Same treatment as the browser relay: mounts commented, code left on disk. Its
tables were already commented out of the schema earlier tonight, which is what
made this necessary — /api/vault was mounted against tables db:push no longer
creates, so a fresh core install shipped an endpoint that could only fail with a
Postgres "relation does not exist".
Vaultwarden is not one mount. Eight places had to go, and grepping for `vault`
found them only because several are not named after a router:
hono.ts /api/vault the authenticated reverse-proxy
/vaultwarden the unauthenticated one for the browser extension
VAULT_ONLY_PREFIXES loop /identity, /notifications, /icons, /events
the isBitwardenClient diverter an /api/* middleware that hands Bitwarden
clients to the vault router before anything else sees them
./api/vault/sidecar-server a SIDE-EFFECT import capturing the sidecar's port
UNPROTECTED_API_PREFIXES the '/vault' entry
server.tsx the 'vault' ws provider, its handler, and the notifications upgrade route
The side-effect import is the one worth naming: it registers a sidecar listener
and appears in no route table, so nothing about unmounting the routers would have
stopped it running.
No capability registry change, unlike browser and task-logs. Vaultwarden is
exempt from totality on both halves — EXEMPT_API_PREFIXES has '/vault'
("Bitwarden protocol clients authenticate to Vaultwarden, not to Officer") and
EXEMPT_WS_PROVIDERS has 'vault'. So nothing claims it and nothing breaks by
unmounting it. I said the opposite before checking; the check is what settled it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A complete read path over a table nothing could write to. task-logger.ts exported
createTaskLog, appendToLog and finalizeLog, and none of the three was called
anywhere in the tree — so `task_logs` could never gain a row, and the screen was
permanently empty for everyone.
The read half was fully wired: mounted router, capability claim, dock icon, two
routes and a page-title rule. That is why it looked alive.
Gone, in the order it was reached:
Screens/Dashboard/TaskLogs/ the screen
App.tsx /task-logs and /task-logs/:id
Dashboard/index.tsx the export
Layout/Dock.tsx the 'Logs' icon, and ScrollText with it
state/usePageTitle.ts the title rule
api/task-logs/task-logs.ts the router, and its mount in hono.ts
api/task-logger.ts 101 lines of orphaned writer
officer_db/src/operations/ the directory
officer_db/src/schema.ts the export line
officer_db/src/types.ts TaskLogSelect / TaskLogInsert
capabilities/registry.ts loses '/task-logs' from the `tasks` capability's `api`
AND `routes`. The api half is not optional: assertCapabilityTotality check 2
refuses to boot on a capability claiming a prefix nothing mounts, so unmounting
the router while leaving the claim would have stopped the server starting.
db:push now creates 21 tables, down from 43 at the start of the evening.
officer_db/src/operations was one of the two lopsided directories the
schema/queries merge exposed. integrations/ is the remaining one, and it is
legitimate — it spans server and user-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
BROWSER_RELAY_PORT is gone and the second listener no longer starts. The Chrome
extension, api/browser/ and the /browser screen all stay on disk — this is going
to be extracted, and deleting it means writing it again.
Three things had to move together, and the middle one would have failed the boot
on its own:
server.tsx the listener, commented out with the variable name recorded
hono.ts the /api/browser mount, closed
registry.ts the 'browser' capability's claim on /browser, dropped
assertCapabilityTotality checks both directions: check 2 refuses to start on a
capability claiming a prefix nothing serves. Unmounting the router alone would
have left the registry describing it, and the server would not have come up.
The capability itself survives because it also claims /scrape, which shares
nothing with the relay — it launches its own headless chromium through playwright
and never speaks to the extension.
The comment in server.tsx carries the two facts that are not recoverable by
reading the remaining code. First, the port is an INPUT TO A CREDENTIAL:
relay-auth.ts derives each extension's token as HMAC(JWT_SECRET,
'officer-browser-relay-v1:${port}:${userId}:${salt}'), so bringing the relay back
on a different number silently invalidates every paired browser — reported by the
extension as "Relay not reachable", which SETUP.md blames on a wrong address,
port or token. Second, it cannot come back as a kernel-assigned port:0 like the
other sidecars: the extension is configured by hand and stores the value, so a
port that moves each restart breaks the pairing each restart.
Left alone deliberately: the /browser route in App.tsx, its Dock entry, and the
Settings → Browser Relay panel. They will not work against a closed endpoint.
Removing them is frontend work for the extraction, not part of switching the
listener off.
.env is down to PORT and POSTGRES_URL.
Not typechecked (empty node_modules, frozen installs). Every changed file parses;
the setup section was run and writes two variables.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN, ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC, and everything they gated. The flag
defaulted to ON, so none of it ran on a real install — what comes out is
documented defence in depth that was already switched off. The file said so
itself: "Both flags and their call sites come out once the tailnet is the
perimeter."
Origin was never authentication here in any case. An app's `officer://<hex>`
origin is chosen by the client, forgeable outside a browser, and extractable from
a shipped binary.
Gone: the two flags, isOriginAllowed, isOriginCheckDisabled, isMusicOriginExempt,
originValidationMiddleware, ORIGIN_RULES and the whole OFFICER_<APP>_ORIGIN
scheme, PUBLIC_URL's origin/host derivation, and origin-validation.test.ts, which
existed only to pin them. CORS now echoes whatever Origin it is given, which is
what every install already did.
What SURVIVES is the reason this needed care. origin-validation.ts held two
unrelated things, and the second was the global authorization gate — a valid
non-owner token reaches only what its role grants, deliberately NOT under the
flag because it is account-based rather than origin-based. Its own comment called
it "the airtight half". Deleting the file wholesale would have deleted
authorization.
So it moves to _middlewares/capability-gate.ts as capabilityGateMiddleware, with
the name matching what it does: nothing in it reads an Origin header any more.
hono.ts mounts it in the same position, ahead of every router.
origin-middleware.ts stays and is untouched — it extracts the Origin for six auth
handlers that log it, and for passkeys. Extraction, not validation.
Also updates every claim that rested on the old model: CLAUDE.md's security
section and repo map, docs/secret-store.md, docs/mobile-api-keys.md, and five
messages in machine-setup's Tailscale section which told the owner to set
ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN=false when declining a tailnet. That advice is now impossible to
follow, and the honest version is different: with no tailnet the token is the
whole lock, so put a proxy in front and restrict who can reach it.
Not typechecked (empty node_modules, frozen installs). Every changed file parses;
the setup section was run and writes four variables now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
f0af723 granted chat to every role by default, which is right, but the route
still refuses non-owners — so a new member gets a tile that resolves and an API
that 403s, the exact broken state b4f88ec and eda004a were built to remove.
The fix is not to withdraw the grant. It is to answer the question the member
actually has, which is "what do I do about it": their own claude, in their own
home, needs them to sign in once with their own Anthropic account. The platform
cannot do that for them — logging in is an interactive act against an account
that is theirs, and the alternative, pointing them at the owner's credential
proxy, spends the owner's subscription on their turns.
