d49776307d458bfcf68301eb2d3ef425347298fc
42
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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d49776307d |
gitea, extracted into plugins/gitea — the platform half
Eleventh extraction, and the only one that deleted its UI instead of moving it. Seventeen files under apps/Gitea/ reimplemented a fraction of an interface Gitea already has; the plugin renders the real one in an iframe over a same-origin proxy. Deleting rather than moving removed a platform change nobody now has to build: useGiteaLocation read :owner/:name/:tab/:item from five route patterns where a plugin gets two, so an as-is extraction would have required teaching the plugin system to declare extra route patterns. Nothing inside an iframe needs a route. Nothing working was lost. The router had been commented out of hono.ts since 2026-08-13 with api: [], and officer-gitea was running nowhere — the screen rendered and every request 404'd, like soulseek, jellyfin and invoices before it. Gitea also stops being a CORE DOCK ITEM. It was hardcoded in CORE_DOCK_ITEMS, the only installable feature that was, on the reasoning that it fronts a remote instance and installs nothing locally. As a plugin its tile arrives from assets/icon.png like every other — which is also why the icon added to public/icons/ this morning was reverted rather than kept. 'gitea' stays in the ServiceName union: the connection lives in core service_connections, and gitea is the reason that table has its "member rows carry only a token and inherit the owner's URL" shape at all. registry.test.ts's grantable-permission test named gitea as "the case this was built for"; a plugin's permissions are registered at install and are never in that compile-time list, so it now names a core one. catalogue.test.ts re-anchored to vnc/notify. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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cfbec0b757 |
plugins: a splash is part of a plugin, like its icon
assets/splash.png is discovered by presence, published by the same copy that already took the whole assets directory, and carried on DiscoveredPlugin beside icon. The platform draws no splash — a plugin has no launch. It is carried because the plugin repository is where a product's artwork lives now, and the phone app that fronts the same product needs somewhere to read it from that is not a designer's folder. The pair is the point: the icon is a reduction of the splash's world, and keeping them together is what stops them drifting. Publishing no longer gates on the icon alone, which left a plugin shipping only a splash serving nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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bbb16d6ed3 |
bitcoin-wallet, extracted into plugins/bitcoin-wallet — the platform half
Tenth extraction, and the first where the blocker was a permission rather than a path. The wallet was kind: 'admin' — owner only, never grantable — and plugin permissions are always kind: 'app'. mount.ts forces that and the manifest has no field for anything else, deliberately, so a plugin cannot ask to be restricted. Extraction therefore could not preserve admin. Raised before moving any code, because turning "the server owner's bitcoin" into a row in the grants list beside Photos and Music is the kind of change nobody notices until someone ticks it. Made anyway, and the objection inverts: every wallet query is scoped by user_id, taken from X-Officer-User which the platform injects from the session, so granting the permission gives an account its OWN wallet rather than access to anyone else's — including to the owner, whose bypass covers permission checks and not query scoping. kind: 'admin' was single-user thinking. Named bitcoin-wallet, not wallet: appName drives route, API prefix, table prefix and install key together, so the name should say what it is. Tables are bitcoin_wallet_*; the prefix guard normalises the hyphen. Verified free before committing to it — no wallet table exists on any server, and db:push would treat a rename as a drop plus a create. registry.test.ts re-anchored: `wallet` was its canonical kind: 'admin' fixture and its no-selfService fixture. Now user-admin/server-admin and terminal, with a note that a plugin's permissions are always `app` — which is exactly why this one needed a decision rather than a default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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9c309c5ab6 |
calendar and contacts are core again, with radicale as a plain sidecar
Reverses the 2026-08-13 decision to make caldav an app-store entry. Three reasons it does not belong there. It is not an integration. Photos-via-Immich or torrents-via-Transmission assume you already run the thing; a calendar assumes nothing, and a personal server without one is missing a baseline rather than an optional app. It needs TWO top-level routes, /calendar and /contacts, and a plugin gets one — derived from its appName, which is what makes it structurally impossible for a plugin to shadow a core route. Nobody thinks "I'll open my dav", so collapsing them under /dav was the wrong trade, and weakening the namespace guarantee to allow two was a worse one. As core routes the question does not arise. And it never actually needed Docker. Radicale is a ~2MB Python package; sidecar/caldav/radicale.ts already spawns it directly on loopback with http_x_remote_user. The container came from the app store making everything a container, not from anything Radicale requires. So: the routers are mounted again (/caldav for the UI's JSON door, /dav for app passwords, the top-level /dav sync door and the two .well-known redirects), officer-caldav joins CORE_PROCESSES, radicale joins the machine-setup package list for all four package managers, and the catalogue entry is gone. members.test.ts re-anchored a fifth time — caldav was one of two `accounts` services and memos is now the last. Noted in the test that the sixth time should be a literal fixture instead. Verified: assertPermissionTotality accepts /caldav and /dav, tsgo clean, 1085 pass. NOT yet verified against a real client — radicale is not installed on this machine. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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f566fda0b2 |
invoices, extracted into plugins/invoices — the platform half
Ninth extraction, third resurrection. Switched off since 2026-08-13 with the permission reduced to api: [], so assertPermissionTotality was satisfied, the server booted clean, and every panel request 404'd. Closes the same data hazard as jellyfin and soulseek: invoiceshelf/schema was commented out of the drizzle barrel. Named `invoices`, not `invoiceshelf`. The appName is THE id — API prefix, frontend route, table prefix, sidecar suffix, install key — and before extraction the API (/api/invoiceshelf) and the screen (/invoices) had drifted apart, which was harmless only while they were separate hardcoded strings. The route is the part a person sees, and the permission key and label were already `invoices`, so the API prefix was the odd one out. Cost three call sites and a table rename to invoices_accounts, which was free only because the table existed on no server — verified before deciding, not after. members.test.ts re-anchored again, this time to caldav and memos: services with no extraction planned. That assertion has now been re-pointed four times by services leaving for plugins/, which is the whole reason installer.test.ts was made literal earlier tonight. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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aebd6ff0c0 |
jellyfin, extracted into plugins/jellyfin — the platform half
Eighth extraction, second resurrection. Same shape as soulseek: hono.ts had the router import and its PROTECTED_MOUNTS entry commented out since 2026-08-13 and the permission reduced to api: [], so assertPermissionTotality was satisfied, the server booted clean, and every panel request 404'd. Also closes the same data hazard — jellyfin_servers was absent from the drizzle barrel, so bun db:push would have dropped it. No frontend call site needed repointing: mountPrefix derives /jellyfin from the appName, which is what the router already hardcoded. Test fixtures fixed properly rather than re-anchored again. Extracting jellyfin broke 18 tests, the FOURTH extraction in a row to break the same files — photos and transmission yesterday, slskd an hour ago, jellyfin now. installer.test.ts now builds literal CatalogueEntry fixtures and asks the catalogue nothing: it pins planSteps and runInstall, which are installer logic, and a service leaving for plugins/ says nothing about whether the installer still plans the right steps. catalogue.test.ts stays the place real entries are checked well-formed. members/catalogue/preflight re-anchored to memos, which has jellyfin's exact shape. The .prettierignore rule for the vendored hls.mjs moved into the plugin rather than being left behind naming a deleted path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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b196c9cb55 |
soulseek, extracted into plugins/soulseek — the platform half
