import { listRoles, setRoleGrant } from 'officerdb';
import { invalidateRoleGrants } from '../permissions/authorize';
import type { DiscoveredPlugin } from './manifest';

/**
 * Installing a plugin grants it to every role.
 *
 * ── The policy, and why it changed ──
 *
 * Until 2026-08-24 a newly installed plugin reached nobody. Every grant had to be added by hand afterwards,
 * per role, through the permissions screen — and the owner was the only one who could do it. The defensive
 * default made sense while the permission model was being built and nobody had members; it stopped making
 * sense once installing a plugin became a deliberate administrative act. A system administrator installing
 * something has already decided the server should have it. Requiring a second decision, in a different
 * screen, to make it reachable is a step whose only reliable outcome is that it gets forgotten and the
 * plugin appears broken.
 *
 * So: install grants, the owner revokes what should not be there. `uninstallPlugin` already removes those
 * grants, so the pair is symmetric and reinstalling means granting again — which is the honest behaviour.
 *
 * ── What did NOT change, and this is the important part ──
 *
 * **"Absence denies" is still the only rule in the resolver.** This writes ROWS. It does not teach
 * `authorize.ts` that a missing grant means yes, which would have been the other way to get this behaviour
 * and is the version that bites later: every capability with no row for any reason — a failed write, a
 * half-finished install, a bug — would become permitted, and nothing would look wrong.
 *
 * The blast radius is also only ever a plugin's own keys. `core` is granted to everyone by definition,
 * `execution` and `admin` are never grantable at any level, and `confined` still resolves to nothing for an
 * account with no Linux user. None of that is reachable from here.
 *
 * ── Why the owner's role is skipped ──
 *
 * Not politeness: `ck_role_permissions_not_owner` is a CHECK constraint that refuses `Super Admin` in that
 * table outright, so including it would fail the whole insert rather than grant anything. The owner
 * bypasses every permission check before grants are consulted, so the row would be inert regardless — and
 * that schema comment says why an inert row is worse than none: somebody eventually revokes one and expects
 * it to do something.
 *
 * The name is a literal here because it is a literal in the constraint. There is no constant for it: the
 * owner is an IDENTITY (`OWNER_USER_ID`) rather than a role, and this string is the one place the old
 * role-shaped notion of ownership still survives.
 */
const OWNER_ROLE_NAME = 'Super Admin';

export type GrantOnInstallResult = { granted: number; roles: string[] };

export async function grantPluginToAllRoles(plugin: DiscoveredPlugin): Promise<GrantOnInstallResult> {
  const keys = plugin.manifest.permissions.map((p) => p.key);
  if (!keys.length) return { granted: 0, roles: [] };

  const roles = (await listRoles()).map((r) => r.name).filter((name) => name !== OWNER_ROLE_NAME);
  if (!roles.length) return { granted: 0, roles: [] };

  let granted = 0;
  for (const role of roles) {
    for (const key of keys) {
      // `write`, not `read`. "Full access unless revoked" is the policy, and a read-only default would be a
      // third state nobody asked for — the owner would still have to visit the screen to make the plugin
      // usable, which is the step this exists to remove.
      await setRoleGrant(role, key, 'write');
      granted += 1;
    }
  }

  // The cache is keyed on role and its whole invalidation contract is this call. Without it the grants are
  // in the database and invisible until something else happens to invalidate — which would present as the
  // plugin still being unreachable right after an install that said it granted access.
  invalidateRoleGrants();

  return { granted, roles };
}

/**
 * What a role created at runtime starts with.
 *
 * The mirror of the above, and it closes a gap that predates the policy change. `DEFAULT_ROLE_PERMISSIONS`
 * — the `confined` baseline every seeded role gets — was only ever applied in `auth/bootstrap.ts`, so a
 * role created through `/api/roles` began with NOTHING. Not the plugins, not even chat, files and terminal.
 * A new "Support" role could reach less than Member and nothing said why.
 *
 * That was survivable while the default was deny-everything and grants were expected to be added by hand.
 * It stops being survivable now: leaving it would mean the new policy holds for roles that existed when a
 * plugin was installed and not for any created afterwards, which is the kind of half-applied rule that
 * reads as a bug in whichever half somebody meets first.
 *
 * So a new role starts where Member does — the confined baseline plus every installed plugin — and the
 * owner takes away what should not be there. Same direction as everything else here.
 */
export async function seedGrantsForNewRole(role: string): Promise<number> {
  if (role === OWNER_ROLE_NAME) return 0;

  const { snapshotPlugins } = await import('./mount');
  const { DEFAULT_ROLE_PERMISSIONS } = await import('../permissions/registry');

  const keys = new Set<string>(DEFAULT_ROLE_PERMISSIONS);
  try {
    const { states } = await snapshotPlugins();
    for (const state of states) {
      if (!state.install?.enabled) continue;
      for (const p of state.plugin.manifest.permissions) keys.add(p.key);
    }
  } catch {
    // The baseline still lands. A plugin list that cannot be read is a louder problem elsewhere, and
    // failing the whole seed over it would leave the role with nothing — the state this exists to prevent.
  }

  for (const key of keys) await setRoleGrant(role, key, 'write');
  invalidateRoleGrants(role);
  return keys.size;
}