Files
platform/CLAUDE.md
T
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5 6d8709c05a plan: roles as data, teams as scopes, and the owner as an identity
Design for tomorrow, written down so the work starts from a spec. Phase 0 is
already built; everything after it is plan.

The load-bearing decision is the smallest one. Ownership is answered today by
users.role === 'Super Admin', which was fine while roles were a hardcoded union
and nothing could write a new one — and becomes a privilege-escalation path the
moment roles are editable data, because then adding a role and becoming the owner
are the same feature. So phase 1 is just that: the owner is OWNER_USER_ID, every
existing call site keeps meaning owner, and nothing downstream starts until it
lands.

Teams union rather than restrict, which is the only coherent resolution and has a
consequence worth stating: a team can only ever grant. Deny rules are named under
what must not be built, along with a role that confers ownership and team-scoped
execution capabilities.

And the thing a reader would otherwise discover at the end of phase 4: there is
still no way to create a second account, so this is a permission model for
accounts that cannot yet exist. Sequenced last because it is orthogonal, flagged
because it may be worth doing first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 04:40:27 +00:00

33 KiB

CLAUDE.md

Project Overview

Officer is a self-hosted platform built around one person — the server owner — which since 2026-08-07 also admits additional accounts holding a strict subset of it. It bundles an AI agent, a terminal, a file browser, a code editor, a bitcoin wallet, a remote desktop and customisable dashboards behind a single web app.

The owner/member split, and where the line falls. This file said "single-user is a hard invariant, not a stage" until 2026-08-07. That is no longer true and had already stopped being true when it was written: users holds six rows. The accurate statement is narrower and more useful —

  • One owner. User id 1, role Super Admin, created by POST /auth/bootstrap while the table is empty, pinned there by a CHECK constraint. The owner bypasses every permission check.

  • Other accounts get only what their ROLE is granted. Roles are Admin, Member, Developer; grants live in role_permissions, keyed on role, never on user. Absence denies — there is no row meaning "no", so an empty table is a server where members reach nothing but their own profile.

  • Some things can never be shared, structurally. Tasks, items, desktop and browser are kind: 'execution': they run as the owner's OS user in the owner's home, so there is no level of "read" that makes them safe. They have no level at all and the grants API refuses to store one.

  • And some are shared only because the kernel enforces it. Terminal, chat and files are kind: 'confined', added 2026-08-11 with per-user Linux accounts. They still touch the filesystem and still run processes — but not the owner's, because the account has its own Linux user, its own home, and the kernel refusing everything above it.

    The distinction earns its keep in one place: a confined grant means nothing without that Linux user. authorize.ts drops it for an account whose osUser is null, so "granted but unconfined" resolves to no access rather than to the owner's home — which is what it would otherwise resolve to, since getOwnerHomeDir ignores the email it is passed. That rule lives there once and covers the HTTP routes, the websocket doors and the dock together.

So "which user is this" has a real answer for the app surface (gitea, music, photos, calendar…) and for the confined one (terminal, chat, files), and is still always "the owner" for anything under execution.

src/servers/permissions/registry.ts is the authority and reads as the design document for this. Mounting a router without a registry entry makes the server refuse to boot — see "Permissions" below before adding one.

Still single-user: account creation. createUser has exactly one call site, auth/bootstrap.ts, gated on an empty table. There is no signup route, no invite flow and no admin create-user handler, so every existing member was inserted into Postgres by hand. That is the largest gap in the model, not a deliberate boundary.

Architecture

One Bun process (src/server.tsx) serves everything:

  • the React SPA, via Bun's HTML import of src/apps/officer-web/index.html (HMR in dev)
  • the REST API, a Hono app mounted at /api (src/servers/hono.ts)
  • eight WebSocket providers — terminal, chat, task-runner, pipeline, cliamp, cliamp-audio, desktop, vault — plus a sidecar registration socket. terminal is a byte relay onto the pty sidecar's own listener, not a translating bridge; vault is the same shape onto Vaultwarden's notifications hub.
  • a browser relay on its own port — switched off 2026-08-13, awaiting extraction into a plugin. The extension and api/browser/ stay on disk; the listener and the /api/browser mount do not.