Seventh extraction, and the first of something that was already dead. Soulseek had been switched off since 2026-08-13: hono.ts carried the router import and its PROTECTED_MOUNTS entry commented out, so createSidecarProxy never ran and registerProxiedPrefix was never called; officer-slskd was not in the ecosystem at all. Because the permission entry had been reduced to api: [], the totality check was satisfied and the server booted clean — the UI rendered and every request 404'd. Worth naming: the boot check proves every MOUNTED prefix has a permission, and is silent about a feature that mounts nothing. Also closes a live data hazard: schema.ts had the soulseek export commented out, so the three tables were absent from the drizzle barrel and bun db:push would have dropped soulseek_favorites, soulseek_browse_snapshots and soulseek_browse_dirs on any server holding them. rebuild-soulseek-tree.ts documented the workaround rather than the problem; deleted with the rest. The connection stays in core service_connections under service 'slskd' while the mount is now /api/soulseek. Those differ on purpose. Test fixtures: slskd was canonical in three app-store tests, the third extraction running to break them. installer.test.ts now builds a literal fixture instead of reaching into the catalogue — it pins planSteps, which is installer logic, and no catalogue entry is both provisioned and members:'none' any more. catalogue.test.ts and members.test.ts re-anchored to vnc/notify/gitea. Unrelated but mine: check:theme caught 5 palette classes I introduced in CommandHQ earlier tonight against a baseline of 0. Converted to bg-success / bg-warning. check:theme is not part of bun test, which is why the green suite never showed it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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f8028364f1 |
transmission, extracted into plugins/transmission — the platform half
Sixth extraction, straight after photos. Everything transmission now lives at gitea.officer.dev/plugins/transmission. Deleted, not commented: the sidecar, the api router, the Transmission app (28 files including detail/ and dialogs/), the screen, the App.tsx route pair, the Dashboard barrel line, the usePageTitle rule, the AppRegistry wiring, the officerdev barrel re-exports, the permission registry entry, the hono.ts import and mount comments, and the app-store catalogue entry. No database change: transmission owns no tables. Its connection lives in service_connections, a core table it now depends on from outside — a real coupling, recorded in the plugin's own PLUGIN.md rather than left to be discovered. ── Test fixtures, repointed rather than deleted ── Transmission was the canonical `members: 'none'` fixture — a single-tenant daemon with no user concept — across three app-store test files. slskd has the identical shape, so the assertions moved there. Deleting them would have quietly dropped coverage of the no-members install path along with the plugin, which is the same trap the vault extraction hit with `members: 'invite'`. ── Vocabulary swept, per the runbook ── Six screens and two App.tsx comments pointed at `/photos` or `/transmission` as the worked example of the Workspace/Panel shape. Both are plugins now, so those pointers dangled at code no longer in the tree. Repointed at /command-hq and /soulseek, which are core. bunx tsgo clean. 1080 pass / 0 fail. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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a327dfc82c |
photos, extracted into plugins/photos — the platform half
Fifth extraction, and the clean case: no reverse dependency, configuration already server-side, frontend already panels. Everything photos now lives at gitea.officer.dev/plugins/photos. Deleted, not commented: the sidecar, the api router, the db directory, the Photos app (25 files), the screen, the App.tsx route pair, the Dashboard barrel line, the usePageTitle rule, the AppRegistry wiring, the officerdev barrel re-exports, the permission registry entry, both database barrels, the hono.ts import comment, and the app-store catalogue entry. The catalogue deletion is required rather than tidying — the trap the runbook records as having bitten twice. permissionAvailability() derives from sidecar_installs, which a plugin never gets a row in, so a leftover entry makes the permission permanently 'unavailable' and withholds the route and dock tile on a server where the plugin is installed and working. ── Test fixtures, repointed rather than deleted ── Photos was the canonical app-store fixture across four test files, chosen for being existing|provisioned with members: 'accounts'. Jellyfin has the identical shape, so the assertions moved there — they are about the installer, not about photos, and deleting them would have quietly dropped coverage of the provisioned install path along with the plugin. One loss worth naming: Immich's `provisioned` install mode went with the catalogue entry. Docker provisioning for plugins does not exist yet, so photos is point-at-your-own-instance until it does. bunx tsgo clean. 1080 pass / 0 fail, unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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f6a1194905 |
vault, extracted into plugins/vault — the platform half
Fourth extraction, after offscale, music and email. Everything vault is now at
gitea.officer.dev/plugins/vault and installs from the marketplace; this commit
is what the platform stopped knowing.
Deleted, not commented: both routers, the sidecar, the db directory, the
hono.ts mounts/imports, server.tsx's ws import + handler entry + four
route-table entries, '/vault' from UNPROTECTED_API_PREFIXES, both entries in
totality.ts's exemption lists, both database barrels, and the app-store
catalogue entry.
The catalogue deletion is required rather than tidying — the trap the runbook
records as having bitten twice. permissionAvailability() derives from
sidecar_installs, which a plugin never gets a row in, so a leftover entry makes
the permission permanently 'unavailable' and withholds the route and dock tile
on a server where the plugin is installed and working.
── The one new piece of platform: src/servers/account-lifecycle.ts ──
Three auth handlers (signout, distress, panic) imported clearVaultTokens and
clearVaultUnlockKey directly. That is the security property behind the distress
and panic buttons — "someone got in, make the vault need a master password
again" — so it could not just be dropped, and a plugin cannot be imported by
core.
Rejected: having core DELETE from the plugin's tables by name. It removes the
import but moves the coupling somewhere worse — core would depend on a plugin's
SCHEMA, so renaming a column would silently stop the wipe. A security property
that fails silently on an unrelated change is the failure mode to design
against. (docs/email-plugin-extraction.md took that shape for READING a
plugin's data, where a stale answer is a missing feature rather than a lock
left open. The stakes decide it, not the pattern.)
Taken instead: core announces 'signout' | 'distress' | 'panic' with a user id,
and anything holding per-account state subscribes. ~30 lines, fire-and-forget,
one listener's failure cannot stop another. Core names no plugin, no table and
no column; a listener that is not there is a plugin that is not installed. The
severity mapping moved into the plugin — signout keeps the protector key,
distress and panic drop it — so the behaviour is unchanged.
── Two things deleted rather than carried, both dark since 2026-08-13 ──
The unauthenticated Bitwarden passthrough (/vaultwarden plus four root
prefixes and an /api/* header diverter). A plugin's routes mount into
protectedRouter at /api/<name>, behind the account gate; top-level
unauthenticated prefixes are not something a manifest can declare, and the Bun
route table they need entries in is built once at serve(). Keeping it meant
core naming /vaultwarden and /identity in its own route table — the vocabulary
leak the runbook forbids, for a path its own comments called TEMPORARY pending
a first-party browser extension. Owner's call: nice to have, not a requirement.
The notifications websocket, for the same reason plus a second: no plugin owns
a socket on this platform yet (server.reload({routes}) proven, never called;
handlers in server.tsx is a static map). Music parked cliamp/ for exactly this.
SignalR degrades to HTTP long-polling by itself, so clients still sync.
── Tests ──
Vault was the ONLY members: 'invite' catalogue entry, so deleting it would have
silently dropped coverage of that branch in plannedOutcome. It is now tested
against a synthetic entry instead: deleting an assertion along with the last
real user of a case is how a switch arm stops being covered without anyone
deciding it should.
bunx tsgo clean (verified it really does cover plugins/ by injecting a
deliberate error and watching it fail). Suite back at its 7 pre-existing
baseline failures — none of them this feature's, all confirmed unrelated
(the totality ones are about 'desktop'). 85 test files, unchanged, per the
runbook's trap about a moved test vanishing silently.
Needs `bun db:push` and a restart before installing, then point it at a
Vaultwarden from /vault — VAULTWARDEN_URL in .env is no longer read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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98c37c4ce9 |
email leaves the platform for plugins/email
the sidecar, the router, the table, the screens and the account manager are
gone from src/ entirely - deleted, not commented, because a commented mount is
what assertPermissionTotality cannot see.
three reverse imports had to go first, and they are what decided the boundary.
