a user can mint a long-lived key for an app or a device instead of carrying a 30-day session, so multiple logins on the mobile apps are per-device revocable rather than one shared token. identity was being decided independently in userMiddleware and originScopeMiddleware, each verifying the token itself. teaching only one of them a new credential format is how those two stop agreeing, so both now call resolveAuthToken and neither knows what a bearer string is. verified: a member's key returns the same status as their jwt on every route tried, 403s included. a key carries its holder's full authority — not an escalation, it equals what the password could already do. scoping wants a scopes column, not a change here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
249 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
249 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
import { Hono } from 'hono';
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import { cors } from 'hono/cors';
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import { createRouter } from './create-router';
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import type { HonoVariables } from './create-router';
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import { authRouter } from './api/auth';
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import { serverSettingsRouter } from './api/server-settings/server-settings';
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import { landingPageDataRouter } from './api/landing-page-data/landing-page-data';
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import { waitlistRouter } from './api/waitlist/waitlist';
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import { usersRouter } from './api/users/users-router';
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import { apiKeysRouter } from './api/api-keys/router';
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import { plansRouter } from './api/plans/plans';
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import { skillsRouter } from './api/skills/skills';
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import { tasksRouter } from './api/tasks/tasks';
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import { agentsRouter } from './api/agents/agents';
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import { toolsRouter } from './api/tools/tools';
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import { processesRouter } from './api/processes/processes';
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import { rescanRouter } from './api/items/rescan';
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import { scrapeRouter } from './api/scrape/scrape';
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import { uploadRouter } from './api/upload/upload';
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import { settingsRouter } from './api/settings/settings';
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import { dashboardsRouter } from './api/dashboards';
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import { taskLogsRouter } from './api/task-logs/task-logs';
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import { router as fileBrowserRouter } from './api/file-browser/router';
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import { musicRouter } from './api/music/router';
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import { vaultRouter } from './api/vault/router';
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import { agentHandoffRouter } from './api/agent-handoff/router';
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import { slskdRouter } from './api/slskd/router';
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import { headscaleRouter } from './api/headscale/router';
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import { transmissionRouter } from './api/transmission/router';
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import { invoiceshelfRouter } from './api/invoiceshelf/router';
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import { jellyfinRouter } from './api/jellyfin/router';
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import { photosRouter } from './api/photos/router';
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import { walletRouter } from './api/wallet/router';
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import { vpnRouter } from './api/vpn/router';
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import { terminalRouter } from './api/terminal/sidecar-server';
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import { caldavRouter } from './api/dav/sidecar-server';
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import { memosRouter } from './api/memos/router';
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import { giteaRouter } from './api/gitea/router';
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import { davSyncRouter } from './api/dav/sync-router';
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import { davRouter } from './api/dav/router';
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import { claimIosProfile } from './api/dav/ios-profile';
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import { notifyRouter } from './api/notify/router';
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import { systemMonitorRouter } from './api/system-monitor/system-monitor';
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import { activityRouter } from './api/activity/router';
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// Vault still hand-rolls its port capture, so it keeps a side-effect import; every other HTTP sidecar
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// registers its listener when createSidecarProxy runs inside the router this file already imports.
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import './api/vault/sidecar-server'; // side-effect: capture the officer-vault reverse-proxy port
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import { dockRouter } from './api/dock/dock';
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import { integrationsRouter, googleCallbackHandler } from './api/integrations/integrations';
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import { queueRouter } from './api/queue/queue';
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import { emailRouter } from './api/email/router';
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import { browserRouter } from './api/browser/router';
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import { desktopRouter } from './api/desktop/rest';
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import { bugReportRouter } from './api/bug-report/bug-report';
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import { chatRouter } from './api/chat/chat';
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import { pipelineJobsRouter } from './api/tasks/pipeline-jobs-routes';
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import { CustomError } from './custom-errors';
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import { userMiddleware, bodyParser, isOriginAllowed, originScopeMiddleware } from './_middlewares';
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import { isMusicOriginExempt } from './_middlewares/origin-validation';
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export { Hono };
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export { createRouter };
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export type { HonoVariables };
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export const honoServer = new Hono<{ Variables: HonoVariables }>();
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const corsMiddleware = cors({
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origin: (origin, c) => {
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const host = c.req.header('host');
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// TEMPORARY: see isMusicOriginExempt — echoes any Origin back for /api/music when enabled, so a
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// browser client is not blocked by CORS after userMiddleware has already let it through.
