platform/src/servers/hono.ts

import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { cors } from 'hono/cors';
import { createRouter } from './create-router';
import type { HonoVariables } from './create-router';
import { authRouter } from './api/auth';
import { serverSettingsRouter } from './api/server-settings/server-settings';
import { landingPageDataRouter } from './api/landing-page-data/landing-page-data';
import { waitlistRouter } from './api/waitlist/waitlist';
import { usersRouter } from './api/users/users-router';
import { apiKeysRouter } from './api/api-keys/router';
import { skillsRouter } from './api/skills/skills';
import { tasksRouter } from './api/tasks/tasks';
import { agentsRouter } from './api/agents/agents';
import { toolsRouter } from './api/tools/tools';
import { processesRouter } from './api/processes/processes';
import { rescanRouter } from './api/items/rescan';
import { scrapeRouter } from './api/scrape/scrape';
import { uploadRouter } from './api/upload/upload';
import { settingsRouter } from './api/settings/settings';
import { dashboardsRouter } from './api/dashboards';
import { taskLogsRouter } from './api/task-logs/task-logs';
import { router as fileBrowserRouter } from './api/file-browser/router';
import { musicRouter } from './api/music/router';
import { vaultRouter } from './api/vault/router';
import { publicVaultRouter, VAULT_ONLY_PREFIXES, isBitwardenClient } from './api/vault/public-router';
import { agentHandoffRouter } from './api/agent-handoff/router';
import { slskdRouter } from './api/slskd/router';
import { headscaleRouter } from './api/headscale/router';
import { transmissionRouter } from './api/transmission/router';
import { invoiceshelfRouter } from './api/invoiceshelf/router';
import { jellyfinRouter } from './api/jellyfin/router';
import { photosRouter } from './api/photos/router';
import { walletRouter } from './api/wallet/router';
import { vpnRouter } from './api/vpn/router';
import { terminalRouter } from './api/terminal/sidecar-server';
import { caldavRouter } from './api/dav/sidecar-server';
import { memosRouter } from './api/memos/router';
import { giteaRouter } from './api/gitea/router';
import { appStoreRouter } from './api/app-store/router';
import { davSyncRouter } from './api/dav/sync-router';
import { davRouter } from './api/dav/router';
import { claimIosProfile } from './api/dav/ios-profile';
import { notifyRouter } from './api/notify/router';
import { systemMonitorRouter } from './api/system-monitor/system-monitor';
import { activityRouter } from './api/activity/router';
// Vault still hand-rolls its port capture, so it keeps a side-effect import; every other HTTP sidecar
// registers its listener when createSidecarProxy runs inside the router this file already imports.
import './api/vault/sidecar-server'; // side-effect: capture the officer-vault reverse-proxy port
import { dockRouter } from './api/dock/dock';
import { integrationsRouter, googleCallbackHandler } from './api/integrations/integrations';
import { queueRouter } from './api/queue/queue';
import { emailRouter } from './api/email/router';
import { browserRouter } from './api/browser/router';
import { desktopRouter } from './api/desktop/rest';
import { bugReportRouter } from './api/bug-report/bug-report';
import { agentStatusRouter } from './api/agent-status/router';
import { chatRouter } from './api/chat/chat';
import { pipelineJobsRouter } from './api/tasks/pipeline-jobs-routes';
import { CustomError } from './custom-errors';
import { userMiddleware, bodyParser, isOriginAllowed, originScopeMiddleware } from './_middlewares';
import { isMusicOriginExempt } from './_middlewares/origin-validation';

export { Hono };
export { createRouter };
export type { HonoVariables };

export const honoServer = new Hono<{ Variables: HonoVariables }>();

const corsMiddleware = cors({
  origin: (origin, c) => {
    const host = c.req.header('host');
    // TEMPORARY: see isMusicOriginExempt — echoes any Origin back for /api/music when enabled, so a
    // browser client is not blocked by CORS after userMiddleware has already let it through.
    if (isMusicOriginExempt(c.req.path)) return origin ?? '*';
    return isOriginAllowed(origin, host) ? origin : '';
  },
  allowMethods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'],
  allowHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization'],
});

// The DAV doors are the one place CORS must NOT run, because hono's cors() answers every OPTIONS itself
// as a preflight — 204, no body, no DAV headers — and never calls the route beneath it.
//
// OPTIONS is not a preflight to a DAV client. It is how the client asks what the server can do, and the
// answer it needs is the `DAV: 1, 2, 3, calendar-access, addressbook` header. iOS sends it during account
// setup and refuses the account when it is missing, reporting the failure as "Cannot connect using SSL" —
// a message about TLS for a problem that has nothing to do with TLS, which is how this cost an evening.
//
// Nothing is lost by skipping it: a CalDAV client is not a browser and has no origin to check.
const isDavPath = (path: string) =>
  path === '/dav' || path.startsWith('/dav/') || path === '/.well-known/caldav' || path === '/.well-known/carddav';

honoServer.use((ctx, next) => (isDavPath(ctx.req.path) ? next() : corsMiddleware(ctx, next)));