core may not import a plugin's queries, and one of these had already proved
why: getEmailAccounts was awaited at the top level of the agent sidecar, so
when the table went away on 2026-08-13 the rejection took officer-agent into a
pm2 restart loop with every live chat session inside it (
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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1426c3a856 |
rebuild the frontend without restarting, and restart when you must
Settings → System → Maintenance. Two buttons that are deliberately not a pair. ── Rebuild: real, and free ── The same `rebuildFrontend` a plugin install already runs. `Bun.build` reads source from disk on every call and writes `build/`, and the server serves that directory by reading each file per request — so a rebuild lands on the next page load with no process restart, no dropped websocket and no chat session lost. ── Restart: the only way to load server code, and it costs ── Bun caches modules for the life of the process. Measured rather than assumed: editing a file and re-importing returns the ORIGINAL export, and a cache-busting query picks up that one specifier while everything it imports stays cached. So `rebuildHonoApp` — which install already does — re-wires the same module instances into a new tree and cannot see a backend edit. Busting the whole graph would duplicate singletons: two database clients, two session maps, one process. There is therefore no third button, and the screen says why. A "remount the API" control would look like it reloaded the backend and would not. The restart answers BEFORE it schedules itself, because the process serving that request is the one being replaced. It refuses outright when PM2 does not know this process — in development the platform runs under `bun --watch`, where the restart would fail into a promise nobody awaits while the button reported success. Verified: `POST /rebuild-frontend` → 200, 3.0s, 3 outputs; anonymous → 401. The restart button is deliberately untested from here — pressing it would end the session this was written in, which is the same reason it needs a label that says so. tsgo clean, frontend builds, 914 pass / 7 fail unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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0230e62a71 |
the platform stops explaining what Headscale is
Correcting my own reasoning from the last commit. I left "Headscale's API", "the Headscale admin credential" and similar alone on the grounds that they name the thing the plugin drives, so renaming them would make the sentences false. True as far as it goes, and it misses the point: those sentences are in the PLATFORM. It has no business knowing what Headscale is at all. Correct language in the wrong repository is still a remnant. Ten of them, each replaced with the platform's own vocabulary rather than the plugin's domain: - `crypto.ts` and `secret-store.ts` listed "the Headscale admin credential" among what one key used to protect. It is "the tailnet's admin credential" — the purpose, which is a word this repository owns. - `catalogue.ts` and `availability.ts` explained `alsoServes` — a LIVE mechanism — entirely through a Headscale example that left the repository. Restated as the general shape, with one parenthesis saying which case produced it. - The photos types file explained another plugin's sidecar. - `App.tsx` cited `/headscale/:section` as the example of a route pair; that route does not exist. `/photos/:section` does. - `plugins/router.ts` pointed at `useCompanionLogStream`, a hook that lives in a plugin now. - `registry.ts` said in the present tense that `headscale` is `admin` — the permission is the plugin's and it declares its own, so a member-facing enrolment surface would be the PLUGIN's to add, not this file's. - `proxy.sh` cited `headscale/schema.ts` as a style reference. That file is not in this repository. - machine-setup said "Its Headscale app" — the app is the Offscale plugin. `machine-setup/lib/tailscale.sh` keeps all ten of its mentions: it exists to explain tailscale, headscale and offscale to somebody choosing between them, on a core install, before any plugin exists. That is machine setup's subject, not the plugin's domain leaking upward. What survives elsewhere is only dated history — "was here until 2026-08-15", "It was: music, vault, slskd, headscale, …" — plus the notes about the real `headscale_servers` orphan and the secret-store key removed yesterday. Those record that something called headscale used to be here, which is a different claim from explaining what it does. tsgo clean, frontend builds, 873 pass / 7 fail unchanged, setup scripts parse. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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27aa72d923 |
finish the offscale sweep: two real remnants and eleven stale names
Asked for a thorough check that nothing of offscale is left in the platform. The extraction was sound — no router, no permission entry, no app-store entry, no screen, no panel app, no env var anything reads. Two things were genuinely wrong, and both were in setup rather than in the server. ── The secret store minted a key for a plugin ── `officer-setup` bootstrapped two purposes: `jwt` and `headscale`. The second was a key for a PLUGIN, under a name the rename had already replaced, on a machine where the plugin is not installed and nothing would ever ask for it. offscale encrypts under `offscale`, and `getKey` creates on demand — which is precisely what lets core know nothing about plugins. Now core bootstraps `jwt` alone. ── `.env.example` documented variables for a deleted router ── HEADSCALE_URL, HEADSCALE_API_KEY and HEADSCALE_USER were described as driving `/api/vpn`. That router was deleted on 2026-08-14 and nothing has read any of them since. Left as a note saying where the tailnet's credentials live now, because somebody with an older `.env` will otherwise wonder why setting them does nothing. ── Names that outlived the thing ── Eleven comments referred to the plugin's route, panels, console or server registry as "headscale": three sidecar config files describing their own shape by pointing at it, two screens citing `/headscale` as the example of a Workspace/Panel route, the terminal's note about the Console, and the photos types. Also `catalogue.ts`, which still claimed headscale "is CORE now", and `working-on-officer.md`, which told the reader a core install runs six processes including `officer-headscale`. Upstream references are deliberately untouched: "Headscale's API", "the Headscale admin credential", "is this a Headscale server?" all name the thing the plugin drives, and renaming those would make the sentences false. `docs/secret-store.md` argued headscale must be core because the tailnet is the perimeter. Marked superseded rather than deleted, with the distinction that settles it: the perimeter is the tailnet EXISTING, which machine-setup still arranges on a core install — not the platform shipping the screen that administers it. Verified by counting: live code, setup provisioning, env references, permission entries, app-store entries, hono mounts, dock defaults, screens and panel apps all zero. What is left is generated files (Plugins.gen, plugin-schemas.gen), the bundled catalogue entry, test fixtures using "offscale" as an example app name, and history. tsgo clean, frontend builds, 873 pass / 7 fail unchanged, setup scripts parse. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhas
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2e8ec845c8 |
step 1/4: the permission engine is called permissions, not capabilities
The word meant four different things in this repo, not the three the offscale
doc records:
1. the permission registry → RENAMED here
2. $OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities/ items → kept; this is what capabilities are
3. sidecar routing keys → step 3, becoming `handles`
4. Lightning wallet features → kept; a domain term, and on the wire
to the mobile apps
The fourth was not in the doc and a global find-and-replace would have broken
the mobile wallet, which reads `{ kind, capabilities: Capability[] }` from the
wallet sidecar. So this renamed against an explicit file allowlist rather than
by sweeping the tree, and `CapabilityPage.tsx` — the UI for the item store, and
correctly named already — was left alone.
Moved: servers/capabilities/ → servers/permissions/, capability-gate.ts →
permission-gate.ts, users/capabilities-routes.ts → permissions-routes.ts,
hooks/useCapabilities.ts → usePermissions.ts. Identifiers follow.
Three breaks the typechecker could not see, all found by exercising it live.
The route paths moved with the prose sweep, so the server served
/user/permissions while the frontend still called /user/capabilities. A 404 on
every page load, and tsgo clean throughout.
The response FIELD moved too. `client.get<SelfPermissions>()` is an unchecked
cast, so `data.capabilities` became `undefined` at runtime with no compile
error — `can()` would have answered "no" to everything and the dock would have
emptied itself.
And the grants list was passed straight out of the database, so it arrived as
`{ role, capability, level }` while the screen read `grant.permission`. Every
role would have rendered as holding nothing. It is now mapped in the route:
the wire says `permission`, the column still says `capability`, and step 2
therefore changes nothing any client can see.
The stale react-query keys were the quiet one: two files still invalidated
['self-capabilities'] after the hook moved to ['self-permissions'], so
installing a plugin would have silently stopped refreshing the dock.
The database is untouched — `role_capabilities` and its `capability` column are
step 2, and the two call sites that cross that boundary say so in a comment.
Round-tripped the 9 live grants through the admin endpoint to prove the PUT
contract survived: 9 before, 9 after, Member's three intact.
Also reverted prettier churn on five landing-page files that a broad --write
picked up. Second time today; the lesson is not sticking.
tsgo clean. 797 tests, 787 pass, same 7 pre-existing failures — two of which
now read "path → permission" rather than "path → capability".
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pastilhas
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de3340398c |
music becomes a plugin, and the player stays behind
The whole of music moves to plugins/music/: the sidecar (index, indexer,
stream-audio, nightly-reindex), the four Postgres tables and their queries,
the /music workspace panels, MUSIC_API.md and the reindex CLI. The platform
keeps no music routes, no music capability entry, no music screen and no
music schema.
Three things stayed, each on purpose.
cliamp and the widget were out of scope by the owner's decision. The plugin's
sidecar still serves the two cliamp sockets, so it imports cliamp-ws.ts and
pulse-audio.ts from @@/sidecar/music/ — the files stay where they were.
