// The permission registry: the single enumeration of what this platform can do, and the unit the owner
// grants to a role.
//
// ── Why permissions and not routes ──
//
// The obvious model is "list the routes a role may call". It does not survive contact with this codebase.
// A sweep of all 100 mutating platform routes on 2026-08-06 found reads permanently stuck on POST for two
// reasons that are not going away: bodies GET cannot carry (`/stt` multipart audio, `/tts`, `/ocr`,
// `/transcribe`), and credentials that must not sit in a query string where access logs, shell history and
// Referer headers capture them (`/tts/voices` apiKey, the four `/test` endpoints, `/local-providers/probe`).
// Five genuinely free conversions were done in e54d71d; the rest are staying. So the METHOD alone cannot
// carry the read/write distinction — hence `readOnlyWrites` below, declared per permission.
//
// The deeper reason is that a route list is not what the owner is deciding. The owner decides "this person
// gets Gitea". A permission is that decision; the prefixes, sockets and screens it expands to are an
// implementation detail that belongs next to the decision rather than in the granting UI.
//
// ── The four kinds, and why `execution` can never be granted ──
//
//   core       every authenticated account, always. Not grantable because not deniable — signing in
//              without them means a broken app, not a restricted one.
//   app        the grantable surface. This is what the owner hands out per role.
//   confined   execution-shaped, but the KERNEL enforces the boundary per account. Grantable, and only
//              to an account that has a Linux user — see below.
//   execution  NEVER grantable. Owner only, structurally.
//   admin      owner only: the platform administering itself, and the owner's own money and network.
//
// ── `confined`, and why it is not just `app` ──
//
// Added 2026-08-11 with per-user Linux accounts (docs/per-user-linux-accounts.md). A confined permission
// touches the filesystem or runs a process, so calling it an `app` would be a lie — but it is no longer
// the OWNER'S filesystem, because the account has its own Linux user, its own home, and the kernel refusing
// everything above it.
//
// The distinction earns its keep in one place: a grant on a confined permission means NOTHING unless the
// account actually has that Linux user. `authorize.ts` drops confined grants for an account with no
// `osUser`, so "granted but unconfined" resolves to no access rather than to the owner's home. That rule
// lives there, once, instead of in each router that would otherwise have to remember it.
//
// Moving a permission from `execution` to `confined` is therefore a claim with a test attached: every path
// it reaches must resolve its directory from the CALLER, not from HOME_DIR.
//
// `execution` is the important one. Everything under it runs as the OWNER'S OS user in the owner's home
// directory: the terminal is a real shell, chat spawns `claude` with --dangerously-skip-permissions, tasks
// run arbitrary scripts, the file browser and code editor read and write the owner's disk, the desktop is
// the owner's physical screen. Granting any of them is not a feature flag, it is co-ownership of the
// machine. There is no level of "read" that makes a shell safe, which is why these have no level at all.
// Revisit only if per-user home confinement is ever solved — and that is a project, not a checkbox.
//
// ── Read by default ──
//
// A grant carries a level, `read` or `write`. `read` permits safe methods (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS) anywhere in
// the permission, plus mutations under `personal` — sub-paths that hold the CALLER'S own data and nothing
// else. `dashboards` is the worked example: a dashboard belongs to the account that made it, so the whole
// surface is personal and a read grant is really "your own, fully". So "may a member write here" is a
// property of the endpoint, not a policy knob someone has to remember to set.
//
// Music was this note's example until 2026-08-15, when it left with `plugins/music/`. A plugin declares
// the same thing through its manifest's `readOnlyWrites` — `isRequestAllowedAtLevel` merges the two lists,
// so they are one mechanism under two names.