GET /api-status returns two booleans about the caller's own home plus the one
instruction that fits their case, so the UI can render a terminal saying "run
claude once" rather than an error.
Its own router, deliberately not on chatRouter: that router refuses every
non-owner wholesale and is right to — reads there leak the owner's project
directory names — which means an endpoint on it could not be read by the
accounts that need it most. Same `chat` capability, no owner gate, and nothing
in the response describes anyone but the caller.
Frontend not done: nothing calls this yet, so behaviour is still unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"This folder is empty" was a lie. The five seeded directories were sitting there and the
platform's readdir raised EACCES: a member's home is 700 and owned by them, which is
correct for a shell and locks out the file browser, which runs inside the platform
process. /ls caught the error and returned an empty listing, so a refusal looked exactly
like data.
Two doors, two boundaries, and that is the point rather than a compromise. The terminal
and the agent RUN AS the member and the kernel is the boundary there. The file browser
acts on the member's behalf from inside the platform, which already applies its own
containment and is the owner's process on the owner's machine — it can read anything via
sudo regardless. Giving it access describes who is doing the work.
Done with named POSIX ACLs, because it has to hold in BOTH directions: a file the
platform writes must be editable by the member and vice versa. Mode bits cannot say that
— whichever party is neither owner nor group lands in "other", and widening "other"
opens the home to every account on the box. A shared group fails the same way, since both
parties would have to be in it and that puts every member in a group that can read every
other member's home. Two named entries plus `d:` defaults grant exactly two users and are
inherited by whatever either side creates, whatever their umask.
Verified: platform lists the home, member edits a platform-written file, platform edits a
member-written file, and a SECOND member is refused on both ls and cat.
/ls now distinguishes EACCES from a missing directory. An empty result is data and must
never be how a refusal looks.
acl joins the core packages in setup.sh — the alternative is an account that provisions
and then cannot list its own home.
Also: the file browser's own useTasks/useAgents fired /tasks, /agents and both category
endpoints on every render, which is where the last four 403s came from — they are the
context menu's Run Task and agent submenus, execution-only. Gated.
And plans is deleted: router, screen, routes, dock tile, hook, page title and its
capability. It read markdown from <repo>/plans, which does not exist. Fresh-install
Permissions is now Files alone, with Terminal to come.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the /vaultwarden mount: the suffix is superfluous if officer can tell a
bitwarden client apart, and it can.
Most of vaultwarden surface does not collide at all — /identity, /notifications, /icons and
/events belong to it and to nothing here, so those are served at the root by path alone, no
sniffing. Only /api collides (vaultwarden has /api/settings/domains, officer has
/api/settings), and there the client says who it is: every bitwarden client stamps
Bitwarden-Client-Name, older ones Device-Type.
Trusting a client header is fine because this is ROUTING, not authentication — the worst a
forged one achieves is reaching vaultwarden, which then demands its own credential exactly
as it would have. Nothing is authorised by it.
Registered before /api so it wins for a bitwarden client, and narrow enough that an ordinary
officer request never matches. Verified: /identity reaches the proxy, /api/sync with the
header diverts, /api/chat/models without it still answers 401 from officer, and the SPA is
untouched. /vaultwarden still works for anything that prefers an explicit path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
So the bitwarden browser extension can point here and the separate public vaultwarden
hostname can be taken down.
/api/vault cannot serve it: that router requires an officer session and REPLACES the caller
Authorization header with a server-held vaultwarden token. Right for our own clients — the
device then holds no vault credential — and impossible for a third-party client that gets
its own token from /identity/connect/token and has nowhere to put a platform JWT.
So a separate mount rather than a mode of that router: blending them would put an
unauthenticated branch inside the authenticated path. This one forwards Authorization
untouched and rewrites nothing.
Leaving it open is not a new exposure — everything here was already reachable at the
vaultwarden URL it replaces, behind the same master password, and officer cannot add a check
it has no credential for. It is also going behind tailscale.
Temporary. The end state is our own extension reusing @officer/vault, which already runs as
a plain JS bundle outside react native (the iOS autofill extension hosts it in
JavaScriptCore), against the /api/vault/session/login broker — then nothing addresses
vaultwarden directly and this mount is deleted rather than adjusted.
Needed its own entry in server.tsx: only listed paths reach hono and the rest fall through
to the SPA, so without it the endpoint answered 200 with the react shell — a missing route
that looks like a working one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Email installs end to end now, which was the point of picking it as tier one: no container, no external
wiring, so the machinery is exercised without the provisioning half.
Verified against the running system, not asserted:
POST /api/app-store/email/install -> {"status":"installed","completed":["preflight","schema","process"]}
row -> email mode=config status=installed enabled=true
pm2 -> officer-email online
second install -> all three steps skipped, process not restarted
disable -> stopped
The server boots with the new router, which is the real test of the capability entry: totality.ts throws
before serve() if a mounted router has none, so booting IS the check passing.
pm2.ts shells out rather than importing pm2 as a library. PM2 is already the supervisor and the
ecosystem file is already the definition of how each process runs; a second thing in charge of that
means two supervisors disagreeing. It also means an owner can undo anything the app store did with a
command they already know. The one fact that matters: `pm2 start <name>` fails for a process PM2 has
never seen, so a first install starts from the ecosystem file with --only, and everything after goes by
name. Callers cannot know which case they are in, so startProcess decides.
Disable stops rather than deletes: a stopped process still shows in `pm2 list`, which is the honest
picture. Deleting would make a disabled sidecar indistinguishable from one never installed.
beginInstall returns the existing row instead of replacing it — that is what makes a retry a resume
rather than a re-provision — and clears lastError on the way in, so a UI never shows a stale failure
beside a working service.
The container half of enable/disable/uninstall is deliberately absent rather than stubbed silently: a
disable that leaves Immich running is a different thing from one that stops it, and the difference is
memory on the user's machine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
a user can mint a long-lived key for an app or a device instead of
carrying a 30-day session, so multiple logins on the mobile apps are
per-device revocable rather than one shared token.
identity was being decided independently in userMiddleware and
originScopeMiddleware, each verifying the token itself. teaching only
one of them a new credential format is how those two stop agreeing, so
both now call resolveAuthToken and neither knows what a bearer string
is. verified: a member's key returns the same status as their jwt on
every route tried, 403s included.
a key carries its holder's full authority — not an escalation, it
equals what the password could already do. scoping wants a scopes
column, not a change here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Committing work that was left uncommitted in the shared tree. I did not write it;
I reviewed it in full, verified it against the running system, and am landing it at
the owner's explicit request because no one currently owns it.
This REPAIRS master. `useAgentPanel.ts` shipped in dbe585f and calls
`/chat/agent-panels`, but `registerAgentPanelRoutes` existed only in the working
tree — so on master as pushed, every one of those calls 404s. The feature has been
half-landed since that commit.
