efa570333795d50a1559c94e34a4e4c3a65c844e
35
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 pastilhas
|
d9110c373d |
a manifest cannot ask for a particular port
A preference sounds helpful and fails silently. When the wished-for number is taken the plugin is handed a different one, the install succeeds, and whatever was configured against the old number goes on pointing at nothing - with nobody told. This afternoon that nearly happened: 3011 was only free because fofos-dev had been stopped twenty minutes earlier, and had it still been running the site would have been given a random port behind an nginx host still aimed at 3011. So the number is always drawn fresh and always kept. Always drawn means it is never something you can assume; always kept means the proxy host is configured against it exactly once. The failure mode that remains - having to go and read the number - is one that announces itself, which the other one did not. isFree went with it; it existed only to test a wish. |
||
|
pastilhas
|
518d329c29 |
the platform can allocate a plugin a port, and remember it
A sidecar already gets a port and nothing here changes that: it binds 0, the
kernel picks, it announces the number. That is right for what it is - a private
detail between two processes, loopback, re-chosen every restart, and nothing
outside Officer needs it.
A port something ELSE connects to is a different thing. A plugin serving a
website has to be reachable from nginx, which means the number must survive a
restart and be knowable by whoever writes the proxy configuration. Ephemeral
fails both, which is why the first site plugin was going to hardcode 3011 and
hope.
So: `extraPorts: [{ name: 'site', preferred: 3011 }]` in a manifest, allocated at
install, persisted in plugin_ports, and delivered as PORT_SITE in the sidecar's
pm2 environment. Environment rather than the registration socket because a socket
answer arrives after the process has already had to decide what to bind, and pm2
is the only thing that can tell a process something before it starts.
What the platform guarantees is the part per-plugin config could never do: no two
plugins are ever handed the same number. That is a unique index rather than a
convention, because a collision is not a duplicate row - it is two services
fighting over a listener where the loser fails to bind and the winner is whoever
started first.
`preferred` is a wish, not a claim. A plugin usually arrives after the thing that
connects to it, and moving that configuration is work the platform can spare
somebody; but a preference that could fail an install would be a claim wearing a
softer word.
Allocations survive uninstall and are released only by purge. The number is
written down where this database cannot see it, so handing it to a different
plugin because this one was briefly removed points that configuration at the
wrong service.
Pm2App gained `env`, emitted as JSON rather than hand-quoted: a port is a number
today, but this is the seam where a path arrives eventually, and one apostrophe
in a value produces a file PM2 cannot parse - which takes every process on the
machine down, not just the plugin's.
Verified: stable across calls, distinct across plugins, released cleanly,
honours a preference, and a plugin declaring no ports gets no env key at all.
|
||
 pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
898209725a |
a plugin owns the routing under its mount
Reverts the manifest route table. Declaring a plugin's URLs to the platform put the platform in the middle of a decision that is not its own, and it was more code than what it replaced. One splat where there were two routes. A splat matches zero segments, so the bare route still works, and the plugin reads its own position off the location. The platform owns where a plugin starts and nothing after it — the same line mountPrefix already draws around its API. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
1fe767ea77 |
a plugin screen can declare its routes
Every screen got `/<route>` and `/<route>/:section` and nothing deeper, so a section had to live in the query string. A screen may now name its routes in the manifest, and give one its own arrangement of the screen's panels. Absent, the old pair is unchanged — which is every plugin but fofos-admin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
a6d4a18592 |
a plugin can put an action in the file browser's context menu
Tasks already reach that menu and are right for "do this to these files" — a script, run as the owner, reported through the job system, needing no frontend. They are the wrong shape for anything that continues in the interface. "Create Gallery" from a folder is not a job to watch; it is a name to type and a screen to land on, and expressing that as a script would mean a job whose only output is somewhere to go next. So a plugin exports `fileActions` from `web/file-actions.ts` and the generated module collects them. Presence on disk is the declaration, exactly as panels.ts and layout.ts already are — the manifest says nothing, because an action carries its own label and decides for itself whether it applies. They are registered by injection rather than imported by the browser. Plugins.gen.tsx is generated INTO the app, and the file browser lives in a workspace package that app depends on; importing it there would point the dependency backwards and make the package unusable outside Officer's frontend. The selection is resolved by FileGrid, which has it, and FileItem is handed ready-made items. An action receives the whole selection when the right-clicked item is part of one and just that item otherwise — what every file manager does; acting on a selection the click was not part of is the surprising alternative. An action whose `appliesTo` throws hides itself rather than breaking the menu for everything else on it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
912ecd04f7 |
a plugin can hand the agent its own MCP server
openseo is the first: it fronts something that already ships an MCP server, and the choice was to reimplement that vocabulary as Officer tools or hand the real one over. Reimplementing means a second copy that goes stale, and it fails silently — a tool exists upstream that Officer cannot see. Handing it over costs one manifest field. What a wrapper would have bought — authentication, logging, refusal — is already true of the path, because the agent reaches it through Officer's own API with Officer's own gate in front. Wrapping would buy it twice. The manifest declares a PATH and never a URL, and that is the safety property rather than a convention: mcp-host.json carries OFFICER_AUTH_TOKEN, which signs as the owner, so a manifest able to name an arbitrary host would be a manifest able to post the owner's credential anywhere. A path can only reach this machine. Installed AND enabled, since a disabled plugin's routes are not mounted and offering the agent a tool list that 404s is worse than offering nothing. A plugin that cannot be read loses its tools for the session rather than stopping the agent from starting. `generateMcpConfig` becomes async because it now asks the database. Awaited, not fire-and-forget: setMcpConfigPath is what the manager reads when it spawns, so a config arriving later is an agent running without its plugin tools and no sign of why. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
000df7fe45 |
platform events, and thumbnails warmed the moment files arrive
a closed, named list of events — `files:uploaded`, `archive:extracted`,
`files:placed` — each carrying absolute paths and an owner. NOT an event bus in the
open sense: `emit(anyString, anything)` becomes an API nobody can change, because
the moment a plugin listens for a string that string is a contract with no list
saying so. a union means adding one is a deliberate edit and removing one fails to
compile.
