Files
platform/CLAUDE.md
T
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5 f063fc0c08 remove origin validation
ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN, ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC, and everything they gated. The flag
defaulted to ON, so none of it ran on a real install — what comes out is
documented defence in depth that was already switched off. The file said so
itself: "Both flags and their call sites come out once the tailnet is the
perimeter."

Origin was never authentication here in any case. An app's `officer://<hex>`
origin is chosen by the client, forgeable outside a browser, and extractable from
a shipped binary.

Gone: the two flags, isOriginAllowed, isOriginCheckDisabled, isMusicOriginExempt,
originValidationMiddleware, ORIGIN_RULES and the whole OFFICER_<APP>_ORIGIN
scheme, PUBLIC_URL's origin/host derivation, and origin-validation.test.ts, which
existed only to pin them. CORS now echoes whatever Origin it is given, which is
what every install already did.

What SURVIVES is the reason this needed care. origin-validation.ts held two
unrelated things, and the second was the global authorization gate — a valid
non-owner token reaches only what its role grants, deliberately NOT under the
flag because it is account-based rather than origin-based. Its own comment called
it "the airtight half". Deleting the file wholesale would have deleted
authorization.

So it moves to _middlewares/capability-gate.ts as capabilityGateMiddleware, with
the name matching what it does: nothing in it reads an Origin header any more.
hono.ts mounts it in the same position, ahead of every router.

origin-middleware.ts stays and is untouched — it extracts the Origin for six auth
handlers that log it, and for passkeys. Extraction, not validation.

Also updates every claim that rested on the old model: CLAUDE.md's security
section and repo map, docs/secret-store.md, docs/mobile-api-keys.md, and five
messages in machine-setup's Tailscale section which told the owner to set
ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN=false when declining a tailnet. That advice is now impossible to
follow, and the honest version is different: with no tailnet the token is the
whole lock, so put a proxy in front and restrict who can reach it.

Not typechecked (empty node_modules, frozen installs). Every changed file parses;
the setup section was run and writes four variables now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 00:15:25 +00:00

25 KiB

CLAUDE.md

Project Overview

Officer is a self-hosted platform built around one person — the server owner — which since 2026-08-07 also admits additional accounts holding a strict subset of it. It bundles an AI agent, a terminal, a file browser, a code editor, email, a bitcoin wallet, a remote desktop and customisable dashboards behind a single web app.

The owner/member split, and where the line falls. This file said "single-user is a hard invariant, not a stage" until 2026-08-07. That is no longer true and had already stopped being true when it was written: users holds six rows. The accurate statement is narrower and more useful —

  • One owner. User id 1, role Super Admin, created by POST /auth/bootstrap while the table is empty, pinned there by a CHECK constraint. The owner bypasses every permission check.
  • Other accounts get only what their ROLE is granted. Roles are Admin, Member, Developer; grants live in role_capabilities, keyed on role, never on user. Absence denies — there is no row meaning "no", so an empty table is a server where members reach nothing but their own profile.
  • Some things can never be shared, structurally. Terminal, chat, tasks, files, desktop and browser are kind: 'execution' in the capability registry: they run as the owner's OS user in the owner's home, so there is no level of "read" that makes them safe. They have no level at all and the grants API refuses to store one.

So "which user is this" now has a real answer for the app surface (gitea, music, photos, email, calendar…), and is still always "the owner" for anything that executes code or touches the disk.

src/servers/capabilities/registry.ts is the authority and reads as the design document for this. Mounting a router without a registry entry makes the server refuse to boot — see "Capabilities" below before adding one.

Still single-user: account creation. createUser has exactly one call site, auth/bootstrap.ts, gated on an empty table. There is no signup route, no invite flow and no admin create-user handler, so every existing member was inserted into Postgres by hand. That is the largest gap in the model, not a deliberate boundary.

Architecture

One Bun process (src/server.tsx) serves everything:

  • the React SPA, via Bun's HTML import of src/apps/officer-web/index.html (HMR in dev)
  • the REST API, a Hono app mounted at /api (src/servers/hono.ts)
  • eight WebSocket providers — terminal, chat, task-runner, pipeline, cliamp, cliamp-audio, desktop, vault — plus a sidecar registration socket. terminal is a byte relay onto the pty sidecar's own listener, not a translating bridge; vault is the same shape onto Vaultwarden's notifications hub.
  • a browser relay on its own port (BROWSER_RELAY_PORT, default 18792)