Long-running and privileged work lives in sidecars: separate processes that dial back in over /api/sidecar/register and are tracked in src/servers/sidecar-registry.ts. PM2 runs them (the generated ecosystem.config.cjs — see below): officer (the server), officer-anthropic-proxy, officer-claude-code, officer-opencode, officer-pty, officer-vnc, officer-music, officer-vault, officer-slskd, officer-headscale, officer-transmission, officer-invoiceshelf, officer-wallet, officer-photos, officer-notify, officer-caldav, officer-memos, officer-jellyfin, officer-gitea — twenty as of 2026-08-06, and a list that goes stale every time a sidecar lands. pm2 jlist is the source of truth.

officer-anthropic-proxy and officer-claude-code are not the same thing. (The second was called officer-agent until 2026-08-13; older docs use that name.) The proxy holds the Anthropic credential and forwards API traffic; the agent is the process that spawns claude. They were one entry named officer-claude until the sidecar-isolation work — which is exactly how the false claim that "restarting officer doesn't disturb the agent" survived so long. Every sidecar is a PM2 peer of officer, so no sidecar is a child of the server and restarting the server does not kill one.

Agents run unsandboxed as the server owner, with --dangerously-skip-permissions. This is deliberate — it is the owner's own machine. Do not add a jail without being asked.

Repository Layout

src/
├── server.tsx              # the single entrypoint: routes, WS upgrades, static files
├── apps/
│   └── officer-web/        # the SPA shell — Screens/Authentication + Screens/Dashboard
├── servers/
│   ├── hono.ts             # router composition; everything under /api
│   ├── _middlewares/       # auth, body parsing, the permission gate, rate limiting
│   ├── api/<feature>/      # one folder per feature, each exporting a router
│   ├── channels/           # send-claude-code / send-opencode — how /chat drives an agent turn
│   ├── queue/              # background job engine
│   └── sidecar/            # sidecar implementations + the wire protocol
├── databases/officer_db/   # the only database (Postgres + Drizzle)
├── extensions/browser-relay/
└── workspaces/             # shared packages, each a bun workspace

src/workspaces/officerdev is the biggest of these: the windowed "apps" (FileBrowser, Chat, Terminal, CodeEditor, Desktop, Dashboards, Wallet…) that the shell hosts, behind an AppRegistry. src/apps/officer-web is only the shell — screens, routing and settings.

Path aliases (tsconfig.json): @/* → src/apps/officer-web, @/components/* → src/workspaces/components, @@/* → src/servers, @/public/* → public. Workspace packages are imported by their package name (officerdev, hooks, state, types, helpers, …).

Tech Stack

  • Runtime: Bun (Node 22 or newer is enforced by a preinstall check)

    That check demanded exactly 22 until 2026-08-12. The reason was a node-pty build failure some months earlier, whose details were not recorded. It was relaxed to >= 22 after confirming node-pty ships no Linux prebuilds — its install script always falls through to node-gyp rebuild, so it compiles against whatever Node is present and there is no ABI to mismatch. Untested on 24 at the time of the change. If bun install fails building node-pty, or officer-pty cannot load its native module, restore the exact pin first. The source build also needs build-essential and python3.

    Bun itself is held at the 1.3 series, on purpose and temporarily. 1.4.0 was published 2026-08-20; the owner asked on 2026-08-22 to stay on 1.3 for a few months until 1.4 has been watched. Two places carry that number and they move together: BUN_SERIES in scripts/setup/machine-setup/lib/dev.sh, which resolves the newest 1.3.x from the npm registry and passes it to the installer as a release tag, and engines.bun in package.json, which is what bun run doctor reads. bun ignores engines (verified — an install declaring 1.9.x ran clean under 1.3.14), so that field is the declaration and doctor is the enforcement.

    Do not run bun upgrade on a machine running Officer. It takes no version argument — latest stable or --canary, nothing else — so it jumps straight past the pin and says nothing. That is the whole reason doctor checks the running version at all; machine-setup.sh --only 'JavaScript runtimes' offers to pin a drifted machine back down. Lifting the hold is todo/infra/.

