It was stored encrypted in service_connections as well. Nothing needs it there
any more: the UI is an iframe carrying the browser's own Gitea session, so the
only consumer left was the health probe. Meanwhile tea keeps its own copy
regardless — it is what the agent uses, and what this plugin's affordance tells
the agent to use.
Two copies of one secret is a drift waiting to happen: rotate with `tea login`
and the database quietly keeps the dead one. So the token lives once, where it
is used, and saving now writes `tea login add --name officer` AS that account —
a member's token lands in a home only they can read. `secret: null` on save
clears whatever an earlier version stored, so an upgraded machine stops
carrying a copy nothing reads.
service_connections keeps the URL, which is the owner's and genuinely shared.
The settings page READS the existing config first, so on a machine where the
owner and their members already ran `tea login` by hand it says "tea is
configured as X" rather than demanding something they have. It also says when
an account has no OS user yet, since there is then nowhere to write one — the
web view works regardless.
Test runs `tea whoami` as that account. Deliberately not a call the platform
makes with a token it read: the point is to prove what the AGENT will get, and
those are now the same thing. `--name officer` so the platform never overwrites
a login somebody set up by hand.
Noted rather than hidden: `tea login add` takes the token in argv, visible in
ps while it runs. tea offers no stdin form, and the alternative is writing its
YAML by hand — a visible argument traded for a fragile format.
officer
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