661b3d761f48518027798b3636674cbfb88517fe
1088
Commits
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8bab607366 |
name a chat tab, and let that name win the page title
Click the active tab (or double-click any) to rename it inline — Enter commits, Escape cancels, blur commits, and an empty value hands the tab back to its derived name. Same shape as renaming a conversation, which is the gesture that already exists here. The name outranks everything: chatTabName ?? label ?? override ?? route. It is the most specific statement anyone has made about the page — more specific than the conversation inside it, since there may be three, and more deliberate than a browser-tab name typed earlier on a different screen. Only a name you TYPED is published. Publishing the derived label would restate the title the chat already publishes one tier down, and would then outrank a browser-tab name for no reason the user could see. Cleared on unmount, or every other screen would keep being called by the chat tab you last had open. The rename field seeds from the typed name only, never the derived one — pre-filling a name the user never chose makes Enter silently adopt it as if they had. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a19895c216 |
tabs and panes: several conversations, several machines, one window
The iPad layout in the browser. A tab holds one to three panes; each pane is a whole chat — its own server chips, its own list, its own conversation, its own socket. The blocker was that chat:selected-session is ONE channel for the screen, so two detail panels would have shown the same conversation. A pane now provides its own selection through context and usePaneSelection prefers it; outside a pane the context is absent and the channel behaves exactly as before, so the dashboard chat panel and the mobile layout are untouched. Context rather than props because SessionList and ChatDetailPanel sit at different depths and neither should know whether it is inside a pane. A pane shows its LIST until something is open and the CHAT afterwards, with one way back. Mobile can afford both at once inside a pane; three of those in a browser column would leave nothing for the conversation itself. The layout lives in one unscoped localStorage entry, deliberately not per server — a tab holding one conversation from the laptop and one from alpha belongs to neither. Pane keys are re-minted on restore, because keys from a previous page whose counter restarted at zero make React reuse the wrong subtree and a conversation appears in the wrong column. What this gives up, and it is the only thing: /chat/<id> still deep-links but can only open in the first pane. With three conversations on screen there is no single one for the address bar to name. WorkspaceView and the fixed three-panel layout are gone from this screen; the panels themselves are unchanged and still registered for the dashboard. Typecheck, 602 tests and the SPA bundle all pass. Nobody has clicked it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ec4f06a313 |
write down how an agent could commit as itself
Not built, and deliberately so — this is the idea as it stood, with the spawn path read at
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b7184283e0 |
app store: a screen, so this can be clicked instead of curled
/app-store, built to the platform's own conventions: a locked WorkspaceView with two panels, the selection in `?selected=` rather than a channel, and rows that are real links so cmd-click and a pasted URL both work. `?selected=` and not a /app-store/:id detail route, per docs/navigation-audit.md: this is a master list with a live preview, and linking rows to a detail route would make the detail the whole page and destroy the side-by-side. Both panels read the URL independently — the list and the detail cannot disagree if neither is telling the other anything. The install form is generated from the catalogue's fields rather than written per service, which is what lets a sidecar shipping from its own repository present a form nobody here wrote. `existing` is first in `modes` by catalogue rule, so the default selection is "I already have one" — the answer that avoids starting a second copy of something already running. States are distinguished rather than flattened. Blocked is amber and titled "Needs you", not an error: everything worked and it is waiting for a token only a person can mint. Installed-and-enabled but with a dead process shows a warning rather than a tick that lies. And the disable/uninstall copy says plainly that data, configuration and tables are kept either way, because that is the question anyone hesitates over before clicking. The dock tile is CORE, not plugin-derived: the store is how every other feature arrives, so it must never be one of the things that disappears. Verified through the API the screen uses — 14 items, email reporting installed/enabled with its process online, and /app-store present in the capability routes so the tile renders. NOT verified in a browser: no page has been opened, so the rendering itself is reasoned rather than seen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dd2be8c8b3 |
app store: never assume a service is local, or on its usual port
An instance may be on another host, behind a reverse proxy on 443 under a path prefix, on a tailnet address, or on an arbitrary port because the usual one was taken. All ordinary self-hosted setups, and each one a case where assuming otherwise produces a connection that fails later with no clue why. Two places were sloppy about it. Jellyfin's placeholder read `http://localhost:8096` and Transmission's `http://localhost:9091`, which quietly teach that a service must be local and on its project's default port; both now show remote examples, and the field type says why. And nothing validated what was typed, so a bare hostname or a URL with a token in the query string was stored as-is. The rule: reject only what cannot work, normalise what is merely untidy, have no opinion about the rest. No check that the host is local, that the port matches a default, or that the scheme is https — a tailnet HTTP service is completely normal. Trailing slashes go, because `${url}/api/x` otherwise doubles the separator: accepted by some servers and 404 by others, which is the kind of difference that reproduces on one machine and not another. Query strings go, because that is where a token hides, and it would sit in a column meant for a location. Credentials in the URL are refused for the same reason — outside the encrypted secret, and in every log line that ever prints it. A missing scheme is named rather than called invalid: it is the commonest mistake, because it is what people type into a browser. Verified through the API: `memos.example.com` is blocked with the fix quoted back, and `https://memos.example.com:8443/memos/` installs and stores normalised — remote host, non-standard port, path prefix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2ef4efd39b |
app store: ask before repointing a service that is already connected
Found by breaking it. Installing a sidecar that was already configured replaced its connection row with the new install's, silently repointing a working service somewhere else — during testing that took the live Transmission from :9091 to a scratch container on :18092, and the only symptom was that it stopped working. Install now blocks instead of overwriting, naming both URLs and offering the choice. Blocked rather than failed because there is a sensible answer and the user is the only one who has it: keep what is there, or reinstall with `replaceConnection` to change it deliberately. Harmless on a fresh machine; this is entirely for the one with an existing setup. Verified against the live row: an install pointed at a different URL is refused and the original connection is still there afterwards. Also makes "do you already have one?" structural rather than a UI convention. Three tests: anything that can provision must also offer `existing`, `existing` must come first in `modes` since that is the order the prompt uses, and it must ask for a URL. A new entry added later cannot quietly offer only "provision one for me" — which is how someone with a working Immich ends up with a second one and finds out when two libraries disagree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dc6b623ee1 |
talk to two officers at once from one browser
The chat app on the iPad does this already and this is its model, not the music app one. Music keeps its active server — one library at a time is the right question there. Chat is the exception: two panels side by side, one on the laptop and one on alpha, both live, no switching. The mechanism is one string. A panel holds a serverId; that same string picks the base URL, the credential, the websocket host and the tail of the react-query key. Nothing global is consulted when it is named, which is exactly why two can be live at once — there is no active server in connections.ts at all, because there is nothing to switch. THIS ORIGIN IS NOT IN THE LIST. It is represented by null, so every existing useClient() call is untouched and adding a connection cannot break the app you are already signed into. That property is what makes this shippable before anyone has tried it. A second server is reached with an ofk_ API key minted there, verified against /api/auth/me before it is stored — a URL typo and a key from the wrong machine are otherwise indistinguishable from an empty conversation list an hour later. Copied deliberately from the mobile code: the base URL is derived per call rather than memoised (a cached one hands back whichever server was asked for first), the row stamps its server onto the selection BEFORE navigating (or the resolver reads the transcript from this origin, where two officers can hold the same uuid), and changing server clears the cwd and the open conversation, because a path from the machine you left names nothing on the one you arrived at. Not yet opened in a browser. Typecheck and 602 tests pass, and the cross-origin request with an API key is verified by curl, but no human has clicked any of this. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e83585dd42 |
app store: containers follow the sidecar through enable, disable and uninstall
Tier two works end to end. Transmission installed through the API with a real container, verified on
this machine and then removed:
install preflight, provision, connect, schema, assets, process — container up, health-checked,
connection written from what the setup script printed
disable process stopped, then container Exited(0), data intact
enable container back up, then the process
uninstall container gone, install row gone, DATA UNTOUCHED — config, compose file, downloads and
watch directories all still present
Order matters in both directions and it is opposite each way. Enable brings the container up first: a
sidecar that starts before its upstream exists spends its first seconds failing health checks and
logging about a service that is merely not up yet. Disable stops the process first, for the same reason
in reverse.