  • Language: TypeScript, strict. bunx tsgo is clean — keep it that way.

  • Frontend: React 19, React Router 7, React Query, Tailwind 4, shadcn/ui + custom components

  • Backend: Hono

  • Database: Postgres via Drizzle — officer for the platform, plus officer_marketplace on the host that serves marketplace.officer.dev (see docs/marketplace.md)

  • Agents: Claude Code and opencode, driven through sidecars; tools exposed over MCP

Data

Two stores, and the split matters:

Postgres (src/databases/officer_db) holds the account, passkeys, settings, dashboards, queue and pipeline jobs. Since 2026-08-16 there is a SECOND database, officer_marketplace (src/databases/marketplace_db), and the split is deliberate: it is a public catalogue served by a process with no login, no session and no user, so sharing a connection would put an unauthenticated surface one query away from every private table. It runs only on the host serving marketplace.officer.dev — docs/marketplace.md. One directory per feature holding schema.ts and queries.ts beside each other; src/schema.ts is what db:push reads, and it lists the core tables with the plugin ones commented out. Types inferred from the schema in src/types.ts.

The filesystem holds everything the agent authors. OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR ($OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities) contains one directory per item under skills/, tools/, tasks/, processes/, extensions/ — no database rows, no scope tiers. DATA_PATH/<email>/ holds the managed home and attachments. It also holds email_accounts/, which is the email plugin's — the platform pre-creates the directory and never opens what is inside it.

None of those paths is configured. Since 2026-08-13 src/servers/data-path.ts derives the install root as resolve(process.cwd(), '..') and hangs data/, permissions/ and dockers/ off it. That replaced DATA_PATH, OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR and HOME_DIR in .env — three values that had to agree with each other and with the tree on disk. assertInstallLayout refuses to boot when the working directory is not the repo, because otherwise a wrong cwd relocates the whole install silently rather than failing.

Note getHomeDir (the managed home under DATA_PATH, now used only for NON-owner accounts and by pipeline-executor) versus getOwnerHomeDir (the owner's real login home, where terminals, chats and task runs execute — captured from homedir() once at module load, and it ignores the email it is passed).

Schema changes use push, not migrations

This database is kept in sync with bun db:push, which diffs the schema code against the live database and alters it directly. drizzle-kit migrate has never been run here — there is no __drizzle_migrations table. Change the schema, run bun db:push, done.

bun db:gen writes files to officer_db/migrations/, but nothing applies them; the old numbered history was deleted because it had drifted from the real schema. Treat the schema code, not those files, as the source of truth.

Declare multi-column uniqueness as uniqueIndex('uq_…').on(a, b), never unique('uq_…').on(a, b) — drizzle-kit mis-diffs named composite unique constraints and re-creates them on every push, which used to stop db:push on an unanswerable truncate prompt. Same for any foreign key whose generated name would exceed Postgres's 63-character identifier limit: name it explicitly. See src/databases/CLAUDE.md → "Composite keys" before adding either.

Security Model

  • IS_DEV_BUILD (src/servers/build-env.ts) is true only when PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV is explicitly dev/development. Everything else, including unset, is hardened. Rate limiting and password rules key off it — they fail closed.
  • There is no origin checking. It was removed on 2026-08-13, along with ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN and ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN_MUSIC. The flag defaulted to ON, so origin validation ran on no real install — what came out was documented defence in depth that was already switched off. Origin was never authentication here anyway: an app's officer://<hex> origin is chosen by the client, forgeable outside a browser, and extractable from a shipped binary. The perimeter is the tailnet, and the lock is a valid token on every protected route plus the permission gate below.
  • JWTs are 30-day, blacklisted on signout, and invalidated by a password change (passwordChangedAt). The role is deliberately not a claim — every authorization decision re-reads users.role from Postgres, so a grant or a revoke takes effect on the next request rather than at next sign-in.
  • A panic lockdown (src/servers/api/auth/panic.ts) is in-memory only and refuses every authenticated request until the server restarts.

Permissions — read this before mounting a router

Authorization is one system, and it is not in userMiddleware (which only answers "is this token valid"). It is _middlewares/permission-gate.ts → permissions/authorize.ts, mounted globally in hono.ts ahead of everything, and it re-verifies the token itself so it covers routes that never mount userMiddleware.