What it is. A panel on a dashboard can be given a name ("frontend", "code-reviewer").
Naming it mints two things: a `sessionKey`, which is the panel's permanent continuity
(it keys the sidecar's on-disk resume map and `chat_session_events`, so the same panel
reopens the same Claude session), and a `handoffToken`, a bearer credential scoped to
exactly one verb. The agent in that panel is then addressable by name, and can pass
work to a peer on the same dashboard over `/api/agent-handoff`.
Three doors, deliberately separate:
- `/chat/agent-panels` (browser, session-authed) — name / list / rename / forget.
Mounted on the chat router rather than given its own prefix: these routes create
and name Claude sessions, which is authority `chat` already grants. A second
top-level mount would have meant a second capability entry claiming the same
thing under a different name.
- `/api/agent-handoff` (agent, token-authed) — peers and send. Unprotected by the
session middleware and exempted in `capabilities/totality.ts` with its reasoning
written down, because the caller is a subprocess with a token, not a browser with
a cookie.
- The transcript stays where transcripts live. DELETE forgets the address and the
panel's claim on the session; it does not touch ~/.claude/projects.
Security, as verified rather than assumed:
- The sender is derived from the token, never from the request body — there is no
`from` field on the wire, so it cannot be forged.
- Every lookup is scoped to the token's `userId` AND `dashboardId`, so an agent can
only see and reach peers on its own dashboard.
- `toAgentPanelView` strips `handoffToken` and `userId`, and it is the only shape
the browser routes return. Confirmed by reading every return path.
- Live-tested: a real token on `GET /api/agent-handoff/peers` returns 200 with
correctly scoped peers; a bogus one returns 401.
Two judgement calls in the code worth knowing about, both already commented at their
site: the introduction turn inlines the handoff token into a runnable curl (a
single-owner MVP trade), and `agent_panels` carries no FK to `dashboards.id` because
that primary key is mid-rework to a composite.
Schema uses `uniqueIndex` throughout, never `unique().on(...)` — the rule that exists
because drizzle-kit mis-diffs named composite unique constraints and re-creates them,
which is what wiped seven tables on 2026-08-03.
NO `bun db:push` IS NEEDED. `agent_panels` is already live in Postgres with 6 rows;
the schema file is catching up to a database that already has it.
Verified: `bunx tsgo` clean, `bun test` 538 pass / 0 fail across 35 files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
permissions are capabilities, not routes. a capability is a feature — the
unit the owner grants, the dock filters on and the acl enforces — declaring
the api prefixes, websocket providers and screens it expands to.
four kinds. core is every account and is not grantable because it is not
deniable. app is the grantable surface. admin is the platform administering
itself. execution is never grantable at any level: terminal, chat, tasks,
files, desktop and browser all run as the owner's os user in the owner's
home, so granting one is co-ownership of the machine rather than a feature.
the part that matters is assertCapabilityTotality. the websocket hole fixed
in 2873948 was not a wrong rule — it was a door added without telling the
rule, because bun's route table matches /api/terminal/ws before the /api/*
catch-all that reaches hono's middleware. so the server now refuses to start
unless every mounted prefix and every user-facing socket maps to exactly one
capability. hono.ts mounts from a table and exports it, so the check reads
the real surface instead of a copy that can drift from it.
verified: passes against the live surface, and refuses all four ways — an
ungated router, an ungated socket, a claim on a deleted router, a claim on a
deleted socket.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replicates what Gitea's own web UI offers, on top of the sidecar's /_api pass-through.
Repository browsing (tree, file view with the FileViewer's shiki renderer, README), commits,
branches, tags, releases, issues and pull requests both per-repo and cross-repo, notifications,
explore/search and organizations. Routes are /gitea/:section plus /gitea/repo/:owner/:name/:tab/:item,
all real Links with the URL as the source of truth — no selection channel.
Markdown is rendered client-side (react-markdown + remark-gfm + rehype-sanitize, rehype-raw
deliberately absent) rather than through the instance's /api/v1/markdown, because consuming that
means dangerouslySetInnerHTML and there is no DOMPurify in the tree with installs frozen. The cost
is Gitea's #123 and @mention cross-references; relative links and images are resolved instead.
The /markdown and /markup allow-list entries stay, so that door is open when a sanitiser lands.
retargetUrls rebases instance-minted URLs onto a browser-reachable origin, IN ONE DIRECTION ONLY.
This instance answers with two: /user and /repos build from its configured ROOT_URL
(http://localhost:9004), /contents from the public host. An unconditional rewrite onto the
connection URL therefore broke the second set to match the first, turning working https links into
dead loopback ones. Only a private/loopback URL is rewritten now, and only when the target is
itself public; when the connection URL is a dial address nothing is touched and the connection
screen says why avatars will not load.
Also carries the frontend half of the one-instance-many-tokens model: the connection form draws a
URL field only for the owner and sends no url key at all for anyone else, ServiceConnection.url is
string | null to match officerdb, and the rebase origin comes from the resolved instanceUrl rather
than connection.url, which is null for a member.
Not verified: no runtime pass since the last four changes, the issues and pull views have never
rendered a row (the instance has none), and the member path has never executed (one account).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
officer-jellyfin owns the whole Jellyfin contract: the instance URL, the access
token, the Jellyfin user it belongs to and the DeviceId its sessions are keyed
by. The platform side is a 17-line proxy holding no credentials.
Servers are a registry, not a single row — this machine runs four instances and
the owner switches between them. The password is never stored: it is traded once
for an access token through AuthenticateByName, and only that token is persisted,
encrypted.
Two doors. /_officer/* is a hand-written JSON façade for the things the browser
should not have to know — the user id in the path, the Fields lists that decide
whether a grid has posters, the PlaybackInfo negotiation. /_jf/* is a GET-only,
allow-listed byte pass-through for images, video, HLS and subtitles; it keeps
Jellyfin's own paths because a master playlist references its segments
relatively, so any renaming would mean rewriting m3u8 bodies.
TranscodingUrl arrives with api_key=<access token> in its query string and would
otherwise be handed straight to a video element. It is stripped before anything
is returned; the pass-through re-adds the credential as a header.