Long-running and privileged work lives in sidecars: separate processes that dial back in over /api/sidecar/register and are tracked in src/servers/sidecar-registry.ts. PM2 runs them (ecosystem.config.cjs): officer (the server), officer-anthropic-proxy, officer-agent, officer-opencode, officer-email, officer-pty, officer-vnc, officer-music, officer-vault, officer-slskd, officer-headscale, officer-transmission, officer-invoiceshelf, officer-wallet, officer-photos, officer-notify, officer-caldav, officer-memos, officer-jellyfin, officer-gitea — twenty as of 2026-08-06, and a list that goes stale every time a sidecar lands. pm2 jlist is the source of truth.

officer-anthropic-proxy and officer-agent are not the same thing. The proxy holds the Anthropic credential and forwards API traffic; the agent is the process that spawns claude. They were one entry named officer-claude until the sidecar-isolation work — which is exactly how the false claim that "restarting officer doesn't disturb the agent" survived so long. Every sidecar is a PM2 peer of officer, so no sidecar is a child of the server and restarting the server does not kill one.

Agents run unsandboxed as the server owner, with --dangerously-skip-permissions. This is deliberate — it is the owner's own machine. Do not add a jail without being asked.

Repository Layout

src/
├── server.tsx              # the single entrypoint: routes, WS upgrades, static files
├── apps/
│   ├── officer-web/        # the SPA shell — Screens/Authentication + Screens/Dashboard
│   └── landing/            # marketing landing page
├── servers/
│   ├── hono.ts             # router composition; everything under /api
│   ├── _middlewares/       # auth, body parsing, the capability gate, rate limiting
│   ├── api/<feature>/      # one folder per feature, each exporting a router
│   ├── channels/           # send-claude-code / send-opencode — how /chat drives an agent turn
│   ├── queue/              # background job engine
│   └── sidecar/            # sidecar implementations + the wire protocol
├── databases/officer_db/   # the only database (Postgres + Drizzle)
├── extensions/browser-relay/
└── workspaces/             # shared packages, each a bun workspace

src/workspaces/officerdev is the biggest of these: the windowed "apps" (FileBrowser, Chat, Terminal, CodeEditor, Desktop, Dashboards, Wallet…) that the shell hosts, behind an AppRegistry. src/apps/officer-web is only the shell — screens, routing and settings.

Path aliases (tsconfig.json): @/*src/apps/officer-web, @/components/*src/workspaces/components, @@/*src/servers, @/public/*public. Workspace packages are imported by their package name (officerdev, hooks, state, types, helpers, …).

Tech Stack

  • Runtime: Bun (Node 22 or newer is enforced by a preinstall check)

    That check demanded exactly 22 until 2026-08-12. The reason was a node-pty build failure some months earlier, whose details were not recorded. It was relaxed to >= 22 after confirming node-pty ships no Linux prebuilds — its install script always falls through to node-gyp rebuild, so it compiles against whatever Node is present and there is no ABI to mismatch. Untested on 24 at the time of the change. If bun install fails building node-pty, or officer-pty cannot load its native module, restore the exact pin first. The source build also needs build-essential and python3.

  • Language: TypeScript, strict. bunx tsgo is clean — keep it that way.

  • Frontend: React 19, React Router 7, React Query, Tailwind 4, shadcn/ui + custom components

  • Backend: Hono

  • Database: one Postgres database via Drizzle

  • Agents: Claude Code and opencode, driven through sidecars; tools exposed over MCP

Data

Two stores, and the split matters:

Postgres (src/databases/officer_db) holds the account, passkeys, settings, dashboards, email accounts, queue and pipeline jobs. Schema in src/schema/, hand-written queries in src/queries/, types inferred from the schema in src/types.ts.

The filesystem holds everything the agent authors. OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR contains one directory per item under skills/, tools/, tasks/, processes/, extensions/ — no database rows, no scope tiers. DATA_PATH/<email>/ holds the managed home, attachments and the per-account email SQLite stores — those are the email sidecar's, and nothing in the platform opens them. Path helpers live in src/servers/data-path.ts; note getHomeDir (the managed home under DATA_PATH) versus getOwnerHomeDir (the owner's real login home when HOME_DIR is set, which is where terminals, chats and task runs actually execute).

Schema changes use push, not migrations

This database is kept in sync with bun db:push, which diffs the schema code against the live database and alters it directly. drizzle-kit migrate has never been run here — there is no __drizzle_migrations table. Change the schema, run bun db:push, done.

bun db:gen writes files to officer_db/migrations/, but nothing applies them; the old numbered history was deleted because it had drifted from the real schema. Treat the schema code, not those files, as the source of truth.

