Ran the live test against green. Two results pointing opposite ways.
setpriv survives. Verified independently by spawning the same argv and reading what the command
printed: id -u = 1001. Nothing layered on the hook has to move. But the test asserts against
/proc/<child.pid>/status where child.pid is sudo, whose real uid is legitimately 1000 until it
execs down to setpriv, so it fails on a working drop. The intent — don't let the child
self-report — is right; the fix is to observe the final process by having the child create a
file and stat its owner, which a process cannot forge.
The binary check refuses a byte-identical path. sameFile calls realpathSync, which throws
EACCES for the service user because .local is 700 and the platform is "other", and the catch
turns that into false. Every member turn would be refused the moment the gates move.
That one is mine. In 16 I argued for leaving .local closed to the platform and reasoned about
the file browser, without considering that spawn-as-member runs IN the platform process and
must stat a path inside it. Recommended comparing resolve(command) to claudeBinIn(run.home)
instead: both operands are platform-computed by the same function, so string equality
establishes exactly what the check is for with no filesystem access. Granting traverse instead
would need x on four directories, not one, and reverses 16 across the tree.
All state restored and verified: .local back to 700, no residual ACL entries on any directory
I touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
85249a2756