bbb16d6ed39ae193c49e0c4f3caa8dd5550afaed
19
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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bbb16d6ed3 |
bitcoin-wallet, extracted into plugins/bitcoin-wallet — the platform half
Tenth extraction, and the first where the blocker was a permission rather than a path. The wallet was kind: 'admin' — owner only, never grantable — and plugin permissions are always kind: 'app'. mount.ts forces that and the manifest has no field for anything else, deliberately, so a plugin cannot ask to be restricted. Extraction therefore could not preserve admin. Raised before moving any code, because turning "the server owner's bitcoin" into a row in the grants list beside Photos and Music is the kind of change nobody notices until someone ticks it. Made anyway, and the objection inverts: every wallet query is scoped by user_id, taken from X-Officer-User which the platform injects from the session, so granting the permission gives an account its OWN wallet rather than access to anyone else's — including to the owner, whose bypass covers permission checks and not query scoping. kind: 'admin' was single-user thinking. Named bitcoin-wallet, not wallet: appName drives route, API prefix, table prefix and install key together, so the name should say what it is. Tables are bitcoin_wallet_*; the prefix guard normalises the hyphen. Verified free before committing to it — no wallet table exists on any server, and db:push would treat a rename as a drop plus a create. registry.test.ts re-anchored: `wallet` was its canonical kind: 'admin' fixture and its no-selfService fixture. Now user-admin/server-admin and terminal, with a note that a plugin's permissions are always `app` — which is exactly why this one needed a decision rather than a default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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9c309c5ab6 |
calendar and contacts are core again, with radicale as a plain sidecar
Reverses the 2026-08-13 decision to make caldav an app-store entry. Three reasons it does not belong there. It is not an integration. Photos-via-Immich or torrents-via-Transmission assume you already run the thing; a calendar assumes nothing, and a personal server without one is missing a baseline rather than an optional app. It needs TWO top-level routes, /calendar and /contacts, and a plugin gets one — derived from its appName, which is what makes it structurally impossible for a plugin to shadow a core route. Nobody thinks "I'll open my dav", so collapsing them under /dav was the wrong trade, and weakening the namespace guarantee to allow two was a worse one. As core routes the question does not arise. And it never actually needed Docker. Radicale is a ~2MB Python package; sidecar/caldav/radicale.ts already spawns it directly on loopback with http_x_remote_user. The container came from the app store making everything a container, not from anything Radicale requires. So: the routers are mounted again (/caldav for the UI's JSON door, /dav for app passwords, the top-level /dav sync door and the two .well-known redirects), officer-caldav joins CORE_PROCESSES, radicale joins the machine-setup package list for all four package managers, and the catalogue entry is gone. members.test.ts re-anchored a fifth time — caldav was one of two `accounts` services and memos is now the last. Noted in the test that the sixth time should be a literal fixture instead. Verified: assertPermissionTotality accepts /caldav and /dav, tsgo clean, 1085 pass. NOT yet verified against a real client — radicale is not installed on this machine. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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f566fda0b2 |
invoices, extracted into plugins/invoices — the platform half
Ninth extraction, third resurrection. Switched off since 2026-08-13 with the permission reduced to api: [], so assertPermissionTotality was satisfied, the server booted clean, and every panel request 404'd. Closes the same data hazard as jellyfin and soulseek: invoiceshelf/schema was commented out of the drizzle barrel. Named `invoices`, not `invoiceshelf`. The appName is THE id — API prefix, frontend route, table prefix, sidecar suffix, install key — and before extraction the API (/api/invoiceshelf) and the screen (/invoices) had drifted apart, which was harmless only while they were separate hardcoded strings. The route is the part a person sees, and the permission key and label were already `invoices`, so the API prefix was the odd one out. Cost three call sites and a table rename to invoices_accounts, which was free only because the table existed on no server — verified before deciding, not after. members.test.ts re-anchored again, this time to caldav and memos: services with no extraction planned. That assertion has now been re-pointed four times by services leaving for plugins/, which is the whole reason installer.test.ts was made literal earlier tonight. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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ee321f49fd |