Video only — Officer's own player owns audio, so music collections are filtered
out of the library list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mints a dav app password, renders a configuration profile carrying both the
caldav and carddav payloads, and parks it behind a single-use five-minute token
that safari can fetch without a session.
one profile with both payloads is not a convenience: ios keys accounts by
server+username, so adding carddav separately gets folded into the existing
caldav account and contacts silently never appear.
the profile holds the password in plaintext, so it is held in memory only —
persisting it would falsify createDavAppPassword's "not stored" guarantee.
signing is opt-in via DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CERT/_KEY/_CHAIN and off by default;
this box has no tls certificate, tls terminates upstream. signed at mint time
reading the cert from disk, so a renewal needs no restart and no hook.
the download route is registered before the /dav mount because hono matches in
registration order and the sync door's /* would otherwise demand http basic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
two bugs, both of which iOS reports as "Cannot connect using SSL" — a message
about TLS for a problem that has nothing to do with TLS. the certificate was
never involved.
the well-known routes were registered with .get. RFC 6764 §6 has the client
probe the well-known URI with the method it actually intends to use, and iOS
sends PROPFIND — which fell through to the SPA catch-all and 404'd. they
answered correctly in a browser, which is why they looked healthy.
hono's cors() answers every OPTIONS itself as a preflight and never calls the
route beneath it, so OPTIONS /dav/ returned a bare 204 with no DAV header.
OPTIONS is not a preflight to a DAV client — it is how the client asks what the
server can do, and iOS refuses an account whose server does not advertise
calendar-access. cors now skips the DAV paths entirely; a CalDAV client is not
a browser and has no origin to check.
verified from the public internet: PROPFIND on both well-known paths 301s to
/dav/, and an authenticated OPTIONS now returns
`DAV: 1, 2, 3, calendar-access, addressbook, extended-mkcol`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
wraps the self-hosted memos instance, same shape as transmission and slskd. no
schema change was needed: service_connections already says `service` is text
because "adding a service should not be a schema change", and memos is the
one-instance-per-owner case that table was built for.
the sidecar holds the url and the personal access token; the platform side is
16 lines of createSidecarProxy and holds neither.
/_api/* is a pass-through onto the instance's own /api/v1 rather than a
hand-written wrapper per endpoint — memos generates its rest api from protobufs
and it moves between minor versions, so re-describing it here would be a second
thing to keep in sync. the allow-list is the one piece of policy, and it keeps
this from being a general ssrf hop. auth routes are excluded: signin/signout
would mint sessions on the instance, and this authenticates with a stored token.
probing is two calls on purpose. /healthz answers unauthenticated, so a bad url
is distinguishable from a bad token — memos returns 200 and an empty list for
unauthenticated reads rather than 401, so "the list came back" proves nothing.
verified against the live container: unconfigured reports not-connected, a bad
token is rejected WITH the reason and nothing is stored, and the platform mount
401s without a session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
first two steps of docs/nextcloud-replacement.md — the half that has to work on
a phone, because that is the half that cannot be faked.
radicale is supervised by the sidecar rather than reimplemented. nextcloud does
not implement caldav either; it vendors sabre/dav. icalendar and vcard are a
weekend, but sync-collection, rrule expansion, vtimezone and ctag/etag are not,
and when they are subtly wrong a phone does not error — it silently stops
syncing, or silently duplicates every event.
two doors, because a browser should not speak dav:
/dav/* top-level, http basic against a scoped app password, every
verb and every dav header forwarded verbatim. this is what
davx5 and ios talk to. same reasoning as /api/vault being
mounted outside protectedRouter.
/api/caldav/* the ordinary sidecar proxy, for officer's own ui. json.
the shared proxy factory could not carry the dav door: it forwards three
headers and dav dies without Depth, and it derives the user from a jwt a phone
cannot hold. so it is a separate file, per that factory's own instruction never
to grow per-app logic.
new `dav_app_passwords` — a phone cannot do jwt, and the alternative is the
account password living in a phone's account manager. argon2, shown once,
revocable per device, and accepted ONLY by /dav.
.well-known/caldav and carddav redirect to the dav root. they are most of what
makes adding an account feel transparent, and they need naming explicitly in
server.tsx or the SPA `/*` fallback answers the phone with html.
verified end to end against the running stack: 401 + WWW-Authenticate
unauthenticated; 207 with calendar-access and addressbook advertised; MKCALENDAR,
PUT and GET of a real VEVENT; calendar-query and sync-collection REPORTs; MKCOL,
PUT and GET of a real vCard. X-Script-Name is set because radicale otherwise
generates hrefs at / and the client follows them into the SPA.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The chain was: a Stop hook in Claude's settings curls POST /api/hooks/claude-done,
the platform POSTs /_officer/panel-refresh to the pty sidecar, the sidecar sends a
`panel-refresh` frame to every attached terminal, and the Claude Code panel bumps
`preview:refresh` and `files:refresh-signal`.
It has never fired. generateClaudeSettings writes settings.json into the MANAGED
home under DATA_PATH, but HOME_DIR points terminals at the owner's real login home
— which is where Claude reads its settings from. Verified on this machine: no
claude-done hook exists in ~/.claude/settings.json, and DATA_PATH/*/home/.claude
does not exist at all.
Deleting rather than repairing it, because the Chat panel already does exactly this
job from onTurnComplete — in-process, conditioned on the turn having made tool
calls, with no hook, no HTTP round trip, and no endpoint. The chat UI is where agent
work happens; the terminal TUI is not the destination.
Also removes /api/hooks/claude-done, which was mounted above protectedRouter and so
was the one unauthenticated write-ish endpoint on the API surface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
officer-photos owns the whole Immich contract: the instance URL and the API
key live there and nowhere else, and the platform side is an auth-gated
forwarder holding no credentials. The route surface is an allow-list keyed on
the first path segment, so admin, auth, api-keys, sessions, jobs, system-config
and libraries are unreachable by construction rather than by enumeration.
The UI mirrors Immich's own sidebar — timeline, explore, map, search, albums,
people, favorites, sharing, archive, trash — because the point of a sidecar
screen is to reproduce what the upstream already ships, then extend it. The
timeline reads Immich's columnar time-bucket format directly; selection lives
in the URL per docs/navigation-audit.md.
Two things worth knowing for anyone touching this later:
- `duration` is an integer count of milliseconds in Immich 3.0. It was an
HH:MM:SS.mmm string before, and every stale example still shows that form.
- the map container is sized with h-full/w-full, never `absolute inset-0`.
maplibre's stylesheet sets `position: relative; overflow: hidden` on the
element it is given, and an unlayered vendor rule beats Tailwind 4's layered
`.absolute` regardless of source order — so the div collapses to height 0 and
clips its own canvas away. Nothing errors: the GL context is healthy, tiles
download and pixels are drawn into a buffer nobody ever composites.
maplibre-gl is pinned to 5.x deliberately; 6.0 resolves a separate worker file
from import.meta.url, which Officer's index.html fallback answers with HTML.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 2 of docs/push-notifications.md. One real channel working end to end before any Apple
or Google credential exists, so the pipe is proven before the hard part.
officer-notify is a PM2 peer with its own loopback listener, announced as notify:server and
proxied at /api/notify. It is a sidecar rather than platform code because the producers are
spread across sidecars — the queue, email, the agent — and a platform-owned notifier would
force every one of them to call back into the platform. That is the inversion just removed
from email; this avoids recreating it.
Channels sit behind one interface (types.ts) so APNs and FCM slot in beside Discord rather
than replacing anything. Each is awaited with its own error boundary and the dispatcher
always resolves: a job that finished has finished whether or not a banner appeared, so a
channel must never be able to break its producer.
text.ts is where the doorbell rule is actually enforced. APNs and FCM both need a title to
render a banner, so "send nothing" was never available — what we control is that the string
is composed HERE from the category alone. A producer sends { type: 'mail', count: 3 } and
the wire carries "3 new emails". It cannot carry a subject line because there is nowhere to
put one.
Device registration lives behind X-Officer-User, trusted because the listener binds loopback.
Platform and environment are validated rather than defaulted: an iOS token from a debug build
fails against production APNs with a silent BadDeviceToken, so a wrong value is a device that
never receives anything and never says why. GET /_officer/devices returns only the last 8
characters of a token — enough to identify a row, not enough to push to it.
Verified end to end against a fake webhook: /_health reports configured channels, a test
notification arrives as {"content":"Officer"}, { type: 'mail', count: 3 } arrives as
{"content":"3 new emails"}, and every validation path returns its own error.
Deletes src/servers/notify/discord.ts, which this supersedes and which had no other callers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
All three existed to drive the platform from a chat app. The phone app does that now, so
they are dead weight — three bot gateways, three command parsers, account pairing, admin
config screens and bot tokens sitting in the database.
Gone entirely: telegram/ and whatsapp/, discord/'s bot and command handler, the shared
channel plumbing they were the only users of (pairing.ts, send-and-await.ts, types.ts,
routes.ts and its 20 config/pairing/status endpoints), the six settings components, and
their sections in the integrations screen.
What Discord keeps is the one piece worth keeping — pushing a message out — as
notify/discord.ts, configured by DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in the env. No UI, no pairing, no
stored credential, and it never throws: a notification that fails to send is logged and
dropped. Unset means notifications are silently skipped, which is the default state.
Kept deliberately: send-claude-code.ts and send-opencode.ts. They live under channels/ but
have nothing to do with chat apps — they are how /chat and the pipeline executor drive an
agent turn.
Also drops four dependencies with no remaining importer (discord.js,
node-telegram-bot-api, whatsapp-web.js, qrcode), and the /sync-now route added to the email
sidecar an hour ago, whose only consumer was the channel handlers.
The "Channel Models" settings section stays, with its description corrected — it is keyed
off the general access policy rather than anything channel-specific, so it governs non-owner
accounts, not chat apps. Whether that whole class still earns its place is the open
question already noted against origin-validation.
Not touched: the telegram, whatsapp and discord rows in server_integrations, which still
hold their bot tokens. Deleting rows is a different kind of decision and the SQL is in the
handover.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Email was the one sidecar built inside out. The platform held ~1,800 lines — the per-account
SQLite store, all 14 HTTP routes, account CRUD, resync, IMAP validation — while the 314-line
sidecar was a scheduler that reached BACK into the platform to do anything
(`import { performResync } from '../../api/email/resync'`).
The sidecar now serves its own HTTP listener and announces `email:server`, and
/api/email/* on the platform is createSidecarProxy like every other one: 1,801 lines down
to 22, with no mail knowledge left in it — not a message, not a folder, not a credential.
The routes moved verbatim, Hono and all. http.ts only reconstructs what the platform's
middleware used to provide: `user` on the context, from the X-Officer-User header the proxy
injects (trusted because this server binds loopback), and an error handler that turns
custom-errors into status codes.
The /email/events SSE stream went with them, which removes a whole round trip: the IDLE
watcher used to send `email:new` over the registration socket so the platform could push to
its SSE clients. Those clients are here now, so it calls broadcastEmailNew in-process and
`email:new` is gone from the wire protocol.
DELIBERATELY NOT DONE YET, and left backwards on purpose rather than half-moved:
- The two sync handlers (email-sync 381 lines, gmail-sync 712) still run in the platform's
queue and now import the store from its new home — a platform → sidecar import, which is
the wrong direction and is temporary. Moving them is option (A) from the plan: the sidecar
schedules its own syncs, independent of the platform Jobs list.
- accounts.ts still imports queue/init to enqueue a sync and to report sync status, and
index.ts still carries the queue-over-WS shim that inversion needs.
- The three channel handlers still open the mail store directly rather than asking over HTTP.
Two things worth knowing while testing: a from-scratch sync holds a proxied request open
well past the 60s idle default, hence timeoutSeconds on the proxy; and `gmail-sync` is
hardcoded in all three channel handlers even though the only account is provider=gmail with
auth_type=password, which routes to IMAP — so "sync emails" from a chat channel is
almost certainly already broken, and folds into the next stage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
createSidecarProxy arrived with the wallet but nothing else moved onto it, so five sidecars
still carried their own copy of the same two files: a sidecar-server.ts that remembered a
port announced as `<name>:server`, and a router.ts that forwarded the subpath. Byte for
byte identical once the app name was normalised away — which is exactly what the factory's
own header said it existed to end.
headscale, transmission, invoiceshelf, slskd and music are now wallet-shaped: create the
proxy, export the router and the URL getter. 386 lines deleted against 163 added, and the
five feature directories go from ~70 lines each to ~18.
Two deviations were real and moved INTO the factory rather than being dropped, because both
are HTTP concerns rather than app knowledge:
- Range and If-None-Match are now forwarded for every sidecar. music needed both (seeking,
and ETag revalidation returning a cheap 304 instead of a cover image) and slskd needed
Range. Forwarding them everywhere costs nothing and removes the reason to hand-roll.
- timeoutSeconds, used only by music at 1800. A from-scratch reindex holds the proxied
connection open for minutes with no bytes flowing, which the 60s idle timeout would drop.
It applies to the whole prefix — the proxy must not know which of a sidecar's routes are
slow.
The five side-effect imports in hono.ts are gone with them: the port listener now registers
when createSidecarProxy runs inside the router this file already imports. Vault keeps its
hand-rolled pair and its side-effect import — it is off-limits by standing instruction, and
is the one sidecar this commit deliberately does not touch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Terminals were a set of commands the platform drove. Officer sent pty:init / pty:input /
pty:resize / pty:close / pty:list over the registration socket, subscribed to ONE global
output stream, filtered every frame down to a session and rewrapped it — double
JSON-encoded — on the way out. That is terminal knowledge living in the process whose job
is authentication, and it made officer part of the data path for every keystroke.
The sidecar now serves its own loopback HTTP + WebSocket listener and announces the port
as `pty:server`, like every other HTTP sidecar. Officer authenticates the upgrade and
relays frames without reading them.
Split into three files, because "the sidecar" was one:
- sessions.mjs — the shell store. Spawn, attach, detach, resize, kill, scrollback, the
OSC-title scrape. Clients are a Set per session, so two panels can watch one shell.
- server.mjs — the listener. /ws speaks the browser's existing contract unchanged
({input,resize} in, {output,replay,exit,panel-refresh} out), plus /_officer/sessions,
DELETE /_officer/sessions/:id and POST /_officer/panel-refresh.