`down`, never `down -v`, and no `--rmi`: the volumes are the user's data and the images are shared and
expensive to re-pull. Both are deliberate omissions, stated so nobody adds them later as a tidy-up.
Uninstall only brings down containers for `mode: 'provisioned'`. An `existing` install points at a
service the user runs themselves, and `down` there would stop a container Officer never started.
Every compose call tolerates a missing directory rather than failing. Three call sites can legitimately
arrive with nothing there — an `existing` install, a failed install that died before writing the file,
and a resumed uninstall re-running a completed step — and erroring would make a row impossible to
uninstall, which is the one state a user cannot escape.
Adds an `assets` step, before `process`: the dock reads manifests as soon as the install is recorded, so
an icon arriving a moment later shows as broken on the first render. And composeDir is recorded from the
install rather than derived later, because the directory is the user's and they may move it — uninstall
must not guess at a path it is about to run `down` in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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45e3e86d72 |
write down what to test, and what is most likely broken
The serve is the only path now, so this is not a comparison against a fallback. Split by what I have actually driven end to end versus what probes cannot answer. The second list is the real testing: resume from history (never exercised against the serve, and my pick for most likely broken), an idle session, a sidecar restart mid-turn, an officer restart mid-turn, and two conversations at once — that last one because the live event stream is global and a wrong sessionID filter would splice one conversation into another. Known gaps are listed so they do not get reported as bugs, and the one silent failure mode with a single cause — a turn producing nothing at all — points at the credential line from boot, which I have chased twice already. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a3dbda7d3b |
phase D: delete the subprocess path
The serve is now the only way an opencode turn runs. runner.ts and its tests are gone, and so is the OPENCODE_TURNS switch — there is no fallback engine any more, and the recovery for a bad day is git rather than a config flag. Deliberate, and cheap right now precisely because nothing depends on opencode yet. What goes with it: mapRunLine and its NDJSON fixtures, the temp-file spill for --file image attachments, the supersede-and-kill dance, the process watchdogs, the pidfile-adjacent child tracking, and stopAllOpenCodeTurns. All of it existed to work around stdin being /dev/null. Verified after deletion, with no env var set at all: tool call, tool result, 5 streaming deltas, text and cost, through the real chat socket. Also corrected the comments the deletion falsified rather than leaving them to mislead — the module header, the wire contract description of opencode:run-streaming, and serve-runner own header, which still announced itself as off by default. One difference worth stating: shutdown no longer kills anything. Turns run inside the serve, which is a separate process that survives us, so officer stops routing them and says so in the transcript. When a subprocess ran the turn, failing to kill it orphaned it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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82e9fdacc2 |
dock: the shell keeps its own items, sidecars contribute theirs
ALL_DOCK_ITEMS was a hardcoded list of everything, so a fresh machine offered Photos, Jellyfin, Transmission and the rest — each leading to a screen reporting itself unavailable — and adding a sidecar meant editing the shell. Neither survives sidecars shipping from their own repositories. Split in two. CORE_DOCK_ITEMS is the baseline that exists on every install: chat, files, terminal, the app's own screens, and Gitea, which is in the light profile because it fronts a remote instance. Everything else is derived from installed sidecars' UI manifests, delivered with /capabilities. Sent with the capability answer rather than fetched separately so the dock has ONE source. Two requests means two moments, and a dock rendered between them shows a tile for something uninstalled or nothing for something installed. Filtered by capability server-side too: a member is not handed the manifest of a feature they cannot use, because "hidden in the client" is the kind of privacy that lasts until someone opens the network tab. Verified live. The owner — who bypasses every permission check — does not bypass this: /photos is absent from routes and present in deniedRoutes because Photos is not installed. Flipping a row's `enabled` makes its tile leave and return with no process touched. Two things fell out. A manifest can declare extraTiles, because CalDAV is one sidecar presenting as Calendar AND Contacts, and collapsing them to keep the model tidy would make the app worse. And DEFAULT_DOCK_PATHS no longer pins /music: useDock drops a path with nothing behind it, so the default dock came up a tile short on any machine where Music was never installed — a default that references an optional feature is how an app looks subtly wrong on a fresh install for no stated reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b79eca45fb |
send images on the serve path too, before anyone switches to it
runOpenCodeTurnOnServe ignored params.images entirely, which is defect B4 rebuilt on the new path: the image renders in your own bubble and the model never receives it, with nothing reporting a loss. Fixed before the path is switched on for anyone rather than after. data: URIs, not file://, and that is measured — the wrong choice is accepted with a 200 and then dies inside the turn with "Anthropic Messages media must contain valid base64". The data URI round-trips and the model describes the image. Strictly better than the subprocess path here: no temp file to spill and nothing to clean up, because the bytes travel in the request. Both prompt paths carry them — an ordinary send and a mid-turn injection. Verified end to end through the chat socket with the serve engine on: a red png came back "**Red**", with deltas streaming. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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209e916343 |
app store: publish a sidecar's assets to public/plugins/<id>/
Real PNG icons are coming, so this is the path they arrive by: a sidecar ships its assets beside its own code, and install copies them to public/plugins/<id>/ where one static route serves them. Copied rather than served in place because a sidecar shipping from its own repository has its assets wherever that repository was unpacked, which is not a path the web server can be taught at build time. One predictable destination means the serving rule never has to know how many plugins exist or where any came from. It also makes assets a property of the INSTALL: uninstall removes them, and a plugin nobody installed serves nothing. Needed a new route, and the reason is a trap worth recording. `publicRoutes` in server.tsx is built by globbing ./public at BOOT, so anything copied there afterwards is invisible to it — the first install of a plugin would show a broken image until the server was restarted, and "install it, then restart to see the icon" is not an install. `/plugins/*` resolves per request, like /novnc/* and /vendor/* already do. Unlike those two it answers 404 rather than 500 for a missing file: an unpublished icon is an ordinary state on a fresh machine, and a 500 would put a red line in the log for every dock render. Proven end to end with a real asset: slskd's icon moved from public/slskd.png into the sidecar's own assets/, published against an ALREADY RUNNING server, and fetched at 200 with the right bytes and content-type — 404 before publishing, no restart between. public/plugins/ is gitignored: it holds copies, and the originals live with each sidecar. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a058cbb3fd |
