be accepted — a one-file send is the common case and must not need a special part.
+  const raw = body.file;
+  const files = (Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : [raw]).filter((f): f is File => f instanceof File);
+  if (!files.length) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('at least one file is required');
+  const tooBig = files.find((f) => f.size > MAX_FILE_SIZE);
+  if (tooBig) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST(`${tooBig.name} exceeds the ${MAX_FILE_SIZE / 1024 / 1024} MB limit`);
+
+  const toUser = body.toUser === undefined || body.toUser === '' ? null : Number(body.toUser);
+  const machine = typeof body.machine === 'string' && body.machine.trim() ? body.machine.trim() : null;
+  if ((toUser === null) === (machine === null)) {
+    throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('send to exactly one of toUser or machine');
+  }
+
+  let targetUserId: number;
+  let targetAccount: { email: string; isOwner: boolean };
+  let folder: string;
+
+  if (machine) {
+    // My own machine, my own tree. The name is mine to choose and is not checked against the device
+    // registry: the registry exists to POPULATE a picker, not to be the authority on what I may call a
+    // folder in my own home.
+    targetUserId = me.id;
+    targetAccount = { email: me.email, isOwner: isOwnerRole(me.role) };
+    folder = safeSegment(machine);
+  } else {
+    if (toUser === me.id) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('use machine to send to yourself');
+    if (!Number.isInteger(toUser) || toUser === null || toUser <= 0)
+      throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('toUser must be an account id');
+    const [recipient] = await accountsByIds([toUser]);
+    // 404, never 403, and the same answer for "no such account" as for "did not allow you". A sender must
+    // not be able to enumerate accounts, nor learn that one refused them.
+    if (!recipient) throw errors.NOT_FOUND('no such recipient');
+    const allowed = isOwnerRole(me.role) || (await maySendTo(me.id, toUser));
+    if (!allowed) throw errors.NOT_FOUND('no such recipient');
+
+    const [full] = await accountsByIds([toUser]);
+    targetUserId = toUser;
+    targetAccount = { email: recipient.email, isOwner: full?.id === 1 };
+    // From the TOKEN. This is the whole reason the folder name can be trusted.
+    folder = safeSegment(me.name || me.email.split('@')[0] || `user-${me.id}`);
+  }
+
+  if (!folder) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('that name has no usable characters');
+
+  const dir = join(sendoffDirFor(targetAccount), folder);
+  await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });
+
+  const written: { name: string; size: number }[] = [];
+  for (const file of files) {
+    const path = freePath(dir, safeFilename(file.name));
+    await Bun.write(path, await file.arrayBuffer());
+    written.push({ name: path.split('/').pop() ?? file.name, size: file.size });
+  }
+
+  void pushLanded(targetUserId, folder, written.length);
+
+  return ctx.json({ path: join('Documents', 'SendOff', folder), files: written });
+});
+
+/**
+ * GET /sendoff/targets — everything the send form needs: my machines, and who I may send to.
+ *
+ * The owner sees every account because they may send to anyone; everybody else sees only the accounts that
+ * have named them. One request rather than two, because a picker with half its options is not a picker.
+ */
+sendoffRouter.get('/targets', async (ctx) => {
+  const me = ctx.get('user');
+  const [devices, people] = await Promise.all([
+    listSendoffDevices(me.id),
+    isOwnerRole(me.role) ? listOtherAccounts(me.id) : listMyRecipients(me.id),
+  ]);
+  return ctx.json({ devices, people });
+});
+
+/** GET /sendoff/senders — who I have allowed to send to me. */
+sendoffRouter.get('/senders', async (ctx) => {
+  const me = ctx.get('user');
+  const [allowed, everyone] = await Promise.all([listAllowedSenders(me.id), listOtherAccounts(me.id)]);
+  const allowedIds = new Set(allowed.map((a) => a.id));
+  // Both lists, so the UI can render a set of toggles rather than an "add" flow over an account picker.
+  return ctx.json({ allowed, candidates: everyone.map((p) => ({ ...p, allowed: allowedIds.has(p.id) })) });
+});
+
+sendoffRouter.post('/senders', async (ctx) => {
+  const me = ctx.get('user');
+  const body = ctx.get('body') as { userId?: number };
+  const id = Number(body?.userId);
+  if (!Number.isInteger(id) || id <= 0) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('userId is required');
+  if (id === me.id) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('you can always send to yourself');
+  const [account] = await accountsByIds([id]);
+  if (!account) throw errors.NOT_FOUND('no such account');
+  await allowSender(me.id, id);
+  return ctx.json({ ok: true });
+});
+
+sendoffRouter.delete('/senders/:userId', async (ctx) => {
+  const me = ctx.get('user');
+  const id = Number(ctx.req.param('userId'));
+  if (!Number.isInteger(id) || id <= 0) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('userId is required');
+  // Revoking stops future sends. Files already delivered are the recipient's own files now, and deleting
+  // somebody's files as a side effect of a permission change would be its own kind of surprise.
+  await revokeSender(me.id, id);
+  return ctx.json({ ok: true });
+});
+
+/** POST /sendoff/devices — register or refresh. Idempotent on the client's own uuid; called every launch. */
+sendoffRouter.post('/devices', async (ctx) => {
+  const me = ctx.get('user');
+  const body = ctx.get('body') as { id?: string; name?: string; platform?: string };
+  const id = typeof body?.id === 'string' ? body.id.trim() : '';
+  const name = typeof body?.name === 'string' ? body.name.trim() : '';
+  if (!id || !name) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('id and name are required');
+  if (!safeSegment(name)) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('that name has no usable characters');
+  await upsertSendoffDevice({ id, userId: me.id, name, platform: body?.platform ?? null });
+  return ctx.json({ ok: true });
+});
+
+sendoffRouter.get('/devices', async (ctx) => ctx.json({ devices: await listSendoffDevices(ctx.get('user').id) }));
+
+sendoffRouter.patch('/devices/:id', async (ctx) => {
+  const me = ctx.get('user');
+  const body = ctx.get('body') as { name?: string };
+  const name = typeof body?.name === 'string' ? body.name.trim() : '';
+  if (!name || !safeSegment(name)) throw errors.BAD_REQUEST('name is required');
+  if (!(await renameSendoffDevice(me.id, ctx.req.param('id'), name))) throw errors.NOT_FOUND('no such device');
+  return ctx.json({ ok: true });
+});
+
+sendoffRouter.delete('/devices/:id', async (ctx) => {
+  const me = ctx.get('user');
+  if (!(await deleteSendoffDevice(me.id, ctx.req.param('id')))) throw errors.NOT_FOUND('no such device');
+  return ctx.json({ ok: true });
+});

