the whole reason the credential store exists. a tailnet-only hostname cannot be
reached on port 80, so HTTP-01 is impossible and a DNS record is the only proof
Let's Encrypt accepts — which needs the provider's API key.
POST /domains/certificate is the one route here that is deliberately not a
pass-through, and it has to be: the request needs dns_provider_credentials, and
officer never returns a stored key to any caller. so the platform resolves
which provider owns the name from the Domains list, decrypts, builds the
request and returns NPM's own answer unchanged. same arrangement as the NPM
token one level up — the thing that wants the work done is not the thing
holding the password.
NOT under /_config. reading and writing a DNS key stays owner-only; USING it on
the owner's behalf is the feature, and gating this to the owner would defeat
it. a read-level account still cannot reach it, because it is a POST.
three refusals, all before anything is placed at the registrar: a name whose
apex is not in the domain list, a provider with no key stored, and a
certificate spanning two providers — NPM takes one credential per certificate,
and discovering that halfway through leaves a challenge record behind. tested,
because each one otherwise fails deep inside certbot with an error about
something else.
ten minute timeout, 120s default propagation. both err long on purpose: NPM
waits for the record to spread before asking Let's Encrypt to look, and
abandoning the request does not stop it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
one section, not two. a provider serves many domains so the lists differ, but a
person thinks in DOMAINS — the provider is something the check discovers, and a
key only matters as the answer to "can officer do anything for THIS domain".
two tabs would make somebody hold that join in their head, and the providers
tab would be two rows most of the time. so the key is entered from the row that
needs one and stored against its provider: add it for one cloudflare domain and
every other cloudflare domain turns green at once.
THE CHECK runs before you commit, because its answer is usually the reason you
would or would not add it, and a list of unchecked rows is a list somebody has
to remember to revisit.
it reports five verdicts, not two, and the extra three are the interesting
ones. `private` — atelier.officer.dev resolves to 100.64.x, which is CORRECT
and reads as broken against any public-IP comparison. `unknown` — we could not
establish our own address, so "is that us" has no answer and saying so beats a
confident wrong one. `nowhere` — a name bought ten minutes ago. plus
maybeProxied, because a cloudflare domain resolving to cloudflare is a working
setup rather than a misconfiguration.
NS gives the DNS HOST, not the registrar. officer.dev is godaddy on both counts
here, but a domain bought at godaddy and delegated to cloudflare answers
cloudflare — and that is the one that matters, since its API is what places an
ACME challenge. the UI says so where it would otherwise be read as wrong.
only an apex has NS records, so the lookup walks up to find them. verified
live: platform.officer.dev now answers godaddy instead of nothing.
CREDENTIALS are keyed on the provider, encrypted under this plugin's purpose
key, never returned by any route. scope is narrow|broad and NOT read|write —
DNS-01 works by WRITING a TXT record, so no read-only key can ever issue a
certificate, and offering one would produce a setup that looks configured and
fails at the first renewal sixty days later. the dialog says that out loud.
the form is generated from NPM's own dns-providers template, so the field names
are the provider's and it stays right for providers we have never heard of.
the routes live under /_config, which the manifest already marks ownerOnly: a
DNS key can rewrite every record for a domain, which is strictly more than the
NPM login kept there, and declaring it once beats checking it twice.
tables verified by query rather than by db:push's exit code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5