Declare multi-column uniqueness as uniqueIndex('uq_…').on(a, b), never unique('uq_…').on(a, b) — drizzle-kit mis-diffs named composite unique constraints and re-creates them on every push, which used to stop db:push on an unanswerable truncate prompt. Same for any foreign key whose generated name would exceed Postgres's 63-character identifier limit: name it explicitly. See src/databases/CLAUDE.md → "Composite keys" before adding either.

Security Model

  • IS_DEV_BUILD (src/servers/build-env.ts) is true only when PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV is explicitly dev/development. Everything else, including unset, is hardened. Rate limiting and password rules key off it — they fail closed.
  • There is no origin checking. It was removed on 2026-08-13, along with ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN and ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC. The flag defaulted to ON, so origin validation ran on no real install — what came out was documented defence in depth that was already switched off. Origin was never authentication here anyway: an app's officer://<hex> origin is chosen by the client, forgeable outside a browser, and extractable from a shipped binary. The perimeter is the tailnet, and the lock is a valid token on every protected route plus the capability gate below.
  • JWTs are 30-day, blacklisted on signout, and invalidated by a password change (passwordChangedAt). The role is deliberately not a claim — every authorization decision re-reads users.role from Postgres, so a grant or a revoke takes effect on the next request rather than at next sign-in.
  • A panic lockdown (src/servers/api/auth/panic.ts) is in-memory only and refuses every authenticated request until the server restarts.

Capabilities — read this before mounting a router

Authorization is one system, and it is not in userMiddleware (which only answers "is this token valid"). It is _middlewares/capability-gate.tscapabilities/authorize.ts, mounted globally in hono.ts ahead of everything, and it re-verifies the token itself so it covers routes that never mount userMiddleware.

  • capabilities/registry.ts — the single enumeration of what the platform can do, in four kinds: core (every account, not deniable), app (the grantable surface), execution and admin (owner only, and execution is never grantable at any level).
  • capabilities/authorize.ts — resolves "may this account do this". Owner short-circuits first; every other answer is role grants plus core, with execution/admin stripped even if a row grants them. Every catch returns deny. Grants are cached by role and the cache's whole invalidation contract is invalidateRoleGrants, called by the one writer in api/users/capabilities-routes.ts.
  • capabilities/totality.tsassertCapabilityTotality runs in server.tsx before serve() and throws. Mount a router or a socket without a registry entry and pm2 restart officer fails, naming what is missing. That is deliberate: the hole it closes was a Member 403'ing on GET /api/tasks and opening /api/tasks/pipeline/ws with a 101 in the same minute, because Bun's route table matches the socket before the /api/* catch-all that reaches Hono. A patch does not survive the next door; refusing to boot does.

So adding a router means adding one line to CAPABILITIES. If the surface genuinely is not user-gated, add it to EXEMPT_API_PREFIXES in totality.ts with a reason — an unexplained exemption is how the hole happened the first time.

The frontend hook useCapabilities fails open on purpose: hiding a dock icon is a courtesy, the 403 is the lock, and an owner locked out by a transient network error is worse than a member clicking into a refusal.

Commands

bun dev          # the whole app — SPA + API + WebSockets, watched
bun start        # production
bunx tsgo        # typecheck (not tsc)
bun test         # tests
bun format       # prettier over every dirty file — see the note below before running it
bun db:push      # apply the schema to Postgres
bun setup        # guided install (writes .env, incl. PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV=production)

Sidecar control is PM2, not npm scripts: pm2 restart officer-<name>, pm2 logs officer-<name>. See docs/working-on-officer.md for which process a given change needs restarted.

Installs are frozen. Never resolve a dependency you did not ask for.

bunfig.toml sets [install] frozenLockfile = true, so bun install resolves from bun.lock and nothing else — it fails rather than quietly picking up a newer version, including a transitive one nobody chose. Verified on bun 1.3.10: a lockfile that no longer satisfies package.json exits 1 with error: lockfile had changes, but lockfile is frozen.

It is config rather than a habit because a supply-chain compromise does not wait for the one time somebody forgets a flag. On 2026-08-04 eleven cache packages — keyv, flat-cache, file-entry-cache, cacheable-request, cache-manager, the @cacheable/* scope, ecto — were published with a preinstall dropper that harvested npm and GitHub tokens, AWS and Kubernetes credentials, SSH and PEM keys, .env files and .claude/settings.json, then republished itself through any npm token it found. It reached 434 further packages across 1,381 versions. This machine was unaffected only because nothing had installed since 2026-08-02.

To change a dependency: edit package.json, run bun install --no-frozen-lockfile deliberately, read the lockfile diff, and commit it. The friction is the point — an unexplained lockfile change in a diff is the signal this exists to produce.

Do not add --no-frozen-lockfile to a script, a Dockerfile or CI to make an error go away. The error means the lockfile and package.json disagree, and that is worth a human look every time.

Format your own files, not the whole dirty tree. bun format globs git diff --name-only HEAD, so it rewrites every uncommitted file — including work in progress that isn't yours, which then shows up as unexplained whitespace churn in someone else's diff. Run bunx prettier --write <paths> on the files you actually touched. bun format is only safe when the tree is otherwise clean.

Code Style

  • Paradigm: functional — pure functions, immutability, composition
  • TypeScript: strict, no any. Type-only imports are required (verbatimModuleSyntax).
  • Comments: minimal, and about why. Don't narrate what the code already says.
  • Async: always async/await
  • Exports: named only, no defaults
  • Files: PascalCase.tsx for components, kebab-case.ts for everything else
  • Prettier: single quotes in JS, double in JSX, semicolons, trailing commas, 120 cols

Imports

Order: types → external → workspace → relative.

import type { User } from 'types';
import { useState } from 'react';
import { useQuery } from '@tanstack/react-query';
import { useClient } from 'hooks/useClient';
import { formatDate } from 'helpers/formatters';
import { useWebsites } from '../useWebsites';

In app code import types from 'types', which re-exports the database types. Only server and database code imports from officerdb/types directly.

Functions

Arrow functions for one-liners, regular functions for anything with real logic. No multiline parameter lists — extract a params type instead.

type ProcessDataParams = { body: Record<string, unknown> | undefined; query: Record<string, string> };
export function processData({ body, query }: ProcessDataParams): Result { ... }

Components and hooks

type ExperimentCardProps = { experiment: Experiment; onSelect: (id: number) => void };

export const ExperimentCard = ({ experiment, onSelect }: ExperimentCardProps) => { ... };

Complex hooks return objects; simple state hooks return as const tuples. Event parameters are always named ev, never e.

API calls

useClient() returns typed verbs — client.get<Foo>('/foo') really does return Foo, so pass the type parameter and let inference flow from it.

Working With Me

  • Ask first — confirm the approach before a significant change
  • Explore thoroughly — read the related files before editing
  • Keep it simple — no over-engineering, no premature abstraction
  • Be explicit — no magic, no implicit behaviour
  • Stay focused — note unrelated problems, don't fix them uninvited
  • Report honestly — say what you verified and what you didn't

Always commit and push when you finish implementing — including when it went wrong. Don't wait to be asked, and don't hold a branch back because it is unfinished, untested or turned out to be a dead end. The history of the mistakes is worth having: a reverted commit and its message explain why an approach was abandoned, which is exactly the thing that gets lost when a failed attempt is quietly discarded. Say what state it is in — in the commit message and in COMMS/ if another agent will pick it up — rather than withholding the commit until it is good.

Commit messages: simple lowercase, no prefixes.

Frontend route conventions (apply to EVERY new dashboard route)

Worked examples: /soulseek, /music, /chat.

  • Workspace/Panel framework, always — never a standalone single screen. The screen renders <WorkspaceView workspace={ws} locked /> where ws = useDashboardState<LayoutNode>('screens/<name>', defaultLayout), guarded by a normalizeLayout that pins appTypes to an allow-list. Panels are windowed apps under src/workspaces/officerdev/src/apps/<Feature>/, each exporting appRegistryMetas ({ key, name, icon, component, availableOnPanel: false }) and registered in AppRegistry.tsx. The Workspace/Panel framework is orthogonal to routing — it contains no route navigation, and panels live inside the Route element tree, so they can call useParams/useSearchParams directly.
  • Page title by route. Add a rule to RULES in src/apps/officer-web/state/usePageTitle.ts ({ match: (p) => p.startsWith('/<name>'), title: '<Name>' }, most-specific first); usePageTitleSync does the rest. startsWith means nested routes are covered.

The URL is the source of truth for selection

docs/navigation-audit.md is the authority here — read it before building a screen that selects things. It names the "opaque click" anti-pattern: an element that opens something addressable but keeps the id in an onClick closure instead of the DOM, leaves the URL unchanged, holds the selection in usePanelChannel/useGlobal, and has no anchor semantics (no cmd-click, no middle-click, not link-focusable). Half the app still does this; none of the new code should.

  • Addressable state goes in the URL (useParams / useSearchParams), never in a channel. usePanelChannel is for genuine signals and refresh buses (files:refresh-signal, SLSKD_REFRESH_CHANNEL, MUSIC_RESYNC_CHANNEL) — and declare one with defineChannel in officerdev/src/channels.ts rather than spelling the name and type at each site. "Which thing is open" is a URL. Panels each read the URL rather than passing it between themselves.
  • Rows and nav items are real links. <Link> for rows (exemplar: the /chat session list, f35c145); react-router's <NavLink> for nav chrome, so active state comes from the router. The hand-rolled isActive in Dock/Header is scheduled for replacement (audit Phase 4) — don't copy it. A disabled entry renders as a <span>; a disabled <a> is not a thing. A control that mutates rather than navigates stays a <button>.
  • Route pairs. A bare screen route plus a param route rendering the same component: /chat + /chat/:sessionId, /jobs + /jobs/:id, /email + /email/:emailId, /headscale + /headscale/:section. One <Navigate … replace /> guard in the screen, placed after all hooks, canonicalises both the bare route and a bogus param.
  • Master list + live preview uses ?selected=<id>, not the detail route — linking rows straight to /x/:id destroys preview-on-list, because that route is the full page. Rows link to /x?selected=id on-page and /x/:id off-page; list, mobile panel and preview all read the param. Action buttons are siblings of the anchor, never nested inside it.
  • src/workspaces/components/NavLink.tsx is not react-router's NavLink — it's a <Link> wrapper that appends useGlobalQueryString() and provides no active state. Import react-router's when you want isActive.
  • Route helpers shared between an officerdev panel app and an officer-web screen must be re-exported from src/workspaces/officerdev/src/index.ts (named exports only — the barrel deliberately avoids export * for app modules to keep appRegistryMetas from colliding).

COMMS — a channel between agents, when one is open

COMMS/<work-stream>/ is a tracked channel between agents working on this repo from different machines. It exists because findings used to reach each other by the owner relaying them from memory at the end of long sessions.

There is no open channel right now. COMMS/sidecar-app-store/ ran for one night — per-user Linux accounts through to a member's first agent turn — and was deleted when the work landed, which is the convention rather than an oversight: a spent channel left in place gets read as current.

If you open one:

  • Read it before starting, if your task touches its work stream. It carries what is verified, what is assumed, what is broken, and what is waiting on a decision — the parts a commit message does not hold.
  • Number the files and alternate, one per turn, odd for one agent and even for the other. The parity is the author; the alternation is the protocol. A push with no doc is then visibly a break rather than something to find by diffing, and "nothing to report" is still a turn worth taking — silence and a crashed agent read identically.
  • End on a checkable condition, not on either party's judgement: no open item is actionable by a participant. "I think we're done" can close a thread with work still in it.
  • Durable reasoning goes in docs/ or next to the code. The channel is for coordination. When the work lands, delete the channel and move anything still open to TODO.md.

Two things that made it work, and neither is about either agent being more careful. One writes, the other verifies, and only the verifier runs things on a real machine — most of what was caught was invisible to reading and needed a live filesystem. And the author of a comment is the worst-placed person to notice the code disagrees with it: the two most serious defects were both found by whoever had not written the sentence explaining why it was safe.

Further Reading

  • docs/navigation-audit.mdauthoritative on routing/navigation: the opaque-click anti-pattern, a severity-ranked findings table, the channel-selection map and the four-phase plan
  • docs/agent-coordination.mdthe north star for the workspace/panel work: agents on one dashboard coordinating with each other instead of through the human, the handoff protocol, and what is deliberately not being built. Read it before ranking, deferring or starting any panel item — it is what docs/workspace-panel-todo.md is ranked against.
  • docs/workspace-panels.md — how the Workspace/Panel framework works: the layout tree, how a panel is mounted and what it knows, the URL-vs-channel split for panel-to-panel communication, and the persistence key families. Read before building a panel app. Its defect list is docs/workspace-panel-todo.md.
  • docs/secret-store.mddesign, not built: moving the encryption and signing keys out of .env into a SQLite store, why they cannot live in Postgres, and key rotation. Also records the core/plugin split it assumes — light plus officer-headscale is the core; Vaultwarden and the wallet are plugins
  • docs/sidecar-topology.md — where the sidecar architecture is going, and what was considered and dropped
  • docs/working-on-officer.md — how to run, restart and check your work on this machine
  • docs/wallet-key-custody.md — what the platform can and cannot see of the wallet
  • TODO.md — current direction and deferred work; takes precedence over this file where they disagree
  • src/apps/CLAUDE.md — shared frontend patterns
  • src/databases/CLAUDE.md — database patterns
  • CONVENTIONS.md — component organisation, state management and React patterns, with rationale; src/workspaces/officerdev/APP_CONVENTIONS.md and HOOK_CONVENTIONS.md for panel apps and hooks

Treat the code as the source of truth where anything here disagrees with it.