export type PermissionKind = 'core' | 'app' | 'confined' | 'execution' | 'admin';

export type Permission = {
  /** Stable identifier. Stored in the database as the grant's subject — renaming one is a data change. */
  key: string;
  label: string;
  description: string;
  kind: PermissionKind;
  /**
   * Path prefixes under `/api`, written exactly as they are mounted on protectedRouter in hono.ts —
   * leading slash, no `/api`. The totality check pairs these against the real mount table, so a prefix
   * here that nothing mounts is as much an error as a mount nothing claims.
   */
  api: string[];
  /** WebSocket providers, named as in server.tsx's `handlers` map. */
  ws?: string[];
  /** Frontend route prefixes. Filters the dock and the app registry; never a security boundary. */
  routes?: string[];
  /**
   * Sub-paths, relative to each `api` prefix, that a READ grant may still mutate because they hold only
   * the caller's own data. Matched as a prefix after the permission's own: `/devices` on the `notify`
   * permission permits `POST /api/notify/devices/123`.
   */
  personal?: string[];
  /**
   * Reads that must stay POST — see the note at the top. A read grant permits these paths at any method.
   * Written relative to the permission's `api` prefix, like `personal`.
   */
  readOnlyWrites?: string[];
  /**
   * Routes any authenticated account may call even holding NO grant on this permission, because they act
   * on the caller themselves. `METHOD /exact/path`, relative to the permission's prefix — exact, not a
   * prefix, so this cannot widen by accident.
   *
   * One entry exists and it should stay that way. `PUT /api/users` is self-profile update (useAuth.ts
   * calls it to change your own name and avatar) and has always lived on the same router as the owner-only
   * account administration beside it. Moving it to `/api/user` would be tidier and would break every
   * shipped mobile client, so the honest fix is to say out loud that this one route is not what the
   * permission around it is.
   */
  selfService?: string[];
};

/**
 * The PLATFORM's own permissions. A plugin's are added on top at runtime — see `setPluginPermissions`.
 *
 * Kept separate from the live `PERMISSIONS` below so two invariants hold by construction rather than by
 * anyone remembering them: a plugin can never become `core` (granted to everyone, undeniable), and a
 * plugin is never in the fresh-install baseline.
 */
const CORE_REGISTRY: Permission[] = [
  // ── core ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  {
    key: 'account',
    label: 'Account',
    description: 'Sign in, your own profile, password, preferences and API keys',
    kind: 'core',
    // `/api-keys` is core rather than app or admin because a key is not new authority — it is a second way
    // to present the authority the account already has, so denying it would only force the holder to keep
    // using a password in places a password should not go. What a key can then DO is decided by the same
    // permission checks as any other request from that user; nothing here widens them.
    api: ['/user', '/dock', '/api-keys'],
    routes: ['/settings/profile'],
  },
  {
    key: 'themes',
    label: 'Themes',
    description: 'Read the themes installed on this machine',
    // `core`, and not deniable. Themes are how the interface looks; an account that could not read the
    // list would render unstyled, which is not a permission decision anyone means to make. It is read-only
    // — installing a theme is a directory on disk, not a request.
    kind: 'core',
    api: ['/themes'],
    routes: [],
  },
  {
    key: 'bug-report',
    label: 'Report a problem',
    description: 'Send the server owner a bug report',
    kind: 'core',
    api: ['/bug-report'],
  },