inject a mid-turn message instead of replacing the turn
Phase C server half, and a real flaw in phase B. On the subprocess path a second message could only supersede — kill the process, start again, lose the turn — because opencode run has no input channel. The serve takes another prompt into the running turn, so a message arriving mid-turn is handed over with delivery steer and the existing turn is left exactly as it is. Keeping the same turn object is the load-bearing part. Phase B retired it and registered a replacement, which stops officer routing events the serve is still producing while the serve carries on regardless: output goes nowhere and the turn looks hung. Verified end to end through the chat socket — sent a count to 50, injected a change of plan eight seconds in, and BANANA INJECTED came back inside the same turn with deltas streaming throughout. No client change was needed. Officer composer already sends while generating; the difference is only what the sidecar does with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9084fabbf6 |
app store: note where a real PNG icon's bytes will have to live
Real icons are coming and the manifest field already exists — slskd uses it. What is not decided is where the bytes come from for a sidecar that ships from its own repository: /slskd.png works only because it sits in the platform's public/, which a marketplace plugin cannot write to. Records the three options and their trade — marketplace URL (loses icons offline), served by us from the sidecar's directory (works offline, needs a route and caching), or a data URI (no fetch, but bloats every manifest) — so the next person meets the question instead of assuming the current path generalises. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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27c1331b3c |
app store: a sidecar carries its own dock tile and routes, and an uninstalled one has neither
Two gaps, both from the same root: the app knew what an account MAY use and not what this server actually HAS. Availability is now subtracted server-side in the /capabilities answer. "Installed" is orthogonal to "permitted" and the owner is subject to it — the owner bypasses every permission check, but a capability they hold unconditionally still means nothing if its sidecar was never installed. Without this the dock on a fresh machine lists Photos, Jellyfin, Transmission and the rest, each leading to a screen that reports itself unavailable. Computed on the server rather than intersected in the client, so the rule lives in one place: the dock already reads `/capabilities`, and making it read a second list and combine them is how a member's dock and an owner's dock drift apart. `unavailable` is returned alongside `deniedRoutes` because the two mean different things to a UI — "not yours" versus "not here yet, install it". A disabled sidecar counts as unavailable: disable stops the process and its container, so the feature genuinely does not work, and leaving its icon would make disable look broken rather than effective. Reading install state failing subtracts NOTHING, matching useCapabilities' deliberate fail-open. Each entry now also carries a UI manifest — name, icon, colour, rootRoute, routes — because a sidecar shipping from its own repository has to be able to say what it looks like. The icon is a NAME rather than an imported component: a manifest has to survive being JSON from marketplace.officer.dev, which a lucide import cannot make. Tests pin the manifests against the capability registry, so a tile cannot appear for a route the server guards differently, and against each other, so two sidecars cannot claim one root route. No backfill, by decision: this is proven on a blank machine first and applied to alpha from scratch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a06422bd4c |
phase B: run a turn through the serve, behind a switch
OPENCODE_TURNS=serve picks the new engine; unset keeps the subprocess, which is the default and stays the default until this has been lived with. A bad evening should cost one restart, not a revert. Claude is a different sidecar and is untouched. Verified end to end through the real chat socket: session:init -> tool:start(bash) -> tool:result -> assistant:delta x3 -> assistant:text -> result, cost in=304 out=73 Those deltas are the first token streaming an opencode turn has ever produced in officer. Stop is now an INTERRUPT: the turn ends and the session survives — verified by sending a second prompt to the same session afterwards and getting an answer, which killing a subprocess could never do. Reads the LIVE global stream rather than the durable per-session one, because it is a strict superset — same tool.called, tool.success, step.ended, text.ended, plus the deltas that are the whole point. Global means one socket carries every session, so everything filters on sessionID; one subscription is shared for the process rather than one per turn. A turn ends on step.ended with finish != tool-calls. tool-calls is a step boundary MID-turn, and treating it as terminal would cut every tool-using conversation in half. delivery is stated explicitly as queue because it DEFAULTS to steer, which injects into a running turn — wrong for an ordinary send, where two quick messages would merge into one. Wiring steer to the button that means it is phase C. What phase B does not do: read the durable stream. The sidecar still commits every event to chat_session_events as it arrives, so durability is unchanged, but recovering a turn this process never saw needs the ?after= cursor and is its own change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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feb9010097 |
phase A: map the serve event stream, routed nowhere
The mapping half of the serve migration, written and pinned before anything depends on it,
so the switch-over is not also the moment the parsing turns out to be wrong. Nothing routes
through this — turns are still opencode run subprocesses, and the claude path is untouched.
The finding that matters: the serve publishes each turn TWICE, and reading the wrong one
makes it look like it cannot stream at all.
/api/session/{id}/event?after= durable, per session, replayable, durable.seq on every
event, whole values only, NO deltas
/api/event live, GLOBAL, ephemeral, carries text.delta and
tool.input.delta, no cursor
Same turn: 13 events durable, 21 live, the difference being 3 text.delta and 5
tool.input.delta. I probed the per-session one first and nearly recorded "no streaming" as
a fact — it would have removed the main reason to migrate. The split maps exactly onto what
officer already does for claude: durable to chat_session_events, live to UI deltas. The cost
is that the live stream is global, so a consumer must filter on sessionID.
tool:start is emitted on tool.called, not tool.input.started, because only tool.called has
the resolved input object — the input arrives as JSON fragments ({"comman) and a tool row
rendered with half-parsed arguments is worse than one that appears a moment later.
step.ended with finish tool-calls is a step boundary MID-turn, not the end of the turn, so
nothing terminal is emitted for it. Treating it as the end would cut every tool-using
conversation in half.