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if (isMusicOriginExempt(c.req.path)) return origin ?? '*';
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return isOriginAllowed(origin, host) ? origin : '';
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},
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allowMethods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'],
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allowHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization'],
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});
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// The DAV doors are the one place CORS must NOT run, because hono's cors() answers every OPTIONS itself
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// as a preflight — 204, no body, no DAV headers — and never calls the route beneath it.
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//
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// OPTIONS is not a preflight to a DAV client. It is how the client asks what the server can do, and the
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// answer it needs is the `DAV: 1, 2, 3, calendar-access, addressbook` header. iOS sends it during account
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// setup and refuses the account when it is missing, reporting the failure as "Cannot connect using SSL" —
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// a message about TLS for a problem that has nothing to do with TLS, which is how this cost an evening.
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//
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// Nothing is lost by skipping it: a CalDAV client is not a browser and has no origin to check.
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const isDavPath = (path: string) =>
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path === '/dav' || path.startsWith('/dav/') || path === '/.well-known/caldav' || path === '/.well-known/carddav';
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honoServer.use((ctx, next) => (isDavPath(ctx.req.path) ? next() : corsMiddleware(ctx, next)));
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// Scoped-origin gate: restrict app origins (e.g. the music app) to their allowed path prefixes
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// (/api/auth + /api/music). No-ops for the main web origin and while OFFICER_MUSIC_ORIGIN is unset.
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honoServer.use(originScopeMiddleware);
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honoServer.get('/api', (ctx) => ctx.json({ officerAPI: 'ok' }));
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honoServer.route('/api/auth', authRouter);
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honoServer.route('/api/landing-page-data', landingPageDataRouter);
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honoServer.route('/api/waitlist', waitlistRouter);
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// Vaultwarden reverse-proxy — mounted TOP-LEVEL (not under protectedRouter): the Bitwarden client
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// carries its own bearer token, not a platform session JWT, so userMiddleware would 401 it. Origin
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// gating still applies via originScopeMiddleware above (OFFICER_VAULT_ORIGIN → /api/vault). The
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// notifications WebSocket is upgraded at the serve level (server.tsx).
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honoServer.route('/api/vault', vaultRouter);
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honoServer.get('/api/integrations/google/callback', googleCallbackHandler);
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// Agent-to-agent handoff — mounted TOP-LEVEL for the same reason the vault is: the caller is a Claude
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// session running a curl, and it carries a per-panel bearer token rather than a platform session JWT,
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// so userMiddleware would 401 it and a capability lookup would have no account to resolve. The token
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// identifies exactly one agent panel and authorises exactly one action: deliver a prompt to a named
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// peer on that panel's own dashboard. See servers/api/agent-handoff/router.ts.
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honoServer.route('/api/agent-handoff', agentHandoffRouter);
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// CalDAV/CardDAV for phones and desktop clients — mounted TOP-LEVEL for the same reason the vault is:
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// DAVx5, iOS and Thunderbird authenticate with HTTP Basic on every request and have nowhere to put a
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// platform JWT, so userMiddleware would 401 them. The credential is a scoped DAV app password; see
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// api/dav/sync-router.ts.
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// The iOS profile download, registered BEFORE the /dav mount below because hono matches in registration
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// order and davSyncRouter's `/*` would otherwise demand HTTP Basic for it. Safari has no credential to
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// offer — it was handed a URL by the app and nothing else — so the one-shot token in the path IS the
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// authentication. Minted by POST /api/dav/provision/ios; see api/dav/ios-profile.ts.
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honoServer.get('/dav/provision/:file', (ctx) => {
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const file = ctx.req.param('file');
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const token = file.endsWith('.mobileconfig') ? file.slice(0, -'.mobileconfig'.length) : null;
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const body = token ? claimIosProfile(token) : null;
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// Expired, already used, or never existed — all the same 404. There is nothing useful to tell a
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// caller who has the wrong token, and distinguishing the cases would confirm that a token once existed.
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if (!body) return ctx.text('not found', 404);
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return new Response(body as unknown as BodyInit, {
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headers: {
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// Mandatory. iOS identifies a configuration profile by MIME type; served as octet-stream or
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// text/xml the file downloads and the OS does nothing with it.
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'Content-Type': 'application/x-apple-aspen-config',
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'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
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},
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});
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});
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honoServer.route('/dav', davSyncRouter);
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// Autodiscovery. This is most of what makes adding an account on a phone feel transparent instead of
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// fiddly: the client is given a bare domain and probes these paths UNAUTHENTICATED before it has any
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// credential, so they must sit above every auth gate. Without them iOS in particular degrades to
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// demanding a full collection URL, which is exactly the sort of thing that makes self-hosting feel
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// worse than the commercial product it is replacing.