TWO GUARANTEES, AND THEY ARE THE WHOLE DESIGN. emit never blocks: it schedules and
returns, so an upload does not wait for a subscriber thumbnailing a HEIC. and a
subscriber cannot fail the operation that triggered it — the upload is written and
answered before anybody is told, so a plugin that is down, slow or throwing gets a
line in the log. tested both ways, sync and async, plus that one failing listener
does not stop the next.
PLUGINS SUBSCRIBE THROUGH THE MANIFEST, same shape as `fileTypes`: `hooks: {
'files:uploaded': '/v1/on-upload' }`. resolved at EMIT time rather than at boot,
because plugins are installed, updated and disabled while the server runs and a
registration made at startup describes a machine that has since changed. nothing
here names a plugin.
CORE IS THE FIRST SUBSCRIBER, and that is deliberate rather than a shortcut. the
thumbnail cache belongs to the platform — its key, its route — so a plugin doing
this work would produce files the browser never looks at. the warmer calls the same
`buildThumbnail` the request path calls, which means HEIC still warms through
av-club via the fileTypes claim, without this file knowing that plugin exists.
AND A SINGLE-FLIGHT MAP, which the warmer made necessary. two callers now want the
same thumbnail as a matter of course: the warmer starts on upload and the browser
asks a moment later. measured before the fix — four concurrent requests plus the
warmer each decoded the same 4032x3024 HEIC and took a slot from a limit of four,
which is a warmer competing with the person waiting rather than helping them. after:
all five share one build, 5.5s once, then 130ms.
verified end to end: upload returns in 56ms, four concurrent requests all 200 in a
single 5.5s build, cached 130ms. 1679 tests, docs:check green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
|
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
111618bd7f |
a plugin can claim a file type the platform cannot read
the file browser's thumbnailer read what sharp and ffmpeg read, and that list was a constant in core. HEIC forced the question: sharp's bundled libheif has no HEVC decoder, and teaching core to shell out to ImageMagick means the PLATFORM acquiring a system dependency for one format. that is a plugin's job. so a manifest may declare `fileTypes` — extensions, plus a thumbnail path and a render path on its own sidecar. `ls` unions those with core's, so a file only promises a thumbnail when something can actually produce one. `/thumb` forwards a claimed type to whoever claimed it. CORE DOES NOT KNOW av-club EXISTS. it reads a claim at runtime from whatever is installed and enabled, calls a path by name, and falls back to a file icon when nothing claims the type. no import, no name, no special case. PROVEN BY DISABLING IT: heic reports thumb=image with av-club enabled, thumb=none disabled, image again re-enabled. that is the whole requirement — the file browser is what it was without the plugin — and it is a test rather than a claim. the plugin's bytes are cached by CORE, under the same key everything else uses, so a HEIC thumbnail is produced once and then served from disk like any other. that is why `buildThumbnail` takes a producer rather than there being a second path beside it: the cache key with its mtime and size, the concurrency cap and the remembered failures all live in that one function, and a parallel path would be a second place to forget the negative caching. TWO THINGS FOUND BY WIRING IT UP. a claimed-but-not-running sidecar is skipped rather than recorded, or `ls` promises a thumbnail that cannot be fetched while a plugin restarts. and the sidecar authenticates: it accepts `x-officer-user` from anything on loopback, by its own design, so core sends the account the request is FOR — passing anything else would be lying to a plugin that scopes per user. verified: HEIC 2 MB in, 12 KB out, 5.4s cold and 101ms cached; png and mp4 unchanged; 1665 tests; docs:check green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043 |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
d381140d54 |
plugins say what they are for, and their checkouts stop lying about themselves
two things, and the second is why the first was painful. TAGS. the marketplace is going to be browsed rather than scrolled: tags on the left, the plugins carrying one on the right. a plugin declares its own in the manifest and the catalogue caches it on sync, exactly as it already does for label and summary — the alternative is editing a table every time a plugin ships, and a plugin that cannot say what it is. the vocabulary is CLOSED (PLUGIN_TAGS) because free text becomes homelab, home-lab, Home Lab and selfhosted inside a month, and a filter list of synonyms is worse than no filter. an unknown tag is refused at discovery BY NAME, so the author is told which tag rather than which array index. all 21 are tagged, each with a one-line note saying why, so a later disagreement is with a stated reason rather than a mystery. every tag has at least three plugins behind it — no filter opens onto an empty page. PLUGINS:CHECK. getting one commit into 21 repositories failed seven times and none of the reasons were about the commit: six remotes were HTTPS and cannot authenticate unattended, three checkouts were behind their remote, one URL had no .git suffix so the catalogue published a clone URL unlike every other, and offscale's fetch refspec named a branch that does not exist. that last one is why this is a script and not a habit. every command reported on a phantom — `git push` said "Everything up-to-date" while the branch looked diverged — and the repository was fine the whole time. twenty minutes spent in a repo with nothing wrong with it. none of it is visible until you try to push, which is the worst moment to learn it: mid-task, across 21 repositories, and every failure looks like it is about your change. so it checks the facts with one right answer — remote URL, fetch refspec, branch, upstream, dirty tree, ahead/behind — and exits non-zero. `--fix` is a separate flag so running the check can never be what changes your tree, and divergence is never auto-repaired because it needs a decision about content. verified by breaking each case on purpose and watching it catch them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043 |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
52f209c69f |
caldav leaves the platform
calendar and contacts are a plugin now — plugins/caldav, its own repository like every other one. a fresh machine runs five processes instead of seven and gets a calendar by installing one plugin, which is the whole point: the platform stops carrying a python calendar server for people who may not want one. what left: the radicale sidecar, four routers, the panel apps, the dav_app_passwords table, the two screens, the two dock tiles, the permission registry entry, the settings section, and radicale from every package list. three platform things had to change first, each committed on its own: |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
e0df28ff5d |
a first-party plugin may claim a root path the platform reserved
caldav is not only /api/caldav. four of its surfaces are top-level and above the account gate on purpose, because DAVx5, iOS and Thunderbird send HTTP Basic on every request and have nowhere to put a JWT: /dav, the ios profile under it, and the two .well-known discovery paths a client probes before it has any credential. the mechanism for that already existed — unauthenticatedRootPaths, exclusive claims, first come wins. what stopped caldav using it was RESERVED_ROOT, and what that list was recording is worth being exact about: `dav` and `.well-known` are in it because the PLATFORM serves them today, not because they are dangerous in themselves. once caldav is a plugin, the thing the reservation protects IS the plugin, and keeping it would mean the platform permanently owning routes for a feature it no longer contains. so a reserved name is claimable by a first-party plugin and refused to everyone else. the owner drew that line today: fine for a plugin we wrote, and letting a stranger's plugin claim /dav is a question that needs thinking about properly rather than falling out of a flag. /api stays refused to us too — everything of officer's lives under it and protocolHeaders is the only sanctioned way in. .well-known needed two segments, which the single-segment rule refuses. allowed by NAME rather than by pattern, and the reason is in the same namespace: acme-challenge is how this machine gets its TLS certificates, so a plugin owning it could take the domain. caldav and carddav are on the list; nothing else is, for us as much as for anyone. the OPTIONS carve-out moved with it. hono's cors() answers every OPTIONS as a preflight and never calls the route beneath — which to a DAV client is not a preflight but the question "what can you do", answered by a header iOS refuses the account without. that was a literal list of four DAV paths; it asks the claim registry now, so it follows whoever owns the route rather than naming it here. verified: server boots (totality passes), /.well-known/caldav still 301s and /dav/ still asks for basic auth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043 |