  • permissions/registry.ts — the single enumeration of what the platform can do, in five kinds: core (every account, not deniable), app (the grantable surface), confined (grantable, but only to an account that has a Linux user), execution and admin (owner only, and execution is never grantable at any level). 20 entries as of 2026-08-23 — verified by bun run docs:check, which fails if this number drifts again: 5 core, 4 app, 3 confined, 4 execution, 4 admin. It said 27 for nine days.
  • permissions/authorize.ts — resolves "may this account do this". Owner short-circuits first; every other answer is role grants plus core, with execution/admin stripped even if a row grants them, and confined stripped for an account with no osUser. Every catch returns deny. Grants are cached by role and the cache's whole invalidation contract is invalidateRoleGrants, called by the one writer in api/users/permissions-routes.ts.
  • permissions/totality.ts — assertPermissionTotality runs in server.tsx before serve() and throws. Mount a router or a socket without a registry entry and pm2 restart officer fails, naming what is missing. That is deliberate: the hole it closes was a Member 403'ing on GET /api/tasks and opening /api/tasks/pipeline/ws with a 101 in the same minute, because Bun's route table matches the socket before the /api/* catch-all that reaches Hono. A patch does not survive the next door; refusing to boot does.

So adding a router means adding one line to CAPABILITIES. If the surface genuinely is not user-gated, add it to EXEMPT_API_PREFIXES in totality.ts with a reason — an unexplained exemption is how the hole happened the first time.

The frontend hook usePermissions fails open on purpose: hiding a dock icon is a courtesy, the 403 is the lock, and an owner locked out by a transient network error is worse than a member clicking into a refusal.

Commands

bun dev          # the whole app — SPA + API + WebSockets, watched
bun start        # production
bunx tsgo        # typecheck (not tsc)
bun test         # tests
bun format       # prettier over every dirty file — see the note below before running it
bun db:push      # apply the schema to Postgres
bun docs:check   # do the docs still match the code? REQUIRED before tagging a release
bun setup        # runs scripts/install.sh — blank machine to running platform

bun docs:check before every release, and leave it green. It compares documented claims against values derived at run time — the permission count, the PM2 entry count, every settings route Spotlight offers — and exits non-zero on drift. A check must never compare a doc against a second hard-coded copy; that is one more place to drift, and it drifts in the same edit that misses the doc.

It is narrow on purpose. It cannot read prose and judge it, only claims with a machine-checkable counterpart — which is a small part of the documentation and the part that rots fastest, because a number is exactly what nobody re-derives while editing the sentence around it. Both claims it found on the day it was written had been wrong for over a week.

scripts/install.sh is only an orchestrator — it runs the two halves in order and does nothing itself: setup/machine-setup/machine-setup.sh (28 sections: packages, tailnet, runtimes, docker, shell) then setup/officer-setup.sh (11: pre-flight, layout, repository, dependencies, database, environment, secrets, schema, build, services, verify). Either runs alone — --machine-only, --officer-only, or by path — because a machine you already trust needs only the second. Both are re-runnable: each records the steps it finished and skips them, so stopping halfway costs nothing. Run it as yourself; it re-execs through sudo when it needs to, and on macOS never does, because Homebrew refuses to run as root.

Sidecar control is PM2, not npm scripts: pm2 restart officer-<name>, pm2 logs officer-<name>. See docs/working-on-officer.md for which process a given change needs restarted.

Installs are frozen. Never resolve a dependency you did not ask for.

bunfig.toml sets [install] frozenLockfile = true, so bun install resolves from bun.lock and nothing else — it fails rather than quietly picking up a newer version, including a transitive one nobody chose. Verified on bun 1.3.10: a lockfile that no longer satisfies package.json exits 1 with error: lockfile had changes, but lockfile is frozen.