The player did not move, and that was the open judgement call. Deciding it
took one fact: the dashboard widget imports useMusicPlayer and PlayerTrack
from officerdev, and the platform cannot import from a plugin. So the player
STATE stays whatever is decided about the UI around it, and two copies would
mean two audio engines. Given that, the engine and the bar stayed with the
state rather than being split from the thing they drive. Moving them would
also have needed a shell slot rendering a plugin-provided component on every
route — the one escape hatch this system deleted on purpose. MusicPlayerHost
gates on can('music'), which is now the plugin's permission, so the seam
switches itself off with the plugin.
api/music/router.ts stays too: api/cliamp/relay.ts imports getMusicServerWsUrl
from it. The plugin's api/router.ts re-exports that proxy rather than building
a second one — two subscribers to the one-shot music:server port announcement
would work today and 503 on the first reconnect where only one was listening.
Two bugs found on the way, neither visible from reading.
The app-store catalogue still listed music. Availability is derived from
sidecar_installs and a PLUGIN never gets a row there, so `music` would have
been permanently unavailable — which puts /music into deniedRoutes and blanks
the screen on a server where the plugin was installed and healthy. Exactly
the headscale bug documented six lines above it in the same file, and it would
have fired on the first install. Entry removed.
[test] root was "./src", so moving lyrics.test.ts into plugins/ stopped it
running and said nothing — the count fell by nine and the suite still read
green. Root is now the repo. Positional filters cannot fix this: `bun test
plugins` matches under root and finds src/servers/plugins/ instead.
registry.test.ts tested the `personal` mechanism THROUGH the music capability.
Re-anchored on a fixture rather than on another entry, because borrowing a
feature only moves the problem to the next extraction — and three of those
four tests had been passing for the wrong reason since music's api was
commented out on 2026-08-13, when everything started resolving to "refused
because nothing is claimed". The cliamp sockets being claimed by nothing is
now pinned by a test instead of being rediscovered.
music's `personal` paths ride across on readOnlyWrites, the one field a
manifest has. isRequestAllowedAtLevel concatenates the two lists, so a read
grant permits exactly the four paths it permitted yesterday, and no field was
added to the manifest to design a per-user model that is not this work.
bunx tsgo clean. 772 tests, 762 pass, 7 fail — all seven pre-existing and
unrelated (cliamp, pty, and five capability tests that other switched-off
plugins break). Baseline was 757/10; the three that went green are the ones
re-anchored above.
Not yet verified on the live server — that is next.
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
e13128846b |
offscale is a plugin
headscale leaves the platform. 45 files move to plugins/offscale/ and the
platform stops knowing it exists.
api/router.ts the thin auth-gated proxy, now at /api/offscale
sidecar/ 18 files, the whole headscale contract and its admin keys
db/ schema + queries, offscale_servers
web/ 26 files as panels and a layout — no screen, per the rule
removed from the platform: the hono mount, the `headscale` capability, the
App.tsx route pair, the screen and its barrel, the AppRegistry spread, the
officerdev re-exports, the dock tile, the page-title rule, and both database
barrels. tsgo is clean and nothing references it.
the imports tell the story of what the plugin↔host API actually is. the sidecar
takes @@/sidecar/protocol, @@/sidecar/connect, @@/data-path and
@@/officer-url.mjs; the queries take officerdb/db and officerdb/crypto; the
schema takes officerdb/auth/schema for the one reference a plugin may make; the
web half takes useClient, copyToClipboard, WorkspaceView and TerminalView from
the officerdev barrel. all of it resolves because a plugin lives inside the repo
— no publishing, no version negotiation.
AND IT FOUND A REAL BUG IN THE INSTALLER. createSidecarProxy learns its port
from a one-shot `<name>:server` event and subscribes when the plugin's router is
first imported — at mount. install started the sidecar BEFORE mounting, so the
announcement fired into a void: process online, routes mounted, every request
answering `503 sidecar not available` until something forced a reconnect. it
would have hit every plugin with an http sidecar. `example` never caught it
because it has no listener to announce.
install and enable now mount before starting; disable still unmounts before
stopping. neither direction leaves a mounted route in front of a sidecar that
cannot be reached.
verified live: /api/offscale/_officer/servers answers {"servers":[]}, /offscale
and /offscale/nodes serve, the old /api/headscale is 404, the offscale
capability is registered from the manifest, and officer-offscale is online.
757 pass, same 10 pre-existing failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
bbc60b34ac |
headscale leaves the baseline, and offscale gets a design doc
first step of extracting headscale into a plugin. CORE_PROCESSES is five now, and the catalogue.test CORE[] mirror follows it — not optional, since that list asserts "the catalogue must not offer a core process" and would have blocked adding offscale to the catalogue later. the local generated ecosystem file lost its entry too, and officer-headscale was stopped and deleted from pm2 by hand. the platform still mounts /api/headscale and still declares the headscale and vpn capabilities, so the feature is present-but-unavailable rather than gone. docs/offscale-plugin.md is a live document for the rest of it. what it records that nothing else does: core is now `officer` alone and everything else is a plugin; routes are /api/<app-name> for ours and /api/p/<creator>/<app-name> for third parties, derived by one function so the two can never become two systems; tables stay in public with an app-name prefix; mounting becomes genuinely dynamic, which retires the "every route stays mounted" premise and relocates assertCapabilityTotality from a boot check to a per-mount transaction. it also records a rejected experiment with evidence — a postgres schema per plugin works completely, including cross-schema FK, idempotent push and DROP SCHEMA CASCADE as uninstall — and the reason not to: drizzle-kit 0.31.8 needs schemaFilter naming every schema, contradicting its own docs, and without it push reports "No changes detected" and creates nothing. a plugin install that reports success and makes no tables is the exact failure shape we have hit three times this week. and /api/vpn is dead: no caller in the mobile monorepo, none in the web app, no grants in the database. offscale is permanently standalone, so it never comes back. the invite flow is unaffected — the phone claims from the Companion, not from officer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
eb1fd8c31a |
headscale is core, so stop offering to install it
Reported as: the routes are unreachable and there is no dock tile, on a server where officer-headscale is up and healthy. Both symptoms, one cause. Availability is derived ONLY from the sidecar_installs table — `usable` is the rows with status='installed' AND enabled, and every capability mapped to a sidecar outside that set is added to `unavailable`. A CORE sidecar never gets a row there, because core processes are started by pm2 from the generated ecosystem file and never go through the app store. So `headscale` and `vpn` were permanently unavailable, which withheld the dock manifest AND put /headscale into deniedRoutes for the route guard. The design already knew. catalogue.test.ts has a test called "does not offer to install the baseline", and it has been FAILING since headscale was promoted: Expected to not contain: "officer-headscale" docs/secret-store.md predicted it in as many words — "moving headscale into the light profile also removes it from the app store automatically: catalogue.test.ts asserts the catalogue equals full − light, so the test fails until the entry is deleted". The entry was never deleted, and the failing test was never read. So: entry removed, and the tile moved to CORE_DOCK_ITEMS, where the other things that are always present live. DashboardLayout filters every tile through canVisit(), so a member still never sees it — the capability is kind: 'admin'. The entry's existingFields (URL + API key) are not lost. Servers are added from the Servers view inside the app — ServersView.tsx, ServerForm.tsx, useHeadscaleServers.ts — which is where they were really configured; the app-store form was a second place to type the same two values. Verified: catalogue.test.ts 19 pass/1 fail → 20 pass/0 fail, tsgo clean. PRE-EXISTING, not touched: 10 other tests fail on master, 8 of them in src/servers/capabilities. Confirmed identical before and after this change by stashing it and re-running. Worth a look but not this change's business. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
f1cfc0042f |
rename officer-agent to officer-claude-code
The old name said nothing about what the process runs, and it sits directly beside officer-anthropic-proxy — a different process doing a different job — so "the agent" was ambiguous exactly where it mattered. CLAUDE.md already had to spend a paragraph insisting the two are not the same thing. It spawns `claude`; the name says so now. Only two references were functional: the generator's CORE_PROCESSES and the CORE list in catalogue.test.ts. Everything else was prose or comments. Left alone deliberately: `x-officer-agent-token`. It looks like the same string and is not — it is the agent-handoff HTTP header, naming a per-panel bearer token, unrelated to any pm2 process. Renaming it would have changed a wire protocol to tidy a label. Historical docs keep the old name. claude-sidecar-isolation.md and open-threads-after-per-user-claude.md are dated investigations that record the PREVIOUS rename, from officer-claude to officer-agent, and rewriting them would make that history unreadable. CLAUDE.md notes the change instead, where somebody reading those will be looking. Also worth recording, from the owner: merging this with officer-anthropic-proxy into one sidecar was investigated tonight and rejected. They stay separate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
62cbf510cb |
no ecosystem files in git; officer-setup generates one
Deleted all four — ecosystem.config.cjs, .light., .mac.light. and the .profile. they derived from. The repository now contains no ecosystem file at all, and .gitignore keeps it that way. officer-setup writes one at the end, describing exactly the six processes a core install runs: officer, officer-anthropic-proxy, officer-agent, officer-opencode, officer-pty and officer-headscale. No profiles, no derivation, no plugins. The four existed because a profile has to subtract from something, so the full list had to name every plugin's process whether or not anybody installed it — and a test then had to assert the two files still agreed. Generating one file removes the subtraction, the second list and the test that policed them. It is .cjs, not the .js PM2's docs use, and that is not a preference: package.json declares "type": "module", so a .js file here is ESM and `module.exports` throws. PM2 require()s the config. Sections 10 (Services) and 11 (Verify) are built on top of it — write, startOrRestart, save, optional boot hook, then check every process is online with a sane restart count AND that the API actually answers on PORT. A process can be `online` and serving nothing, so the port is asked directly rather than inferred. That completes all eleven sections. catalogue.test.ts required both deleted files at import, so it could not even load. Its central assertion — "the store offers exactly what light leaves out" — has no meaning without a full list to subtract from, which is the point of the change. Replaced by two weaker but real checks: the store must not offer a core process, and every process it names must have a sidecar directory to run. The second catches the same typo the old one did without needing a manifest of everything; verified it holds for all 15 catalogue entries. app-store/pm2.ts starts a sidecar with `--only` against this file, which now holds core alone — so it can stop a plugin but cannot start one that was never written in. Marked `[open]` there rather than left to be discovered: appending a plugin's entry is the plugin system's job. Generated one in a scratch directory and required it with node: six apps, correct cwd on each, valid CommonJS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
3f071c0b24 |
the install root is derived, not configured
Seven variables out of .env. DATA_PATH, OFFICER_ITEMS_DIR and HOME_DIR are gone from the code entirely; PUBLIC_URL, PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV, JWT_SECRET and VAULT_STORE_KEY are no longer written by the setup script. data-path.ts now derives OFFICER_ROOT as dirname(process.cwd()), with data/, capabilities/ and dockers/ as fixed names under it. The direction used to run the other way — DATA_PATH from env, then OFFICER_ROOT = dirname(DATA_PATH) in app-store/paths.ts — which meant three environment variables that had to agree with each other and with the tree on disk. Eight files re-read process.env.DATA_PATH independently, each with its own `?? cwd()/data` fallback. They import the one value now, which is what made removing it safe: otherwise each would have derived its own and drifted. Three things this turned up. The cwd pin in ecosystem.profile.cjs was broken. It set `cwd: __dirname` under a comment asserting "__dirname is the repo root — this file sits beside ecosystem.config.cjs", which stopped being true when these files moved into ecosystem-files/. It walks up to the platform's package.json now, which holds wherever the file lives. That was a live bug before this change and a load-bearing one after it, since cwd now decides where the install is. assertInstallLayout joins the other two boot assertions. A wrong cwd does not error — it computes a plausible root somewhere else and writes managed homes and agent runs into it, so the install looks empty and the data looks lost with nothing naming the cause. It throws before serve(), first of the three, because a wrong answer there makes the other two check the wrong files. getOwnerHomeDir captures homedir() once at module load rather than per call. Measured on bun 1.3.10: both os.homedir() and os.userInfo().homedir return $HOME when set rather than reading passwd, and user-instance.ts assigns process.env.HOME on its way to spawning an agent. A lazy read would have returned the owner's home on the first call and a member's afterwards. data-path.ts imports only node builtins, so it is evaluated before any of that runs. JWT_SECRET and VAULT_STORE_KEY leaving .env means an install made by this script does not boot — jwt.ts throws at module load without one. That is the agreed sequencing: they move to the SQLite store (docs/secret-store.md), and writing them here meanwhile would create a second origin for a secret the store then has to be reconciled with. Said plainly in .env.example and in lib/env.sh rather than left to be discovered. Not typechecked: node_modules is empty here and installs are frozen. Every edited file parses under `bun build --no-bundle`; the profile loads and pins the right cwd; assertInstallLayout was exercised from both the repo and /tmp; the setup section was run and writes five variables. Prettier was NOT run — 3.9.6 via bunx is not the pinned resolution and reformatted unrelated unions and line wraps in six files, so those were reverted and the edits re-applied by hand. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
a64d5610e6 |
officer-setup section 5: Postgres, and only Postgres
The original offered five containers. Of those:
Postgres the only database Officer has — account, passkeys, settings,
dashboards, email accounts, the queue. Required.
Redis not referenced anywhere in the platform. No import of the client,
no environment variable, no mention; the only "redis" string in
src/ is the word "rediscover" in a comment. Dropped. (It is still
in package.json and comes out in the dependency pass.)
SearXNG zero references anywhere. Dropped. If it ever arrives it brings
its own compose file and its own Redis with it.
Mailhog a development convenience, offered separately rather than here.
Nginx PM a deployment choice — Caddy, Traefik, nginx or the tailnet — and
not something a setup script should pick.
Provisioned into $OFFICER_ROOT/dockers/postgres/, the same convention the app
store uses: one directory per service, the compose file in it, relative bind
mounts so the data sits beside the compose file.
Bound to 127.0.0.1, deliberately and with the reason in the compose file itself.
Docker publishes ports by writing iptables rules underneath ufw, so "5432:5432"
is reachable from the internet whatever the firewall reports — the same mechanism
the machine-setup firewall section exists to close. The platform runs on this
machine, so loopback is all it needs.
The password lives in a 0600 .env beside the compose file rather than inside it,
so the compose file can be read or copied without carrying a credential. A second
run reuses it rather than minting a new one, which would leave the container and
the URL disagreeing.
Readiness is waited for rather than assumed: Postgres initialises its data
directory on first start, and db:push against a database that is still starting
fails in a way that reads as a schema problem.
Choosing an existing database checks the URL but does not insist on it — the URL
may be right and the database not yet started, and refusing to continue over that
would be worse than saying so.