||
|
pastilhas
|
6b5c87da10 |
a plugin can be more than one screen
a plugin was one screen because the two things it declares — a mount prefix and a frontend — happened to be the same string. caldav is where that stops holding: one sidecar, one permission, one install, and two screens that have nothing to do with each other on screen. calendar and contacts are not sections of one page, and forcing them into one would be a worse product than the core screens they replace. nothing else moved. all eighteen plugins with a frontend use flat web/panels.ts, which is now "one screen, at the mount prefix, labelled by the manifest" — the same file, the same route, the same persisted layout key. the nested form is opt-in and caldav is its only user. the split of who declares what follows the rule this file already had. the DIRECTORY declares that a screen exists (web/<segment>/panels.ts); the MANIFEST says what to call it and which glyph to draw, because a directory listing cannot say either and those are a human's choice. the two are cross-checked and a mismatch is refused rather than reconciled: a segment with no directory renders nothing, a directory with no entry has no tile and no label, and both are the quiet kind of broken. the part that needed the most care is that a segment is a URL the plugin CHOSE — /calendar, not /caldav/calendar. mountPrefix is what makes it impossible for a plugin to shadow a core route, and a chosen segment steps straight out of it. so this is first-party only, refused at discovery, and tested: without that check this field is a way for any installed plugin to take over /files. screenId, not appName, is now the layout key and the panel allow-list's owner. two screens sharing one would persist over each other's sizes and each would accept the other's panels. existing plugins get screenId === appName, so no stored layout is orphaned — verified by regenerating. |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
c427cb5b61 |
plugins: a backend plugin can have settings
A plugin with no web/ has no route, no dock tile and no panel — so it had nowhere to put a setting. transcribe shipped exactly like that: installed, running, and configurable only by an HTTP call somebody had to already know about. The plugin DECLARES its fields and the platform renders them, on the plugin detail page — the one screen that exists for every plugin whether or not it has a frontend. A component would have survived settings too complicated to describe, at the cost of every backend plugin carrying a frontend to draw one text field, each looking slightly different. The platform stores nothing. It is a form over the plugin's own /config: GET to populate, PUT to save. So a plugin that validates before saving still does, and one that keeps a credential keeps it where it already kept it. A `secret` field is write-only across the boundary — never read back, rendered as a password, and left out of the PUT when untouched so an untyped box is not read as "clear it". The plugin reports whether it HAS one, never the value. Eight strings across all six locales, because the key type refuses anything else — which is the localisation work from earlier tonight doing its job. 1426 pass, tsgo clean, docs:check green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043 |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
4ca4becaa8 |
plugins: a dependency can declare the architecture its package needs
Minesweeper could not be installed by the plugin flow at all. Its game is an i386 PE, so it needs wine32:i386 — and that package does not exist on a 64-bit host until dpkg has been told the architecture does. No package name can say that, so the step fell outside the manifest entirely and had to be run by hand, which meant an install that reported success and left a game dying with `Bad EXE format` several steps from anything mentioning architectures. Two fields, both declarative: `multiarch: 'i386'` on an osDependency. The platform runs `dpkg --add-architecture` and `apt-get update` before installing, apt hosts only, skipped when already enabled. It is a closed enum rather than a command because it runs as root: a manifest that could supply the string could run anything as root on every machine that installs the plugin, which is a much larger grant than "may install wine". Same principle as a plugin websocket naming a sidecar rather than a port. `packages.apt` may now be a LIST. One binary really can need more than one package — `wine` provides the launcher on PATH and `wine32:i386` the 32-bit loader, and either alone gives a wine that cannot run what the plugin came for. Every element goes through the same regex and reaches apt as separate argv, so a list is no more powerful than the names in it. The regex also now accepts an architecture suffix from the same closed set. Enabling an architecture is system-wide and permanent — nothing here ever disables one, including plugins:delete, because by then something else may depend on it. So it is reported before the owner consents rather than mentioned in a log afterwards, and only for dependencies actually being installed: a binary already present had its architecture enabled at some point in the past. multiarch.test.ts pins the enum against shell-shaped input, the suffix against an unknown arch, and the report against re-announcing a change that is not happening. 1409 pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043 |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
fbdfd3fb89 |
minesweeper leaves the platform; plugin sockets relay ws-to-ws
Minesweeper is now plugins/minesweeper (gitea.officer.dev/plugins/minesweeper). Removes /api/minesweeper, the Dashboard screen, the officerdev panel, the permission registry entry, the App.tsx route and the hand-written websocket provider in server.tsx. Registry entries: 22 -> 21, execution 4 -> 3. The relay changed transport, and that is the part worth reading. A sidecar announces exactly one port. That single announcement is the whole provenance argument in target.ts — the platform watched the port arrive at registration, which is the only thing separating it from a number a manifest asserted. But a raw-TCP relay requires that port to BE a raw TCP listener, so the sidecar cannot also serve HTTP on it, and the plugin's ordinary routes have to fall back to the typed command vocabulary over the registration socket. That is the mechanism the fleet has spent months retiring, and Minesweeper would have been the first thing to go back to it. Relaying websocket-to-websocket dissolves the conflict. The sidecar serves HTTP and /ws on the one port it announced, exactly as the pty sidecar already does; createSidecarProxy handles the HTTP half; and the conversion from frames to whatever the plugin actually speaks happens inside the plugin, which is the only process that knows. The relay is still ignorant of the payload — the ignorance sits one layer up. Also: the caller's JWT is no longer forwarded upstream. A sidecar has no use for it and forwarding one puts a bearer token into whatever that process logs. X-Officer-User carries the only part it needs. (The terminal relay still forwards its token to the pty sidecar; not touched here.) Verified: bunx tsgo clean, bun test 1403 pass / 0 fail, bun run docs:check green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043 |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
f2f3ca12ba |
a plugin websocket targets a sidecar, never a port a manifest picked
The fixed-port form shipped this morning and lasted about an hour. The owner asked
whether declaring a port was safe, and it is not: nothing stopped a manifest naming
a port it does not own, so `websocket: { port: 5432 }` plus a grant would have been
a raw TCP relay onto Postgres — authenticated by the platform, available to anyone
that plugin was granted to. Port 22 and officer's own port are the same sentence.
The relay checked that the HOST was loopback and I mistook that for having checked
anything about the port. They are different questions and only the second one
matters: loopback is exactly where everything worth reaching already is.
So the only form is `{ sidecar }`. A sidecar's port is trustworthy for a reason a
declaration can never be — the platform watched it arrive at registration, so the
association between a port and a plugin is observed rather than asserted. The same
distinction that decides the delegation problem in todo/agent-coordination: a claim
is not evidence, whoever is making it.
The cost is that a plugin wanting a socket needs a sidecar. That is not ceremony,
it is the thing that makes the port mean anything. It was added as a shortcut for
Minesweeper, whose x11vnc listens on a known port — which is precisely the case
that looked harmless and generalised into a hole.
Nothing had used it. Minesweeper is still whole in the platform and its extraction
had not started.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
|
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
eba0e86758 |
a plugin can serve a websocket
Bun's route table is fixed at serve() and WS_ROUTES is read once before it, so a plugin installed afterwards could never add a socket route. That was a hard ceiling, not a preference: /minesweeper had to live in the platform and plugins/desktop could not stream a display at all. The way out was already in the tree and had one consumer. dev-proxy serves a socket with no WS_ROUTES entry, through a WILDCARD route whose handler calls server.upgrade itself. Nothing has to become dynamic, because a plugin name is a path segment rather than a route — one wildcard declared at boot serves every plugin that will ever be installed. Authorisation is the PLUGIN's own capability, asked as if the socket were a GET against its HTTP prefix. That is the safety argument: there is no second permission to grant, forget, or drift, so granting a plugin grants its socket and revoking it closes it. It is also why plugin-ws is exempt from the boot totality check rather than carrying a registry entry — one entry covering every plugin's socket would mean granting one plugin granted them all. A target is a TCP address and never a URL, which keeps the relay ignorant of what it carries. That ignorance is the only reason one relay can serve an RFB display and a line-oriented sidecar. Loopback only and not configurable: a plugin naming an arbitrary host would be a request-forgery primitive handed to every plugin author. sidecarPort() is new because createSidecarProxy learned announced ports per-proxy and that state was unreachable from anywhere else — a second subscription would have been a second thing to keep in step. Verified: boots past the totality gate, and both an existing and a non-existent plugin refuse 401 before revealing which. NOT yet verified: that it relays a byte. Minesweeper is about to be the first caller, which is what proves it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043 |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
4efc2552d0 |
os-deps: a dependency declares who has to be able to run it
The probe asked the owner's login shell where a binary was, and the install reported that as a fact about the machine. For a confined plugin the work happens as the member's own Linux user, in their own home, where the owner's ~/.local/bin is neither on PATH nor reliably reachable. On alpha it worked — because /home/pastilhas happens to be mode 751, world-traversable, so an absolute path resolved. At 750, the more usual default, every member would have lost every binary with nothing reporting it: the install would still have said satisfied, having only ever asked the owner. Nobody chose 751, and that is the part worth fixing. `scope: 'owner' | 'shared'` on an osDependency, defaulting to owner, an unrecognised value being a manifest error rather than a silent fall back to the permissive one. Shared changes three things. It is searched for on system directories only — asking the owner's shell would find the copy in the owner's home and call it satisfied, the exact false pass this exists to stop. Reachability is checked as world-executable AND every parent traversable to the root, because a binary at 755 inside a home at 700 is unreachable and stat on the file alone says it is fine. And a release binary goes to /usr/local/bin through sudo -n install, staged in the owner's space first so the download itself never runs as root. An unreachable shared dependency gets its own state and refuses the install ahead of every other check, because no package manager fixes it: the binary is installed and works, and what is wrong is where it lives — reinstalling would report success and change nothing. Not a security boundary, and docs/plugin-dependency-scope.md says so: anything in /usr/local/bin is runnable by any account with a shell, grant or no grant. That is already true of ffmpeg. The plugin's data is gated; its executable is not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
10feb76880 |
permissions: a plugin can mark part of its surface owner-only
A plugin worth granting to a Member can also hold the credential the rest of it runs on. Jellyfin's /_config stores a server's admin token and drives account provisioning; the rest of the plugin is exactly what a Member should have. The choice was all of it or none of it. `ownerOnly` on a plugin permission takes sub-paths relative to the mount prefix. The permission stays fully grantable — this is not the ownerOnly PERMISSION that manifest.ts refuses, and that refusal still stands: a permission nobody can delegate is a contradiction. This says a few paths administer the plugin rather than use it. Declared by the plugin, enforced by the platform. A plugin could check this itself and the first one would; the tenth would add a route and forget, with no boot failure and no warning — the shape assertPermissionTotality exists to prevent. In the gate it is enforced once, on the door they all pass through, and a route added later by someone who never read the manifest is covered by default. Checked before selfService and before kind. A path that is somehow both self-service and owner-only is a contradiction, and the safe reading has to win. A write grant does not unlock it either — level is not the question this answers. Also forwards X-Officer-Owner and X-Officer-Level to a sidecar whose proxy names its permission key, for the finer decisions the platform cannot make for it: whose rows a read returns, which fields a level may see. Facts, never the role name — a plugin branching on "Super Admin" would give every plugin repository an opinion about the platform's role vocabulary, and renaming a role would change authorization in code the platform does not own. These are safe to trust only because the proxy copies a three-item allowlist off the inbound request; that is now written where it would be changed. The owner's level is reported as write rather than the absent 'none': they hold everything implicitly and appear in no grants map, so the raw lookup inverts the meaning for the one account that can do anything. No plugin declares one yet. Jellyfin cannot until connections stop being per-user — locking /_config today leaves a Member with a plugin that only shows a connect form they may not submit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhas
|
a6e61d0c26 |
user provisioning: the platform pushes the account list to plugins that declare it
a plugin that creates accounts in an upstream service — jellyfin first, immich next — needs to know who the platform's users are. it now gets told. DECLARED IN THE MANIFEST, not asserted at registration. `name` and `handles` arrive on an unauthenticated socket and are believed, so a capability claimed there would be a plugin granting itself one. the manifest was reviewed when the owner installed it, and sits beside `permissions` where "this plugin will be told who your users are" belongs — on the install screen, not discovered later. PUSHED, not requested. a sidecar has no authenticated way to ask, so a request could only be answered, never authorised. a push inverts that: the platform decides who gets it, and a caller registering under a name with no such manifest gets nothing. `listProvisionableUsers` is a hand-written projection — id, email, username, name, role — and NOT `select *`. `users` holds `password` and `os_user`, and `getUsers()` returns both, so a plugin reaching for the obvious function would get every account's password hash. naming the columns means adding a secret to the table cannot silently add it to what plugins receive. pinned by a test that asserts the key set, not just the absence of today's secrets. the owner is excluded. they bypass every permission check and already have whatever upstream account they want; provisioning them is at best a no-op and at worst a second admin nobody asked for. sent after the ack rather than inside it, so registration never waits on a database query — a slow postgres would otherwise stall every sidecar's startup, and none of them need the list to start. and re-sent on every account create and delete, because the registration copy is a snapshot: a plugin still holding a deleted user would keep an upstream login alive for someone the platform has removed. read once per broadcast, so two plugins cannot be told different things about the same moment. |
||
|
pastilhas
|
21bedf1418 |
npmDependencies in the manifest, installed once for every plugin
replaces the per-plugin package.json from earlier tonight. the owner's call, and the reason is one i had not weighed: sharp is ~50 MB of platform binaries and the obvious dependency for anything touching images, so a second and third plugin wanting it would have meant a second and third copy with no version they could converge on. so every plugin's `npmDependencies` merge into ONE generated plugins/package.json, installed into plugins/node_modules/. bun resolves node_modules up the tree, so that directory serves every plugin and none of the platform's own code. ranges intersect rather than alternate. two plugins asking for ^0.33.5 and ^0.33.9 produce "^0.33.5 ^0.33.9", which npm and bun read as AND — the resolved version must satisfy both. `||` would have meant "either", which is the silent version of this failure: one plugin quietly getting a version the other cannot import. incompatible requirements now fail the install with bun's own message, and both askers are named in the steps either way. generated from the plugins ON DISK, like generatePluginSchemas, and never edited — so a package cannot appear there without a plugin having declared it. what this gives up, knowingly: a committed lockfile. ranges are the whole point and a range resolves per machine, so plugin packages are resolved at install time like osDependencies are, and unlike the platform's own. CLAUDE.md is emphatic about frozen lockfiles and 2026-08-04, so it is named in the manifest type rather than left to be discovered. the generated plugins/package.json and lockfile are gitignored — /plugins/*/ only ignores directories, so files at that level needed naming explicitly. |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
09f2cfa267 |
a plugin can depend on a release binary, and prove it is the right one
osDependencies could only say "this package, from this manager". Gitea's `tea`
is not in any distribution — it is a Go binary from dl.gitea.com — and Debian
has an UNRELATED package of that name: a graphical text editor. So the one
dependency gitea actually wants could not be expressed, and its marketplace
page showed no dependencies at all while music's showed two.
`release: { url, identify }` covers it. {os} and {arch} are filled from the
host in the spelling Go releases use, and the binary is fetched to
~/.local/bin — no root, and nothing a plugin downloaded from the internet
sitting beside what the distribution installed. Written to a temporary name and
moved into place, so a half-downloaded file is never on PATH under the real
one.
`identify` is the part that matters. Bun.which('tea') cannot tell Gitea's CLI
from the text editor, so presence was never the same question as identity —
and reporting the wrong program as satisfied is worse than reporting it
missing, because the install succeeds and every call afterwards fails
strangely. A binary that fails to identify is now `present: false, imposter:
true`.
Found while testing: Bun.which() with no options reads the PATH the PROCESS
started with, which under PM2 frequently excludes ~/.local/bin entirely. A
release binary fetched during an install would have been reported missing
seconds later by stillMissing, failing an install that had just succeeded. The
search now passes PATH explicitly, with ~/.local/bin first.
Verified against the real binaries on this machine: the genuine tea identifies,
a fake that prints text-editor output is caught as an imposter, and both
dl.gitea.com URLs (linux-amd64, darwin-arm64) answer 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
cfbec0b757 |
plugins: a splash is part of a plugin, like its icon
assets/splash.png is discovered by presence, published by the same copy that already took the whole assets directory, and carried on DiscoveredPlugin beside icon. The platform draws no splash — a plugin has no launch. It is carried because the plugin repository is where a product's artwork lives now, and the phone app that fronts the same product needs somewhere to read it from that is not a designer's folder. The pair is the point: the icon is a reduction of the splash's world, and keeping them together is what stops them drifting. Publishing no longer gates on the icon alone, which left a plugin shipping only a splash serving nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
8367fada13 |
plugins: let a plugin claim top-level paths and divert /api by header
Restores the setup the vault extraction regressed: paste the bare Officer URL
into a Bitwarden client and log in. Nothing else.
The extraction moved the Bitwarden door to /api/vault/bw, which is correct and
unusable — a client derives /api, /identity, /icons and /notifications from ONE
url it is given, so a prefixed base turns setup into five fields copied by hand
into an advanced pane. That is not a feature anyone completes, and the owner
said so. My regression, my wrong call: I treated "a plugin cannot serve
top-level paths" as a fact about the platform when it was a fact about what had
been built.
Two additions, both manifest-declared, both narrow:
unauthenticatedRootPaths single lowercase segments (`/identity`), served
above the gate. Refused if reserved (`/api`,
`/auth`, `/plugins`, `/dav`, …), refused if another
plugin already claims it, refused if it is anything
more structural than one name.
protocolHeaders hands `/api/*` to the plugin when the request
carries one. Needed because /api is the one
namespace both servers claim — Vaultwarden has
/api/sync, Officer has /api/chat — and the path
cannot tell them apart, so the client says who it
is. ROUTING, not authentication: a forged header
reaches the plugin, which demands its own
credential, and cannot reach anything of Officer's.
The worst it does is cost that caller Officer's API.
The Bun route table gets an entry per claimed segment, built from the plugin
set — `refreshPluginMounts` runs at line ~204, long before serve() at ~378, so
the claims are known. This is the constraint I earlier asserted made the whole
thing impossible, without checking it. The real cost is smaller and stated in
the code: a plugin claiming a root path is not fully installed until
`pm2 restart officer`, because the table is fixed once serve() is called.
Every claim is logged at boot by plugin — a root path answering without a
session should not be something you read a manifest to discover.
13 more tests (30 in the file): reserved segments, malformed segments, two
plugins colliding, and segment-not-substring matching so `/identityx` never
matches `/identity`. Suite 1074 pass / 0 fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
2f31d464be |
plugins: declare unauthenticated paths, validated; mounting designed and measured
half of the primitive kiosk needs. the manifest field and its validator are in;
the mounting is documented and not wired, so nothing serves anything publicly
today.
paths are relative to the plugin's own mount and refused rather than corrected:
no leading-slash-missing, no .., no //, no query or fragment, wildcard only as a
trailing /*, and never the bare / or /*. the plugin is trusted with what those
paths DO, never with which paths.
the mounting was measured rather than reasoned about, and two obvious designs
are wrong:
mounting the public router at the plugin prefix gives correct fall-through but
lets the router serve any route it defines - the manifest becomes documentation
rather than enforcement.
adding a use('*') guard blocks that leak and BREAKS the plugin's authenticated
api: a use('*') middleware always matches, so the parent never continues.
measured - an authenticated route 404'd with a valid token.
what works is registering only the declared patterns, delegating into a
pre-mounted app. undeclared paths never register a handler, so they fall through
naturally. enforcement by registration rather than by checking, which is why a
plugin cannot widen it.
docs/plugin-unauthenticated-paths.md has the probe results and the six
remaining steps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
pastilhas
|
027b10bd6e |
step 4/4: the docs say permissions too, and capability means one thing again
44 files of prose — CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, TODO.md, 20 docs, both plugin design
documents, and the comment surface the earlier steps could not reach.
Applied against an explicit keep-list, not swept, because the word turned out to
have SIX meanings in this repository rather than the three the offscale doc
recorded:
permissions renamed (steps 1–2)
$OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities/ KEPT — the item store, and now the only thing
the word means that is ours
sidecar routing keys renamed to `handles` (step 3)
Lightning wallet KEPT — a domain term, and on the wire to the mobile apps
terminfo queries KEPT — XTGETTCAP, in the pty sidecar
InvoiceShelf KEPT — per-resource { write, bulkDelete } flags
The sweep still falsified two things, both caught by checking rather than by
review, and both in prose that discusses more than one meaning at once:
CLAUDE.md began claiming the item store lives at `$OFFICER_ROOT/permissions`.
It does not; that directory is on disk and full of skills and tools.
And the offscale doc's own note about the collision became
"Named `permissions`, NOT `permissions`" — a sentence that had eaten the thing
it existed to warn about.
Both restored, and the note rewritten to say what is now true: capability means
one thing of ours, and three that belong to somebody else's vocabulary.
Verified live after restart: self and admin permission endpoints 200, gated
route 200, agent-status 200, 9 grants intact with 6 permissions offered.
tsgo clean, 797 tests, 787 pass, same 7.
The rename is done. Four steps, no data lost, no client break that survived
the step it was introduced in.
|
||
|
pastilhas
|
2e8ec845c8 |
step 1/4: the permission engine is called permissions, not capabilities
The word meant four different things in this repo, not the three the offscale
doc records:
1. the permission registry → RENAMED here
2. $OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities/ items → kept; this is what capabilities are
3. sidecar routing keys → step 3, becoming `handles`
4. Lightning wallet features → kept; a domain term, and on the wire
to the mobile apps
The fourth was not in the doc and a global find-and-replace would have broken
the mobile wallet, which reads `{ kind, capabilities: Capability[] }` from the
wallet sidecar. So this renamed against an explicit file allowlist rather than
by sweeping the tree, and `CapabilityPage.tsx` — the UI for the item store, and
correctly named already — was left alone.
Moved: servers/capabilities/ → servers/permissions/, capability-gate.ts →
permission-gate.ts, users/capabilities-routes.ts → permissions-routes.ts,
hooks/useCapabilities.ts → usePermissions.ts. Identifiers follow.
Three breaks the typechecker could not see, all found by exercising it live.
The route paths moved with the prose sweep, so the server served
/user/permissions while the frontend still called /user/capabilities. A 404 on
every page load, and tsgo clean throughout.
The response FIELD moved too. `client.get<SelfPermissions>()` is an unchecked
cast, so `data.capabilities` became `undefined` at runtime with no compile
error — `can()` would have answered "no" to everything and the dock would have
emptied itself.
And the grants list was passed straight out of the database, so it arrived as
`{ role, capability, level }` while the screen read `grant.permission`. Every
role would have rendered as holding nothing. It is now mapped in the route:
the wire says `permission`, the column still says `capability`, and step 2
therefore changes nothing any client can see.
The stale react-query keys were the quiet one: two files still invalidated
['self-capabilities'] after the hook moved to ['self-permissions'], so
installing a plugin would have silently stopped refreshing the dock.
The database is untouched — `role_capabilities` and its `capability` column are
step 2, and the two call sites that cross that boundary say so in a comment.
Round-tripped the 9 live grants through the admin endpoint to prove the PUT
contract survived: 9 before, 9 after, Member's three intact.
Also reverted prettier churn on five landing-page files that a broad --write
picked up. Second time today; the lesson is not sticking.
tsgo clean. 797 tests, 787 pass, same 7 pre-existing failures — two of which
now read "path → permission" rather than "path → capability".
|
||
|
pastilhas
|
9b1c0a75b2 |
a dock tile can be bare, so artwork is not framed in a swatch
The tile background exists so a white lucide glyph has something to sit on — on nothing it is invisible. Artwork does not need it, and a logo framed in an arbitrary coloured square reads as a mistake. badge rounded square filled with `color`, icon inset (what a glyph needs) bare no background, artwork fills the tile (what a mark wants) DEFAULTED from whether the plugin ships assets/icon.png — artwork gets bare, a glyph gets badge — with `tile` on the manifest to override either way. Presence is the declaration, as everywhere else here; the field exists only for the plugin whose artwork genuinely wants a backdrop. Music sets nothing and gets bare. `color` is still required either way. It does four jobs and only one of them is the square: the active glow, the indicator dot and the plugins-list tint all read it too. The icon was also smaller than it looked. The source carried ~8% transparent margin on every side and the artwork is 233x221 inside a square frame, so with the old `h-7 w-7` inset inside a `w-10` box the duck occupied roughly 39% of the tile's area. Cropped to its alpha bounding box, padded back to square to keep aspect, and rescaled: it now fills 95% of the frame instead of 79%, and `bare` gives it the whole tile instead of half. Measured rather than eyeballed — the bounding box came from extracting the alpha plane and scanning it, then the crop was applied to the 1254px original so nothing was resampled twice. tsgo clean, 797 tests, 787 pass, same 7. Verified live: music reports tile=bare, example and offscale still badge. |
||
|
pastilhas
|
f78abbe05a |
a plugin ships its own dock icon as a file, not a lucide name
The manifest's `icon` was a lucide NAME, resolved by `resolveIcon` — which knows 106 glyphs out of lucide's ~1,500. A plugin naming one outside that set silently rendered a neutral box, and a plugin from a marketplace had no way to see the ceiling coming. So the icon is a FILE now: `plugins/<name>/assets/icon.png`, discovered by presence like everything else here. `manifest.icon` stays as an optional fallback for a plugin with no artwork — example and offscale still use it — and the file wins when both exist. No new mechanism was needed. The app store already published sidecar assets: `<dir>/assets/` → `public/plugins/<id>/`, served by a dynamic `/plugins/*` route, with `DockItem.image` rendering an <img>. `pluginDockManifests()` simply never emitted `image`. Install now publishes and uninstall unpublishes — the one thing uninstall is allowed to delete, because these are copies whose originals are still in the plugin's source. Base64 in the manifest was considered and dropped. It would ride in every /api/user/capabilities response for every user on every page load, can't be cached separately, and puts a 5KB string literal in a source file — against the rule this manifest keeps: what a directory listing can say, it says. It also needs no support: `image` goes straight into <img src>, so a data: URL already works for anyone who wants one. Music ships OffMusic.png, resized 1254² → 256² (1.6MB → 108KB) with alpha intact, sized for 3× DPI at the dock's 32px render. It also drops `icon` — the artwork is a voxel duck in headphones, not a glyph. The plugins page showed a generic Puzzle for every plugin; the list and detail header now show the plugin's own icon when it has one. Two bugs found while testing. Dock.tsx imported 26 lucide icons and used 14. The twelve dead ones — Music, Bitcoin, Receipt, Images, CalendarDays, Contact, Clapperboard, Mail, Network, ArrowDownUp, FileText, FolderKanban, MonitorSmartphone — were residue from when every feature had a hardcoded tile. Deleted. And uninstalling a plugin left its icon URL answering 500, not 404. server.tsx globs ./public at BOOT into one exact route per file, each holding a Bun.file handle, spread into the route table AHEAD of the /plugins/* wildcard. So an icon present at boot got an exact route that outlived the file, returning ENOENT on every dock render with the error logged each time — exactly what the wildcard's own comment says it exists to prevent. The comment covered the ADD case; this is its mirror. `plugins/` is now excluded from the boot glob, so the wildcard owns that prefix alone. Verified: 200 installed, 404 uninstalled, 200 reinstalled. [open] A plugin's icon cannot be seen BEFORE installing it, which is the one place an app store most wants to — assets are published at install by design, and an authenticated icon route is no use to an <img>. |
||
|
pastilhas
|
e930586878 |
plugins declare the host binaries they need, and the installer checks
Offscale was self-sufficient. Music is not — it shells out to ffmpeg and ffprobe — and the way it fails without them is the reason this is a check rather than a line in a README. It does not fail. Missing ffprobe means the indexer catches the spawn error and returns a track carrying its filename and nothing else: no title, artist, album, duration or embedded lyrics. It then walks the whole library, writes a complete cache tree and reports success. Five swallowed catches, no log, no counter, and the only tell is coversSaved: 0 in a report nobody reads. So `osDependencies` is a manifest field: the binary to probe on PATH, why it is needed, and a package name per package manager. The shape is taken from scripts/setup-old/setup.sh rather than invented — probe the binary, case on $PM — and the names are per-manager rather than canonical-with-overrides because lib/packages.sh already recorded why that indirection was rejected. Probing the binary is what makes "built-in on this OS" free: on PATH means the package map is never consulted. Four decisions worth naming. Missing and uninstallable REFUSES the install, first, before a table is created or a row written — so there is nothing to undo, and the alternative is a plugin that installs, answers 200 and quietly produces nothing. The status is on GET /api/plugins and rendered before the button, because the owner is deciding whether to let the server run a package manager as root and that needs answering first. Installing by hand and watching it flip to present is the escape hatch on a machine without passwordless sudo. Package names get a deliberately narrow regex and reach Bun.spawn as an argv ARRAY, never a shell. Both halves are load-bearing: the regex means a metacharacter cannot get there, argv means it would be an argument rather than syntax if it did. Narrower than package managers actually accept — no `:`, no `+` version pins — because a plugin needing one wants a conversation. Success is OBSERVED, not inferred: after installing, the binaries are re-probed. A package manager exiting 0 having installed something that does not provide the binary is exactly the failure this exists to catch. installCommand mirrors lib/packages.sh's pkg_install_now exactly, including apt's non-interactive environment, so there is one definition of "install a package" rather than two that drift. sudo always gets -n: under PM2 a password prompt is not a slow path, it is a hang. brew never escalates. Verified live. ffmpeg and ffprobe were absent on this machine all evening; the page showed both missing with the exact root command, the install streamed `dependencies: installing ffmpeg with apt` then `ffprobe, ffmpeg now on PATH`, and X-Audio-Duration appeared on a stream response for the first time. The refusal path was exercised against a temporary probe dependency: HTTP 400, steps: [], reason named. THIS CHANGED THE MACHINE: ffmpeg 6.1.1-3ubuntu5 is now installed via apt. Found on the way: a manifest is read once per process. Discovery does `await import()` and the module cache holds it, so editing a manifest changes nothing until pm2 restart officer — including `outdated`. Cost ten minutes and is now in the runbook. bunx tsgo clean. 797 tests, 787 pass, 7 fail — the same seven, +25 new. |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
