give each member their own immich account and key

Photos had no user provisioning at all: one registry row, the owner's, and
every other account resolving to nothing. Same shape as the Jellyfin gap, but
this one was never built rather than built and dropped.

photos_accounts records who on Officer is who on Immich, and carries that
person's own API key. getConfig falls back to it when the caller has no
registry of their own, and there is no path from there to the owner's key —
an Immich key with permissions:['all'] can read and delete the whole library,
so a member resolving to it would be administering everyone's photographs
rather than reading their own.

Matching is on email, which Immich enforces uniqueness on and Officer already
holds. That is exact where the Jellyfin side has to go through an uppercased
username index and cope with two Officer names colliding into one.

Two deliberate differences from the Jellyfin flow:

The admin's own account is reported as itself, not as "no Officer account".
That bug shipped there and was fixed in 591c0da; there was no reason to write
it twice, so reconcile takes the key's identity from /api/users/me and the
test pins it.

And the temporary password is HANDED OVER rather than discarded. Jellyfin
discards because it has no must-change-password flag, so anything handed over
stays valid forever. Immich has one, and Immich's own app is where phone
backup runs — discarding would leave a photo account that can never back a
phone up again. So: set a password, spend it on a key, raise
shouldChangePassword, return it once. POST /_config/:id/handover re-issues on
demand, because "setting up my phone" happens long after provisioning and more
than once. Verified against the running 3.1.0 image that an API key survives a
password change, so re-issuing never costs Officer its access.

Applied on alpha: conceiba and fedra linked, guipinto and diogo created, all
four keyed and each resolving to their own Immich identity. jrg.conceicao left
alone. Members still need the photos grant on the Member role before the
permission gate lets them through.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

db/queries.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-import { eq, and, desc } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { eq, and, desc, isNotNull } from 'drizzle-orm';
 import { db } from 'officerdb/db';
-import { photosConfig } from './schema';
+import { photosAccounts, photosConfig } from './schema';
 import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret } from 'officerdb/crypto';
 
 // Immich account registry for the officer-photos sidecar. Callers deal in PLAINTEXT — encryption to and from
@@ -53,6 +53,44 @@ export async function getActivePhotosCredentials(userId: number): Promise<Photos
   return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret('photos', row.apiKey) };
 }
 
+/**
+ * The credentials a NON-OWNER reads the library with: the owner's selected instance, and that person's own
+ * API key from their link row.
+ *
+ * `id` and `label` are the REGISTRY row's, so a probe is recorded against the instance it actually reached
+ * and everything downstream treats this as "the connection in use" without caring whose key is inside it.
+ * The only field that differs from the owner's is the one that must — the key.
+ *
+ * Null rather than a fallback in two cases, and both are deliberate:
+ *
+ *   - **The instance must be the ACTIVE one.** Accounts are provisioned against one Immich, so a member
+ *     linked to an instance the owner has since switched away from is genuinely not provisioned on the one
+ *     in use.
+ *   - **The key must exist.** Minting needs a password, which is not always ours to set.
+ *
+ * There is deliberately no path from here to the OWNER's key. An Immich key created with `permissions:
+ * ['all']` can read and delete the entire library, so a member resolving to it would not be reading their
+ * own photographs — they would be administering everyone's.
+ */
+export async function getLinkedPhotosCredentials(userId: number): Promise<PhotosCredentials | null> {
+  const [row] = await db
+    .select({
+      id: photosConfig.id,
+      label: photosConfig.label,
+      url: photosConfig.url,
+      apiKey: photosAccounts.apiKey,
+    })
+    .from(photosAccounts)
+    .innerJoin(photosConfig, eq(photosAccounts.configId, photosConfig.id))
+    .where(
+      and(eq(photosAccounts.userId, userId), eq(photosConfig.isActive, true), isNotNull(photosAccounts.apiKey)),
+    );
+
+  // The isNotNull above already excludes it; this narrows the type and keeps the guarantee local.
+  if (!row?.apiKey) return null;
+  return { id: row.id, label: row.label, url: row.url, apiKey: decryptSecret('photos', row.apiKey) };
+}
+
 /** One account's credentials by id — for probing a specific account rather than the active one. */
 export async function getPhotosCredentials(userId: number, id: number): Promise<PhotosCredentials | null> {
   const [row] = await db
@@ -175,3 +213,80 @@ export async function recordPhotosProbe(userId: number, id: number, version: str
     .set({ version, lastSeenAt: new Date() })
     .where(and(eq(photosConfig.userId, userId), eq(photosConfig.id, id)));
 }
+
+// ── The Officer ↔ Immich account mapping ──
+
+/**
+ * Links already recorded for one instance, for the reconcile to compare against.
+ *
+ * `hasKey` rather than the key itself: callers need to know whether this person can reach their library,
+ * and none of them needs the credential to answer that. The ciphertext does not leave this file.
+ */
+export async function listPhotosAccountLinks(configId: number): Promise<
+  { userId: number; immichUserId: string; immichEmail: string; adopted: boolean; hasKey: boolean }[]
+> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .select({
+      userId: photosAccounts.userId,
+      immichUserId: photosAccounts.immichUserId,
+      immichEmail: photosAccounts.immichEmail,
+      adopted: photosAccounts.adopted,
+      apiKey: photosAccounts.apiKey,
+    })
+    .from(photosAccounts)
+    .where(eq(photosAccounts.configId, configId));
+  return rows.map(({ apiKey, ...rest }) => ({ ...rest, hasKey: !!apiKey }));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Record a pairing.
+ *
+ * `onConflictDoNothing` on BOTH unique indexes, so a re-run is silent rather than an error — a second
+ * reconcile finding the same thing already true is the normal case, not a fault.
+ */
+export async function linkPhotosAccount(params: {
+  userId: number;
+  configId: number;
+  immichUserId: string;
+  immichEmail: string;
+  adopted: boolean;
+}): Promise<void> {
+  await db
+    .insert(photosAccounts)
+    .values({
+      userId: params.userId,
+      configId: params.configId,
+      immichUserId: params.immichUserId,
+      immichEmail: params.immichEmail,
+      // Mirrors what Immich stores, so matching is a lookup rather than a convention every call site has
+      // to remember.
+      normalizedEmail: params.immichEmail.trim().toLowerCase(),
+      adopted: params.adopted,
+    })
+    .onConflictDoNothing();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Store the key minted for one person, encrypted.
+ *
+ * Separate from `linkPhotosAccount` rather than a parameter on it, for the reason the Jellyfin side learned
+ * the hard way: linking is `onConflictDoNothing`, but a key is exactly the thing you re-run provisioning to
+ * REPLACE. An insert that does nothing on conflict cannot express that.
+ */
+export async function setPhotosAccountKey(params: {
+  userId: number;
+  configId: number;
+  apiKey: string;
+}): Promise<void> {
+  await db
+    .update(photosAccounts)
+    .set({ apiKey: encryptSecret('photos', params.apiKey) })
+    .where(and(eq(photosAccounts.userId, params.userId), eq(photosAccounts.configId, params.configId)));
+}
+
+/** Drop a pairing. Removes Officer's RECORD of the account, never the account itself. */
+export async function unlinkPhotosAccount(userId: number, configId: number): Promise<void> {
+  await db
+    .delete(photosAccounts)
+    .where(and(eq(photosAccounts.userId, userId), eq(photosAccounts.configId, configId)));
+}