c87127ff9322f85ee4c0283b61abdb42adfc14b3
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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9c353f5f0d |
move host setup into scripts/setup/
scripts/ was holding two unrelated kinds of thing: install-this-machine, and run-this-occasionally. The eight installers now live in scripts/setup/; what stays at the top level is the build steps (gen-index, prebuild, build/) and the two maintenance scripts (reindex-music, rebuild-soulseek-tree). The move is not just a rename. Three of these derive the repo root from their own location: setup.sh:51 PROJECT_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")" setup_mac_light.sh:51 same cleanup-desktop.sh:134 ENV_FILE="$(dirname "$0")/../.env" Left alone, all three would now resolve to scripts/ — and nothing downstream complains. PROJECT_DIR is where .env is written, where `bun install`, `gen:index` and `db:push` run, and what pm2 is pointed at, so a fresh install would have quietly provisioned scripts/ and reported success. cleanup-desktop.sh fails the other way: it would find no .env, print "No .env — skipping", and leave the real VNC_PASSWORD in the real file. All three are now `../..` with a comment saying why the level matters. provision-user-dirs.ts imports data-path.ts relatively; that one tsgo caught. Also disambiguated `setup.sh` where it had become two files. app-store/templates/<name>/setup.sh is a per-sidecar installer with its own contract, and preflight.ts + docs/sidecar-app-store.md discussed both in the same paragraph. The host one is now spelled with its full path at those sites. Verified: bash -n on all six shell scripts, tsgo clean, os-user tests pass, both derivations resolve to the repo root, starship.toml still resolves from os-user-shell.ts, and provision-user-dirs.ts runs under DRY_RUN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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ed52faae02 |
correct two claims about agents that the SDK disproves
docs/per-user-linux-accounts.md carried the reasoning that per-user agents were a large piece of work, and both halves of that reasoning were wrong. The SDK does have somewhere to put a uid — spawnClaudeCodeProcess, documented for running Claude Code in VMs and containers — so a member's turn does not have to become its own process. And the credential claim was backwards: the proxy holds the OWNER'S credential, reading the owner's own ~/.claude/.credentials.json, so pointing a member at it spends the owner's account on the member's turns. The previous handoff had already retracted that one; the doc had not caught up, which is how a retracted claim stays live. Corrected in place rather than deleted, with what was believed and why it was wrong, because the superseded version is the interesting part: the first claim is what made agents look like a later stage than they are. Adds the constraint that actually is out of scope, which the old text never stated: no platform process ever runs as a member, because the sidecar holds POSTGRES_URL and the JWT secret. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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401dcb710c |
a blessed directory for container bind mounts
From a live-server report: a bind-mounted postgres:18-alpine crash-looped with
`mkdir: can't create directory '…/18/docker'` on a directory that already existed.
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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aaeb3424ab |
the rootless docker fix is proven; correcting the record
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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ea0d2396f7 |
linux accounts use the chosen username, and refuse to take one over
Two changes, and the second is what makes the first safe. The officer_ prefix is gone: a member's account is the username the owner typed, so whoami says who they are and a commit from their checkout is attributed to something recognisable. Measured first — useradd on this host accepts everything validateUsername permits, including dots, hyphens, underscores and uppercase. The prefix was also load-bearing, though, and not for looks. ensureOsUser REUSES an existing account, which is what makes it re-runnable, and that was safe by construction while only we created officer_* names. Unprefixed, adoption becomes the dangerous path: a platform account named root would have found root in passwd, and every runAs for that member would have been a root shell. So adoption now requires the existing account's passwd home to be exactly the home we are about to confine — that is what makes it ours — and any uid below 1000 is refused outright. Verified: root and daemon refused as system accounts, and the owner's own username refused by name with its real home quoted back. Also, the ancestor trap from the first real install. A member's home is under DATA_PATH, which is under the OWNER'S home, and /home/<owner> is 750 on Debian and Ubuntu — so every mode bit on the account tree was right, the directory existed, and the member still could not reach it for want of x four levels up. It surfaced as "ssh-keygen: Could not stat …/.ssh: Permission denied", which points at the wrong thing entirely. firstUntraversableAncestor now walks the chain as the member before anything uses the home, and the error names the directory and the chmod. The dev machine was already 751, and the probe used /tmp, so it never crossed the ancestor that mattered. Worth remembering as a shape of mistake. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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0fb9a29e64 |
ssh for a member's linux account, both directions
Inbound and outbound are two keys doing two jobs, and treating them as
alternatives breaks the goal:
inbound ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, from an optional public key the owner pastes
on the create form. Their private half stays on their laptop.
outbound ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, generated in their home, never leaves the machine.
"They pasted a key, so skip generating one" is the obvious simplification. Agent
forwarding covers a human in an interactive session, but a platform-spawned agent
has no agent socket to borrow — so an edge checkout it is asked to commit and push
needs a key that lives on the box. The inbound key is therefore optional and the
outbound one is not.
No linux password, ever: useradd sets none, which blocks password login and does
not block key auth. So "real user, reachable over SSH, no password anywhere" is
the resting state, and the platform password stays the platform's business.
Validation is about line count, not key shape. Every line of authorized_keys is a
credential, so a pasted value with a newline would install a SECOND key silently.
Multi-line refused, a private key refused by name, an options prefix refused.
Every write goes through sudo install: the home is 700 and the member's, so the
service user cannot even create .ssh. install sets content, owner and mode in one
step, and content travels as a temp path so nothing quotes a form value into a
shell. ssh-keygen runs AS the member so the private key is never briefly root's.
known_hosts is not seeded — StrictHostKeyChecking accept-new instead. The Gitea
SSH endpoint is not knowable at create time, and the default setting makes a first
connection prompt, which in a non-interactive agent turn is a hang rather than an
error. accept-new still refuses a changed host key.
The generated public key is stored on the row and shown twice: on the after-create
panel and behind a key button on the user's row. It has an errand attached that
nothing else will remind anyone about — it must be added to their Gitea account.
Verified with a real useradd: .ssh 700 and id_ed25519 600 both owned by the member
and usable by them, authorized_keys byte-identical to the paste, no key rotation on
a second run, and a multi-line paste refused with authorized_keys untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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5c7ceb2283 |
per-user linux accounts, stage 1: the account and the privilege drop
A member gets a real Linux account whose home is the directory the platform already
provisions for them. Nothing uses it yet — this is the mechanism plus the account,
deliberately with no behaviour change, so the file browser and terminal can be moved
onto something already proven.
Bun.spawn silently ignores uid/gid. Verified on 1.3.10: from uid 1000,
Bun.spawn(['id','-u'], {uid: 65534}) exits 0 and prints 1000. No throw, no warning.
Bun's types don't declare the option so typed code can't reach it by accident, but the
runtime accepts it, and a silently absent isolation boundary is the worst outcome this
feature could have. So privilege drops go through sudo -n setpriv, and a test pins Bun's
behaviour — if it's ever implemented, that test tells us we may simplify.
sudo is required for the drop and not because of the uid: --init-groups fails with
"Operation not permitted" for an unprivileged caller even when reuid'ing to its own
account, because setgroups(2) is root-only. --reset-env is what stops the platform's
environment crossing; verified POSTGRES_URL is unset on the far side and HOME arrives
from the target's passwd entry.
Three bugs that only a real run with a real useradd could find:
- chmod after chown fails forever, because chmod needs ownership. Both orderings fail
unprivileged. Both operations now go through sudo, which is what makes it re-runnable.
- a member could read ANOTHER member's home: provisionUserDirs created at the default
umask (755) and only the account being created got confined. An unlistable parent is
no protection when the child is world-readable and emails are guessable. The skeleton
is now created closed, 711 on the account dir and 700 inside.
- platform/.env was 664 and a member's shell printed JWT_SECRET, which is enough to mint
an owner token and bypass every capability check. Now a boot check that refuses to
start with OFFICER_OS_USERS on while any .env in the project root is group- or
world-readable.
Design, the measured results and the staging plan: docs/per-user-linux-accounts.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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