Fixtures are verbatim captures from 1.18.16. Replaying both real streams through the mapper
reconstructs the turn identically from each, with the reassembled deltas exactly equal to
the committed text and identical cost, and zero unrecognised events.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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38ebe168f0 |
retire two phantom gaps, and plan the migration
Crash-recovery state is not a gap: state:sync goes to the proxy capability and carries proxySecret, and syncState/getCachedState have no callers at all. The row compared opencode against a mechanism officer never consults. The real recovery story now exists and is better — a sidecar restart stops in-flight turns and writes the reason to chat_session_events. Identity is deferred, not forgotten: TODO.md already records it, and chat is kind execution, which the grants API refuses to share at any level, so no member can reach it. Also adds the serve migration plan, written while the facts are fresh and nothing is on fire. It leads with the five things that will bite whoever implements it — per-request location, the data wrapper, delivery defaulting to steer, silent failure on an unconnected credential, and the session.next event names — because none of them are in the API docs and each cost time to find today. Phased so the old path stays one config flip away, and so warm-session lifetime (idle GC, orphan adoption, the supersede race) is imported deliberately rather than discovered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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86fd03b35b |
say a missing opencode binary out loud instead of hanging
Bun.spawn throws on a missing or non-executable binary rather than resolving to a failed process, and that throw escaped runOpenCodeTurn entirely — past the bookkeeping, out of the sidecar command handler, with no opencode:event ever emitted. The browser sat on a spinner nothing could end, because the code that ends turns had not been reached. A wrong OPENCODE_BIN is the ordinary way to get there, so the message names the path it tried: that is the difference between a fix and a debugging session. Also records that messageCount is not a gap. SessionList renders an OpenCode badge in place of the count for those rows, so the hardcoded 0 never reaches a screen, and computing a real one would cost an HTTP call per listed session — the session record has no count field — to populate something nothing shows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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35970146bb |
connect the opencode credential at sidecar boot
opencode keeps credentials in two unrelated places. The CLI, opencode run and the legacy /session surface read auth.json. The newer /api surface — the one with steer, queue, interrupt and a resumable per-session stream — reads its own integration store and knows nothing about that file. With none connected it does not fail. It falls back to what needs no credential, the free tier, and a request for a paid model is never executed: prompt accepted, admitted, prompted, then no step, no error, no message, forever. That silence cost most of an afternoon and would cost it again on every new machine — alpha included. So the sidecar does it, rather than depending on someone having run a curl. Best-effort and never blocking: turns go through opencode run, which reads auth.json and does not care. Retried, because /api/health answers before the integration store is ready — the first version of this shipped without a retry and failed on its very first real boot with a 500, while the identical request succeeded seconds later. Only 5xx retries; a 4xx means the request is wrong and repeating it just prints the same complaint six times. Verified by deleting the credential, restarting, and running sonnet on the new pipeline with no manual step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ecb9025f8f |
the fork blocker was a missing credential, not an upstream bug
Andre said his terminal opencode reaches paid zen models and suggested it was simply not set up here. Correct, and my second wrong call on this page. The new /api pipeline has its own credential store — /api/integration and /api/credential — separate from auth.json, which is what the CLI, opencode run and the legacy /session surface read. Ours had none connected, so it fell back to what needs no credential: the free tier. One POST to /api/integration/opencode/connect/key fixes it, and it survives a serve restart. sonnet and haiku both run on the new pipeline now. The tell I had and did not use: the configured default is big-pickle, and a session with no model ran on ling-3.0-tiny-free INSTEAD of the default. A pipeline ignoring its configured default cannot use it — a credential symptom, sitting in /config/providers the whole time. So steer, queue, interrupt and the resumable per-session SSE are all available with real models. alpha needs the same one-time connect, and the sidecar should do it at boot rather than depend on someone having run it by hand. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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6e9a8ee42f |
let the extension use the bare officer url, no path
Follow-up to the /vaultwarden mount: the suffix is superfluous if officer can tell a bitwarden client apart, and it can. Most of vaultwarden surface does not collide at all — /identity, /notifications, /icons and /events belong to it and to nothing here, so those are served at the root by path alone, no sniffing. Only /api collides (vaultwarden has /api/settings/domains, officer has /api/settings), and there the client says who it is: every bitwarden client stamps Bitwarden-Client-Name, older ones Device-Type. Trusting a client header is fine because this is ROUTING, not authentication — the worst a forged one achieves is reaching vaultwarden, which then demands its own credential exactly as it would have. Nothing is authorised by it. Registered before /api so it wins for a bitwarden client, and narrow enough that an ordinary officer request never matches. Verified: /identity reaches the proxy, /api/sync with the header diverts, /api/chat/models without it still answers 401 from officer, and the SPA is untouched. /vaultwarden still works for anything that prefers an explicit path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f2e38ed9a7 |
serve vaultwarden at officer own host, without officer auth
So the bitwarden browser extension can point here and the separate public vaultwarden hostname can be taken down. /api/vault cannot serve it: that router requires an officer session and REPLACES the caller Authorization header with a server-held vaultwarden token. Right for our own clients — the device then holds no vault credential — and impossible for a third-party client that gets its own token from /identity/connect/token and has nowhere to put a platform JWT. So a separate mount rather than a mode of that router: blending them would put an unauthenticated branch inside the authenticated path. This one forwards Authorization untouched and rewrites nothing. Leaving it open is not a new exposure — everything here was already reachable at the vaultwarden URL it replaces, behind the same master password, and officer cannot add a check it has no credential for. It is also going behind tailscale. Temporary. The end state is our own extension reusing @officer/vault, which already runs as a plain JS bundle outside react native (the iOS autofill extension hosts it in JavaScriptCore), against the /api/vault/session/login broker — then nothing addresses vaultwarden directly and this mount is deleted rather than adjusted. Needed its own entry in server.tsx: only listed paths reach hono and the rest fall through to the SPA, so without it the endpoint answered 200 with the react shell — a missing route that looks like a working one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b07cae142f |
adopt on a resume even when the harness is a guess
Regression from my own B7 change, reported within the hour: turns collapsing to "turn completed without output" and coming back only on refresh. B7 stopped resume-cursor defaulting an unidentified session to claude-code. Correct for the durable cut-off row, wrong for adoption: useChat sends model only if modelRef.current is set, so a reconnect without one is routine, not exotic. Declining to adopt left the socket unbound to the live session, so the running turn output went nowhere — and a refresh looked like a fix because it rebuilds from the durable log. Adoption is about DELIVERY and must be generous; only the durable write needs certainty. So adopt on the default again, mark it as an assumption, and skip the cut-off check on it. That keeps B7 fixed — no false "agent went away" written against an opencode session — with no unbound sockets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ecc10ae6af |
name a live opencode row from the prompt until opencode names it
Same shape as the claude side, which has never shown a live row without a name. OpenCode titles a session from the conversation and does it well, but asynchronously — so for the whole time a turn is RUNNING, which is exactly what /chat/live shows, the session is still called "New session - <ISO>". Its own title wins the moment it exists; until then the row falls back to the prompt that started the session. Kept per sessionKey, first turn only, so it stays the name of the conversation rather than following whatever was asked most recently. Dropped with the session id it sits beside. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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90e0ca8ab4 |