- index.mjs — the registration socket, and nothing else. It carries a port now.
On the platform side /api/terminal/* becomes createSidecarProxy, deleting the hand-rolled
router from two days ago, and websocket.ts drops from a translating bridge to a byte relay
modelled on the vault one. The whole PtyCommand/PtyEvent/PtyInitConfig/PtySessionInfo
vocabulary is gone from protocol.ts, connect.ts and sidecar-registry.ts.
broadcastPanelRefresh is now a POST to the sidecar: officer no longer holds terminal
sockets to loop over. Fire-and-forget — a missed refresh is a stale panel, not a failure.
The frontend did not move. The sidecar speaks what the browser already spoke.
The integration test was rewritten against the new shape, and tests something stronger than
before: officer is stopped mid-session and the shell keeps streaming, because officer is
not in the path at all. It also covers re-attach replay, the session list and kill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closing a terminal panel abandoned its shell. TerminalWrapper deleted the panel -> session
mapping on *unmount*, so any layout or route change generated a fresh uuid on the way back
and left the old shell running: alive, unreachable, and never killed, because nothing has
ever sent pty:close. The mapping now outlives the mount, so reopening a panel re-attaches
to the shell you left — which is also what finally makes the sidecar's replay buffer worth
having. It is persisted dashboard state, so this survives a reload too.
That trades an invisible leak for a visible one: a panel deleted for good still leaves its
shell behind. So `pty:list` now enumerates live sessions, and GET /api/terminal/sessions +
DELETE /api/terminal/sessions/:id expose them. pty:close finally has a sender.
Each session carries createdAt, lastActivityAt, pid, and the title the shell sets for
itself via OSC 0/2 — usually the running command, which is what turns "some uuid" into
"the one running claude" when you are deciding what to kill.
Killing on unmount is still not an option: it needs the panel system to distinguish a real
close from an incidental remount, which it cannot currently do.
Also raises the sidecar replay buffer from 50KB to 512KB — 50KB was about one long agent
turn, so reconnecting mid-task showed you the tail and nothing before it — and cuts the
buffer on a line boundary rather than a byte offset. A blind slice can land inside an
escape sequence, and the replay then opens with the tail of a colour or cursor-move code,
which xterm renders as garbage or applies as a real instruction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
deletes the last of the projects/apps cluster: the published-app store
(/api/apps + /api/app-serve), the project dev-server and its websocket
proxy (/api/dev-server + /api/dev-server-proxy), the shared html-rewrite
they were the only consumers of, and their frontend — the Preview panel,
the UserApp panel/header, useUserApps and the /settings/apps screen.
also drops getUserProjectsDir and getUserAppsDir, the ProjectType and
ProjectDefinition types, and the 'dev-server' websocket provider from
server.tsx. nothing on disk is touched.
1440 deletions, 31 insertions. tsgo clean.
eight sidecars hand-rolled the same port capture — byte-identical once
the app name is normalised — and six repeated the same auth-and-forward
router. createSidecarProxy collapses both into one call and covers the
variants the others need: a ws:// url for music and vault, an onRegister
hook for opencode.
the wallet adopts it first: two files become one, 54 lines of router
become 16, and hono no longer needs a side-effect import to capture the
port. the no-body-parsing, no-body-logging rule moves into the factory
with its rationale, since that restraint is what keeps unlock
passphrases and macaroons out of the platform process.
costs 31 net lines today and pays back from the second adopter on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
the owner's work, committed as one unit rather than split: the registration
files (App.tsx, Dock, AppRegistry, hono.ts, the schema and db barrels,
ecosystem.config.cjs) all reference modules under src/servers/{api,sidecar}/wallet
and src/workspaces/officerdev/src/apps/Wallet, so committing the shared plumbing
on its own would leave a commit that does not build.
officer-wallet is a new pm2 peer holding seed material sealed under an owner
passphrase on top of VAULT_STORE_KEY, with an unlock ttl after which the root key
is wiped from memory. five backends: on-chain via esplora, and lnd, clnrest,
lndhub and nwc for lightning. bolt11 encode/decode is implemented in-tree.
no secrets in the diff — the key-shaped literals under sidecar/wallet are the
bolt11 spec vectors and the bip39 "abandon … about" vector. .env.example gains
placeholders only. bun test src/servers/sidecar/wallet: 38 pass, 0 fail.
not reviewed line by line; assembled and verified to build, not audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
owns the invoiceshelf contract: instance url, sanctum token and the company
header that scopes every request. the platform side is the usual thin
auth+forward proxy at /api/invoiceshelf and holds no credentials.
built against the live 2.4.2 instance rather than the 3.0.0-alpha.1 checkout
in _references — the route allow-list came from artisan route:list on the
running container. they differ: 2.4.2 has estimates/{id}/convert-to-invoice
but no invoices/{id}/convert-to-estimate.
three upstream quirks absorbed here:
- accept: application/json is mandatory, or an unauthenticated request 302s
to an html login instead of returning 401
- origin/referer must never be sent, or statefulapi() switches to session+csrf
and every request 419s. the proxy forwards neither.
- a wrong company header does not error, it silently returns another company's
data. the pinned company is explicit and logged.
document pdfs are repaired: 2.4.2 prefixes them with a literal serialised http
response (201 bytes) inside a body already typed application/pdf. we slice to
the %PDF- magic. the report routes don't have the bug.
resources are an allow-list. backups, disks, modules, update/*, installation/*,
mail config, settings writes and ownership transfer stay unreachable, and the
per-resource action list keeps `send` — which really emails the customer —
from being reachable by accident.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
officer-transmission is a new pm2 peer that owns the transmission rpc
connection and exposes a curated /_officer/* contract instead of proxying
raw rpc. it absorbs the three quirks callers otherwise have to know about:
the 409 x-transmission-session-id handshake, failures returned as
{"result": "..."} inside http 200, and basic auth where an empty username
must send no header at all.
/transmission is the ui, on the workspace/panel framework: a filter nav and
three sections (torrents, stats, settings). the torrent list is virtualised
with 30 available columns, multi-select, and a right-click menu; the detail
pane covers general, files as a real tree, peers and trackers. filters and
the open torrent live in the url, so a filtered view is a link.
phase 1 goal was parity with _references/transmission-web. follow-up work is
recorded in TODO.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
officer-headscale owns the whole Headscale contract: the registered servers and
their admin api keys, the >=0.29 version floor, and every multi-call composition
the ui needs. the platform side is auth+forward only and holds no headscale
credentials, so the existing /api/vpn/enroll route and its HEADSCALE_* env vars
are untouched and unrelated.
officer manages many servers rather than one. the owner registers each with a url
and a key generated on that server and switches between them; exactly one is
active, enforced by a partial unique index rather than by convention. keys are
encrypted at rest and never leave the sidecar — the list projection cannot return
one. registration validates before it saves: an unauthenticated GET /version to
prove something headscale-shaped is there and meets the floor, then an
authenticated call to prove the key works. an edit that moves either half
re-validates.
there is deliberately no transparent /api/v1/* passthrough. headscale serialises
every uint64 as a json string and its rest shape moved repeatedly below 0.29;
proxying raw would push all of that into the browser, which is the mistake the
soulseek panels made with 37 raw upstream calls.
the /headscale workspace is nav + view over the panel system. only the servers
section is implemented — nodes, users and pre-auth keys say so plainly rather
than rendering an empty table that reads as a failed fetch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Off unless ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC=true, so it is opt-in per host and reverting is an env
edit rather than a deploy. Set on this host now; the flag and the two call sites come out
when the tailnet becomes the perimeter and the music app stops needing to be public.
It drops one layer, not the lock: /api/music still requires a valid token through
userMiddleware, and the non-owner account backstop in originScopeMiddleware still confines
music accounts to /api/auth + /api/music whatever Origin they claim. Worth being plain
about what is lost — Origin was never authentication here. `officer://<hex>` is chosen by
the client, trivially forged outside a browser, and extractable from any shipped app
binary. It is defence in depth, and this removes it for one path prefix.
Two gates had to know: userMiddleware, which is what actually 403s, and the CORS origin
callback, which would otherwise echo an empty origin and block a browser client that
userMiddleware had already allowed through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each app origin was declared three times — destructured from process.env, listed in
APP_ORIGINS, then given a rule — so adding an app meant editing the same file in three
places and remembering all three. Two apps in and the list was already wrong: OffTail had
been added to .env as OFF_SCALE_ORIGIN, which nothing read, so it did nothing.
Any `OFFICER_<APP>_ORIGIN` in the environment is now an app origin, and its rule comes
from its own name: an app may reach /api/auth (it has to sign in) plus the one feature it
is named for, so OFFICER_VAULT_ORIGIN gets /api/vault without being told. Adding an app is
adding an env var.
Two things stay hand-written because they are not that convention:
- OWNER_ONLY_APPS ('APP') — the main app is the whole platform rather than one feature of
it, so it keeps full access but owner-only. A different kind of rule, not a path scope.
- APP_SCOPE_OVERRIDES ('TAIL' → /api/vpn) — the one app whose name and API surface differ.
NON_OWNER_PATHS also stays, and is worth not mistaking for the music app's rule even
though the value matches: it is the ACCOUNT backstop, applied whatever Origin a caller
claims or omits, and it is the airtight half of that pair.
Also renames MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN to OFFICER_MUSIC_ORIGIN (the other three already had the
shape) and drops the dead OFF_SCALE_ORIGIN. Env and code changed together; .env on this
host is updated, so this needs a restart, not a migration.
Verified the derived rules against the live .env: APP → superAdminOnly, MUSIC →
auth+music, VAULT → auth+vault, TAIL → auth+vpn — identical to what was hardcoded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The in-app Tailscale needs one thing from the platform: a way to turn an authenticated
Officer session into a Headscale pre-auth key, so the phone registers itself instead of
someone pasting a key by hand. The VPN's control and data planes talk directly to
Headscale — never through /api — so this is not a proxy and should not become one.
Headscale itself runs on a separate host, managed manually. The platform consumes
HEADSCALE_URL (also returned as controlUrl) and HEADSCALE_API_KEY, both from the host
env. Neither is set yet, which is why an unconfigured instance answers 503 rather than
crashing — Headscale is being stood up in parallel.
The response is `{ controlUrl, authKey }` exactly, because enrollVpn() in
@officer/core/officer-net.ts reads those two fields; changing the shape means changing the
app.
Two things the spec's sketch does not do:
- The `user` field changed meaning across Headscale versions — a name on <=v0.22, a
numeric id on v0.23+ — and we cannot see which one is running from here. So it resolves
the id via /api/v1/user and tries that first, falling back to the name. Whichever the
live server accepts wins, and neither version needs a config flag.
- Upstream calls carry a 10s timeout, and upstream error bodies are logged but never
returned to the client: that is an admin API and its errors are descriptive.
The standalone app's origin follows the platform's own convention rather than the spec's
literal: every other app origin is an env var with a scope rule, so this one is
OFFICER_TAIL_ORIGIN (set in .env on this host), restricted to /api/auth + /api/vpn the way
OffVault is restricted to /api/auth + /api/vault. The OffTail tile embedded in the main
Officer app needs nothing — it reuses OFFICER_APP_ORIGIN.
Not implemented: the optional GET/DELETE /api/vpn/devices. They are not needed for a first
connection and are better written against a running Headscale.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add officer-slskd, a singleton sidecar that reverse-proxies to a
self-hosted slskd (Soulseek) instance and reports its loopback port to
the API on connect. All slskd knowledge (URL + API key) lives in the
sidecar; the platform is a thin auth+forward proxy for /api/slskd/* and
holds no slskd credentials. Mirrors the officer-vault pattern.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Transparent pass-through fronting a self-hosted Vaultwarden so the OffVault
(Bitwarden-SDK) app reaches it through the platform's per-app origin gate. True
out-of-process sidecar (officer-vault): it owns all Vaultwarden knowledge (URL,
paths, notifications WebSocket) on a random loopback port and registers via the
sidecar connector; the platform is a thin origin-gated forwarder that knows only
the sidecar's port. Never decrypts/parses/rewrites/logs bodies.
- sidecar/vault: HTTP + notifications-WS proxy to VAULTWARDEN_URL, /_health
- api/vault: sidecar-port discovery + thin forwarder + WS pipe + origin gate
- origin: OFFICER_VAULT_ORIGIN allow-listed, scoped to /api/vault
- mounted top-level (not protected) so the Bitwarden bearer token isn't 401'd
- protocol: vault:server event; ecosystem: officer-vault app
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Activity" (placeholder name — jobs/tasks were taken) = watch background tasks
scroll in parallel with chat. Built DB-free; NOT restarted — deploy + test in
the morning.
- NDJSON progress contract (activity/progress.ts): capabilities append
{job,cap,phase,status,pct,detail,ts,...} lines; tolerant parser treats any
JSON object with phase/status as structured progress, else a raw log line.
- Backend (activity/router.ts, owner-only, path-guarded):
- GET /api/activity/tasks — registry by scanning /tmp/claude-*/<cwd>/tasks/
*.output (harness run_in_background) + announced detached jobs.
- POST /api/activity/announce {name,path} — register a detached (setsid) job's
log so it's followable too (the setsid case is on the critical path, since
the warm worker now makes plain run_in_background the default for heavy jobs).
- GET /api/activity/stream?task=<id>|path=<abs> — SSE tail (poll + offset),
emitting {kind:'line'|'progress'} with NDJSON parsed.
- Frontend /activity screen + Radio nav item: task list (active dot) → live tail
with a phase/pct progress header + raw log, following the /system-monitor pattern.
- Retention: startChatEventRetention() prunes chat_session_events >7d every 6h
(wired in bootstrap) so the durable queue stays bounded.
Verified headlessly (no restart): parseTailLine classification, and the scan
finds 53 real task output files. Endpoints + UI untested until deploy.
Deferred (see handoff): cross-device sync + OpenCode parity (both touch the
now-stable chat path — won't ship un-restart-tested); task:progress into chat.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Backend GET /api/system-monitor/stats: one snapshot — CPU overall + per-core
(two /proc/stat samples), memory + swap (/proc/meminfo), disks (df), load,
uptime, top-20 processes (ps). Owner-only via the account gate.
- Frontend /system-monitor screen: polls every 2s; CPU/Memory/Disks cards with
bars + per-core mini-bars, top-processes table. Nav dock "Monitor" item.
- Register /music and /system-monitor in usePageTitle RULES so the browser tab
and editable header title update on those routes (/music was missing too).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN to the origin allowlist and a global
originScopeMiddleware that restricts scoped app origins (the standalone
officer-music client) to their permitted path prefixes — /api/auth and
/api/music — and 403s everything else. The main web origin is unaffected,
and the gate no-ops while MUSIC_APP_ORIGIN is unset.
Lets extra sign-in-only users authenticate through the music app and reach
only music + auth, without reintroducing any per-user permission scheme.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an officer-music sidecar that owns an audio-streaming HTTP server, and a
thin authenticating proxy on the platform. All processing (path resolution,
byte-range streaming, ffprobe duration) is in the sidecar; the platform only
authenticates and forwards.
App-facing contract (handoff):
GET /api/music/stream?path=<home-relative path>&token=<jwt>
- auth via userMiddleware (Bearer or ?token= for media elements)
- 200 full / 206 on Range, with Accept-Ranges, Content-Length,
Content-Range, Content-Type, and X-Audio-Duration (seconds, ffprobe)
- path resolved within HOME_DIR, traversal-guarded (400); 404 if missing
Purpose: stream + seek without pre-downloading the whole file — the app can
read X-Audio-Duration instead of scanning for VBR duration.
Pieces:
- sidecar/music/{index.ts,stream-audio.ts}: Bun.serve on a random port, /stream
+ /health, duration cached by path+mtime; reports its port via a new
music:server sidecar event on connect.
- api/music/{sidecar-server.ts,router.ts}: capture the port; reverse-proxy
/api/music/* → sidecar, streaming status + headers through.
- protocol.ts music:server event; hono.ts mounts /api/music; ecosystem adds
officer-music.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Onboarding was dead in three layers:
- The OnboardingAdmin screen was only reachable from a route block in App.tsx
that has been commented out, so it never rendered. Its ServerTypeCard carried
accountMode ('organization' | 'single'), inherited from the codebase this was
based on and meaningless for a single-user platform.
- Two /onboarding-complete endpoints, one public and one protected, that no
frontend code called. Both read a server_config key that was never written, so
both answered false while the app's own path defaulted to true.
- HomeScreen gated on settings.onboarding.complete to show a welcome panel, and
seedHomeDir created an Onboarding folder from DATA_PATH/Onboarding and
/Onboarding_Admin — neither seed directory exists, so it only ever produced an
empty folder.
Also drops the onboarding key from UserSettings and the now-empty home-header
panel from the default home layout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer is single-user: the server owner is the only account, created once by
/auth/bootstrap. Everything that existed to serve additional users was
unreachable, so it is gone rather than left looking like it does something.
Accounts: drop the invite / resend-invite / delete / list-users routes and the
Users settings screen, the inert /auth/signup handler, and the account
verification chain it fed (verify, resend-verification, VerifyScreen, the
UserInvite + VerifyAdmin + VerifyRegistration templates). /auth/verify-token
survives for password resets only, and now requires a reset-password token
rather than accepting any signed JWT.
Roles: drop the users.role column and the four-value USER_ROLES enum. The
permissions table granted every role identical methods, and every
role === 'Super Admin' check was permanently true. The JWT no longer carries a
role claim.
Sandbox: remove sidecar/sandbox.ts and its five call sites. bwrap was selected
only for non-Super-Admin users, so it never ran. It was also not a usable agent
jail as written — --share-net, the project root (with .env) bound read-only,
and runuser dropping to the server's own uid. Rebuilding it for agent
containment would be a different construction, and git history keeps this one.
getHomeDir keeps its DATA_PATH meaning; the new getOwnerHomeDir resolves the
owner's real login home, which is what terminals, chats and task runs use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deletes all session persistence that isn't Claude's native transcript store, per
the "only harness-native session management survives" rule.
Backend: delete api/pi/storage.ts (meta.json+messages.json file store), the
api/saved-sessions router (+ unmount), the /pi/sessions REST endpoints, and the
storage.save/loadSession calls in the chat WS handler (in-memory session-manager
stays for live turns; no disk persistence — Claude's transcript is the record).
Also drops the Postgres saved_sessions layer: schema/chat.ts, queries/saved-sessions.ts,
its types and re-exports.
Frontend: delete state/useSavedSessions, ChatList, and the ChatHistory Widget
(all pure saved-session UI); slim ChatHeader to a label; strip the auto-load-latest
+ Save wiring from ChatPanelWrapper and ChatDetailPanel; drop the old resume path
from useChat and SessionListPage; remove the /chat/saved/:id route and the
useInitialData prefetch.
Behavior removed (intended): the Save-session button, email/project panels
auto-resuming the last chat, and /chat/saved/:id. /chat itself is unchanged —
already fully on Claude transcripts. The orphaned saved_sessions Postgres table
is dropped on the next `bun db:push`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First slice of making Claude's session store the source of truth. Adds a reader
(api/chat/claude-sessions.ts) that lists sessions straight from Claude's JSONL
transcripts under $HOME/.claude/projects/<cwd-slug>/, plus GET /chat/sessions
over a dedicated per-user claude_sessions working directory. No bookkeeping
layer — Claude's files are authoritative. Verified against real transcripts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New POST /api/rescan re-runs the boot item setup (ensureItemDirs +
ensureToolLoader) and returns live item counts; the header button calls it
and invalidates the item query caches so the UI refetches from disk.
Also fix ensure-tool-loader to write into OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR/extensions (the
runtime read path) instead of the now-unread DATA_PATH/extensions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Pipeline jobs now persist to DB with progress tracking and cost accumulation
- Jobs survive WebSocket disconnects with in-memory event buffer replay
- New /jobs list page with search, status badges, and cost display
- New /jobs/:id detail page with live WebSocket attachment and REST fallback
- Two-column layout using WorkspaceLayout for resizable steps/output panels
- Streaming messages tagged with stepIndex/iterationLabel for per-step output grouping
- TaskRunnerModal links to job detail page once job is created
- Dock entry added for Jobs page
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5