#!/bin/bash
# =============================================================================
# officer-setup — the environment file
# =============================================================================
#
# Definitions only.
#
# ── Two secrets that must never be regenerated ──
#
# JWT_SECRET signs every session token. Minting a new one logs everybody out of
# every device, silently — the symptom is people being signed out for no stated
# reason. The original regenerated it on every run that answered "yes" to
# regenerating .env.
#
# VAULT_STORE_KEY is worse, and the original never wrote it at all — so a
# scripted install had no key and the vault and wallet refused to store anything.
# It encrypts every upstream credential the platform holds (see docs/secret-store.md
# for the full list) and, on top of the owner passphrase, the BIP39 seed envelope.
# Changing it makes all of them unreadable, and for the seed that is unrecoverable:
# the passphrase opens the inner envelope, and the outer one is gone. Unless the
# mnemonic was written down offline, so are the coins.
#
# Both are read back from an existing .env and kept. Both are slated to move into
# the secret store — docs/secret-store.md — which is what makes changing them an
# operation rather than data loss.
#
# ── Derived, not asked ──
#
# DATA_PATH and OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR come from $OFFICER_ROOT. They were two separate
# questions in the original, which had to agree with each other and with where the
# app store looks.

[[ -n "${OFFICER_SETUP_ENV_LOADED:-}" ]] && return 0
OFFICER_SETUP_ENV_LOADED=1

env_file() { echo "$(platform_dir)/.env"; }

env_exists() { [[ -f "$(env_file)" ]]; }

# One value out of an existing .env, without sourcing it — the file holds
# secrets and arbitrary shell would run as root.
env_get() {
  [[ -r "$(env_file)" ]] || return 0
  awk -F= -v k="$1" '
    $1 == k {
      v = substr($0, index($0, "=") + 1)
      gsub(/^"|"$/, "", v)
      print v
      exit
    }' "$(env_file)"
}

# Long enough to be worth having, and stripped of characters that would need
# quoting in a file everything reads with a naive parser.
generate_secret() { openssl rand -base64 48 | tr -d '/+=\n' | head -c 48; }

# Origin checking is OFF unless this is explicitly false — CLAUDE.md is explicit
# that the inversion is deliberate and is only defensible because the tailnet is
# the perimeter. With no tailnet there is no perimeter, so the default stops
# being defensible and the value has to be written the other way.
tailnet_present() { ip link show tailscale0 &>/dev/null; }

write_env() {
  local dest
  dest="$(env_file)"

  [[ -f "$dest" ]] && cp -a "$dest" "${dest}.before-officer-setup"

  # Restrictive from the moment it exists rather than chmod'd afterwards, so the
  # secrets are never briefly world-readable. Restored straight after: umask is
  # not scoped to a function, and leaving it at 077 would quietly make every file
  # a later section creates owner-only.
  local prior_umask
  prior_umask="$(umask)"
  umask 077
  cat >"$dest" <<ENVF
# Written by officer-setup.
#
# Everything Officer reads at runtime. Kept at 0600 and owned by ${USERNAME}: it
# holds the token-signing secret and the database credential.

PORT="${ENV_PORT}"
PUBLIC_URL="${ENV_PUBLIC_URL}"
PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV="production"

# The browser relay listens on its own port, separate from the app.
BROWSER_RELAY_PORT="${ENV_BROWSER_RELAY_PORT}"

# ── Do not regenerate either of these ──
#
# JWT_SECRET signs every session token. A new one logs everybody out, everywhere.
JWT_SECRET="${ENV_JWT_SECRET}"

# VAULT_STORE_KEY encrypts every upstream credential in Postgres, and encrypts
# the wallet's seed envelope on top of the owner passphrase. Changing it makes
# all of them unreadable — and for the seed that is unrecoverable, passphrase or
# not. Back it up with the same seriousness as the mnemonics.
VAULT_STORE_KEY="${ENV_VAULT_STORE_KEY}"

POSTGRES_URL="${POSTGRES_URL}"

# Derived from the install root — see scripts/setup/officer-setup/lib/layout.sh.
DATA_PATH="${OFFICER_ROOT}/data"
OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR="${OFFICER_ROOT}/capabilities"

# The owner's real login home, which is where terminals, chats and task runs
# actually execute — as opposed to the managed home under DATA_PATH.
HOME_DIR="${USER_HOME}"

# Origin checking. Off by default in the platform, which is only safe behind a
# tailnet; written explicitly here so the machine's actual situation decides it.
ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN="${ENV_ALLOW_ANY_ORIGIN}"

MAIL_TRANSPORT="${ENV_MAIL_TRANSPORT}"
DISCORD_BUG_REPORT_WEBHOOK="${ENV_DISCORD_WEBHOOK}"
ENVF

  umask "$prior_umask"

  chown "${USERNAME}:$(user_group)" "$dest"
  chmod 600 "$dest"
  return 0
}