src/servers/hono.ts

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import { isPluginPublicPath, pluginForProtocolHeaders } from './plugins/public-p
 import { agentHandoffRouter } from './api/agent-handoff/router';
 import { terminalRouter } from './api/terminal/sidecar-server';
 import { minesweeperRouter } from './api/minesweeper/router';
+import { sendoffRouter } from './api/sendoff/router';
 import { caldavRouter } from './api/dav/sidecar-server';
 // import { memosRouter } from './api/memos/router';
 import { appStoreRouter } from './api/app-store/router';
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ const PROTECTED_MOUNTS: [prefix: string, router: ReturnType<typeof createRouter>
   ['/file-browser', fileBrowserRouter],
   ['/terminal', terminalRouter],
   ['/minesweeper', minesweeperRouter],
+  ['/sendoff', sendoffRouter],
   // ['/memos', memosRouter],  // plugin — switched off 2026-08-13
   ['/app-store', appStoreRouter],
   ['/plugins', pluginsRouter],

src/servers/notifications/catalogue.ts

@@ -99,6 +99,22 @@ const CORE_ENTRIES: Record<string, NotificationEntry> = {
     route: 'officer://jobs/{id}',
     thread: 'officer/core:job',
   },
+  /*
+    SendOff. `id` is the FOLDER — a username, or one of your own machine names — and `n` is how many
+    files landed, so the device renders "3 file(s) from andre" and the route opens that directory.
+  
+    A folder name and a count travel, and nothing else: no filename, no path, no size. That is a
+    deliberate relaxation of "content does not travel" rather than an oversight — the owner's call, on
+    the grounds that the file itself never leaves the tailnet, and a notification nobody can act on is
+    not worth sending. A filename would be content; whose folder it is, is addressing.
+  */
+  'officer/core:sendoff.landed': {
+    title: 'SendOff',
+    body: '{n} file(s) from {id}',
+    target: 'mobile',
+    route: 'officer://files?path=Documents/SendOff/{id}',
+    thread: 'sendoff:{id}',
+  },
   'officer/core:job-failed': {
     title: 'Job failed',
     target: 'mobile',

src/servers/permissions/registry.ts

@@ -347,6 +347,27 @@ const CORE_REGISTRY: Permission[] = [
     ws: ['minesweeper'],
     routes: ['/minesweeper'],
   },
+  /*
+    SendOff is `app`, not `confined`, and the distinction is the point.
+    
+    It writes into a home directory, which normally means `confined` — but it writes exactly one shape of
+    path, `Documents/SendOff/<sender>/`, chosen by the server from the caller's token. There is no path in
+    the request to contain, nothing to traverse out of, and no way to read anything back. So the Linux-user
+    requirement that `confined` exists to enforce buys nothing here, and requiring it would mean an account
+    with no OS user could not be sent a file — which is most of the point of the feature.
+    
+    WHO may send to whom is not decided here. It is a row per pair held by the recipient, because the
+    person who should decide whether somebody may put a file in your home is you, not whoever administers
+    roles. This grant only says the feature is reachable at all.
+  */
+  {
+    key: 'sendoff',
+    label: 'SendOff',
+    description: 'Send files to your own machines, and to accounts that have allowed you',
+    kind: 'app',
+    api: ['/sendoff'],
+    routes: ['/sendoff'],
+  },
   {
     key: 'items',
     label: 'Permission authoring',