the whole reason the credential store exists. a tailnet-only hostname cannot be
reached on port 80, so HTTP-01 is impossible and a DNS record is the only proof
Let's Encrypt accepts — which needs the provider's API key.
POST /domains/certificate is the one route here that is deliberately not a
pass-through, and it has to be: the request needs dns_provider_credentials, and
officer never returns a stored key to any caller. so the platform resolves
which provider owns the name from the Domains list, decrypts, builds the
request and returns NPM's own answer unchanged. same arrangement as the NPM
token one level up — the thing that wants the work done is not the thing
holding the password.
NOT under /_config. reading and writing a DNS key stays owner-only; USING it on
the owner's behalf is the feature, and gating this to the owner would defeat
it. a read-level account still cannot reach it, because it is a POST.
three refusals, all before anything is placed at the registrar: a name whose
apex is not in the domain list, a provider with no key stored, and a
certificate spanning two providers — NPM takes one credential per certificate,
and discovering that halfway through leaves a challenge record behind. tested,
because each one otherwise fails deep inside certbot with an error about
something else.
ten minute timeout, 120s default propagation. both err long on purpose: NPM
waits for the record to spread before asking Let's Encrypt to look, and
abandoning the request does not stop it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
867226d897