stop showing opencode placeholder titles as if they were names
OpenCode titles a session from the conversation, but asynchronously — a finished turn of ours ended up called "Single color in oc-red2.png", better than anything we would generate. Until then the session is literally named "New session - 2026-08-10T15:44:17.178Z". That window is exactly when a session is most visible: /chat/live shows turns that are RUNNING, so the placeholder is what the panel catches, and a live row was being labelled with a timestamp string. Recognise it and treat it as untitled, so the good name arrives on its own. Passing --title on the run was the other option and is worse: it fixes the transient case by permanently replacing opencode own title with a truncated prompt, degrading it where it lasts longest. A pattern match rather than startsWith, because a genuine title is allowed to begin with those words. Two defects the tests caught while writing them: a whitespace-only title was not treated as unnamed, and the mapping let undefined through where a string was required. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f0aa6dbf4b |
record that images are done and were never fork-gated
Bucket 1 lists them as No, and phase 4 put them behind the migration. opencode run takes --file, so the path we already use carries them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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73b8111216 |
send images to opencode, which never needed the fork
B4 properly. The composer gate was the honest stopgap; this is the fix. opencode run takes attachments with --file, so images work on the subprocess path we already use — the parity doc had them down as phase 4, behind the serve migration, and they were not. The bug was one omission: handleOpenCodeChat`s msg type had no images field, so the browser sent them, the bubble rendered them, and they stopped at that signature. Nothing reported a loss anywhere. Attachments are paths, not inline data, so the sidecar spills each image to a temp file for the length of the turn and removes it in settle — the same place every other per-turn resource is released, so a killed or superseded turn cleans up too. The load-bearing detail is `--` before the prompt: --file is an array option, so without the separator the prompt is eaten as another filename and the turn dies with "File not found:" followed by the entire message. Confirmed against the binary, and pinned by a test that records argv from a stub. list-models now reports each model own capability instead of a hardcoded false — opencode publishes capabilities.input.image per model and nothing had ever read it. Defaults to false, so a model that does not declare it keeps the affordance hidden. Verified end to end: a red png sent over the chat socket to opencode/claude-sonnet-4-6 came back "Red". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ba71dc1957 |
app store: make it work — pm2, install state, and the routes
Email installs end to end now, which was the point of picking it as tier one: no container, no external
wiring, so the machinery is exercised without the provisioning half.
Verified against the running system, not asserted:
POST /api/app-store/email/install -> {"status":"installed","completed":["preflight","schema","process"]}
row -> email mode=config status=installed enabled=true
pm2 -> officer-email online
second install -> all three steps skipped, process not restarted
disable -> stopped
The server boots with the new router, which is the real test of the capability entry: totality.ts throws
before serve() if a mounted router has none, so booting IS the check passing.
pm2.ts shells out rather than importing pm2 as a library. PM2 is already the supervisor and the
ecosystem file is already the definition of how each process runs; a second thing in charge of that
means two supervisors disagreeing. It also means an owner can undo anything the app store did with a
command they already know. The one fact that matters: `pm2 start <name>` fails for a process PM2 has
never seen, so a first install starts from the ecosystem file with --only, and everything after goes by
name. Callers cannot know which case they are in, so startProcess decides.
Disable stops rather than deletes: a stopped process still shows in `pm2 list`, which is the honest
picture. Deleting would make a disabled sidecar indistinguishable from one never installed.
beginInstall returns the existing row instead of replacing it — that is what makes a retry a resume
rather than a re-provision — and clears lastError on the way in, so a UI never shows a stale failure
beside a working service.
The container half of enable/disable/uninstall is deliberately absent rather than stubbed silently: a
disable that leaves Immich running is a different thing from one that stops it, and the difference is
memory on the user's machine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a41abb4b0f |
characterise the fork blocker: only free models run
Not sonnet, and not variant. Swept models through the new pipeline: every -free model runs, every paid one silently does not — haiku, sonnet and codex-mini all never start. Ruled out: variant (sonnet advertises low/medium/high/max and echoes back an invalid "default", which looked like the answer and was not — setting high explicitly also never ran); credentials (zen key in auth.json plus ANTHROPIC_API_KEY); and the sidecar environment, since the same process runs sonnet fine through opencode run. So the new pipeline does not resolve paid-model credentials and says nothing, while run and the legacy path authenticate fine. Upstream bug in an in-progress pipeline, not our config. The fork stays blocked, but precisely: steer and queue are proven, and the day a paid model runs there the migration is worth doing immediately. Re-run the sweep after each upgrade. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4b9b98efda |
app store: run a sidecar's setup.sh, streaming it and collecting what it returns
Implements the half of the template contract that faces the platform: answers go in as environment and never as prompts, and results come back as OFFICER_RESULT_<KEY>= lines on stdout. A line protocol rather than JSON because the same stream is the user's live log — it goes to a terminal panel while the install runs. A script that must emit clean JSON cannot also narrate, and one that emits both needs a framing convention anyway. This mirrors the @@officer:progress@@ sentinel the job runner already uses, with the same rule: marker lines are plucked out, everything else passes through. parseResults is pure and tested against the realistic near-misses: a line that MENTIONS the prefix without starting with it, an empty value (Transmission with no RPC auth returns exactly that, and blank is a real answer), a value containing `=` (splitting on every one would truncate a credential), and a prefix with no assignment (a script bug — skipped rather than stored as a blank key). Verified end to end against a real script: environment reaches it, stderr is forwarded (docker compose writes its progress there, so dropping it would hide most of what a user watches), OFFICER_NONINTERACTIVE is set so a script that would block fails loudly instead of hanging behind a web form, and a non-zero exit is reported with the tail. Notes an artifact rather than hiding it: the two streams are pumped concurrently, so the error tail can interleave differently from real time. The live log is correctly ordered; only the summary can read out of order. Serialising the pumps would make a script that writes heavily to one stream block on the other. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4a03b9f84e |
app store: the install step machine, resumable and testable without docker
Install spans a container start, a health wait, an upstream API call and a process start. Any can fail, and one of them — a token only a human can mint — is EXPECTED to stop the run. A straight-line function has two bad options there: unwind everything, or leave a half-installed service that neither works nor uninstalls, which is the state users cannot get out of. So each step is named, completion is persisted, and running install again resumes. planSteps is a pure function of (entry, mode) and the effects are injected, which makes ordering, resume, blocking and failure testable with no Docker, Postgres, PM2 or Immich in sight. 15 tests cover exactly the behaviour that only appears when something goes wrong. Two rules are enforced by the plan rather than remembered at call sites: 'existing' never provisions, so pointing at an instance the user already runs cannot start a container; and the members step is omitted entirely for a service with no user concept, so a Transmission install does not report a step that did nothing — which reads as a silent failure to anyone debugging a member's access. `blocked` is a first-class outcome, not an error. For Immich the container is up and healthy and only its own UI can mint a key; calling that a failure would make a normal install look broken and invite the user to tear down a working container. The blocking step is deliberately NOT recorded as complete, so a resume re-runs the step the human just answered. Results feed forward — provision discovers the URL that connect writes down two steps later — over a copy of the caller's values, so a failure halfway cannot rewrite what an earlier attempt achieved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b197c2aeba |