Also carries the whitespace fix for the comment removed in the previous commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
911b79b6a2 |
drop a comment describing a machine that no longer exists
paths.ts carried a parenthetical explaining that the development machine had the layout inverted — the project inside ~/dockers/officer.dev/, so the root derived to officer.dev and the app store's directory came out as a dockers inside a dockers. That machine is gone. The project sits at ~/officerdev/platform, which is the clean shape the comment said new installs would get. Anyone reading it now goes looking for a directory that is not there and comes away unsure whether the derivation can be trusted. The rule above it is unchanged and is the whole contract: data/ is a direct child of the root, and OFFICER_ROOT is dirname(DATA_PATH). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
9c353f5f0d |
move host setup into scripts/setup/
scripts/ was holding two unrelated kinds of thing: install-this-machine, and run-this-occasionally. The eight installers now live in scripts/setup/; what stays at the top level is the build steps (gen-index, prebuild, build/) and the two maintenance scripts (reindex-music, rebuild-soulseek-tree). The move is not just a rename. Three of these derive the repo root from their own location: setup.sh:51 PROJECT_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")" setup_mac_light.sh:51 same cleanup-desktop.sh:134 ENV_FILE="$(dirname "$0")/../.env" Left alone, all three would now resolve to scripts/ — and nothing downstream complains. PROJECT_DIR is where .env is written, where `bun install`, `gen:index` and `db:push` run, and what pm2 is pointed at, so a fresh install would have quietly provisioned scripts/ and reported success. cleanup-desktop.sh fails the other way: it would find no .env, print "No .env — skipping", and leave the real VNC_PASSWORD in the real file. All three are now `../..` with a comment saying why the level matters. provision-user-dirs.ts imports data-path.ts relatively; that one tsgo caught. Also disambiguated `setup.sh` where it had become two files. app-store/templates/<name>/setup.sh is a per-sidecar installer with its own contract, and preflight.ts + docs/sidecar-app-store.md discussed both in the same paragraph. The host one is now spelled with its full path at those sites. Verified: bash -n on all six shell scripts, tsgo clean, os-user tests pass, both derivations resolve to the repo root, starship.toml still resolves from os-user-shell.ts, and provision-user-dirs.ts runs under DRY_RUN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
6b4fed68fd |
gitea leaves the baseline and becomes an app-store install
It was in both light profiles on the reasoning that it fronts a REMOTE instance and so needs nothing installed locally. That is true and it was beside the point: a baseline process appears in the dock and in the Permissions screen whether or not anyone ever gave it a URL, so a fresh server offered to grant members access to a Gitea that did not exist. "Is Gitea here" had two answers that could disagree. Now it is `existing` mode with a URL and a token, like any other remote service, and the one place that says whether it is here is the install row. No compose template and no `provisioned` mode: Gitea is always something the owner already runs, and offering to spin one up would mean owning its migration, backup and upgrade story. members: 'none' — not because Gitea is single-tenant, it is the most per-user service in the catalogue, but because there is nothing for the INSTALLER to do. The owner's connection carries the instance; each member adds their own access token from /gitea and acts only as themselves upstream. A provisioner would need an admin token and would mint credentials on their behalf, which is more authority than this needs. The catalogue test already pinned "the store offers exactly what light leaves out", so removing it from the profile is what forced the entry to exist. Both light profiles changed together — the mac one carried the same comment and the same gap. Permissions on a fresh install is now Files and Plans. Plans stays because it reads the platform's own shipped markdown from <repo>/plans, not anyone's disk, so it needs nothing installed and exposes nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
e393d0f5c2 |
a member's screens render, and the shell stops asking for things it cannot have
Three findings from granting Files to a role and signing in as the member. THE BLANK SCREEN. WorkspaceView returns null until workspace.isLoaded, and isLoaded was the success flag of GET /api/dashboards — which the `dashboards` capability gated. So a member with files granted got a completely blank Files screen and no request to /api/file-browser at all: the panel never mounted. Terminal, Chat and every other workspace screen were the same. /api/dashboards is not a feature. It is the per-user key-value store where every screen keeps its layout, entirely `personal`, every row keyed to the caller. Gating it does not restrict an account, it breaks it — which is the definition of `core` at the top of the registry. Moved there. And the failure mode was wrong independently: `isLoaded` now covers a failed fetch as well as a successful one, with `loadFailed` for the difference, so a screen that cannot remember its layout still renders with defaults instead of showing nothing and explaining nothing. THE STRAY REQUESTS. Six shell-level queries gated on isAuthenticated but not on capability, so a member's first paint fired 403s at /server-settings/settings, /jobs/counts (every three seconds, forever), /chat/models, /plans, /music/now-playing and the chat access policy. Each now checks the capability it needs. JobsIndicator and RescanButton also render nothing without `tasks` and `items` — the header was offering two links to a screen the member cannot open and a button that would 403. THE PERMISSIONS SCREEN. It listed all fourteen app capabilities on a server where none of their sidecars are installed. Offering to grant Photos on a machine with no Immich is not a permission decision. It now shows only what is installed, lists the rest as "nothing installed for these yet" so their absence reads as a fact rather than a bug, and marks confined rows as needing a Linux account. Fails open on a degraded read. Found while checking that: the headscale catalogue entry claimed only the `headscale` capability, but the same sidecar also serves `vpn` — a member enrolling their own device — so vpn was never subtracted. Hence `alsoServes`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
dd2be8c8b3 |
app store: never assume a service is local, or on its usual port
An instance may be on another host, behind a reverse proxy on 443 under a path prefix, on a tailnet address, or on an arbitrary port because the usual one was taken. All ordinary self-hosted setups, and each one a case where assuming otherwise produces a connection that fails later with no clue why. Two places were sloppy about it. Jellyfin's placeholder read `http://localhost:8096` and Transmission's `http://localhost:9091`, which quietly teach that a service must be local and on its project's default port; both now show remote examples, and the field type says why. And nothing validated what was typed, so a bare hostname or a URL with a token in the query string was stored as-is. The rule: reject only what cannot work, normalise what is merely untidy, have no opinion about the rest. No check that the host is local, that the port matches a default, or that the scheme is https — a tailnet HTTP service is completely normal. Trailing slashes go, because `${url}/api/x` otherwise doubles the separator: accepted by some servers and 404 by others, which is the kind of difference that reproduces on one machine and not another. Query strings go, because that is where a token hides, and it would sit in a column meant for a location. Credentials in the URL are refused for the same reason — outside the encrypted secret, and in every log line that ever prints it. A missing scheme is named rather than called invalid: it is the commonest mistake, because it is what people type into a browser. Verified through the API: `memos.example.com` is blocked with the fix quoted back, and `https://memos.example.com:8443/memos/` installs and stores normalised — remote host, non-standard port, path prefix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
2ef4efd39b |
app store: ask before repointing a service that is already connected
Found by breaking it. Installing a sidecar that was already configured replaced its connection row with the new install's, silently repointing a working service somewhere else — during testing that took the live Transmission from :9091 to a scratch container on :18092, and the only symptom was that it stopped working. Install now blocks instead of overwriting, naming both URLs and offering the choice. Blocked rather than failed because there is a sensible answer and the user is the only one who has it: keep what is there, or reinstall with `replaceConnection` to change it deliberately. Harmless on a fresh machine; this is entirely for the one with an existing setup. Verified against the live row: an install pointed at a different URL is refused and the original connection is still there afterwards. Also makes "do you already have one?" structural rather than a UI convention. Three tests: anything that can provision must also offer `existing`, `existing` must come first in `modes` since that is the order the prompt uses, and it must ask for a URL. A new entry added later cannot quietly offer only "provision one for me" — which is how someone with a working Immich ends up with a second one and finds out when two libraries disagree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
e83585dd42 |
app store: containers follow the sidecar through enable, disable and uninstall
Tier two works end to end. Transmission installed through the API with a real container, verified on
this machine and then removed:
install preflight, provision, connect, schema, assets, process — container up, health-checked,
connection written from what the setup script printed
disable process stopped, then container Exited(0), data intact
enable container back up, then the process
uninstall container gone, install row gone, DATA UNTOUCHED — config, compose file, downloads and
watch directories all still present
Order matters in both directions and it is opposite each way. Enable brings the container up first: a
sidecar that starts before its upstream exists spends its first seconds failing health checks and
logging about a service that is merely not up yet. Disable stops the process first, for the same reason
in reverse.
`down`, never `down -v`, and no `--rmi`: the volumes are the user's data and the images are shared and
expensive to re-pull. Both are deliberate omissions, stated so nobody adds them later as a tidy-up.
Uninstall only brings down containers for `mode: 'provisioned'`. An `existing` install points at a
service the user runs themselves, and `down` there would stop a container Officer never started.
Every compose call tolerates a missing directory rather than failing. Three call sites can legitimately
arrive with nothing there — an `existing` install, a failed install that died before writing the file,
and a resumed uninstall re-running a completed step — and erroring would make a row impossible to
uninstall, which is the one state a user cannot escape.
