import { pgTable, integer, text, timestamp, boolean, check } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
import { sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { users } from 'officerdb/auth/schema';

// Officer Vault server-side state. The device never holds a Vaultwarden token; the platform brokers it,
// stores it here tied to the owner account, and injects it on proxied /api/vault requests. All secret
// columns are AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest under the `vault` key purpose (officerdb/crypto).

/**
 * Where this install's Vaultwarden lives. ONE ROW, ever — `id` is pinned to 1 by a CHECK.
 *
 * ── Why this is a table and not `VAULTWARDEN_URL` in .env ──
 *
 * It was the environment variable until the extraction (2026-08-18). Three things were wrong with that,
 * and only the first is about tidiness:
 *
 *  1. `.env` is auto-loaded by bun into EVERY pm2 process, so a value only the vault sidecar needs was
 *     readable from `/proc/<pid>/environ` of every other one. Same argument `docs/secret-store.md` makes
 *     about keys, applied to a URL — lower stakes, identical shape.
 *  2. A plugin cannot ask the owner to edit a file and restart a process. Installing it has to be enough,
 *     and pointing it at a server has to be something the UI can do.
 *  3. An env var read at module load cannot change without a restart, so "point it somewhere else" meant
 *     editing a file, restarting the sidecar, and knowing to do both.
 *
 * ── Why server-wide rather than per-user ──
 *
 * Decided with the owner 2026-08-18: one Vaultwarden per install. Jellyfin's registry is per-user because
 * this machine genuinely runs four instances; there is no such case here, and a `userId` column would be
 * a join every request pays for a second row that does not exist. Onboarding additional accounts onto the
 * same instance is a separate, later question — Vaultwarden has its own users, and mapping Officer
 * accounts onto them is not a column here.
 */
export const vaultConfig = pgTable(
  'vault_config',
  {
    /**
     * Always 1. A single-row table wants a way to say so structurally, or the second row arrives
     * eventually and nothing says which one is real.
     */
    id: integer('id').primaryKey().default(1),
    /** Base URL, no trailing slash (normalised on write). Null before the owner has pointed it anywhere. */
    url: text('url'),
    /**
     * Whether the reverse-proxy should serve at all. Distinct from `url` being set: the owner may want to
     * stop exposing a vault without forgetting where it is.
     */
    enabled: boolean('enabled').notNull().default(true),
    updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
  },
  // The singleton rule, said structurally rather than by convention — `src/databases/CLAUDE.md`'s point
  // about the schema owning what the database MAY contain, not only its shape.
  (table) => [check('ck_vault_config_singleton', sql`${table.id} = 1`)],
);

/**
 * The brokered Vaultwarden token set. One row per owner account (single active vault session). Dropped on
 * platform logout / distress / panic.
 */
export const vaultTokens = pgTable('vault_tokens', {
  userId: integer('user_id')
    .primaryKey()
    .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
  accessToken: text('access_token').notNull(), // encrypted
  refreshToken: text('refresh_token').notNull(), // encrypted
  expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { withTimezone: true }),
  deviceIdentifier: text('device_identifier'), // plaintext; the last device that brokered a login
  clientId: text('client_id'), // plaintext; the connect/token client_id, needed to refresh
  updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
});

/**
 * The platform-held "protector key" for the Officer-app unlock path: it unwraps the on-device wrapped user
 * key, so a valid platform session opens the vault without the master password. Persists across normal
 * logout (frictionless re-login); wiped on distress/panic (forces a one-time master-password re-setup).
 * The zero-knowledge OffVault path never writes here (its protector stays in the Secure Enclave).
 */
export const vaultUnlockKeys = pgTable('vault_unlock_keys', {
  userId: integer('user_id')
    .primaryKey()
    .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
  wrappedKey: text('wrapped_key').notNull(), // encrypted (the protector key)
  updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
});