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// `.all`, not `.get`: RFC 6764 §6 has the client probe the well-known URI with the method it actually
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// wants to use, and iOS sends PROPFIND, not GET. Registered as GET-only these answered 404 to every real
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// client while looking perfectly healthy in a browser.
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honoServer.all('/.well-known/caldav', (ctx) => ctx.redirect('/dav/', 301));
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honoServer.all('/.well-known/carddav', (ctx) => ctx.redirect('/dav/', 301));
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const protectedRouter = createRouter();
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protectedRouter.use(bodyParser());
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protectedRouter.use(userMiddleware);
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// The mount table, as DATA rather than forty statements.
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//
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// The reason is the capability registry: assertCapabilityTotality refuses to boot unless every mounted
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// prefix maps to exactly one capability, and that check is only worth anything if it reads the real mount
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// list. A hand-copied second list would drift, and the drift would be invisible until someone tried a
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// prefix nobody had gated — which is precisely how the websocket hole happened.
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//
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// Order is irrelevant here: every prefix is distinct, so hono's registration-order matching has nothing to
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// disambiguate. `/pipeline-jobs` and `/jobs` deliberately share one router.
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const PROTECTED_MOUNTS: [prefix: string, router: ReturnType<typeof createRouter>][] = [
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['/server-settings', serverSettingsRouter],
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['/users', usersRouter],
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['/plans', plansRouter],
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['/skills', skillsRouter],
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['/tasks', tasksRouter],
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['/agents', agentsRouter],
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['/tools', toolsRouter],
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['/processes', processesRouter],
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['/rescan', rescanRouter],
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['/scrape', scrapeRouter],
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['/upload', uploadRouter],
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['/user', settingsRouter],
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['/api-keys', apiKeysRouter], // your own keys; the `account` core capability covers it
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['/dashboards', dashboardsRouter],
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['/task-logs', taskLogsRouter],
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['/file-browser', fileBrowserRouter],
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['/music', musicRouter],
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['/slskd', slskdRouter],
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['/terminal', terminalRouter],
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['/memos', memosRouter],
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['/gitea', giteaRouter],
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['/caldav', caldavRouter], // the JSON door for Officer's own calendar/contacts UI
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['/dav', davRouter], // app-password management (the sync door is /dav, top-level)
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['/notify', notifyRouter],
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['/headscale', headscaleRouter],
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['/transmission', transmissionRouter],
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['/invoiceshelf', invoiceshelfRouter],
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['/jellyfin', jellyfinRouter],
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['/photos', photosRouter],
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['/wallet', walletRouter],
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['/vpn', vpnRouter],
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['/system-monitor', systemMonitorRouter],
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['/activity', activityRouter],
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['/dock', dockRouter],
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['/integrations', integrationsRouter],
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['/queue', queueRouter],
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['/email', emailRouter],
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['/browser', browserRouter],
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['/bug-report', bugReportRouter],
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['/chat', chatRouter],
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['/pipeline-jobs', pipelineJobsRouter],
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['/jobs', pipelineJobsRouter], // unified jobs API (script + pipeline); /pipeline-jobs kept for the existing UI
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['/desktop', desktopRouter],
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];
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for (const [prefix, router] of PROTECTED_MOUNTS) protectedRouter.route(prefix, router);
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/** Every prefix served behind the account gate. Read by the capability totality check at boot. */
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export const PROTECTED_API_PREFIXES: string[] = PROTECTED_MOUNTS.map(([prefix]) => prefix);
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/**
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* Mounted above the account gate, and so exempt from capability checks — see EXEMPT_API_PREFIXES in
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* capabilities/totality.ts, which has to justify each one.
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*/
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export const UNPROTECTED_API_PREFIXES: string[] = [
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'/auth',
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'/landing-page-data',
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'/waitlist',
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'/vault',
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'/sidecar',
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'/agent-handoff',
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];
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honoServer.route('/api', protectedRouter);
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honoServer.onError((error, ctx) => {
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if (error instanceof CustomError) {
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if (error.returnValue) {
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if (typeof error.returnValue === 'string') {
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return ctx.text(error.returnValue, error.statusCode);
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} else {
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return ctx.json(error.returnValue, error.statusCode);
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}
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}
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return ctx.text(error.message, error.statusCode);
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}
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console.error('Unexpected error:', error.message);
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console.log(error.stack);
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return ctx.text('Internal Server Error', 500);
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});
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