  // ── app: the grantable surface ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  {
    key: 'memos',
    label: 'Memos',
    description: 'Notes',
    kind: 'app',
    // api: ['/memos'],  // plugin — switched off 2026-08-13
    api: [],
    routes: ['/memos'],
  },
  {
    key: 'calendar',
    label: 'Calendar and contacts',
    description: 'Calendars, contacts, and the app passwords that sync them to a phone',
    kind: 'app',
    api: ['/caldav', '/dav'],
    routes: ['/calendar', '/contacts'],
    // App passwords are minted for and revoked by their own owner; `/dav` holds nothing shared.
    personal: ['/'],
  },
  {
    key: 'notify',
    label: 'Notifications',
    description: 'Push notifications to your devices',
    kind: 'app',
    api: ['/notify'],
    // Device registration is the caller's own — a phone subscribing to its own push channel.
    //
    // The `_officer/` segment is NOT decoration: these are the sidecar's paths, and `personal` is matched
    // against what remains after the permission's own prefix is stripped. Written as `/devices` it matched
    // nothing, so a read-level member could list their phones but not register or delete one — the exact
    // opposite of the line above. Invisible in testing because the owner bypasses every check.
    personal: ['/_officer/devices', '/_officer/subscriptions'],
  },
  // `vpn` (POST /api/vpn/enroll) was here until 2026-08-14 — the one member-grantable piece of headscale,
  // minting a pre-auth key bound to the caller. Deleted because it had no caller anywhere: the standalone
  // OffScale app gates it on `embedded`, which it never sets, and it never will — the app is permanently
  // independent of the platform, since the thing that gets you to the platform cannot itself need it.
  //
  // Device enrolment did not go away, it moved out. A phone claims an invite from the Companion at
  // `${invite.base}/api/v1/enroll/claim`, which is a different component entirely and does not involve
  // Officer. Confirmed against the mobile monorepo and the companion repo before removal.
  //
  // What this cost: the tailnet's own permission was `admin`, so with `vpn` gone no member-grantable
  // tailnet surface remained. That permission has since left with the offscale plugin, which declares its
  // own — so a member-facing enrolment surface would be the PLUGIN's to add, not this file's.
  // Core, not app — and this was a real defect, not a preference. `/api/dashboards` is not a feature, it is
  // the per-user key-value store where EVERY workspace screen keeps its layout (`screens/files`,
  // `ws-layout-*`, panel config). `WorkspaceView` renders nothing until that store has loaded, so gating it
  // meant a member with `files` granted got a completely blank Files screen and no request to
  // /api/file-browser at all — the panel never mounted. Same for Terminal, Chat and every other screen.
  //
  // It is entirely `personal` and always was: every row is keyed to the caller. There is nothing here to
  // withhold, and withholding it does not restrict an account, it breaks it — which is exactly the
  // definition of `core` at the top of this file.
  {
    key: 'dashboards',
    label: 'Screen layouts and dashboards',
    description: 'Where your own screen layouts and dashboards are saved',
    kind: 'core',
    api: ['/dashboards'],
    routes: ['/dashboards'],
    personal: ['/'],
  },
  // Core because there is nothing to grant a level of: a commander is the caller's own session, in the
  // caller's own directory, in a table scoped to the caller's own user_id at every query. Withholding
  // this from a role would not restrict what they can reach, it would just hide their own conversations
  // from a second list of the same conversations — the same reasoning `dashboards` above rests on.
  {
    key: 'command-hq',
    label: 'Command HQ',
    description: 'Long-running commanders you started, organised into categories',
    kind: 'core',
    api: ['/command-hq'],
    routes: ['/command-hq'],
    personal: ['/'],
  },