// Scoped-origin gate: restrict app origins (e.g. the music app) to their allowed path prefixes
// (/api/auth + /api/music). No-ops for the main web origin and while OFFICER_MUSIC_ORIGIN is unset.
honoServer.use(originScopeMiddleware);

honoServer.get('/api', (ctx) => ctx.json({ officerAPI: 'ok' }));
honoServer.route('/api/auth', authRouter);
honoServer.route('/api/landing-page-data', landingPageDataRouter);
honoServer.route('/api/waitlist', waitlistRouter);
// Vaultwarden reverse-proxy — mounted TOP-LEVEL (not under protectedRouter): the Bitwarden client
// carries its own bearer token, not a platform session JWT, so userMiddleware would 401 it. Origin
// gating still applies via originScopeMiddleware above (OFFICER_VAULT_ORIGIN → /api/vault). The
// notifications WebSocket is upgraded at the serve level (server.tsx).
honoServer.route('/api/vault', vaultRouter);

// The same Vaultwarden, with NO Officer authentication, so the Bitwarden browser extension can point at
// this host instead of at a second public hostname for Vaultwarden. Deliberately its own mount rather
// than a mode of the router above: that one requires an Officer session and swaps the caller's
// Authorization header for a server-held token, and blending the two would put an unauthenticated branch
// inside the authenticated path. Temporary — see public-router.ts for what replaces it and why leaving it
// open is not a new exposure.
honoServer.route('/vaultwarden', publicVaultRouter);

// …and at the ROOT, so the extension can be pointed at the bare Officer URL with no path at all.
//
// Registered BEFORE `/api` is mounted, because hono matches in registration order and this has to win
// for a Bitwarden client. It is deliberately narrow: the four prefixes below belong to Vaultwarden and
// to nothing else here, and `/api/*` is diverted ONLY when the request carries a Bitwarden client
// header. An ordinary Officer request never matches, so nothing that worked before changes.
for (const prefix of VAULT_ONLY_PREFIXES) honoServer.route(prefix, publicVaultRouter);

honoServer.use('/api/*', async (ctx, next) => {
  if (!isBitwardenClient(ctx.req.raw.headers)) return next();
  return publicVaultRouter.fetch(ctx.req.raw, ctx.env);
});
honoServer.get('/api/integrations/google/callback', googleCallbackHandler);

// Agent-to-agent handoff — mounted TOP-LEVEL for the same reason the vault is: the caller is a Claude
// session running a curl, and it carries a per-panel bearer token rather than a platform session JWT,
// so userMiddleware would 401 it and a capability lookup would have no account to resolve. The token
// identifies exactly one agent panel and authorises exactly one action: deliver a prompt to a named
// peer on that panel's own dashboard. See servers/api/agent-handoff/router.ts.
honoServer.route('/api/agent-handoff', agentHandoffRouter);

// CalDAV/CardDAV for phones and desktop clients — mounted TOP-LEVEL for the same reason the vault is:
// DAVx5, iOS and Thunderbird authenticate with HTTP Basic on every request and have nowhere to put a
// platform JWT, so userMiddleware would 401 them. The credential is a scoped DAV app password; see
// api/dav/sync-router.ts.
// The iOS profile download, registered BEFORE the /dav mount below because hono matches in registration
// order and davSyncRouter's `/*` would otherwise demand HTTP Basic for it. Safari has no credential to
// offer — it was handed a URL by the app and nothing else — so the one-shot token in the path IS the
// authentication. Minted by POST /api/dav/provision/ios; see api/dav/ios-profile.ts.
honoServer.get('/dav/provision/:file', (ctx) => {
  const file = ctx.req.param('file');
  const token = file.endsWith('.mobileconfig') ? file.slice(0, -'.mobileconfig'.length) : null;
  const body = token ? claimIosProfile(token) : null;
  // Expired, already used, or never existed — all the same 404. There is nothing useful to tell a
  // caller who has the wrong token, and distinguishing the cases would confirm that a token once existed.
  if (!body) return ctx.text('not found', 404);

  return new Response(body as unknown as BodyInit, {
    headers: {
      // Mandatory. iOS identifies a configuration profile by MIME type; served as octet-stream or
      // text/xml the file downloads and the OS does nothing with it.
      'Content-Type': 'application/x-apple-aspen-config',
      'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
    },
  });
});

honoServer.route('/dav', davSyncRouter);