Adds an `assets` step, before `process`: the dock reads manifests as soon as the install is recorded, so
an icon arriving a moment later shows as broken on the first render. And composeDir is recorded from the
install rather than derived later, because the directory is the user's and they may move it — uninstall
must not guess at a path it is about to run `down` in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
82e9fdacc2 |
dock: the shell keeps its own items, sidecars contribute theirs
ALL_DOCK_ITEMS was a hardcoded list of everything, so a fresh machine offered Photos, Jellyfin, Transmission and the rest — each leading to a screen reporting itself unavailable — and adding a sidecar meant editing the shell. Neither survives sidecars shipping from their own repositories. Split in two. CORE_DOCK_ITEMS is the baseline that exists on every install: chat, files, terminal, the app's own screens, and Gitea, which is in the light profile because it fronts a remote instance. Everything else is derived from installed sidecars' UI manifests, delivered with /capabilities. Sent with the capability answer rather than fetched separately so the dock has ONE source. Two requests means two moments, and a dock rendered between them shows a tile for something uninstalled or nothing for something installed. Filtered by capability server-side too: a member is not handed the manifest of a feature they cannot use, because "hidden in the client" is the kind of privacy that lasts until someone opens the network tab. Verified live. The owner — who bypasses every permission check — does not bypass this: /photos is absent from routes and present in deniedRoutes because Photos is not installed. Flipping a row's `enabled` makes its tile leave and return with no process touched. Two things fell out. A manifest can declare extraTiles, because CalDAV is one sidecar presenting as Calendar AND Contacts, and collapsing them to keep the model tidy would make the app worse. And DEFAULT_DOCK_PATHS no longer pins /music: useDock drops a path with nothing behind it, so the default dock came up a tile short on any machine where Music was never installed — a default that references an optional feature is how an app looks subtly wrong on a fresh install for no stated reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
209e916343 |
app store: publish a sidecar's assets to public/plugins/<id>/
Real PNG icons are coming, so this is the path they arrive by: a sidecar ships its assets beside its own code, and install copies them to public/plugins/<id>/ where one static route serves them. Copied rather than served in place because a sidecar shipping from its own repository has its assets wherever that repository was unpacked, which is not a path the web server can be taught at build time. One predictable destination means the serving rule never has to know how many plugins exist or where any came from. It also makes assets a property of the INSTALL: uninstall removes them, and a plugin nobody installed serves nothing. Needed a new route, and the reason is a trap worth recording. `publicRoutes` in server.tsx is built by globbing ./public at BOOT, so anything copied there afterwards is invisible to it — the first install of a plugin would show a broken image until the server was restarted, and "install it, then restart to see the icon" is not an install. `/plugins/*` resolves per request, like /novnc/* and /vendor/* already do. Unlike those two it answers 404 rather than 500 for a missing file: an unpublished icon is an ordinary state on a fresh machine, and a 500 would put a red line in the log for every dock render. Proven end to end with a real asset: slskd's icon moved from public/slskd.png into the sidecar's own assets/, published against an ALREADY RUNNING server, and fetched at 200 with the right bytes and content-type — 404 before publishing, no restart between. public/plugins/ is gitignored: it holds copies, and the originals live with each sidecar. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
|
9084fabbf6 |
app store: note where a real PNG icon's bytes will have to live
Real icons are coming and the manifest field already exists — slskd uses it. What is not decided is where the bytes come from for a sidecar that ships from its own repository: /slskd.png works only because it sits in the platform's public/, which a marketplace plugin cannot write to. Records the three options and their trade — marketplace URL (loses icons offline), served by us from the sidecar's directory (works offline, needs a route and caching), or a data URI (no fetch, but bloats every manifest) — so the next person meets the question instead of assuming the current path generalises. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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27c1331b3c |
app store: a sidecar carries its own dock tile and routes, and an uninstalled one has neither
Two gaps, both from the same root: the app knew what an account MAY use and not what this server actually HAS. Availability is now subtracted server-side in the /capabilities answer. "Installed" is orthogonal to "permitted" and the owner is subject to it — the owner bypasses every permission check, but a capability they hold unconditionally still means nothing if its sidecar was never installed. Without this the dock on a fresh machine lists Photos, Jellyfin, Transmission and the rest, each leading to a screen that reports itself unavailable. Computed on the server rather than intersected in the client, so the rule lives in one place: the dock already reads `/capabilities`, and making it read a second list and combine them is how a member's dock and an owner's dock drift apart. `unavailable` is returned alongside `deniedRoutes` because the two mean different things to a UI — "not yours" versus "not here yet, install it". A disabled sidecar counts as unavailable: disable stops the process and its container, so the feature genuinely does not work, and leaving its icon would make disable look broken rather than effective. Reading install state failing subtracts NOTHING, matching useCapabilities' deliberate fail-open. Each entry now also carries a UI manifest — name, icon, colour, rootRoute, routes — because a sidecar shipping from its own repository has to be able to say what it looks like. The icon is a NAME rather than an imported component: a manifest has to survive being JSON from marketplace.officer.dev, which a lucide import cannot make. Tests pin the manifests against the capability registry, so a tile cannot appear for a route the server guards differently, and against each other, so two sidecars cannot claim one root route. No backfill, by decision: this is proven on a blank machine first and applied to alpha from scratch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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ba71dc1957 |
app store: make it work — pm2, install state, and the routes
Email installs end to end now, which was the point of picking it as tier one: no container, no external
wiring, so the machinery is exercised without the provisioning half.
Verified against the running system, not asserted:
POST /api/app-store/email/install -> {"status":"installed","completed":["preflight","schema","process"]}
row -> email mode=config status=installed enabled=true
pm2 -> officer-email online
second install -> all three steps skipped, process not restarted
disable -> stopped
The server boots with the new router, which is the real test of the capability entry: totality.ts throws
before serve() if a mounted router has none, so booting IS the check passing.
pm2.ts shells out rather than importing pm2 as a library. PM2 is already the supervisor and the
ecosystem file is already the definition of how each process runs; a second thing in charge of that
means two supervisors disagreeing. It also means an owner can undo anything the app store did with a
command they already know. The one fact that matters: `pm2 start <name>` fails for a process PM2 has
never seen, so a first install starts from the ecosystem file with --only, and everything after goes by
name. Callers cannot know which case they are in, so startProcess decides.
Disable stops rather than deletes: a stopped process still shows in `pm2 list`, which is the honest
picture. Deleting would make a disabled sidecar indistinguishable from one never installed.
beginInstall returns the existing row instead of replacing it — that is what makes a retry a resume
rather than a re-provision — and clears lastError on the way in, so a UI never shows a stale failure
beside a working service.