4a9f23c759 |
the design doc moves into the plugin it produced
docs/offscale-plugin.md becomes plugins/offscale/PLUGIN.md. most of it is about the plugin system generally rather than about offscale, which is exactly why it belongs with the worked example — the reasoning is most useful beside the code it produced, and the platform's docs should not carry the history of something it no longer knows exists. every reference updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
585c046a64 |
the plugin system says permissions, not the other word
i named the field permissions and then narrated in the overloaded one anyway, which is worse than either — the whole reason for the rename was that the word already means three things here. renamed what was mine: setPluginCapabilities -> setPluginPermissions, pluginCapabilities -> pluginPermissions, and the prose throughout. what remains is the platform's own vocabulary, not the plugin system's: the type it imports, and the field on a dock manifest, which is the shape the shell already renders. renaming those is a separate change to a separate system and is the owner's to make. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
8cc51cfb40 |
every plugin permission is grantable, and there is no field to say otherwise
offscale was missing from the permissions page because it declared ownerOnly, which mapped to kind admin, and admin capabilities are never offered for granting. correct by the old rule and wrong by the standard: every plugin follows the same platform-level permission model, appearing on the same page with the same read/write/none per role. so the field is gone rather than flipped. a plugin has no way to say owner-only, which makes the standard structural instead of remembered — the same move as the workspace rule. core, execution, confined and admin stay the platform's to assign and a plugin cannot name any of them, so the escalation question is removed rather than answered. this is the second draft of this decision to be deleted: first a full CapabilityKind with three of five values forbidden, then an ownerOnly boolean, now nothing. the doc records all three so the reasoning is visible rather than just the conclusion. finer visibility stays the plugin's job. offscale is the worked example of the gap that leaves and its manifest says so: it is grantable now, and its queries still scope by the caller, so a granted member would see their own empty server list rather than the owner's. closing that is a change inside the plugin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
543e88a9a6 |
every plugin route renders a workspace, and it is not a rule you can forget
an exclusionary rule, made structural. a plugin does not render a screen: it
contributes panels and says how they are arranged, and the shell renders
WorkspaceView around them.
web/panels.ts appRegistryMetas — at least one panel
web/layout.ts defaultLayout — how they are arranged
both required the moment web/ exists, and missing either is refused at discovery
by name and with the reason. tested:
probeplug: has a web/ directory but is missing web/layout.ts.
Every plugin route renders a Workspace: contribute panels and a layout,
not a screen.
there is deliberately no way to export a component. one that could would be free
to render a bare div, a full-page form, or its own navigation, and the platform
would become a shell hosting strangers' layouts rather than one application.
non-compliance is not so much refused as unrepresentable — there is nowhere to
put a screen.
the shell registers <prefix> and <prefix>/:section, exactly as the core screens
do, so a plugin's sections stay addressable and cmd-clickable, and panels read
useParams independently rather than passing state between themselves.
appTypes.allowed is pinned to that plugin's own keys, so a persisted layout
naming something else falls back instead of rendering another plugin's panel
inside this screen.
the example plugin is rebuilt to model it — two panels, a layout, one of them
calling its own /api/example/ping through useClient — because the reference
implementation is what everyone copies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
2e6c263751 |
the hono app is built, not assembled once
first piece of the plugin system: the platform can now be rebuilt with a
different set of plugins mounted, at runtime, without restarting.
hono cannot do this the obvious way. its default SmartRouter throws "Can not add
a route since the matcher is already built" the moment a route is added after
serving begins, RegExpRouter does the same, and hono has no api to REMOVE a
route at all — so uninstall was impossible even with TrieRouter, which does
allow adding. tested all four.
so nothing is added to a live app. buildHonoApp(plugins) constructs a fresh one
and honoServer is reassigned, which keeps the default fast router and makes
uninstall expressible. server.tsx now serves it through a closure rather than
the bound honoServer.fetch — that one line is the whole mechanism, since the
bound method would capture whichever app existed at serve() and every rebuild
would silently do nothing.
buildHonoApp is pure: everything it needs arrives as an argument, so an app for
a hypothetical plugin set can be built without a database, a filesystem or a
running server.
alongside it, discovery. plugins live at platform/plugins/<app-name>/ — inside
the repo, because bun links the workspace packages into the root node_modules
and that is what lets a plugin author write `import { useClient } from
'hooks/useClient'` with no publishing and no version negotiation. verified with
Bun.resolveSync from a directory there.
discovery is by convention and presence is the declaration: api/router.ts,
db/schema.ts, sidecar/index.ts, web/Router.tsx. the app name comes from the
directory, so it cannot disagree with where the code sits, and the sidecar
runtime comes from the extension — .mjs is node, .ts is bun — which is already
the rule here and cannot contradict the file it describes.
a broken plugin is collected, never thrown: one unreadable manifest must not
stop the boot or hide the nine beside it that are fine.
verified by booting the refactored server on a spare port — /api answers 200,
protected routes still 401. full suite: 719 pass, and the same 10 failures as
before this change (8 in capabilities, plus cliamp and pty), stash-verified
earlier as pre-existing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|