bitcoin-wallet, extracted from the platform as a plugin

Tenth plugin out, and the one whose extraction turned on a permission decision
rather than a mechanical move.

The wallet permission was kind: 'admin' — owner only, not grantable, invisible
to every other account. Plugin permissions are ALWAYS kind: 'app': mount.ts
forces it and the manifest has no field for anything else, deliberately, so
that "can a plugin escalate itself" is a question which cannot be asked. So
extraction could not preserve admin, and that was raised as a blocker before
any code moved.

It was the right change anyway, and the objection inverts. Every wallet query
is scoped by user_id, and that id comes from X-Officer-User which the platform
injects from the authenticated session — a caller cannot name someone else's.
So granting this gives an account ITS OWN wallet. Not through the API and not
with root either does it hand over anyone else's, because their seed is sealed
under a passphrase the server never stores. kind: 'admin' was single-user
thinking; grantable is how a second person gets a wallet at all.

Named bitcoin-wallet rather than wallet: it is a bitcoin wallet specifically,
and the appName drives the route, the API prefix, the table prefix and the
install key together. Tables renamed to bitcoin_wallet_* accordingly — the
prefix guard normalises the hyphen. Free only because no wallet table existed
on any server, which was checked before deciding: db:push treats a rename as a
drop plus a create.

The three custody test files moved with it and still run — 72 tests over
scrypt sealing, envelope open and bolt11. bunfig.toml's test root was widened
on 2026-08-15 after music took lyrics.test.ts and the suite silently shrank by
nine, so that trap was already closed.

68 palette classes converted, five status vocabularies hoisted into shared.ts.
Two deliberate flattenings recorded in PLUGIN.md: testnet/signet/regtest all
read as warning, and the bitcoin and lightning rails no longer differ by hue.

Deferred on purpose: watch-only data (xpubs, balances, history) stays
unencrypted so a locked wallet still shows a balance. Anyone with the database
can therefore SEE any user's balances; they can never move a coin.

api/router.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+import { createSidecarProxy } from '@@/sidecar/create-proxy';
+import { mountPrefix } from '@@/plugins/manifest';
+import { manifest } from '../manifest';
+
+// /api/wallet/* — auth, then forward to officer-wallet. No routes of its own, and no wallet knowledge
+// whatsoever: not a seed, not a node credential, not an xpub. The platform cannot spend and cannot read a
+// balance except by asking the sidecar.
+//
+// The unlock passphrase DOES transit this proxy — the browser has to send it somewhere — but it is
+// forwarded as an opaque body and never parsed, logged or retained. See sidecar/create-proxy.ts, which
+// deliberately performs no body inspection; that restraint matters more for this sidecar than any other.
+
+// DERIVED, never written out — see the runbook. The literal is right by coincidence today and wrong
+// the moment this is published by anyone other than officerdev.
+const proxy = createSidecarProxy({ name: 'wallet', prefix: `/api${mountPrefix({ appName: 'bitcoin-wallet', manifest })}` });
+
+export const router = proxy.router;
+
+/** Base URL of the sidecar's HTTP server, or null if it hasn't reported in yet. */
+export const getWalletServerUrl = proxy.getHttpUrl;