The container half of enable/disable/uninstall is deliberately absent rather than stubbed silently: a
disable that leaves Immich running is a different thing from one that stops it, and the difference is
memory on the user's machine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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4b9b98efda |
app store: run a sidecar's setup.sh, streaming it and collecting what it returns
Implements the half of the template contract that faces the platform: answers go in as environment and never as prompts, and results come back as OFFICER_RESULT_<KEY>= lines on stdout. A line protocol rather than JSON because the same stream is the user's live log — it goes to a terminal panel while the install runs. A script that must emit clean JSON cannot also narrate, and one that emits both needs a framing convention anyway. This mirrors the @@officer:progress@@ sentinel the job runner already uses, with the same rule: marker lines are plucked out, everything else passes through. parseResults is pure and tested against the realistic near-misses: a line that MENTIONS the prefix without starting with it, an empty value (Transmission with no RPC auth returns exactly that, and blank is a real answer), a value containing `=` (splitting on every one would truncate a credential), and a prefix with no assignment (a script bug — skipped rather than stored as a blank key). Verified end to end against a real script: environment reaches it, stderr is forwarded (docker compose writes its progress there, so dropping it would hide most of what a user watches), OFFICER_NONINTERACTIVE is set so a script that would block fails loudly instead of hanging behind a web form, and a non-zero exit is reported with the tail. Notes an artifact rather than hiding it: the two streams are pumped concurrently, so the error tail can interleave differently from real time. The live log is correctly ordered; only the summary can read out of order. Serialising the pumps would make a script that writes heavily to one stream block on the other. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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4a03b9f84e |
app store: the install step machine, resumable and testable without docker
Install spans a container start, a health wait, an upstream API call and a process start. Any can fail, and one of them — a token only a human can mint — is EXPECTED to stop the run. A straight-line function has two bad options there: unwind everything, or leave a half-installed service that neither works nor uninstalls, which is the state users cannot get out of. So each step is named, completion is persisted, and running install again resumes. planSteps is a pure function of (entry, mode) and the effects are injected, which makes ordering, resume, blocking and failure testable with no Docker, Postgres, PM2 or Immich in sight. 15 tests cover exactly the behaviour that only appears when something goes wrong. Two rules are enforced by the plan rather than remembered at call sites: 'existing' never provisions, so pointing at an instance the user already runs cannot start a container; and the members step is omitted entirely for a service with no user concept, so a Transmission install does not report a step that did nothing — which reads as a silent failure to anyone debugging a member's access. `blocked` is a first-class outcome, not an error. For Immich the container is up and healthy and only its own UI can mint a key; calling that a failure would make a normal install look broken and invite the user to tear down a working container. The blocking step is deliberately NOT recorded as complete, so a resume re-runs the step the human just answered. Results feed forward — provision discovers the URL that connect writes down two steps later — over a copy of the caller's values, so a failure halfway cannot rewrite what an earlier attempt achieved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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ee38257856 |
app store: make member provisioning a mechanism, not an install-time loop
The owner installs, but a server may already have members, and a member added next month needs the same work. So the unit is (service × member) reachable from two triggers — install a service, provision existing members; add a member, provision installed services — rather than a loop inside the installer. Only handling the first works on day one and rots. No new table. A member is provisioned exactly when they hold a service_connections row: their own credential, url NULL, inheriting the instance from the owner's. That schema anticipated this before this existed, and a second record of the same fact would only be able to disagree with the first. Three outcomes, declared per catalogue entry so the installer never special-cases a service. `accounts` is fully transparent. `none` is a single-tenant daemon with nothing to do — filtered before the provisioning loop so callers can tell "nothing to do" from "did nothing", which look identical at a call site and matter when someone is asking why a member cannot see a feature. `invite` is not a weaker `accounts`, it is the correct outcome: Vaultwarden derives its encryption key from the master password, so a credential we could mint would mean a vault we could read. Transparent right up to where being transparent would be a defect. The per-service work is an interface implemented beside each sidecar rather than a switch in core — a central function growing a case per service is what would stop any of this shipping from its own repository. Implementations must be idempotent, since both triggers can fire for the same pair and a duplicate account upstream is not ours to undo. Deprovision is optional and defaults to leaving the upstream account alone: deleting an Immich user deletes their photos. Written assuming the vault's multi-user adaptation has landed. Today /api/vault is owner-only by an explicit ownerGate, so a member is refused before Vaultwarden is reached — verified, and out of scope. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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890f57a7a6 |
app store: compose templates and their setup scripts, with two proven end to end
Each provisionable service gets a directory holding a compose template and a setup.sh. Deliberately the shape a sidecar needs once it lives in its own repository: metadata, compose, setup script, schema. The contract (templates/README.md): answers come from the ENVIRONMENT, so the web form fills them in and a person on a VPS is prompted only for what is missing, and only on a TTY — one script for both, not two code paths. Idempotent, writes only inside its own directory, streams progress on stdout (the installer pipes it to a terminal panel), and returns results as OFFICER_RESULT_<KEY>= lines so nothing has to scrape a log. House conventions throughout: relative bind mounts so data sits beside the compose file rather than hiding behind `docker volume inspect`, containers running as the installing user so downloads are not root-owned, loopback-only ports unless the service's whole job is inbound connections, and no external networks — the owner's own composes attach to an `nginx` network that a fresh VPS does not have. Transmission verified end to end on this machine, on non-conflicting ports, then torn down: renders, starts, waits, reports. Its health check accepts 409 because Transmission rejects the first request by design — only-200 would have waited out the full timeout against a working daemon. Re-run produced exactly one container, and files landed owned by the user rather than root. Vaultwarden covers the case where we GENERATE the credential rather than asking for one. An existing token is reused, never rotated, because rotating during a resumed install would lock the owner out of the admin page. The Argon2 hash has its `$` doubled or compose interpolation mangles it. The token is not returned to the platform at all — the vault sidecar proxies the Bitwarden protocol and never needs it, and a secret we do not hold is one we cannot leak. Corrects the design doc, which assumed provisioning always knows the connection. Three shapes: we set the credential, we generate it, or a human must mint it in the service's UI afterwards (Immich, Jellyfin, Memos). The third makes "provisioned and running but not yet connected" a real state rather than a failure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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7359867f7f |
app store: check the host before writing anything
An install that discovers a missing dependency halfway through has already made a directory, possibly started a container and written a row, and then has to unwind — leaving the user with something that neither works nor uninstalls. A 30ms check first is worth most of that. Verified while writing this: nothing in scripts/ installs Docker, and nothing checks for it. setup-dockers.sh invokes `docker compose` with no preflight, so a fresh host without Docker fails partway through setup with a bare "command not found". Recorded in the design doc rather than fixed here — the intended fix is a setup.sh per sidecar, which is also what a sidecar needs once it ships from its own repository. `docker compose version` is the probe, not `docker --version`: the latter passes with a dead daemon, which is the failure people actually hit. "Not installed" and "daemon unreachable" are reported separately because the remedies differ. Checked per MODE, not per entry. A host without Docker can still install Photos by pointing at an Immich somewhere else; refusing the whole entry is the over-strict check that makes people work around the installer instead of using it. Dropped `requires: 'docker'` from the catalogue type. Needing Docker is exactly "this entry can provision", which `modes` already says, so declaring it twice invites the two to disagree. Derived by needsDocker instead, and a test asserts the derivation matches every entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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654cb10711 |
app store: put provisioned containers under the officer root, not the user's
The install layout a machine should have, seasoned owner or not:
~/officerdev/
platform/ the app
data/ DATA_PATH
dockers/ services the app store provisioned
capabilities/ the file-based item store
One root, everything under it. OFFICER_ROOT derives from DATA_PATH rather than being a second variable
that has to agree with the first.
Deliberately not `~/dockers`, where a seasoned user already keeps their own estate — 47 services on this
machine. That separation buys two things. Containers the app store created are distinguishable from the
user's own structurally, rather than by a naming convention we would have to enforce and they could
break. And we never reason about someone else's compose files: the store does not scan, adopt or modify
anything outside its own directory.
That also simplifies "I already have one of these" — it is answered by the user giving a URL, never by
us finding a directory and guessing whose it is. An earlier draft had the installer adopting existing
directories, which meant reading, and potentially writing over, services Officer did not create.
This development machine predates the convention and derives an ugly-but-correct path, since the project
sits inside ~/dockers/officer.dev. Still isolated, still one root. New installs get the clean shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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fc48a572d2 |
app store: the catalogue, the install-state table, and what phase 0 must not foreclose
First slice, on a worktree branch so none of it touches the tree the live server runs from. `sidecar_installs` — server-level, no userId, because a sidecar is one process serving the machine. That is the line that keeps the model coherent for several users: installed is server-level and owner-only, configured is per user in service_connections. A member can use Gitea without being able to install it or point it somewhere else. `installed` and `enabled` are separate because they answer different questions, which is what gives the reversible middle ground: disable stops the process and keeps container, config, schema and data. `completedSteps` makes install resumable rather than merely retryable — the failure mode being designed against is a half-installed service that neither works nor uninstalls. The catalogue is data, not code: no functions, no compile-time coupling, because the same shape has to arrive as JSON from marketplace.officer.dev later. Its test pins it to the real estate — it offers exactly the processes the light profile excludes, names processes that exist, and claims capabilities that exist. That last check earned itself immediately: it caught `vault` (no capability at all — it is EXEMPT because Bitwarden clients carry a Vaultwarden bearer, not a platform JWT) and `notify` (which does have one, where I had written null). Docker templates follow the convention already in use across 47 services in ~/dockers: a directory per service, compose inside, relative bind mounts so data sits beside it, USER_UID/USER_GID as the owner. An existing directory is evidence of an existing install and must be adopted, never overwritten. Records what Phase 0 must not foreclose: a remote marketplace, sidecars moving to their own repositories, and third-party plugins — including the note that catalogue.test.ts pins Phase 0's invariant rather than the design's, since that relationship inverts once sidecars leave this repo. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |