Files
openseo/README.md
T
pastilhas 14f3f3f1e5 the repository, before any code
Per the rule for a new plugin: the public gitea repository and its infrastructure
come first, so there is somewhere for the work to land rather than a directory
that becomes a repository later.

What is here is the shape and the two decisions it deliberately does not make —
where the container runs, and whether Officer's agents call OpenSEO's /mcp
directly or Officer wraps it as native tools. Both are the owner's, both are
recorded in the todo this came from, and the scaffold keeps both open by
proxying.

Everything in the README was verified against upstream's compose.yaml and its
own skills rather than its marketing: one container, port 3001 on loopback,
SQLite in a volume, AUTH_MODE=local_noauth, and DATAFORSEO_API_KEY as base64 of
login:password.
2026-08-29 15:03:47 +01:00

2.7 KiB

OpenSEO for Officer

Keyword research, rank tracking, competitor and backlink data, site audits — from every-app/open-seo, self-hosted, behind Officer's own permission gate.

Why this is a thin plugin

Most integrations need Officer to invent the agent-facing surface. This one arrives with its own: OpenSEO ships an MCP server at /mcp and its own Agent Skills, built to be driven by exactly this kind of client. So the plugin's job is credential plumbing, a permission boundary and a UI surface — not reimplementing a tool vocabulary that already exists upstream.

What it runs against

One container, verified from upstream's compose.yaml rather than its README:

ghcr.io/every-app/open-seo:latest
  port    3001, bound to 127.0.0.1
  data    a Docker volume at /app/.wrangler  (Cloudflare D1 — SQLite; Postgres is opt-in only)
  auth    AUTH_MODE=local_noauth

local_noauth is not a shortcut taken here, it is upstream's documented self-hosting mode — their docs say to "only expose it behind your own auth-protected reverse proxy, tunnel, or private network." That sentence describes an Officer plugin: mounted behind Officer's permission gate, never published on its own port. It is the ordinary case here rather than a risk to design around — but it is also why nothing in this plugin may expose OpenSEO's port directly, and why the pass-through is the only door.

Credentials, and the honest cost

DATAFORSEO_API_KEY Required. Base64 of login:password. Paid pay-as-you-go directly to DataForSEO
OPENROUTER_API_KEY Optional — OpenSEO's own AI features
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID / _SECRET Optional — Search Console

This is free software over a metered API. Nothing here is a subscription to OpenSEO, and nothing here makes the DataForSEO calls free.

Decisions this scaffold does NOT make

Both are open in todo/integrations/openseo-a-plugin-candidate.md, and both are the owner's:

  1. Where the container runs. Today a plugin has no primitive for "bring a container" — osDependencies installs OS packages. todo/infra/opm-officer-s-own-process-manager is heading toward the Docker network, at which point a container-backed dependency needs no published host port at all. Until then this plugin points at an instance rather than owning one, which is what jellyfin, gitea and proxy-manager already do.
  2. Whether Officer's agents call /mcp directly, or Officer wraps it as native MCP tools. Direct is simpler and already works. Wrapping is more consistent with how other plugins expose theirs, and puts every call through one place that can log and refuse. This scaffold proxies, which keeps both open.