CLAUDE.md asserted "single-user is a hard invariant, not a stage" while
users held six rows and role_capabilities held grants. Every doc that
repeated it is corrected here, in prose and in the code comments that
carried the same claim.
The accurate statement is narrower: one owner who bypasses every check,
other accounts holding only what their role is granted, and a set of
capabilities — terminal, chat, files, tasks, items, desktop, browser — that
are structurally ungrantable because they execute as the owner's OS user.
TODO.md gains a Multi-user section for what the read turned up: no way to
create a second account, dashboards.id colliding across users, authorize.ts
untested, pty/vault/opencode taking no identity, Radicale still owner_only.
claude-sidecar-isolation.md's open question is answered rather than left
open — the per-email spawn model is dead weight, because chat is an
execution capability and no second account can ever reach it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
the server half of the previous commit, which belonged with it. the frontend
guard needs both lists: absence from `routes` cannot tell a route this
account lacks from a route no capability claims, so without this the guard
permits everything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /api/user/capabilities is what the caller may reach, and every account
may ask — it is mounted on a core capability so an account granted almost
nothing can still find out what it has. the dock and route guards read it.
it is a courtesy, never enforcement: hiding an icon is not access control
and the 403 in origin-validation stays the lock.
GET/PUT /api/users/capabilities edit the policy, owner-gated. the write path
is where the registry's authority over capability keys is applied, which is
why the column has no CHECK: unknown keys and non-app kinds are refused
rather than stored for the resolver to drop on read.
the exception is `selfService`. useAuth calls PUT /api/users to change your
own name and avatar, and that route has always lived on the same router as
the owner-only account administration around it — so declaring /users an
admin capability locked every member out of their own profile. moving it to
/api/user would be tidier and would break every shipped mobile client, so
instead the registry says out loud that this one route is not what the
capability around it is. exact method and exact path, so it cannot widen:
verified that PUT /api/users passes while GET /api/users, PATCH
/api/users/:id/role, DELETE /api/users/:id and PUT /api/users/:id are all
still refused.
23 unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The role column now has somewhere to be used from. Lists every account, changes
roles, removes members.
API — all owner-only, mounted on the existing users router:
GET /api/users list, plus the role enum so the UI never
hand-writes the names
PATCH /api/users/:id/role change a role
DELETE /api/users/:id remove an account
ownerGate uses isSuperAdmin, which now reads the role column. The global backstop
in originScopeMiddleware already confines a non-owner token to /api/auth +
/api/music, so a Member cannot reach any of this — the gate is the explicit
statement of intent and gives a clear 403 rather than leaning on a rule written
for another purpose.
The password hash never leaves the handler: listing accounts is not a reason to
hand out hashes, so the response is an explicit shape rather than the row.
The owner is refused twice over, in both handlers, before the database has to.
ck_users_owner_is_super_admin and deleteUser() would each reject it anyway, but a
raw CHECK violation surfaces as a 500 in Postgres wording, which tells the person
clicking a dropdown nothing. Same reason `isOwner` is on the wire: the UI locks
that row rather than offering an action that cannot succeed.
The menu entry is shown to the owner only. That is tidiness, not access control —
the route stays reachable and the endpoints are gated server-side, because a
hidden menu item is not a permission and anything relying on it being hidden is
already wrong. Said so in the code, next to both.
Deleting cascades — passkeys, dashboards, screens, email accounts, playlists —
and there is no undo, so it asks first and says what goes.
Not built: invitations. Creating an account still means bootstrap or a row by
hand; an invite flow needs a token, an email and an acceptance screen, which is
its own piece of work.
Untested at runtime: the routes 404 on the running server because platform TS
does not hot-reload. Everything typechecks, the token path was verified against
/api/dashboards, /api/tasks and /api/jobs returning 200, and the 404 is the
restart asymmetry rather than the wiring. Needs `pm2 restart officer`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
provisionUserEnvironment seeded a managed home under DATA_PATH/<email> — shell
configs from a template dir, plus a generated CLAUDE.md and settings.json — and
bootstrap called it fire-and-forget when the owner account was created. It is
outdated: the managed home is not where anything runs. Task runs, terminals and
chats all execute in getOwnerHomeDir (the real login home, HOME_DIR), not the
getHomeDir tree this was populating.
Removed the function, its four template files, and the call in bootstrap. No
setup script referenced it — checked all of scripts/*.sh — and bootstrap was its
only caller anywhere in the tree.
getHomeDir and toShellUsername stay in data-path.ts: pipeline-executor and
pipeline-job-manager still use them.
This leaves src/servers/generate-container-context.ts with zero consumers, since
provision was the only thing importing it. Left in place rather than deleted in
the same commit — it is 173 lines that build a CLAUDE.md and a settings.json for
an agent, which is plausibly wanted somewhere else, and that is a call for the
owner rather than a side effect of this cleanup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
it was the only sidecar living outside src/servers/sidecar/ — it sat in
api/terminal/ next to the bridge that talks to it, which is the one place a reader
looking for "the sidecars" would not check. now src/servers/sidecar/pty/index.mjs,
matching every peer, with a note on the pm2 entry about why this one is node and
.mjs (node-pty is a native addon) rather than bun and typescript like the rest.
the templates/ directory went to api/users/, next to provision.ts:seedShellConfigs,
which is now its only consumer — the sidecar's duplicate seeder went with the
sandbox branch in the previous commit. api/terminal/ is left holding exactly one
thing: the websocket bridge.
no behaviour change. the pm2 entry's script path changed, so `pm2 restart
officer-pty` is not enough — pm2 remembers the old path until the entry is deleted
and started again. commands are in SIDECAR_WORK_LOG.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer is single-user: the server owner is the only account, created once by
/auth/bootstrap. Everything that existed to serve additional users was
unreachable, so it is gone rather than left looking like it does something.
Accounts: drop the invite / resend-invite / delete / list-users routes and the
Users settings screen, the inert /auth/signup handler, and the account
verification chain it fed (verify, resend-verification, VerifyScreen, the
UserInvite + VerifyAdmin + VerifyRegistration templates). /auth/verify-token
survives for password resets only, and now requires a reset-password token
rather than accepting any signed JWT.
Roles: drop the users.role column and the four-value USER_ROLES enum. The
permissions table granted every role identical methods, and every
role === 'Super Admin' check was permanently true. The JWT no longer carries a
role claim.
Sandbox: remove sidecar/sandbox.ts and its five call sites. bwrap was selected
only for non-Super-Admin users, so it never ran. It was also not a usable agent
jail as written — --share-net, the project root (with .env) bound read-only,
and runuser dropping to the server's own uid. Rebuilding it for agent
containment would be a different construction, and git history keeps this one.
getHomeDir keeps its DATA_PATH meaning; the new getOwnerHomeDir resolves the
owner's real login home, which is what terminals, chats and task runs use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove the multi-user provisioning leftovers (the provision-existing-users.sh
migration was already deleted in the prior commit):
- gut provisionVncEnv from provision.ts (per-user startxfce4 virtual desktop, dead
since the switch to mirroring :0 — vnc-manager.ts self-provisions its own passwd)
- drop the Pi `.pi/agent/sessions` seed and the now-orphaned `run` helper
Wire provisioning into bootstrapHandler: the super admin (first user) is created via
createUser, which never called provisionUserEnvironment — only the invite/verify flow
did. So the single user's DATA_PATH/<email> was never provisioned up front. Now it is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
replaces the single hardcoded systemd VNC service with a dynamic
sidecar that manages per-user VNC sessions on demand. any authenticated
user can now access their own desktop, not just Super Admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- chown user dirs to pastilhas:<username> instead of pastilhas:officerdev
so users cannot access each other's data
- chmod 2770 (setgid) gives only the owning user terminal access
- setup.sh: ensure home dir is traversable (o+x) for provisioned users
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- provision linux users with pastilhas:officerdev ownership so server
can always read/write, terminal users get group access
- add officerdev shared group setup to setup.sh
- move go install to ~/.local/go with GOPATH at ~/.local/go-path
- add upload file/folder items to file browser context menu
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
770 (rwxrwx---) is more secure - only owner and group can access, excluding 'others'.
The service user can still access because it's added to the user's group via:
usermod -aG shellUsername serviceUser
The real fix was wrapping chmodSync in try/catch in email-db.ts so it doesn't
crash when trying to chmod files owned by other users.
Issues:
1. User directories created with chmod 770 (too restrictive)
- Prevents service user from reading/writing even though in group
- Changed to chmod 775 (recursive) to allow group access
2. openEmailDb tries to chmod file it may not own
- If file owned by different user (e.g., andrepadez), chmod fails
- Wrapped chmodSync in try/catch to gracefully skip
Changes:
- src/servers/api/users/provision.ts:
* Changed chmod 770 → 775 (owner/group rwx, others rx)
* Applied recursively to all subdirectories
* Added chmod after seeding files to ensure consistency
- src/servers/api/email/email-db.ts:
* Wrapped chmodSync in try/catch
* Logs silently skip if file not owned by current process
* Database still works even if chmod fails
Fixes /email endpoint 500 errors for users with email data.
- Added detailed error logging to detect snap node compatibility issues
- When Pi process exits with code 1, log helpful diagnostic info including node path
- Add hint to check for snap node and reinstall via apt/nvm
- Create SNAP_NODE_COMPATIBILITY.md with full troubleshooting guide
- Document root cause: snap node has file descriptor incompatibility with Bun.spawn stdin pipes
- Provide clear installation instructions for NodeSource and nvm alternatives
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5