app store: settle the lifecycle — disable stops the container, uninstall keeps the schema
Disable now stops the container as well as the sidecar. There is no reason to leave Immich holding memory while Photos is switched off. For mode 'existing' there is no container of ours, so disable is only the sidecar. Uninstall stops both, removes the containers, and deletes the install row. It does NOT drop the sidecar's tables — pushing back on "maybe db schema too" for the same reason volumes are kept, because it is the same category. Music favourites, the Jellyfin server registry, photos configuration and saved connections are real data, and someone uninstalling Photos is saying "stop running this", not "forget which albums I favourited". Keeping them also makes reinstall a RESTORE: uninstall in June, reinstall in August, and the configuration is still there. Dropping the schema would hand back a blank service that looks subtly broken to someone who remembers setting it up. An unused table costs a row in information_schema and nothing else. Also removes a line left stale by the previous commit, which still said the user chooses disposal at uninstall time. There is no such choice any more, and a doc that describes an option the code does not have is how the option comes back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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936b96a36e |
app store: uninstall removes containers and never data
There is now no uninstall option that deletes data, rather than a careful one that does. A user uninstalling a sidecar is saying "stop running this", which is not the same sentence as "delete my photo library", and for Immich or Jellyfin getting that wrong once is unrecoverable. No confirmation dialog makes it a good default. So: `docker compose down` without `-v`. Containers and networks go; the service directory and everything under it stays exactly as it was. The bind-mount convention already makes this hard to get wrong, which is worth noting because it means the safety is structural rather than a rule someone has to keep following. Data lives on the host inside the service directory, so `-v` — which only removes NAMED volumes — could not delete it even if a future change added the flag back. `mode: 'existing'` has no disposal question at all: we did not create that service, so uninstall removes our sidecar and our rows and touches nothing else. Reclaiming disk becomes its own feature later, with the sizes in front of the user — "Photos is using 340 GB, delete it?" — as a deliberate act rather than a checkbox inside an uninstall flow. Removed two stale `down -v` references that survived the first pass, one in the schema comment and one in the design doc's table. Leftovers like those are how a rule becomes permission again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ee38257856 |
app store: make member provisioning a mechanism, not an install-time loop
The owner installs, but a server may already have members, and a member added next month needs the same work. So the unit is (service × member) reachable from two triggers — install a service, provision existing members; add a member, provision installed services — rather than a loop inside the installer. Only handling the first works on day one and rots. No new table. A member is provisioned exactly when they hold a service_connections row: their own credential, url NULL, inheriting the instance from the owner's. That schema anticipated this before this existed, and a second record of the same fact would only be able to disagree with the first. Three outcomes, declared per catalogue entry so the installer never special-cases a service. `accounts` is fully transparent. `none` is a single-tenant daemon with nothing to do — filtered before the provisioning loop so callers can tell "nothing to do" from "did nothing", which look identical at a call site and matter when someone is asking why a member cannot see a feature. `invite` is not a weaker `accounts`, it is the correct outcome: Vaultwarden derives its encryption key from the master password, so a credential we could mint would mean a vault we could read. Transparent right up to where being transparent would be a defect. The per-service work is an interface implemented beside each sidecar rather than a switch in core — a central function growing a case per service is what would stop any of this shipping from its own repository. Implementations must be idempotent, since both triggers can fire for the same pair and a duplicate account upstream is not ours to undo. Deprovision is optional and defaults to leaving the upstream account alone: deleting an Immich user deletes their photos. Written assuming the vault's multi-user adaptation has landed. Today /api/vault is owner-only by an explicit ownerGate, so a member is refused before Vaultwarden is reached — verified, and out of scope. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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890f57a7a6 |
app store: compose templates and their setup scripts, with two proven end to end
Each provisionable service gets a directory holding a compose template and a setup.sh. Deliberately the shape a sidecar needs once it lives in its own repository: metadata, compose, setup script, schema. The contract (templates/README.md): answers come from the ENVIRONMENT, so the web form fills them in and a person on a VPS is prompted only for what is missing, and only on a TTY — one script for both, not two code paths. Idempotent, writes only inside its own directory, streams progress on stdout (the installer pipes it to a terminal panel), and returns results as OFFICER_RESULT_<KEY>= lines so nothing has to scrape a log. House conventions throughout: relative bind mounts so data sits beside the compose file rather than hiding behind `docker volume inspect`, containers running as the installing user so downloads are not root-owned, loopback-only ports unless the service's whole job is inbound connections, and no external networks — the owner's own composes attach to an `nginx` network that a fresh VPS does not have. Transmission verified end to end on this machine, on non-conflicting ports, then torn down: renders, starts, waits, reports. Its health check accepts 409 because Transmission rejects the first request by design — only-200 would have waited out the full timeout against a working daemon. Re-run produced exactly one container, and files landed owned by the user rather than root. Vaultwarden covers the case where we GENERATE the credential rather than asking for one. An existing token is reused, never rotated, because rotating during a resumed install would lock the owner out of the admin page. The Argon2 hash has its `$` doubled or compose interpolation mangles it. The token is not returned to the platform at all — the vault sidecar proxies the Bitwarden protocol and never needs it, and a secret we do not hold is one we cannot leak. Corrects the design doc, which assumed provisioning always knows the connection. Three shapes: we set the credential, we generate it, or a human must mint it in the service's UI afterwards (Immich, Jellyfin, Memos). The third makes "provisioned and running but not yet connected" a real state rather than a failure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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7359867f7f |
app store: check the host before writing anything
An install that discovers a missing dependency halfway through has already made a directory, possibly started a container and written a row, and then has to unwind — leaving the user with something that neither works nor uninstalls. A 30ms check first is worth most of that. Verified while writing this: nothing in scripts/ installs Docker, and nothing checks for it. setup-dockers.sh invokes `docker compose` with no preflight, so a fresh host without Docker fails partway through setup with a bare "command not found". Recorded in the design doc rather than fixed here — the intended fix is a setup.sh per sidecar, which is also what a sidecar needs once it ships from its own repository. `docker compose version` is the probe, not `docker --version`: the latter passes with a dead daemon, which is the failure people actually hit. "Not installed" and "daemon unreachable" are reported separately because the remedies differ. Checked per MODE, not per entry. A host without Docker can still install Photos by pointing at an Immich somewhere else; refusing the whole entry is the over-strict check that makes people work around the installer instead of using it. Dropped `requires: 'docker'` from the catalogue type. Needing Docker is exactly "this entry can provision", which `modes` already says, so declaring it twice invites the two to disagree. Derived by needsDocker instead, and a test asserts the derivation matches every entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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654cb10711 |
app store: put provisioned containers under the officer root, not the user's
The install layout a machine should have, seasoned owner or not:
~/officerdev/
platform/ the app
data/ DATA_PATH
dockers/ services the app store provisioned
capabilities/ the file-based item store
One root, everything under it. OFFICER_ROOT derives from DATA_PATH rather than being a second variable
that has to agree with the first.
