step 1/4: the permission engine is called permissions, not capabilities

The word meant four different things in this repo, not the three the offscale
doc records:

  1. the permission registry              → RENAMED here
  2. $OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities/ items    → kept; this is what capabilities are
  3. sidecar routing keys                 → step 3, becoming `handles`
  4. Lightning wallet features            → kept; a domain term, and on the wire
                                            to the mobile apps

The fourth was not in the doc and a global find-and-replace would have broken
the mobile wallet, which reads `{ kind, capabilities: Capability[] }` from the
wallet sidecar. So this renamed against an explicit file allowlist rather than
by sweeping the tree, and `CapabilityPage.tsx` — the UI for the item store, and
correctly named already — was left alone.

Moved: servers/capabilities/ → servers/permissions/, capability-gate.ts →
permission-gate.ts, users/capabilities-routes.ts → permissions-routes.ts,
hooks/useCapabilities.ts → usePermissions.ts. Identifiers follow.

Three breaks the typechecker could not see, all found by exercising it live.

The route paths moved with the prose sweep, so the server served
/user/permissions while the frontend still called /user/capabilities. A 404 on
every page load, and tsgo clean throughout.

The response FIELD moved too. `client.get<SelfPermissions>()` is an unchecked
cast, so `data.capabilities` became `undefined` at runtime with no compile
error — `can()` would have answered "no" to everything and the dock would have
emptied itself.

And the grants list was passed straight out of the database, so it arrived as
`{ role, capability, level }` while the screen read `grant.permission`. Every
role would have rendered as holding nothing. It is now mapped in the route:
the wire says `permission`, the column still says `capability`, and step 2
therefore changes nothing any client can see.

The stale react-query keys were the quiet one: two files still invalidated
['self-capabilities'] after the hook moved to ['self-permissions'], so
installing a plugin would have silently stopped refreshing the dock.

The database is untouched — `role_capabilities` and its `capability` column are
step 2, and the two call sites that cross that boundary say so in a comment.
Round-tripped the 9 live grants through the admin endpoint to prove the PUT
contract survived: 9 before, 9 after, Member's three intact.

Also reverted prettier churn on five landing-page files that a broad --write
picked up. Second time today; the lesson is not sticking.

tsgo clean. 797 tests, 787 pass, same 7 pre-existing failures — two of which
now read "path → permission" rather than "path → capability".
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-15 16:03:22 +00:00
parent b0fcd8b81b
commit 2e8ec845c8
59 changed files with 454 additions and 442 deletions
+4 -4
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { listUsersHandler, updateUserRoleHandler, deleteUserHandler } from './ma
import { createUserHandler } from './create-user';
import { provisionLinuxHandler } from './provision-linux-route';
import { resetUserPasswordHandler } from './reset-user-password';
import { capabilityAdminRouter } from './capabilities-routes';
import { permissionAdminRouter } from './permissions-routes';
export const usersRouter = createRouter();
usersRouter.use(originMiddleware);
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ usersRouter.use(originMiddleware);
// Self-update. Any signed-in account may change its own name, username and avatar.
usersRouter.put('/', updateUserHandler);
// Everything below manages OTHER accounts and is the owner's alone. The global capability gate in
// Everything below manages OTHER accounts and is the owner's alone. The global permission gate in
// hono.ts already refuses a non-owner here — `user-admin` is `kind: 'admin'`, so it is
// not grantable — but that router-level rule cannot see the one exception beside it: `PUT /` is
// declared `selfService` so every account can edit its own profile. This gate is what keeps that
@@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ usersRouter.post('/:id/provision-linux', ownerGate, provisionLinuxHandler);
usersRouter.post('/:id/password', ownerGate, resetUserPasswordHandler);
usersRouter.delete('/:id', ownerGate, deleteUserHandler);
// Which capabilities each role holds. Owner-gated inside its own router.
usersRouter.route('/', capabilityAdminRouter);
// Which permissions each role holds. Owner-gated inside its own router.
usersRouter.route('/', permissionAdminRouter);