Origin validation, every rate limiter and the password-strength check each
treated an unset PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV as "relaxed", so a deployment that forgot the
variable silently ran with CORS reflecting any origin, no brute-force limit on
the sole account, and no password rules. setup.sh writes it, but .env.example
never mentioned it.
The three now share IS_DEV_BUILD, which is true only when PUBLIC_BUILD_ENV is
explicitly "dev" or "development". Anything else, including unset, is hardened.
Documented in .env.example.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer is single-user: the server owner is the only account, created once by
/auth/bootstrap. Everything that existed to serve additional users was
unreachable, so it is gone rather than left looking like it does something.
Accounts: drop the invite / resend-invite / delete / list-users routes and the
Users settings screen, the inert /auth/signup handler, and the account
verification chain it fed (verify, resend-verification, VerifyScreen, the
UserInvite + VerifyAdmin + VerifyRegistration templates). /auth/verify-token
survives for password resets only, and now requires a reset-password token
rather than accepting any signed JWT.
Roles: drop the users.role column and the four-value USER_ROLES enum. The
permissions table granted every role identical methods, and every
role === 'Super Admin' check was permanently true. The JWT no longer carries a
role claim.
Sandbox: remove sidecar/sandbox.ts and its five call sites. bwrap was selected
only for non-Super-Admin users, so it never ran. It was also not a usable agent
jail as written — --share-net, the project root (with .env) bound read-only,
and runuser dropping to the server's own uid. Rebuilding it for agent
containment would be a different construction, and git history keeps this one.
getHomeDir keeps its DATA_PATH meaning; the new getOwnerHomeDir resolves the
owner's real login home, which is what terminals, chats and task runs use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Collapse the two-phase bootstrap (email a verification link → verify screen) into
one direct step: the Bootstrap form collects name/email/username/password and posts
once to /bootstrap, which creates the first user directly as an active Super Admin
(+ provisions DATA_PATH/<email>). Still gated to an empty user table.
The invite flow (/verify, /verify-token) is untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove the multi-user provisioning leftovers (the provision-existing-users.sh
migration was already deleted in the prior commit):
- gut provisionVncEnv from provision.ts (per-user startxfce4 virtual desktop, dead
since the switch to mirroring :0 — vnc-manager.ts self-provisions its own passwd)
- drop the Pi `.pi/agent/sessions` seed and the now-orphaned `run` helper
Wire provisioning into bootstrapHandler: the super admin (first user) is created via
createUser, which never called provisionUserEnvironment — only the invite/verify flow
did. So the single user's DATA_PATH/<email> was never provisioned up front. Now it is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The default /chat working directory is used by both the Claude and OpenCode harnesses
now, so its Claude-specific name was misleading.
- Rename the dir + accessors: getClaudeSessionsCwd → getGeneralChatSessionsCwd,
ensureClaudeSessionsCwd → ensureGeneralChatSessionsCwd, path segment claude_sessions
→ general_chat_sessions (data-path on disk + code + UI labels/comments). No history
migration — the old Claude transcript slug is orphaned (intentionally).
- Remove the vestigial chat_sessions dir (leftover from the retired session store):
it only ever held empty claude/archived/ dirs, recreated by a signin hook. Drop that
hook (+ its dead imports) and the 4 unused data-path accessors (getUserSessionsDir,
getClaudeDir, getSessionDir, getArchivedSessionDir), and delete the dir.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
exposes the duress lockdown as an endpoint (needs the distress password in the
body, rate-limited) so it can be tripped from a shortcut/webhook, not only by
typing the distress password at the login form.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a duress password (DISTRESS_PASSWORD env): entering it at login trips an
in-memory full lockdown — all new logins (password + passkey) and every existing
session are refused until the server is restarted, and the login itself returns a
normal "invalid credentials" so it gives nothing away. Also add
POST /api/auth/blacklist-token as a clearly-named alias for revoking the current
JWT (same effect as signout).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Added detailed error logging to detect snap node compatibility issues
- When Pi process exits with code 1, log helpful diagnostic info including node path
- Add hint to check for snap node and reinstall via apt/nvm
- Create SNAP_NODE_COMPATIBILITY.md with full troubleshooting guide
- Document root cause: snap node has file descriptor incompatibility with Bun.spawn stdin pipes
- Provide clear installation instructions for NodeSource and nvm alternatives
auth.json stores api keys, models.json stores local providers directly.
no more copies, sync layers, or per-user config generation.
docker containers mount pi config read-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 4.8