// Autodiscovery. This is most of what makes adding an account on a phone feel transparent instead of
// fiddly: the client is given a bare domain and probes these paths UNAUTHENTICATED before it has any
// credential, so they must sit above every auth gate. Without them iOS in particular degrades to
// demanding a full collection URL, which is exactly the sort of thing that makes self-hosting feel
// worse than the commercial product it is replacing.
// `.all`, not `.get`: RFC 6764 §6 has the client probe the well-known URI with the method it actually
// wants to use, and iOS sends PROPFIND, not GET. Registered as GET-only these answered 404 to every real
// client while looking perfectly healthy in a browser.
honoServer.all('/.well-known/caldav', (ctx) => ctx.redirect('/dav/', 301));
honoServer.all('/.well-known/carddav', (ctx) => ctx.redirect('/dav/', 301));

const protectedRouter = createRouter();
protectedRouter.use(bodyParser());
protectedRouter.use(userMiddleware);

// The mount table, as DATA rather than forty statements.
//
// The reason is the capability registry: assertCapabilityTotality refuses to boot unless every mounted
// prefix maps to exactly one capability, and that check is only worth anything if it reads the real mount
// list. A hand-copied second list would drift, and the drift would be invisible until someone tried a
// prefix nobody had gated — which is precisely how the websocket hole happened.
//
// Order is irrelevant here: every prefix is distinct, so hono's registration-order matching has nothing to
// disambiguate. `/pipeline-jobs` and `/jobs` deliberately share one router.
const PROTECTED_MOUNTS: [prefix: string, router: ReturnType<typeof createRouter>][] = [
  ['/server-settings', serverSettingsRouter],
  ['/users', usersRouter],
  ['/skills', skillsRouter],
  ['/tasks', tasksRouter],
  ['/agents', agentsRouter],
  ['/tools', toolsRouter],
  ['/processes', processesRouter],
  ['/rescan', rescanRouter],
  ['/scrape', scrapeRouter],
  ['/upload', uploadRouter],
  ['/user', settingsRouter],
  ['/api-keys', apiKeysRouter], // your own keys; the `account` core capability covers it
  ['/dashboards', dashboardsRouter],
  ['/task-logs', taskLogsRouter],
  ['/file-browser', fileBrowserRouter],
  ['/music', musicRouter],
  ['/slskd', slskdRouter],
  ['/terminal', terminalRouter],
  ['/memos', memosRouter],
  ['/gitea', giteaRouter],
  ['/app-store', appStoreRouter],
  ['/caldav', caldavRouter], // the JSON door for Officer's own calendar/contacts UI
  ['/dav', davRouter], // app-password management (the sync door is /dav, top-level)
  ['/notify', notifyRouter],
  ['/headscale', headscaleRouter],
  ['/transmission', transmissionRouter],
  ['/invoiceshelf', invoiceshelfRouter],
  ['/jellyfin', jellyfinRouter],
  ['/photos', photosRouter],
  ['/wallet', walletRouter],
  ['/vpn', vpnRouter],
  ['/system-monitor', systemMonitorRouter],
  ['/activity', activityRouter],
  ['/dock', dockRouter],
  ['/integrations', integrationsRouter],
  ['/queue', queueRouter],
  ['/email', emailRouter],
  ['/browser', browserRouter],
  ['/bug-report', bugReportRouter],
  ['/agent-status', agentStatusRouter],
  ['/chat', chatRouter],
  ['/pipeline-jobs', pipelineJobsRouter],
  ['/jobs', pipelineJobsRouter], // unified jobs API (script + pipeline); /pipeline-jobs kept for the existing UI
  ['/desktop', desktopRouter],
];

for (const [prefix, router] of PROTECTED_MOUNTS) protectedRouter.route(prefix, router);

/** Every prefix served behind the account gate. Read by the capability totality check at boot. */
export const PROTECTED_API_PREFIXES: string[] = PROTECTED_MOUNTS.map(([prefix]) => prefix);

/**
 * Mounted above the account gate, and so exempt from capability checks — see EXEMPT_API_PREFIXES in
 * capabilities/totality.ts, which has to justify each one.
 */
export const UNPROTECTED_API_PREFIXES: string[] = [
  '/auth',
  '/landing-page-data',
  '/waitlist',
  '/vault',
  '/sidecar',
  '/agent-handoff',
];

honoServer.route('/api', protectedRouter);

honoServer.onError((error, ctx) => {
  if (error instanceof CustomError) {
    if (error.returnValue) {
      if (typeof error.returnValue === 'string') {
        return ctx.text(error.returnValue, error.statusCode);
      } else {
        return ctx.json(error.returnValue, error.statusCode);
      }
    }
    return ctx.text(error.message, error.statusCode);
  }

  console.error('Unexpected error:', error.message);
  console.log(error.stack);
  return ctx.text('Internal Server Error', 500);
});