  // ── execution: never grantable ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  // Confined since 2026-08-11. A member's shell is spawned by the pty sidecar through `sudo setpriv` as their
  // own Linux account, in their own home, with the platform's environment cleared — so it is their shell, and
  // the kernel decides what it can reach. The sidecar also records whose each session is, so `list` and `kill`
  // scope to the caller instead of every shell on the box.
  //
  // What this is NOT is a jail. A member with a shell can `cd /` and read whatever the system leaves
  // world-readable, like any account on any machine. It isolates members from each other and from the owner's
  // files, which is the promise `confined` makes.
  {
    key: 'terminal',
    label: 'Terminal',
    description: 'A shell on this machine, as your own user',
    kind: 'confined',
    api: ['/terminal'],
    ws: ['terminal'],
    routes: ['/terminal'],
  },
  // Confined, and true since 2026-08-12: a member's turn spawns their own `claude` as their own Linux account
  // through `sudo setpriv`, with their own `~/.claude` credential, their own transcripts and sessions that
  // record whose they are. The two owner-only refusals that held this open — `api/chat/chat.ts` and the socket
  // in `server.tsx` — were removed together once each of those was in place.
  {
    key: 'chat',
    label: 'Chat',
    description: 'The agent',
    kind: 'confined',
    // `/agent-status` is on this grant but deliberately NOT on `chatRouter`, because that router refuses
    // non-owners wholesale — so an endpoint there could not be read by the accounts that need it. It reports
    // two booleans about the caller's own home and nothing about anyone else, which is what lets a member be
    // told "run `claude` once to sign in" instead of being shown a tile that 403s.
    api: ['/chat', '/agent-status'],
    // 'chat-notify' is a session-independent socket (the bell feature): it carries no sessionId and no
    // transcript, just a ping that a chat this account can already reach has finished a turn or needs
    // input. Riding this permission rather than a new one, because it is meaningless without `chat`
    // already granted.
    ws: ['chat', 'chat-notify'],
    routes: ['/chat'],
  },
  // Confined rather than execution since 2026-08-11. Every path under `/file-browser` resolves its root
  // through `resolveHomeDir(userId)` in a middleware that refuses the request outright when the account has
  // no Linux user — so a member sees their own home and `resolveUserPath`'s containment check stops them
  // walking out of it. `/upload` was already per-caller: it writes only under
  // `DATA_PATH/<email>/attachments`, never into a home.
  {
    key: 'files',
    label: 'Files',
    description: 'Your own home directory on this machine, and the code editor over it',
    kind: 'confined',
    api: ['/file-browser', '/upload'],
    routes: ['/files', '/code-editor'],
    // `POST /file-browser/download` zips a multi-selection and streams it back. It writes nothing — it is
    // a POST only because a list of paths does not fit a query string. Without this a read-level member
    // could download a whole folder (GET /download) but not two files, which is not a rule anyone chose.
    //
    // `isPrefixOf` is segment-aware, so this does NOT also permit `/download-video` — which really is a
    // write, fetching a video onto the disk.
    readOnlyWrites: ['/download'],
  },
  {
    key: 'tasks',
    label: 'Tasks and jobs',
    description: 'Running permissions, pipelines and background jobs',
    kind: 'execution',
    api: ['/tasks', '/jobs', '/pipeline-jobs', '/queue'],
    ws: ['task-runner', 'pipeline'],
    routes: ['/jobs'],
  },
  {
    key: 'items',
    label: 'Permission authoring',
    description: 'Skills, tools, agents and processes on disk',
    kind: 'execution',
    api: ['/skills', '/tools', '/agents', '/processes', '/rescan'],
  },
  {
    key: 'desktop',
    label: 'Desktop',
    description: "The server owner's physical screen",
    kind: 'execution',
    // api: ['/desktop'],  // plugin — switched off 2026-08-13
    // ws: ['desktop'],
    api: [],
    routes: ['/desktop'],
  },
  // `/browser` — the Chrome-extension relay — is unmounted as of 2026-08-13 and dropped from this claim,
  // because check 2 of assertPermissionTotality refuses to boot on a permission claiming a prefix nothing
  // serves. Put both back together or neither.
  //
  // `/scrape` is untouched and is what this permission still covers. It shares nothing with the relay: it
  // launches its own headless chromium through playwright and never speaks to the extension.
  {
    key: 'browser',
    label: 'Browser',
    description: 'Drives a real browser on the host',
    kind: 'execution',
    api: ['/scrape'],
    routes: ['/browser'],
  },

  // ── admin: the platform administering itself ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  {
    key: 'app-store',
    label: 'App store',
    description: 'Install, enable and remove the sidecars this server runs',
    // Admin, not app. Installing a sidecar starts a process on the machine and provisioning one starts
    // containers — that is process control, not a feature a member can be granted a read of. The router
    // gates on the owner in its own right as well; this entry is what makes the boot check pass and what
    // keeps the surface visible in one enumeration.
    kind: 'admin',
    api: ['/app-store'],
    routes: ['/app-store'],
  },
  {
    key: 'plugins',
    label: 'Plugins',
    description: 'Install, enable and remove the plugins this server runs',
    // Admin for the same reason as the app store above: installing a plugin mounts routes and starts a
    // process, which is process control rather than a feature to grant a read of.
    //
    // Note this permission guards the MANAGEMENT surface, not the plugins themselves. A plugin declares
    // its own permissions in its manifest, and those are what gate its routes — so a member can hold
    // `offscale` at read without being able to install or remove anything.
    kind: 'admin',
    api: ['/plugins'],
    // The API kept its name; only the screen was renamed. `/plugins` stays listed because the redirect
    // is a real route — a client-side redirect still has to resolve before it can send anyone anywhere.
    routes: ['/marketplace', '/plugins'],
  },
  {
    key: 'server-admin',
    label: 'Server settings',
    description: 'Server configuration, integrations and the activity log',
    kind: 'admin',
    api: ['/server-settings', '/integrations', '/activity', '/system-monitor'],
    routes: ['/settings/server', '/settings/system', '/activity', '/system-monitor'],
  },
  {
    key: 'user-admin',
    label: 'User management',
    description: 'Accounts, roles and what each role may reach',
    kind: 'admin',
    api: ['/users'],
    routes: ['/settings/user-management'],
    // Changing your own name, username and avatar. Owner-only account administration is every other route
    // on this router and stays owner-only — see ownerGate in users-router.ts, which is the second lock.
    selfService: ['PUT /'],
  },
  // `headscale` lived here until 2026-08-15, when it left with the rest of offscale. A plugin declares
  // its own permissions in its manifest and they are registered at install — see plugins/mount.ts. The
  // platform no longer knows this permission exists, which is the entire point.
];