It is config rather than a habit because a supply-chain compromise does not wait for the one time somebody forgets a flag. On 2026-08-04 eleven cache packages — keyv, flat-cache, file-entry-cache, cacheable-request, cache-manager, the @cacheable/* scope, ecto — were published with a preinstall dropper that harvested npm and GitHub tokens, AWS and Kubernetes credentials, SSH and PEM keys, .env files and .claude/settings.json, then republished itself through any npm token it found. It reached 434 further packages across 1,381 versions. This machine was unaffected only because nothing had installed since 2026-08-02.

To change a dependency: edit package.json, allow the lockfile to change deliberately, read the diff, and commit it. Note that --no-frozen-lockfile — which this file and bunfig.toml both used to name — is NOT a flag bun 1.3.14 has; it is silently ignored and the install still fails frozen. Comment out frozenLockfile in bunfig.toml for the one command, then put it back. The friction is the point — an unexplained lockfile change in a diff is the signal this exists to produce.

Do not add --no-frozen-lockfile to a script, a Dockerfile or CI to make an error go away. The error means the lockfile and package.json disagree, and that is worth a human look every time.

Format your own files, not the whole dirty tree. bun format globs git diff --name-only HEAD, so it rewrites every uncommitted file — including work in progress that isn't yours, which then shows up as unexplained whitespace churn in someone else's diff. Run bunx prettier --write <paths> on the files you actually touched. bun format is only safe when the tree is otherwise clean.

Code Style

  • Paradigm: functional — pure functions, immutability, composition
  • TypeScript: strict, no any. Type-only imports are required (verbatimModuleSyntax).
  • Comments: minimal, and about why. Don't narrate what the code already says.
  • Async: always async/await
  • Exports: named only, no defaults
  • Files: PascalCase.tsx for components, kebab-case.ts for everything else
  • Prettier: single quotes in JS, double in JSX, semicolons, trailing commas, 120 cols

Imports

Order: types → external → workspace → relative.

import type { User } from 'types';
import { useState } from 'react';
import { useQuery } from '@tanstack/react-query';
import { useClient } from 'hooks/useClient';
import { formatDate } from 'helpers/formatters';
import { useWebsites } from '../useWebsites';

In app code import types from 'types', which re-exports the database types. Only server and database code imports from officerdb/types directly.

Functions

Arrow functions for one-liners, regular functions for anything with real logic. No multiline parameter lists — extract a params type instead.

type ProcessDataParams = { body: Record<string, unknown> | undefined; query: Record<string, string> };
export function processData({ body, query }: ProcessDataParams): Result { ... }

Components and hooks

type ExperimentCardProps = { experiment: Experiment; onSelect: (id: number) => void };

export const ExperimentCard = ({ experiment, onSelect }: ExperimentCardProps) => { ... };

Complex hooks return objects; simple state hooks return as const tuples. Event parameters are always named ev, never e.

API calls

useClient() returns typed verbs — client.get<Foo>('/foo') really does return Foo, so pass the type parameter and let inference flow from it.

Working With Me

  • Ask first — confirm the approach before a significant change
  • Explore thoroughly — read the related files before editing
  • Keep it simple — no over-engineering, no premature abstraction
  • Be explicit — no magic, no implicit behaviour
  • Stay focused — note unrelated problems, don't fix them uninvited
  • Report honestly — say what you verified and what you didn't

Always commit and push when you finish implementing — including when it went wrong. Don't wait to be asked, and don't hold a branch back because it is unfinished, untested or turned out to be a dead end. The history of the mistakes is worth having: a reverted commit and its message explain why an approach was abandoned, which is exactly the thing that gets lost when a failed attempt is quietly discarded. Say what state it is in — in the commit message and in COMMS/ if another agent will pick it up — rather than withholding the commit until it is good.

Commit messages: simple lowercase, no prefixes.

Frontend route conventions (apply to EVERY new dashboard route)

Worked examples: /soulseek, /music, /chat.

