diff --git a/api/ios-profile.ts b/api/ios-profile.ts
index 8ded80f..0b846f7 100644
--- a/api/ios-profile.ts
+++ b/api/ios-profile.ts
@@ -136,11 +136,21 @@ ${kinds.map((k) => account(k, k === 'CalDAV' ? 'Officer Calendar' : 'Officer Con
 // The remaining caveat is Apple's: a REPLACEMENT profile must be signed by the same identity as the one
 // it replaces, so after a certificate rotation a device may refuse to replace an older profile until the
 // old one is removed. Nothing detects that for you.
+/**
+ * `OFFICERDEV_X ?? X`, which is the convention every other consumer follows.
+ *
+ * This read the bare names only. `.env` on a converted install prefixes everything — see
+ * `servers/env-prefix.ts` — so on those machines the signing certificate could be configured correctly
+ * and silently ignored, and the only symptom is a profile that says "Not Signed" for no visible reason.
+ * The unprefixed name stays as the fallback, never the source.
+ */
+const env = (name: string) => process.env[`OFFICERDEV_${name}`] ?? process.env[name];
+
 const signingConfig = () => {
-  const cert = process.env.DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CERT;
-  const key = process.env.DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_KEY;
+  const cert = env('DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CERT');
+  const key = env('DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_KEY');
   if (!cert || !key) return null;
-  return { cert, key, chain: process.env.DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CHAIN };
+  return { cert, key, chain: env('DAV_PROFILE_SIGN_CHAIN') };
 };
 
 let warnedUnsigned = false;
@@ -161,7 +171,30 @@ async function sign(plist: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {
   // there is no reason for it to touch the filesystem. `-outform der` and `-nodetach` are both
   // load-bearing — the default output is base64 S/MIME, which iOS will not parse, and without -nodetach
   // the file is a signature with no profile embedded in it.
-  const args = ['smime', '-sign', '-signer', config.cert, '-inkey', config.key, '-outform', 'der', '-nodetach'];
+  /*
+    `-binary` IS NOT OPTIONAL, and its absence is why every signed profile was refused.
+
+    Without it `openssl smime -sign` treats the input as TEXT: it canonicalises line endings and adds MIME
+    headers before signing. The signature then verifies perfectly — `openssl smime -verify` reports
+    "Verification successful" — while the bytes iOS unwraps are no longer the plist that was written. The
+    device shows the profile, then refuses it with "Invalid Profile".
+
+    Apple's own sample signs with `OpenSSL::PKCS7::BINARY` for the same reason. This was found and written
+    down in `officer-oas/enroll.ts` on 2026-08-20, four wrong endings into a hunt that was never about the
+    ending — and then repeated here on 2026-08-27 because this file was written without reading that one.
+  */
+  const args = [
+    'smime',
+    '-sign',
+    '-binary',
+    '-signer',
+    config.cert,
+    '-inkey',
+    config.key,
+    '-outform',
+    'der',
+    '-nodetach',
+  ];
   if (config.chain) args.push('-certfile', config.chain);
   args.push('-md', 'sha256');
 
@@ -185,7 +218,42 @@ async function sign(plist: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {
   return new Uint8Array(out);
 }
 
-export type StoredProfile = { url: string; expiresAt: string; signed: boolean };
+export type StoredProfile = {
+  url: string;
+  /** The same profile at a URL a person can TYPE. See `shortCode`. */
+  shortUrl: string;
+  code: string;
+  expiresAt: string;
+  signed: boolean;
+};
+
+/*
+  A code short enough to type into Safari's address bar.
+
+  ── Why a long URL is not good enough ──
+
+  The 43-character token cannot be typed, so it has to be tapped or pasted — and on a phone neither
+  works. Officer runs from the Home Screen in a WEBVIEW, and a webview cannot hand a `.mobileconfig` to
+  Settings: the download has nowhere to go and the screen does nothing. Every link the chat renders also
+  gets `target="_blank"`, and a popup tab breaks the profile hand-off in Safari too.
+
+  So the only path that reliably reaches iOS is a person typing a URL into real Safari, and that means it
+  has to be short.
+
+  ── Why this is not a weaker credential ──
+
+  Crockford's alphabet minus the ambiguous letters, 8 characters: ~10^12 combinations. It is SINGLE USE
+  and lives ten minutes, so an attacker gets one guess per attempt against a target that disappears when
+  it is claimed or when the clock runs out. The long token still exists and still works; this is a second
+  door to the same one-shot entry, not a replacement for it.
+*/
+const CODE_ALPHABET = 'ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ23456789';
+const CODE_TTL_MS = 10 * 60_000;
+
+const shortCode = (): string => {
+  const bytes = randomBytes(8);
+  return Array.from(bytes, (b) => CODE_ALPHABET[b % CODE_ALPHABET.length]).join('');
+};
 
 /** Build the profile and park it behind a one-shot token. Returns the URL Safari should be sent to. */
 export async function stashIosProfile(params: ProfileParams, publicUrl: string): Promise<StoredProfile> {
@@ -200,8 +268,15 @@ export async function stashIosProfile(params: ProfileParams, publicUrl: string):
   const expiresAt = Date.now() + TTL_MS;
   pending.set(token, { body, expiresAt });
 
+  // The same profile behind a typeable code. Shorter-lived on purpose — see `shortCode`.
+  const code = shortCode();
+  pending.set(code, { body, expiresAt: Date.now() + CODE_TTL_MS });
+
+  const base = publicUrl.replace(/\/$/, '');
   return {
-    url: `${publicUrl.replace(/\/$/, '')}/dav/provision/${token}.mobileconfig`,
+    url: `${base}/dav/provision/${token}.mobileconfig`,
+    shortUrl: `${base}/dav/p/${code}`,
+    code,
     expiresAt: new Date(expiresAt).toISOString(),
     signed: signed !== null,
   };