---
id: plugin-ecosystem/a-plugin-install-is-not-pinned-so-a-review
title: "A plugin install is not pinned, so a review would bind a repository rather than code"
theme: plugin-ecosystem
status: open
created: 2026-08-04
date_source: stated
order: 1
---

**A plugin install is not pinned, so a review would bind a repository rather than code.**
`fetch.ts:70` is `git clone --depth 1 <source>` — no ref — so it takes whatever the default branch
points at when the install runs. A plugin reviewed at commit X installs at whatever was pushed
since, and `--depth 1` leaves no history to compare against.

This is the shape of the npm attack already documented in `CLAUDE.md` (2026-08-04), and the same
shape as the Chrome Web Store's real failures — not bad extensions passing review, but good ones
sold or compromised and then pushing an update to users who had already accepted them.

Fix: a `reviewedCommit` on the catalogue entry, checkout detached at that SHA, and **verify
`rev-parse HEAD` matches or refuse**. The verification is the part that matters. An update then
becomes "a new reviewed SHA exists" — a catalogue change rather than something the author triggers.