  • Workspace/Panel framework, always — never a standalone single screen. The screen renders <WorkspaceView workspace={ws} locked /> where ws = useDashboardState<LayoutNode>('screens/<name>', defaultLayout), guarded by a normalizeLayout that pins appTypes to an allow-list. Panels are windowed apps under src/workspaces/officerdev/src/apps/<Feature>/, each exporting appRegistryMetas ({ key, name, icon, component, availableOnPanel: false }) and registered in AppRegistry.tsx. The Workspace/Panel framework is orthogonal to routing — it contains no route navigation, and panels live inside the Route element tree, so they can call useParams/useSearchParams directly.
  • Page title by route. Automatic — no rule to add. titleForPath in src/apps/officer-web/state/usePageTitle.ts takes the URL's first path segment, turns kebab-case into Title Case, and that's the tab title; usePageTitleSync does the rest. A screen that wants to say more than its route does (a chat's own name, not just "Chat") publishes an override instead — usePublishPageTitle in officerdev.

The URL is the source of truth for selection

docs/navigation-audit.md is the authority here — read it before building a screen that selects things. It names the "opaque click" anti-pattern: an element that opens something addressable but keeps the id in an onClick closure instead of the DOM, leaves the URL unchanged, holds the selection in usePanelChannel/useGlobal, and has no anchor semantics (no cmd-click, no middle-click, not link-focusable). Half the app still does this; none of the new code should.

  • Addressable state goes in the URL (useParams / useSearchParams), never in a channel. usePanelChannel is for genuine signals and refresh buses (files:refresh-signal, SLSKD_REFRESH_CHANNEL, MUSIC_RESYNC_CHANNEL) — and declare one with defineChannel in officerdev/src/channels.ts rather than spelling the name and type at each site. "Which thing is open" is a URL. Panels each read the URL rather than passing it between themselves.
  • Rows and nav items are real links. <Link> for rows (exemplar: the /chat session list, f35c145); react-router's <NavLink> for nav chrome, so active state comes from the router. The hand-rolled isActive in Dock/Header is scheduled for replacement (audit Phase 4) — don't copy it. A disabled entry renders as a <span>; a disabled <a> is not a thing. A control that mutates rather than navigates stays a <button>.
  • Route pairs. A bare screen route plus a param route rendering the same component: /chat + /chat/:sessionId, /jobs + /jobs/:id, /headscale + /headscale/:section. One <Navigate … replace /> guard in the screen, placed after all hooks, canonicalises both the bare route and a bogus param.
  • Master list + live preview uses ?selected=<id>, not the detail route — linking rows straight to /x/:id destroys preview-on-list, because that route is the full page. Rows link to /x?selected=id on-page and /x/:id off-page; list, mobile panel and preview all read the param. Action buttons are siblings of the anchor, never nested inside it.
  • src/workspaces/components/NavLink.tsx is not react-router's NavLink — it's a <Link> wrapper that appends useGlobalQueryString() and provides no active state. Import react-router's when you want isActive.
  • Route helpers shared between an officerdev panel app and an officer-web screen must be re-exported from src/workspaces/officerdev/src/index.ts (named exports only — the barrel deliberately avoids export * for app modules to keep appRegistryMetas from colliding).

COMMS — a channel between agents, when one is open

COMMS/<work-stream>/ is a tracked channel between agents working on this repo from different machines. It exists because findings used to reach each other by the owner relaying them from memory at the end of long sessions.

There is no open channel right now. COMMS/sidecar-app-store/ ran for one night — per-user Linux accounts through to a member's first agent turn — and was deleted when the work landed, which is the convention rather than an oversight: a spent channel left in place gets read as current.

If you open one:

  • Read it before starting, if your task touches its work stream. It carries what is verified, what is assumed, what is broken, and what is waiting on a decision — the parts a commit message does not hold.
  • Number the files and alternate, one per turn, odd for one agent and even for the other. The parity is the author; the alternation is the protocol. A push with no doc is then visibly a break rather than something to find by diffing, and "nothing to report" is still a turn worth taking — silence and a crashed agent read identically.
  • End on a checkable condition, not on either party's judgement: no open item is actionable by a participant. "I think we're done" can close a thread with work still in it.
  • Durable reasoning goes in docs/ or next to the code. The channel is for coordination. When the work lands, delete the channel and move anything still open to TODO.md.

Two things that made it work, and neither is about either agent being more careful. One writes, the other verifies, and only the verifier runs things on a real machine — most of what was caught was invisible to reading and needed a live filesystem. And the author of a comment is the worst-placed person to notice the code disagrees with it: the two most serious defects were both found by whoever had not written the sentence explaining why it was safe.

Further Reading

  • docs/navigation-audit.md — authoritative on routing/navigation: the opaque-click anti-pattern, a severity-ranked findings table, the channel-selection map and the four-phase plan
  • docs/email-recall.md — design, not built: recall over your own correspondence. The split that matters is counting (needs every message judged) versus retrieval (needs the best few, fast) — and why a number produced by searching is confidently wrong with no signal that it is
  • docs/find-my-device.md — design, not built: locating your own devices from Officer. What is assembly (most of it), what is impossible (offline finding — there is no crowd to relay it), and the question to settle first, which is retention rather than anything technical
  • docs/affordances.md — what an affordance is, the three tests for whether something qualifies (including the one that catches most bad ones: can it be fixed instead?), the file format, and how they reach the agent. Read before writing one
  • docs/agent-coordination.md — the north star for the workspace/panel work: agents on one dashboard coordinating with each other instead of through the human, the handoff protocol, and what is deliberately not being built. Read it before ranking, deferring or starting any panel item — it is what docs/workspace-panel-todo.md is ranked against.
  • docs/workspace-panels.md — how the Workspace/Panel framework works: the layout tree, how a panel is mounted and what it knows, the URL-vs-channel split for panel-to-panel communication, and the persistence key families. Read before building a panel app. Its defect list is docs/workspace-panel-todo.md.
  • docs/multi-server-push.md — design, not built: one Officer app receiving notifications from every server it is signed into. Works already, bar one missing field — and why the mv catalogue-version check turns into an endless resync between servers without it. The server identifier is an SSO decision
  • docs/visual-regression-plan.md — plan, not built: nightly screenshot regression against a JWT dashboard on a second server. The blocker is that a JWT lives in localStorage and iris copies only cookies, so an authenticated capture silently renders the login page — plus why diffing must happen before any agent is asked to look
  • docs/plugin-dependency-scope.md — a plugin declares WHO must be able to run each host binary. Why the owner's login shell is the wrong question for a confined plugin, the two-part reachability check (world-executable AND every parent traversable), and why members' binaries on alpha worked only because one home directory happened to be mode 751
  • docs/plugin-route-authorization.md — design, not built: making a plugin's settings routes owner-only while the plugin itself stays grantable. What the proxy should pass (isOwner and a level, never the role name), why declaring owner-only paths in the manifest beats trusting every plugin to remember, and the credential-resolution work that has to land first
  • docs/roles-and-teams.md — plan, phase 0 built: roles as a table, teams as scopes, and the one change that has to land first — the owner becomes an identity rather than whoever holds a role name, because otherwise "add a role" and "become the owner" are the same feature
  • docs/localization.md — plan, not built, with a working 5% skeleton already in the tree: taking the web UI to more than one language. What exists and what it cannot do yet, why the server should return error CODES rather than prose (and why a code must not leak more than the prose it replaced), the key naming convention, and the four phases. Read before adding a user-facing string
  • docs/secret-store.md — design, not built: moving the encryption and signing keys out of .env into a SQLite store, why they cannot live in Postgres, and key rotation. Also records the core/plugin split it assumes — light plus officer-headscale is the core; Vaultwarden and the wallet are plugins
  • docs/sidecar-topology.md — where the sidecar architecture is going, and what was considered and dropped
  • docs/working-on-officer.md — how to run, restart and check your work on this machine
  • docs/wallet-key-custody.md — what the platform can and cannot see of the wallet
  • docs/editor-buffer-corruption.md — an open bug with a trap set for it: background-job output appearing inside a file open in the editor. Read it BEFORE investigating a report of that, and before re-testing anything it already rules out
  • TODO.md — current direction and deferred work; takes precedence over this file where they disagree
  • src/apps/CLAUDE.md — shared frontend patterns
  • src/databases/CLAUDE.md — database patterns
  • CONVENTIONS.md — component organisation, state management and React patterns, with rationale; src/workspaces/officerdev/APP_CONVENTIONS.md and HOOK_CONVENTIONS.md for panel apps and hooks

Treat the code as the source of truth where anything here disagrees with it.