Deliberately not `~/dockers`, where a seasoned user already keeps their own estate — 47 services on this
machine. That separation buys two things. Containers the app store created are distinguishable from the
user's own structurally, rather than by a naming convention we would have to enforce and they could
break. And we never reason about someone else's compose files: the store does not scan, adopt or modify
anything outside its own directory.
That also simplifies "I already have one of these" — it is answered by the user giving a URL, never by
us finding a directory and guessing whose it is. An earlier draft had the installer adopting existing
directories, which meant reading, and potentially writing over, services Officer did not create.
This development machine predates the convention and derives an ugly-but-correct path, since the project
sits inside ~/dockers/officer.dev. Still isolated, still one root. New installs get the clean shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fc48a572d2 |
app store: the catalogue, the install-state table, and what phase 0 must not foreclose
First slice, on a worktree branch so none of it touches the tree the live server runs from. `sidecar_installs` — server-level, no userId, because a sidecar is one process serving the machine. That is the line that keeps the model coherent for several users: installed is server-level and owner-only, configured is per user in service_connections. A member can use Gitea without being able to install it or point it somewhere else. `installed` and `enabled` are separate because they answer different questions, which is what gives the reversible middle ground: disable stops the process and keeps container, config, schema and data. `completedSteps` makes install resumable rather than merely retryable — the failure mode being designed against is a half-installed service that neither works nor uninstalls. The catalogue is data, not code: no functions, no compile-time coupling, because the same shape has to arrive as JSON from marketplace.officer.dev later. Its test pins it to the real estate — it offers exactly the processes the light profile excludes, names processes that exist, and claims capabilities that exist. That last check earned itself immediately: it caught `vault` (no capability at all — it is EXEMPT because Bitwarden clients carry a Vaultwarden bearer, not a platform JWT) and `notify` (which does have one, where I had written null). Docker templates follow the convention already in use across 47 services in ~/dockers: a directory per service, compose inside, relative bind mounts so data sits beside it, USER_UID/USER_GID as the owner. An existing directory is evidence of an existing install and must be adopted, never overwritten. Records what Phase 0 must not foreclose: a remote marketplace, sidecars moving to their own repositories, and third-party plugins — including the note that catalogue.test.ts pins Phase 0's invariant rather than the design's, since that relationship inverts once sidecars leave this repo. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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977d14922f |
email: migrate the sync position per key, not all-or-nothing
The previous commit migrated only when SQLite was completely empty, on the assumption that a non-empty file is an authoritative one. A real account disproved that within minutes of it landing. The older Gmail backfill had already written SOME keys into SQLite — last_sync_at and the uidvalidity set — and never the imap_lastuid ones. So the file was non-empty and half-migrated at the same time, all-or-nothing skipped the migration, and nine imap_lastuid keys stayed only in Postgres. A missing lastuid makes the next sync refetch that folder from UID 1: on the mailbox this was found on, 18,755 messages and 6.9 GB. Now merged per key with the file always winning a conflict. That keeps the property all-or-nothing was protecting — a restored older emails.db still overrides a newer Postgres row for every key it has, so it cannot be advanced past mail it does not contain — and adds the keys the file never had, which are exactly the ones whose absence is expensive. Verified against the live account: all 22 Postgres keys present afterwards, imap_lastuid:INBOX restored to 208407, and last_sync_at left at the file's older value, so it re-checks a fortnight rather than skipping it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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539aeca7ec |
reverse the fork decision: the pipeline works, my probe did not
I concluded a few commits ago that the serve new /api/session pipeline accepts prompts and never executes them, and kept turns on opencode run. Wrong. Every probe behind that passed an explicit model claude-sonnet-4-6, and THAT model silently does not run on the new surface — no error, no event, no assistant message. Drop the field and the same request completes. One broken variable in every experiment, read as a property of the system. Measured on 1.18.16, both machines upgraded today: delivery steer injects into a running turn (verified, output changed to order), delivery queue runs after it (verified, ONE then TWO, zero errors), and model selection works via POST /model — just not with sonnet. So the fork is reopened and worth taking, targeting the new surface rather than the legacy message path, which generates fine but has neither steer nor queue. Blocked only on why sonnet dies there while working under opencode run. Third time this project has hit the same trap: opencode accepts input it does not honour and says nothing — directory in the body, location.directory that never existed, now model. A probe that changes one thing and sees nothing has not learned the feature is missing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0c90216c7a |
email: keep an account's sync position inside its own emails.db
The messages were in emails.db and the position — last_sync_at, and per-folder uidvalidity/lastuid — was a jsonb column on email_accounts in Postgres. Two stores for one fact, with an edge that only shows up when you try to move a mailbox to another machine. The expensive part of an email account is the first sync: hours of IMAP for a large mailbox, which is exactly why "copy emails.db to the new server" is the obvious way to bring one across. With the position in Postgres that silently does not work — the new server's column is empty, !last_sync_at says first sync, and the whole mailbox downloads again on top of the one just restored. The other direction is quieter and worse. Restore an OLDER emails.db while Postgres holds a NEWER position and the sidecar skips every message between the two, permanently, because nothing looks below lastuid again. Re-syncing is slow; skipping mail is data loss nobody notices. Not a new idea — the Gmail path already read SQLite and fell back to Postgres, backfilling so the fallback was taken once. Only the IMAP path had not followed. This extracts that pattern so both use one copy, and unifies the isFirstSync fork in accounts.ts, which is how the two drifted apart to begin with. The file wins over Postgres, always, and only migrates when it holds nothing at all. Topping up a partial position from Postgres would reintroduce precisely the divergence this removes. email_accounts.sync_meta is kept and marked legacy rather than dropped: it is the one-time backfill source for every account created before this, and dropping it would strand any that has not synced since. Nothing writes to it now. 11 tests on the migration, aimed at both expensive failures — migrating when we should not, and failing to migrate an account that predates the change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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41663bc207 |
decide the phase 2 fork: turns stay on opencode run