// ── Derived lookups ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// `let`, not `const`, because installing a plugin adds permissions and uninstalling removes them. ESM
// exports are live bindings, so an importer holding `PERMISSION_BY_KEY` sees the reassignment — every
// consumer reads these inside a function, never at module scope, which is what makes that safe.
//
// Nothing mutates the arrays in place. `setPluginPermissions` replaces them, for the same reason
// `buildHonoApp` replaces the app rather than adding routes to it: a half-updated lookup is worse than a
// stale one, and replacement has no half.

/** Core plus every installed plugin's. The list `permissionForApiPath` and the totality check read. */
export let PERMISSIONS: Permission[] = CORE_REGISTRY;

export let PERMISSION_BY_KEY = new Map(PERMISSIONS.map((c) => [c.key, c]));

/**
 * The keys an owner may actually hand to a role. `core` is automatic; `execution` and `admin` are owner-only.
 *
 * `confined` is offered here, but a grant on one is inert for an account without a Linux user — that is
 * enforced in `authorize.ts`, not by withholding it from this list. Withholding it would mean the owner
 * could not pre-grant a role before provisioning the people in it, which is the normal order of operations.
 */
export let GRANTABLE_PERMISSIONS = PERMISSIONS.filter((c) => c.kind === 'app' || c.kind === 'confined');

/**
 * What every role starts with on a fresh install: the three confined permissions, at `write`.
 *
 * These are the baseline the platform is FOR — a terminal, a file browser and chat. An account that can sign
 * in and reach none of them is not a restricted account, it is a useless one, and making the owner grant them
 * by hand before anyone can do anything is a step with no decision in it.
 *
 * Seeded as real rows rather than implied by absence, which keeps the table's one rule intact: a missing row
 * means no access, always, with no exceptions to remember. So revoking one of these works exactly like
 * revoking anything else — the row goes, and nothing puts it back.
 *
 * `app` permissions are deliberately NOT here. Those reach data the owner may not intend to share, and each
 * needs a sidecar installed before it means anything anyway.
 */
// From CORE_REGISTRY, never from PERMISSIONS: a plugin must not be able to put itself in the baseline
// every new role starts with.
export const DEFAULT_ROLE_PERMISSIONS: string[] = CORE_REGISTRY.filter((c) => c.kind === 'confined').map((c) => c.key);

/**
 * Available to every signed-in account without a grant.
 *
 * From CORE_REGISTRY, so a plugin declaring `kind: 'core'` — which its manifest cannot express, but which
 * a future bug could smuggle in — still could not grant itself to everyone undeniably.
 */
export const CORE_PERMISSIONS = CORE_REGISTRY.filter((c) => c.kind === 'core');

/**
 * Replace the plugin half of the registry. Called after every install, uninstall, enable and disable.
 *
 * Plugin permissions are dropped and re-added wholesale rather than diffed: the source of truth is the
 * set of installed plugins, and computing a delta against it would be a second answer to the same
 * question. A key colliding with a core one is REFUSED here rather than silently overriding — a plugin
 * that could redefine `chat` or `terminal` could widen it.
 */
/**
 * Which of these keys the PLATFORM already claims.
 *
 * Exported so install can refuse before it starts, rather than leaving `setPluginPermissions` to reject
 * the key afterwards — that rejection is real but it happens at mount time and only reaches stderr, so
 * the install reports success, the dock tile appears, and the route 404s. That exact sequence caught
 * photos, soulseek and jellyfin on the same machine within a day: each had been a CORE permission until
 * the extraction commit, so any server whose platform predates it still claims the key.
 */
export function corePermissionCollisions(keys: string[]): string[] {
  const coreKeys = new Set(CORE_REGISTRY.map((c) => c.key));
  return keys.filter((k) => coreKeys.has(k));
}

export function setPluginPermissions(pluginPermissions: Permission[]): { rejected: string[] } {
  const coreKeys = new Set(CORE_REGISTRY.map((c) => c.key));
  const seen = new Set<string>();
  const accepted: Permission[] = [];
  const rejected: string[] = [];

  for (const permission of pluginPermissions) {
    if (coreKeys.has(permission.key) || seen.has(permission.key)) {
      rejected.push(permission.key);
      continue;
    }
    seen.add(permission.key);
    accepted.push(permission);
  }

  PERMISSIONS = [...CORE_REGISTRY, ...accepted];
  PERMISSION_BY_KEY = new Map(PERMISSIONS.map((c) => [c.key, c]));
  GRANTABLE_PERMISSIONS = PERMISSIONS.filter((c) => c.kind === 'app' || c.kind === 'confined');
  return { rejected };
}

export type PermissionLevel = 'read' | 'write';

const isPrefixOf = (prefix: string, path: string): boolean =>
  prefix === '/' || path === prefix || path.startsWith(`${prefix}/`);

/**
 * Which permission owns this path? `path` is the full request path (`/api/gitea/...`).
 *
 * Longest prefix wins, so a permission may claim `/dav` while another claims `/dav/something` without the
 * order of the array mattering. Returns null for a path no permission claims — which the totality check
 * below is there to make impossible for anything mounted on protectedRouter.
 */
export function permissionForApiPath(path: string): Permission | null {
  const rest = path.startsWith('/api') ? path.slice('/api'.length) : path;
  let best: Permission | null = null;
  let bestLength = -1;
  for (const permission of PERMISSIONS) {
    for (const prefix of permission.api) {
      if (isPrefixOf(prefix, rest) && prefix.length > bestLength) {
        best = permission;
        bestLength = prefix.length;
      }
    }
  }
  return best;
}

export function permissionForWsProvider(provider: string): Permission | null {
  return PERMISSIONS.find((c) => c.ws?.includes(provider)) ?? null;
}

/**
 * Is this an exact self-service route — one any authenticated account may call without holding the
 * permission at all? Matched exactly on method AND path, never as a prefix.
 */
export function isSelfServiceRoute(permission: Permission, method: string, path: string): boolean {
  if (!permission.selfService?.length) return false;
  const rest = path.startsWith('/api') ? path.slice('/api'.length) : path;
  const upper = method.toUpperCase();
  return permission.api.some((prefix) => {
    if (!isPrefixOf(prefix, rest)) return false;
    const sub = rest.slice(prefix.length) || '/';
    return permission.selfService!.includes(`${upper} ${sub}`);
  });
}

const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS']);

/**
 * May a caller holding `level` on `permission` make this request?
 *
 * `write` is unconditional within the permission. `read` permits safe methods, anything the permission
 * declares as a `readOnlyWrites` read-in-POST-clothing, and mutations confined to `personal` sub-paths.
 */
export function isRequestAllowedAtLevel(
  permission: Permission,
  level: PermissionLevel,
  method: string,
  path: string,
): boolean {
  if (level === 'write') return true;
  if (SAFE_METHODS.has(method.toUpperCase())) return true;

  const rest = path.startsWith('/api') ? path.slice('/api'.length) : path;
  // Strip whichever of the permission's own prefixes matched, so `personal` entries are written relative
  // to the permission rather than repeated per prefix.
  const withinPermission = permission.api
    .filter((prefix) => isPrefixOf(prefix, rest))
    .map((prefix) => rest.slice(prefix.length) || '/');

  const allowed = [...(permission.personal ?? []), ...(permission.readOnlyWrites ?? [])];
  return withinPermission.some((sub) => allowed.some((entry) => isPrefixOf(entry, sub)));
}