refuse a plugin install whose permission key the platform still claims
Three times in one day — photos, soulseek, jellyfin — the same failure on the same machine: install reports success, the dock tile appears, the frontend rebuilds with the route in it, and every request 404s. The plugin never mounted, because setPluginPermissions refused its key as already core. That refusal was correct and useless. It happens at mount time, after the install has reported success, and its only trace is one line on stderr that nobody is reading. The cause is always the same: the key was a CORE permission until the extraction commit, so a server whose platform predates that commit still owns it. The fix is always git pull, and nothing in the product said so. installPlugin now checks the manifest's keys against the core registry before anything is written, and refuses with a message naming the colliding keys and telling the operator to pull the platform and restart. Placed with the other pre-flight checks, so it changes nothing that would need undoing. corePermissionCollisions is exported from the registry rather than reimplemented in install.ts — the core key set has one owner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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aebd6ff0c0 |
jellyfin, extracted into plugins/jellyfin — the platform half
Eighth extraction, second resurrection. Same shape as soulseek: hono.ts had the router import and its PROTECTED_MOUNTS entry commented out since 2026-08-13 and the permission reduced to api: [], so assertPermissionTotality was satisfied, the server booted clean, and every panel request 404'd. Also closes the same data hazard — jellyfin_servers was absent from the drizzle barrel, so bun db:push would have dropped it. No frontend call site needed repointing: mountPrefix derives /jellyfin from the appName, which is what the router already hardcoded. Test fixtures fixed properly rather than re-anchored again. Extracting jellyfin broke 18 tests, the FOURTH extraction in a row to break the same files — photos and transmission yesterday, slskd an hour ago, jellyfin now. installer.test.ts now builds literal CatalogueEntry fixtures and asks the catalogue nothing: it pins planSteps and runInstall, which are installer logic, and a service leaving for plugins/ says nothing about whether the installer still plans the right steps. catalogue.test.ts stays the place real entries are checked well-formed. members/catalogue/preflight re-anchored to memos, which has jellyfin's exact shape. The .prettierignore rule for the vendored hls.mjs moved into the plugin rather than being left behind naming a deleted path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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b196c9cb55 |
soulseek, extracted into plugins/soulseek — the platform half
Seventh extraction, and the first of something that was already dead. Soulseek had been switched off since 2026-08-13: hono.ts carried the router import and its PROTECTED_MOUNTS entry commented out, so createSidecarProxy never ran and registerProxiedPrefix was never called; officer-slskd was not in the ecosystem at all. Because the permission entry had been reduced to api: [], the totality check was satisfied and the server booted clean — the UI rendered and every request 404'd. Worth naming: the boot check proves every MOUNTED prefix has a permission, and is silent about a feature that mounts nothing. Also closes a live data hazard: schema.ts had the soulseek export commented out, so the three tables were absent from the drizzle barrel and bun db:push would have dropped soulseek_favorites, soulseek_browse_snapshots and soulseek_browse_dirs on any server holding them. rebuild-soulseek-tree.ts documented the workaround rather than the problem; deleted with the rest. The connection stays in core service_connections under service 'slskd' while the mount is now /api/soulseek. Those differ on purpose. Test fixtures: slskd was canonical in three app-store tests, the third extraction running to break them. installer.test.ts now builds a literal fixture instead of reaching into the catalogue — it pins planSteps, which is installer logic, and no catalogue entry is both provisioned and members:'none' any more. catalogue.test.ts and members.test.ts re-anchored to vnc/notify/gitea. Unrelated but mine: check:theme caught 5 palette classes I introduced in CommandHQ earlier tonight against a baseline of 0. Converted to bg-success / bg-warning. check:theme is not part of bun test, which is why the green suite never showed it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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f8028364f1 |
transmission, extracted into plugins/transmission — the platform half
Sixth extraction, straight after photos. Everything transmission now lives at gitea.officer.dev/plugins/transmission. Deleted, not commented: the sidecar, the api router, the Transmission app (28 files including detail/ and dialogs/), the screen, the App.tsx route pair, the Dashboard barrel line, the usePageTitle rule, the AppRegistry wiring, the officerdev barrel re-exports, the permission registry entry, the hono.ts import and mount comments, and the app-store catalogue entry. No database change: transmission owns no tables. Its connection lives in service_connections, a core table it now depends on from outside — a real coupling, recorded in the plugin's own PLUGIN.md rather than left to be discovered. ── Test fixtures, repointed rather than deleted ── Transmission was the canonical `members: 'none'` fixture — a single-tenant daemon with no user concept — across three app-store test files. slskd has the identical shape, so the assertions moved there. Deleting them would have quietly dropped coverage of the no-members install path along with the plugin, which is the same trap the vault extraction hit with `members: 'invite'`. ── Vocabulary swept, per the runbook ── Six screens and two App.tsx comments pointed at `/photos` or `/transmission` as the worked example of the Workspace/Panel shape. Both are plugins now, so those pointers dangled at code no longer in the tree. Repointed at /command-hq and /soulseek, which are core. bunx tsgo clean. 1080 pass / 0 fail. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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a327dfc82c |
photos, extracted into plugins/photos — the platform half
Fifth extraction, and the clean case: no reverse dependency, configuration already server-side, frontend already panels. Everything photos now lives at gitea.officer.dev/plugins/photos. Deleted, not commented: the sidecar, the api router, the db directory, the Photos app (25 files), the screen, the App.tsx route pair, the Dashboard barrel line, the usePageTitle rule, the AppRegistry wiring, the officerdev barrel re-exports, the permission registry entry, both database barrels, the hono.ts import comment, and the app-store catalogue entry. The catalogue deletion is required rather than tidying — the trap the runbook records as having bitten twice. permissionAvailability() derives from sidecar_installs, which a plugin never gets a row in, so a leftover entry makes the permission permanently 'unavailable' and withholds the route and dock tile on a server where the plugin is installed and working. ── Test fixtures, repointed rather than deleted ── Photos was the canonical app-store fixture across four test files, chosen for being existing|provisioned with members: 'accounts'. Jellyfin has the identical shape, so the assertions moved there — they are about the installer, not about photos, and deleting them would have quietly dropped coverage of the provisioned install path along with the plugin. One loss worth naming: Immich's `provisioned` install mode went with the catalogue entry. Docker provisioning for plugins does not exist yet, so photos is point-at-your-own-instance until it does. bunx tsgo clean. 1080 pass / 0 fail, unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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5e4f3fe29f |
fix all seven failing tests — every one was a stale assertion, not a live bug
The suite has been carried at "1038 pass / 7 fail, same as baseline" for long
enough that the count became the thing being checked instead of the tests. All
seven turned out to pin a contract that changed on 2026-08-13, when a batch of
features were switched off pending plugin extraction. None was a defect in
running code; two were tests that could no longer detect what they were written
to detect.
── Five in registry.test.ts, one root cause ──
Switching a feature off comments out its `api:` line but keeps the permission
(the frontend route still needs gating, and existing role grants have to keep
meaning something). Eleven permissions therefore declare no API prefix now.
• `REAL_WS` still listed 'desktop', which server.tsx stopped serving. The
file's own header says it mirrors that map by hand and that this is "the
drift this file keeps catching" — it caught it, and the failure was read as
baseline for five days.
• 'refuses a claim on a router that no longer exists' withdrew /gitea, which
claims nothing any more, so nothing threw. The test could not fail for the
right reason OR pass. Re-pointed at /tasks, which is core and mounted.
• Two path→permission tests asserted /api/gitea and /api/caldav resolve.
Re-pointed at /tasks and at /user vs /users — the latter is a live overlap
AND a real privilege boundary (resolving /api/users to 'account' would hand
the ordinary-account permission the user-administration API), where the old
/dav vs /caldav pair mapped to one permission and never showed the property.
• 'every permission declares at least one api prefix' stopped being true by
design. Replaced with what it was protecting — a permission must gate
SOMETHING reachable, api or route, since one gating nothing can be granted
and revoked to no effect while reading as a control. `notify` is named as
the one genuine exception rather than silently tolerated: no API, and no
screen by design.
── plugins/music/cliamp: a real ordering fix, pushed separately ──
openPlayer checked for the cliamp binary BEFORE validating the path, so a path
escaping the owner's home answered "cliamp not found on host" on any machine
without it. Fixed there (3f4ee82): validate the request, then inspect the host.
── The pty timeout: an env var that had done nothing for five days ──
The test pinned `HOME_DIR: '/tmp'`. `HOME_DIR` was removed from the platform on
2026-08-13 when the install root became derived, and sessions.mjs resolves `~`
with node's `homedir()` — which reads `$HOME`. So the shell opened in the real
home, `pwd` never printed /tmp, and the test spent its full 15s timeout waiting
for output that could not arrive. One character class of a rename, five days
ago, costing 15s of every suite run since.
1044 pass, 0 fail, 85 files (unchanged). Suite is ~15s quicker for the obvious
reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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f6a1194905 |
vault, extracted into plugins/vault — the platform half
Fourth extraction, after offscale, music and email. Everything vault is now at
gitea.officer.dev/plugins/vault and installs from the marketplace; this commit
is what the platform stopped knowing.
Deleted, not commented: both routers, the sidecar, the db directory, the
hono.ts mounts/imports, server.tsx's ws import + handler entry + four
route-table entries, '/vault' from UNPROTECTED_API_PREFIXES, both entries in
totality.ts's exemption lists, both database barrels, and the app-store
catalogue entry.
The catalogue deletion is required rather than tidying — the trap the runbook
records as having bitten twice. permissionAvailability() derives from
sidecar_installs, which a plugin never gets a row in, so a leftover entry makes
the permission permanently 'unavailable' and withholds the route and dock tile
on a server where the plugin is installed and working.
── The one new piece of platform: src/servers/account-lifecycle.ts ──
Three auth handlers (signout, distress, panic) imported clearVaultTokens and
clearVaultUnlockKey directly. That is the security property behind the distress
and panic buttons — "someone got in, make the vault need a master password
again" — so it could not just be dropped, and a plugin cannot be imported by
core.
Rejected: having core DELETE from the plugin's tables by name. It removes the
import but moves the coupling somewhere worse — core would depend on a plugin's
SCHEMA, so renaming a column would silently stop the wipe. A security property
that fails silently on an unrelated change is the failure mode to design
against. (docs/email-plugin-extraction.md took that shape for READING a
plugin's data, where a stale answer is a missing feature rather than a lock
left open. The stakes decide it, not the pattern.)
Taken instead: core announces 'signout' | 'distress' | 'panic' with a user id,
and anything holding per-account state subscribes. ~30 lines, fire-and-forget,
one listener's failure cannot stop another. Core names no plugin, no table and
no column; a listener that is not there is a plugin that is not installed. The
severity mapping moved into the plugin — signout keeps the protector key,
distress and panic drop it — so the behaviour is unchanged.
── Two things deleted rather than carried, both dark since 2026-08-13 ──
The unauthenticated Bitwarden passthrough (/vaultwarden plus four root
prefixes and an /api/* header diverter). A plugin's routes mount into
protectedRouter at /api/<name>, behind the account gate; top-level
unauthenticated prefixes are not something a manifest can declare, and the Bun
route table they need entries in is built once at serve(). Keeping it meant
core naming /vaultwarden and /identity in its own route table — the vocabulary
leak the runbook forbids, for a path its own comments called TEMPORARY pending
a first-party browser extension. Owner's call: nice to have, not a requirement.
The notifications websocket, for the same reason plus a second: no plugin owns
a socket on this platform yet (server.reload({routes}) proven, never called;
handlers in server.tsx is a static map). Music parked cliamp/ for exactly this.
SignalR degrades to HTTP long-polling by itself, so clients still sync.
── Tests ──
Vault was the ONLY members: 'invite' catalogue entry, so deleting it would have
silently dropped coverage of that branch in plannedOutcome. It is now tested
against a synthetic entry instead: deleting an assertion along with the last
real user of a case is how a switch arm stops being covered without anyone
deciding it should.
bunx tsgo clean (verified it really does cover plugins/ by injecting a
deliberate error and watching it fail). Suite back at its 7 pre-existing
baseline failures — none of them this feature's, all confirmed unrelated
(the totality ones are about 'desktop'). 85 test files, unchanged, per the
runbook's trap about a moved test vanishing silently.
Needs `bun db:push` and a restart before installing, then point it at a
Vaultwarden from /vault — VAULTWARDEN_URL in .env is no longer read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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eb94af87f4 |
command hq: the api, mounted and documented
full REST surface for categories, tags and commanders. core permission (personal: ['/'], no grant to hold — every query is scoped to the caller's own user_id at the sql layer regardless). registered in the permission registry and PROTECTED_MOUNTS together, so totality holds by construction. GET /commanders is the grid endpoint: everything /chat/sessions already returns per session, plus categoryId/tagIds/running. `running` is derived live off collectRunningTasks (now exported from websocket.ts) folded over chat_session_events — not a stored column, on purpose, matching the design doc's stance that a status field would go stale exactly when a sidecar restart silently kills a watcher. GET /commanders/:sessionId deliberately does NOT duplicate the transcript — that stays GET /chat/sessions/:id, unchanged. a client calls both. /chat/sessions now excludes anything filed as a commander (listCommandHqSessionIds, .catch()'d so a hiccup on this feature can't take the whole chat list down) — the other half of the one predicate this whole design turns on. there is deliberately no POST /commanders/new: creation is an ordinary chat turn in the commanders directory, which is the next commit. docs/command-hq.md gains an API reference table for the mobile dev, and a status line at the top saying plainly what is real and what is not yet: needs `bun db:push` before any route returns real data, frontend not started. bunx tsgo clean. suite at baseline (same 7 pre-existing failures, all registry/totality drift and the pty socket test — none touch this router). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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98c37c4ce9 |
email leaves the platform for plugins/email
the sidecar, the router, the table, the screens and the account manager are
gone from src/ entirely - deleted, not commented, because a commented mount is
what assertPermissionTotality cannot see.
three reverse imports had to go first, and they are what decided the boundary.
core may not import a plugin's queries, and one of these had already proved
why: getEmailAccounts was awaited at the top level of the agent sidecar, so
when the table went away on 2026-08-13 the rejection took officer-agent into a
pm2 restart loop with every live chat session inside it (
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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0d29e242a3 |
themes are installable, like plugins
`platform/themes/<id>/` — untracked, same rule as `plugins/`, only the instructions
tracked. Drop a directory in and the theme appears in the picker on the next page load.
themes/my-theme/theme.css required — `[data-theme='my-theme'] { … }`
themes/my-theme/theme.json required — { name, family, dark }
themes/my-theme/assets/ optional — wallpaper, logo
── Why this is cheaper than installing a plugin ──
A plugin is code: it needs a manifest module, mounting, and a frontend rebuild to reach
the bundler. A theme is a block of CSS custom properties, so it needs none of that. The
server reads the directory at request time and the client adds a `<link>`. No install
step, no rebuild, no restart — which is the whole reason this is eighty lines of
discovery rather than four hundred.
The id is the DIRECTORY NAME, not a manifest field, for the same reason a plugin's
`appName` is not one: an id that can disagree with where its files sit eventually will.
Discovery checks that the CSS actually targets its own directory name, because the
failure is otherwise silent — the theme appears, is selected, and nothing changes.
── Problems are reported, not swallowed ──
A malformed theme returns a reason rather than vanishing:
broken-probe: theme.css does not target [data-theme='broken-probe']
The client logs those, so an author has somewhere to look instead of wondering why
their theme never appeared.
── Boundaries kept ──
The `theme` package still performs no IO. It gained an `extraThemes` prop; Officer
fetches and injects, exactly as it supplies the panel registry to `workspaces`. A
failure to fetch is not an error — no server, no session, no directory all mean "you get
the built-in themes", which is a complete product.
`/api/themes` is a `core` capability: read-only, and not deniable, because an account
that cannot read the theme list renders unstyled. Installing remains a directory on
disk; an upload endpoint would be a way to write arbitrary CSS into the page from a
request.
Verified in-process: listing, the problem report, CSS served as text/css, and a
traversal attempt answered 404.
── Needs a restart ──
Server-side change. Until then the client's fetch 404s and silently keeps the built-ins,
so nothing breaks in the meantime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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7d64b0a0d6 |
paste localhost:3000 into the preview and see the server's port
No proxy host, no certificate, no port opened. `/api/dev-proxy/5173/…` forwards to `http://127.0.0.1:5173/…` over the platform's own origin, and the panel maps what you type onto it. ── Why a proxy at all, when the ask was "just point at localhost" ── Neither direct route works from a browser on https://<platform>. `http://localhost:5173` resolves on the VIEWER's machine, not the server's, and `http://<server>:5173` is mixed content inside an https page and is blocked before it is even attempted. Both fail looking exactly like the dev server being down. The bytes have to arrive over an origin the page already trusts, which is the platform. A dev server can therefore stay bound to 127.0.0.1. The workflow this replaces — one NPM proxy host per app — needs it on 0.0.0.0 plus a firewall rule for the docker bridge, so this is both less setup and less exposure. ── What came back from `188b45c1^`, and what did not ── The 46-line HTML/asset rewrite, which is the hard-won part: absolute paths in the document, plus an injected script that intercepts fetch/XHR/WebSocket for the URLs built at runtime. Its JWT injection is deleted — those apps called the PLATFORM's API; a dev server proxied here talks to itself, and handing its process the owner's bearer token would be giving credentials to whatever is on that port. The other 314 lines are not back: spawning, port discovery, idle timers, log collection, a proxyId registry. The port is the id, and the background-job button already starts dev servers. ── HMR is bridged, because "see it" without "follow it" is half the feature ── The injected script rewrites the dev server's socket under the prefix; the relay dials `ws://127.0.0.1:<port>` and forwards frames both ways. Same shape as the vault relay including the non-obvious part — state registered synchronously and frames queued until the upstream opens, because Bun requires the upgrade to be synchronous and an HMR client speaks immediately. An upstream close closes the client, which is what makes a dev-server restart reconnect by itself. ── Access, which was not in the ask and is not optional ── This route reaches any loopback port on the machine, on a host that answers from the public internet. An iframe cannot carry a bearer token — it is a navigation — so the panel puts it in the URL once, the proxy verifies it is the OWNER through `resolveAuthToken`, and issues a short-lived cookie every sub-resource then carries. Anonymous and non-owner requests get 401, verified. Owner-only rather than a permission: reading an arbitrary loopback port is the `execution` power the registry says can never be granted. Both exemptions are registered with reasons, and the boot check earned its keep — it refused to start until the socket provider was claimed too. ── Verified against a real loopback-only server ── Confirmed unreachable from outside, then through the proxy: index served and rewritten, `/_bun/` chunk resolved, JSON passed through untouched, 401 anonymous, 401 with a bad token, "nothing is listening" on a dead port. Websocket: refused without the cookie, target parsed, frames relayed in both directions. One bug found by testing rather than reading: the upstream path was derived by slicing a hardcoded prefix, so every asset request returned the index page. It is found from the `/<port>` segment now. A test asserting `http://localhost:5173` is kept verbatim is now inverted, with the reason written beside it — that was correct when the panel only framed real hostnames. tsgo clean, frontend builds, 890 pass / 7 fail unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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0230e62a71 |
the platform stops explaining what Headscale is
Correcting my own reasoning from the last commit. I left "Headscale's API", "the Headscale admin credential" and similar alone on the grounds that they name the thing the plugin drives, so renaming them would make the sentences false. True as far as it goes, and it misses the point: those sentences are in the PLATFORM. It has no business knowing what Headscale is at all. Correct language in the wrong repository is still a remnant. Ten of them, each replaced with the platform's own vocabulary rather than the plugin's domain: - `crypto.ts` and `secret-store.ts` listed "the Headscale admin credential" among what one key used to protect. It is "the tailnet's admin credential" — the purpose, which is a word this repository owns. - `catalogue.ts` and `availability.ts` explained `alsoServes` — a LIVE mechanism — entirely through a Headscale example that left the repository. Restated as the general shape, with one parenthesis saying which case produced it. - The photos types file explained another plugin's sidecar. - `App.tsx` cited `/headscale/:section` as the example of a route pair; that route does not exist. `/photos/:section` does. - `plugins/router.ts` pointed at `useCompanionLogStream`, a hook that lives in a plugin now. - `registry.ts` said in the present tense that `headscale` is `admin` — the permission is the plugin's and it declares its own, so a member-facing enrolment surface would be the PLUGIN's to add, not this file's. - `proxy.sh` cited `headscale/schema.ts` as a style reference. That file is not in this repository. - machine-setup said "Its Headscale app" — the app is the Offscale plugin. `machine-setup/lib/tailscale.sh` keeps all ten of its mentions: it exists to explain tailscale, headscale and offscale to somebody choosing between them, on a core install, before any plugin exists. That is machine setup's subject, not the plugin's domain leaking upward. What survives elsewhere is only dated history — "was here until 2026-08-15", "It was: music, vault, slskd, headscale, …" — plus the notes about the real `headscale_servers` orphan and the secret-store key removed yesterday. Those record that something called headscale used to be here, which is a different claim from explaining what it does. tsgo clean, frontend builds, 873 pass / 7 fail unchanged, setup scripts parse. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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1b65b83f1f |
the plugins screen becomes /marketplace
`/plugins` redirects rather than 404s: the word is in the dock, in the docs and in whatever anyone bookmarked, and a route that worked yesterday returning nothing reads as the feature having been removed. The API keeps its name — only the screen moved — so the permission entry lists both paths, because a client-side redirect is still a route that has to resolve before it can send anyone anywhere. Also: the fetch stubs in marketplace.test.ts needed `as unknown as typeof fetch`. Bun's `typeof fetch` carries `preconnect`, so a bare stub is not assignable — tests passed while tsgo did not, which is the wrong way round to find out. tsgo clean, frontend builds, 873 pass / 7 fail unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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84d6d7e7ce |
file browser: the eight defects from the audit
1. Kebab Cut/Copy silently did nothing, and sometimes cut the wrong rows. `EllipsisMenu` stops click propagation so opening it does not toggle selection — but Cut, Copy, Download, Delete and Compress all act on the SELECTION, which meant the kebab operated on whatever was selected elsewhere, or returned early with no toast at all. Right-click never had this because it selects first. Both now call one `ensureSelected`, on open. 2. Every menu vanished during a search. That branch had no ContextMenu and its rows are not FileItems, so right-click fell through to the browser. The folder menu is now declared once and mounted in both branches — it acts on `currentPath`, which a search does not change, so it stays meaningful. Search ROWS get their own three-item menu rather than the row menu: a hit carries an absolute path from anywhere in the tree, while every row-menu handler builds its path from the folder being browsed. Reusing it would have acted on a different file with the same name. `DirEntry.path` is optional — only search results carry one — so it is guarded, not asserted. 3. Download and Copy path now fan out over a multi-selection, the rule Delete and Compress already used. The menu downloaded one of six selected files while the toolbar zipped all six. Chat is deliberately NOT included: `chatContext` is a single path that the provider string-splits into a working directory, so a list would need Chat's contract changed. Left alone rather than half-done. 4. Read Aloud stopped offering TTS on binaries — same guard the editor got, since `text` is `getFileType`'s fallback and caught .exe and .sqlite. 5. `POST /file-browser/download` is filed as a read. It zips a selection and writes nothing; it is a POST only because a list of paths does not fit a query string. A read-level member could download a whole folder but not two files. Proved by hand that `readOnlyWrites: ['/download']` permits GET and POST /download, and still denies /download-video, /rm and /write — `isPrefixOf` is segment-aware, so the sibling route does not leak. 6. `disabled` had no use anywhere in the feature — the shared item type did not even expose it. It does now, and the first real case: `/file-browser/read` refuses over 5 MB, so Open in editor on a 40 MB log opened an editor that then failed. Hiding it would have suggested the file is not text; disabled says the true thing. 7. The grid kebab could fade out while its own dropdown was open — list view had `data-[state=open]:opacity-100` and grid did not. 8. Dead exports `getMatchingTasks` / `getMatchingAgents` removed. Both were the ungrouped input to the grouped form the menu actually renders; exporting them invited a second code path that never arrived. 9 is untouched on purpose — a plugin cannot register a menu item, and the music plugin is where that should be designed. tsgo clean, frontend builds, 808 pass / 7 fail unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhas
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9c2d6a97f7 |
a tested migration script for the capabilities→permissions rename
Other machines have to make the same database change, and pasted SQL is the
wrong way to ship it. `scripts/rename-capabilities-to-permissions.ts` renames
the table, its column, both indexes and its three CHECK constraints in one
transaction, and refuses to guess:
neither table nothing to do; db:push will create it
already renamed no-op, prints the grant count
BOTH tables present stops and says a human must decide
old table only migrates, counts before and after, prints every grant
Testing it found a bug that reading it had not. The existence checks were
inside the transaction but ran on the pool rather than on `tx`, so they could
not see the uncommitted rename: `columnExists('role_permissions','capability')`
answered false because that table did not exist yet on that connection, and the
COLUMN rename was silently skipped. The result was a `role_permissions` table
with a `capability` column — half migrated, and only failing on the next query.
That was found by building a scratch database in edge-pertento's exact shape
and running the script against it, rather than by review. Every check now
happens before the transaction, against the old names.
Verified end to end on that scratch: 6 grants migrated intact, a second run
correctly no-ops, and `db:push` afterwards leaves role_permissions and its rows
alone while creating the rest of the schema. Indexes come out as
role_permissions_pkey and uq_role_permissions_role_permission.
Also swept the last all-caps survivors the case-sensitive passes missed:
CORE_CAPABILITIES → CORE_PERMISSIONS, and a react-query key still spelling
['ROLE_CAPABILITIES']. The only CAPABILITIES left in src/ is the wallet's, which
is Lightning and stays.
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pastilhas
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2e8ec845c8 |
step 1/4: the permission engine is called permissions, not capabilities
The word meant four different things in this repo, not the three the offscale
doc records:
1. the permission registry → RENAMED here
2. $OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities/ items → kept; this is what capabilities are
3. sidecar routing keys → step 3, becoming `handles`
4. Lightning wallet features → kept; a domain term, and on the wire
to the mobile apps
The fourth was not in the doc and a global find-and-replace would have broken
the mobile wallet, which reads `{ kind, capabilities: Capability[] }` from the
wallet sidecar. So this renamed against an explicit file allowlist rather than
by sweeping the tree, and `CapabilityPage.tsx` — the UI for the item store, and
correctly named already — was left alone.
Moved: servers/capabilities/ → servers/permissions/, capability-gate.ts →
permission-gate.ts, users/capabilities-routes.ts → permissions-routes.ts,
hooks/useCapabilities.ts → usePermissions.ts. Identifiers follow.
Three breaks the typechecker could not see, all found by exercising it live.
The route paths moved with the prose sweep, so the server served
/user/permissions while the frontend still called /user/capabilities. A 404 on
every page load, and tsgo clean throughout.
The response FIELD moved too. `client.get<SelfPermissions>()` is an unchecked
cast, so `data.capabilities` became `undefined` at runtime with no compile
error — `can()` would have answered "no" to everything and the dock would have
emptied itself.
And the grants list was passed straight out of the database, so it arrived as
`{ role, capability, level }` while the screen read `grant.permission`. Every
role would have rendered as holding nothing. It is now mapped in the route:
the wire says `permission`, the column still says `capability`, and step 2
therefore changes nothing any client can see.
The stale react-query keys were the quiet one: two files still invalidated
['self-capabilities'] after the hook moved to ['self-permissions'], so
installing a plugin would have silently stopped refreshing the dock.
The database is untouched — `role_capabilities` and its `capability` column are
step 2, and the two call sites that cross that boundary say so in a comment.
Round-tripped the 9 live grants through the admin endpoint to prove the PUT
contract survived: 9 before, 9 after, Member's three intact.
Also reverted prettier churn on five landing-page files that a broad --write
picked up. Second time today; the lesson is not sticking.
tsgo clean. 797 tests, 787 pass, same 7 pre-existing failures — two of which
now read "path → permission" rather than "path → capability".
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