The serve has a second, newer API surface nobody here had looked at, and it publishes exactly what the parity doc calls impossible under stdin ignore: delivery steer and queue on POST /prompt, an interrupt that does not tear down, and a per-session event stream with an after cursor — the durable-replay machinery officer hand-built for claude, as a primitive. That would have made migrating obvious. It does not execute. A prompt is accepted with an admittedSeq, stored, emits prompt.admitted and prompted, and then never steps. Ruled out separately: the model, the permissions (build is *:allow, no pending requests), the per-request location (the surface is location-scoped via header or a deepObject query, supplied everywhere, no change), and a config gate. The legacy POST /session/id/message?directory= generates fine in 17s, so the serve itself works — only the new pipeline is inert. session.next.* is the tell. And not a version problem, which is the part everything here had backwards: this Mac runs 1.18.11 and alpha runs 1.17.9, measured. The dead pipeline was tested on the NEWER binary. The original "this server runs 1.17.9" meant alpha and was copied to a machine where it was false; corrected in runner.ts and the test. So building against it now would produce code that looks finished and does nothing, which is the failure mode this project keeps rediscovering. One request reopens the question after any upgrade, and the doc names it. Also de-flakes the lifecycle tests: they spawn real processes, and a fixed sleep(750) went red once on a machine busy running these probes. Presence assertions poll now. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9118a9f76c |
name the live opencode rows
They were permanently unnamed, and the two halves needed to name them already existed on officer: the sidecar reports its own sessionKey because that is all it has, while the ses_ id arrives separately over opencode:session and is recorded in opencode/state.ts. Nothing joined them. /chat/live joins them now, so no protocol or sidecar change — widening LiveOpenCodeSession would have meant sending the sidecar a fact it told officer in the first place. One list call names every row rather than one transcript load each, and it is skipped when nothing is running or no id has been reported, so an idle Live panel never touches the serve. Verified against a real turn, which also showed the design working as intended: the first poll has no id yet and shows nothing, the next shows title and cwd. That window is real and short, and showing nothing beats showing a key the user has never seen. Worth knowing: opencode titles its own sessions "New session - <ISO timestamp>", so the row is located but not meaningfully named. That is genuinely its title, not a bug here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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1892c23aef |
close bucket 0
B8 done, so every defect that made opencode behave wrongly is fixed. Notes what that does not mean: bucket 1 is capability gaps, and the visible ones are downstream of the phase 2 fork, which is still unstarted and still Andre to call. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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cdee320fed |
stop orphaning opencode turns and serves on restart
B8, both halves. They share index.ts, so they share a commit. In-flight turns: `opencode run` is spawned, not supervised, so pm2 restart officer-opencode left every turn ALIVE — reparented, still spending tokens, still writing files as the agent, with the only reader of its stdout gone. The transcript stopped mid-tool-call, which reads as the agent hanging. stopAllOpenCodeTurns kills them and settles each synchronously, because the caller is about to process.exit and nothing waiting on proc.exited would ever run. Settling writes a reason, so a reload after a restart explains itself instead of trailing off. Turns are stopped BEFORE the connection is destroyed — that write travels over it — and the flush is bounded, since losing the explanation is bad but hanging the restart is worse. Stale serves: the sweep read /proc, so it was a no-op on macOS and orphaned serves piled up, one per unclean exit, each holding a port. Added a pidfile sweep alongside it. A pid we wrote ourselves needs no cwd guard to prove it is ours, which is the part ps cannot answer portably (macOS would need lsof), and a serve started by hand is never in the file. The guard checks command AND subcommand: matching the word serve anywhere in the line would sweep a running turn whose prompt merely mentioned it. Fixtures are real ps output from both machines, not invented. Split into serve-sweep.ts because index.ts spawns a serve at module scope, so a test importing it would start one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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73ccf15a89 |
record that only B8 is left, and what B7 actually was
The bucket-0 table had no status anywhere; it lived in the report docs, which means the list itself still reads as eight open defects. Says B1-B7 are done and where. Also corrects B7 in place: the table describes the spurious cut-off only, and the same default was mis-adopting the session into the wrong harness entirely. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d9a3513cb5 |
stop resume-cursor guessing that a session is claude
B7. `msg.model || DEFAULT_MODEL` declared every session without an explicit model to be claude-code, and the parity doc recorded only the visible half of what that cost. The durable false cut-off is real: endTurnIfAgentIsGone asked the claude sidecar about a key it had never held, was told false, and wrote "the agent went away" into a turn that was running fine. It survives reload, because surviving reload is what that row is for. The same default also handed the session to adoptOrphanedSession as a claude one, which subscribes it to that sidecar bus and pins session.model — so an opencode turn output never arrived, and stopping it called killClaude on a key that sidecar never had. A stop button that silently does nothing. decideResume makes both rules explicit: the server record beats the client claim, and an unknown harness stays unknown — no adoption, no cut-off check, just the replay. Silence is the safe failure when the wrong answer is written durably. DEFAULT_MODEL stays in handleAttach and is now commented as to why: that path reached its sessionId by asking the claude sidecar to resolve a claudeSessionId, so only claude could have answered. First test in api/chat, which had none. websocket.ts has no seam to drive the handler through, so the decision is extracted and tested; the wiring around it is not covered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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be259f813a |
design: sidecars as installable apps
Agreed in conversation, nothing implemented. Light stops being a variant and becomes the baseline — chat, terminal, file browser — and the other fourteen sidecars arrive by the user asking for them from an app store, eventually including sidecars the user did not write. Mostly not a rewrite, for three reasons already true: every API route stays mounted regardless of which sidecars run, officer already spawns nothing, and service_connections already solves the multi-user case. What is new is provisioning, per-sidecar schema, and persisted install state. Docker: officer is the installer, never the owner. Real compose files in the user's own directory, started as him, found again by label. `docker compose down` works, and the containers outlive Officer. Per-sidecar schema is right here specifically because third-party plugins are a real goal, and the dependency graph makes it tractable: measured across 19 schema files, every sidecar depends on auth.ts and nothing else, with no sidecar-to-sidecar edges anywhere. So the plugin contract is "you may reference users.id" — which also makes full uninstall well-defined, since nothing else points at a plugin's tables. service_connections stays core and shared rather than per-service, because it already does the part nobody would get right alone: a NULL url means "inherit the instance", so the owner's row is the instance and members hold only their own credential, making "members never see the instance URL" a property of the schema instead of a filter someone has to remember. Records six open questions rather than settling them, including plugin migrations, ID namespacing for a marketplace, and where plugin-specific config lives. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |