decision 2 of the atelier extraction: providers (which adapter, which model, whose key) becomes an
Officer settings screen rather than a panel, since it is owner-level configuration in the same shape
as the Apify token beside it. Talks to /api/atelier/providers over HTTP through useClient() — no
import from plugins/atelier/ in either direction.
recorded in BLOCKERS.md: this goes against IntegrationsSettings' own comment from the email
extraction five days earlier ("a plugin contributes panels, not settings sections"). Followed the
pre-made decision anyway per the kickoff prompt's own instructions, and wrote down the
contradiction rather than picking one silently.
Fifteen sites across thirteen files where a raw green stood in for a
semantic state: connection dots, health lights, completed-job ticks, the
copied-to-clipboard check, the installed badge, the checksum-matched line.
All of them meant "on / connected / succeeded", and matched each other only
because several people happened to pick the same palette number.
The values do move: --success is #16a34a where green-500 was #22c55e and
emerald-500 #10b981. That is the point — one token, so a theme can change
its mind once, and under plain.css (the leak-detection theme, which greys
--success to #404040) these now go colourless instead of staying green.
Left alone, deliberately: the confetti palette and the Start button in
start-confetti-button, the duck-avatar debug HUD, MetricCard's up/down
delta ramp, CommandBlock's check on its hardcoded dark block, the
react-email template, and the plain.css comment that names the anti-pattern.
Reds are untouched — that is a separate pass, so some ternaries now read
bg-success : bg-red-500 until it happens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
24 panel and screen files had their fields sitting in a <div> instead of a
<form> — typing a value and pressing Enter did nothing, and the button was
the only way in. Fixed the sites that are a real form, a single field with
an obvious action, or a multi-field editor; left search/filter boxes and a
few genuinely ambiguous sites alone (see TODO.md for the full breakdown).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
a sweep for remnants after 2026-08-18. nothing was broken - no dangling
import, symbol, route or permission key anywhere in src/ - but the platform
was still speaking the plugin's vocabulary in a dozen places.
the one that mattered is live code rather than prose: ChatPanelWrapper
hardcodes workspace.id === 'email' to send context: 'email', which is the
frontend half of the pair whose backend half (resolveEmailCwd) carries a
fifteen-line justification. the two ends now both say so, including that
adding a SECOND id there is the signal the platform needs a real way for a
plugin to declare a chat context.
the rest: two dead imports left by removing the settings section, an empty
'Email' type-section header, a protocol.ts section header with no members
naming the plugin's SSE design, and a queue comment pointing at
sidecar/email/sync-runner.ts - a path in another repository now.
CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md and working-on-officer.md described email as a platform
feature, an app permission and a pm2 process. those are the files a fresh
agent reads first, so they were the highest-risk staleness in the tree.
TODO.md's whole Email section moved to the plugin's own repository. it held
OPEN items pointing at sidecar/email/store.ts, which is exactly how a leftover
list sends someone to edit files that do not exist.
the delete-account dialog promised it would remove email accounts and
playlists. both tables belong to plugins now, so that cascade only happens
where the plugin is installed - it now says 'anything an installed plugin
keeps for them' instead of naming two it cannot guarantee.
imapflow and mailparser STAY in package.json. the plugin has no package.json
of its own and resolves from the platform's node_modules, so removing them
would break the installed plugin's sidecar. the fix is giving plugins their
own dependency manifest, not deleting these.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
the sidecar, the router, the table, the screens and the account manager are
gone from src/ entirely - deleted, not commented, because a commented mount is
what assertPermissionTotality cannot see.
three reverse imports had to go first, and they are what decided the boundary.
core may not import a plugin's queries, and one of these had already proved
why: getEmailAccounts was awaited at the top level of the agent sidecar, so
when the table went away on 2026-08-13 the rejection took officer-agent into a
pm2 restart loop with every live chat session inside it (fbb6d6c7).
both survivors now read the DISK instead. findEmailAccountName() in
data-path.ts picks the newest emails.db under an account's email_accounts/
directory - no import, no query, and nothing to throw when the plugin is not
installed. the layout was already the platform's, so this costs no coupling.
the agent keeps its email_db tool and an email-context chat still opens in the
right mailbox.
the google oauth callback no longer appends /email to the dock: a plugin's
route is the plugin's business.
app-store/catalogue.ts entry deleted, and that is the whole point rather than
tidying. permissionAvailability derives from sidecar_installs and a plugin only
ever gets a plugin_installs row, so a leftover entry makes the permission
permanently unavailable - denied route, no dock tile - on a machine where the
plugin is installed and healthy. it has bitten headscale and nearly music.
two app-store tests used email as their config-only fixture; repointed at
notify, which is the same shape.
google-auth stays in core and the plugin imports it via @@/. that direction is
allowed and google-auth knows nothing about mail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The other half of the same report. The pill came back after a refresh, and then a
`pm2 restart officer` killed the dev server outright — because `restartBackgroundTask`
spawned it as a plain child of the platform. A job the AGENT starts is a child of the
`officer-claude-code` sidecar, a PM2 peer, so those were never affected. The tray
therefore showed two chips that looked identical and behaved differently, and the
restart button's own help text promised the opposite of what happened.
Measured against a throwaway PM2 app rather than reasoned about, because the two
plausible causes call for different fixes — a signal to the process GROUP, or a walk
of the process TREE:
plain `sh -c` killed
`setsid sh -c` killed <- a new session is NOT enough
`setsid --fork sh -c` survived
PM2 walks the tree by ppid, so a new session leaves the job a child and it is found
anyway. `--fork` is what matters: setsid forks and its parent exits at once, so the
job is reparented to init before any restart can enumerate it.
── What that costs, and how it is paid ──
The handle `Bun.spawn` returns is now the setsid parent, which exits immediately.
Waiting on it reported every job as finished the moment it started, so exit detection
moved to `watchForExit`: poll who holds the output file, and when nobody does, read
the status the wrapper recorded. That is the same liveness question Stop and Pause
already ask, so it adds no second notion of "running" — and a paused job still holds
its file, so SIGSTOP correctly reads as running rather than as an exit.
Two details that would each have been a bug:
- A GRACE PERIOD. Between the fork and the job opening its output there is a moment
with no holders; polling into it announces a completion for a job that never ran.
- The command is a POSITIONAL PARAMETER to the wrapper, not interpolated into it.
Interpolation would let a command containing quotes terminate the wrapper's own
quoting. Tested with `echo "quoted 'both' ways"`.
A missing status file is reported as a clean finish, not a failure: that is what Stop
looks like, and "you stopped it" is nearer the truth than "it crashed".
Also corrected the button text. It said background jobs survive "because they are
their own PM2 processes" — true of agent-started jobs, false of restarted ones, and
now the wrong reason for both. They survive because they are outside this process's
tree.
── Verified ──
End-to-end through `buildHonoApp`, on a synthetic task:
POST /restart -> 200
holders: pid 906186 (ppid 1, session leader), pid 906188 (ppid 906186)
probe process was 906173 — in neither chain
quotes survived the wrapper
durable events: task:started -> task:notification (completed), exit file "0"
My own assertion in that probe was wrong and the output is what corrected it: it
demanded ppid 1 of EVERY holder, but only the session root is reparented — its own
children hang off it, which is the point.
Not in `bun test`: nothing in the suite touches Postgres or spawns processes.
tsgo clean, 919 pass / 7 fail unchanged. Needs a server restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Asked whether there was feedback on failure, and for the restart there was not —
there was the opposite.
`useClient` throws on any status >= 400. The restart handler caught everything and
reported success, on the reasoning that a dropped connection is normal when the
process answering the request is the one being replaced. That is true, and it made
the honest refusal built into the route unreachable: a 400 saying "not running under
PM2" arrived through the same catch, so the button would have said "Restarting…"
while nothing restarted, and stayed disabled forever.
The two failures are opposites and are now told apart by whether an error carries a
STATUS. A status means the server answered and declined — real error, message shown,
button re-enabled. No status means the connection dropped — expected, and the
success path.
Both buttons also unwrap the message. The client throws with the raw response body,
and these routes answer with JSON, so an unhandled failure showed
`{"ok":false,"error":"…"}` and asked the reader to find the sentence inside the
punctuation. Five tests on that, including the cases where it must NOT invent one:
JSON with no error field, and a non-Error thrown value.
Found while answering the question rather than by testing, which is the wrong order.
── One thing I should not have done ──
I exercised the restart route against the live server to see its refusal shape. PM2
knows `officer` here, so it returned 200 and scheduled a real restart; the only
reason it did not happen is that my test process called `process.exit(0)` before the
250ms timer fired. Luck, not design. `pm_uptime` confirms the platform never
restarted.
tsgo clean, frontend builds, 919 pass / 7 fail unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Settings → System → Maintenance. Two buttons that are deliberately not a pair.
── Rebuild: real, and free ──
The same `rebuildFrontend` a plugin install already runs. `Bun.build` reads source
from disk on every call and writes `build/`, and the server serves that directory by
reading each file per request — so a rebuild lands on the next page load with no
process restart, no dropped websocket and no chat session lost.
── Restart: the only way to load server code, and it costs ──
Bun caches modules for the life of the process. Measured rather than assumed: editing
a file and re-importing returns the ORIGINAL export, and a cache-busting query picks
up that one specifier while everything it imports stays cached. So `rebuildHonoApp`
— which install already does — re-wires the same module instances into a new tree and
cannot see a backend edit. Busting the whole graph would duplicate singletons: two
database clients, two session maps, one process.
There is therefore no third button, and the screen says why. A "remount the API"
control would look like it reloaded the backend and would not.
The restart answers BEFORE it schedules itself, because the process serving that
request is the one being replaced. It refuses outright when PM2 does not know this
process — in development the platform runs under `bun --watch`, where the restart
would fail into a promise nobody awaits while the button reported success.
Verified: `POST /rebuild-frontend` → 200, 3.0s, 3 outputs; anonymous → 401. The
restart button is deliberately untested from here — pressing it would end the session
this was written in, which is the same reason it needs a label that says so.
tsgo clean, frontend builds, 914 pass / 7 fail unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Installing Music left the dock unchanged. The tile existed server-side the
moment the plugin was enabled, and the only way to see it was Profile → Dock,
by hand, after a page refresh. Installing something is already the decision to
use it; saying so twice is the bug.
Three separate causes, which is why it looked like one stubborn one:
1. `dock_configs.paths` is a COMPLETE ordered list, not a diff — useDock renders
the saved list rather than everything available, so anything not named in it
is invisible. Nothing in the plugin system had ever written to that table.
installPlugin now appends the new route, for the caller (threaded through the
route) rather than a guessed owner id.
Only for a user who HAS a row. A user without one is left alone deliberately:
there is nothing to append to, and writing one would freeze today's defaults
into their account permanently. That case is (2).
2. The fallback for a user who never customised was DEFAULT_DOCK_PATHS, which is
core-only — so a plugin tile was hidden there too. `defaultDockPaths(plugins)`
is now that list plus a tile per installed plugin, and the dock and its
settings screen both call it so they cannot disagree about what "default"
means.
3. useDock holds ['DOCK'] at staleTime: Infinity and the plugin verbs invalidated
only ['plugins'] and ['self-permissions']. So even once the server wrote the
path, nothing asked again — that is the part that made a reload necessary.
Also fixes a guard I broke reaching for this: typing VERBS as
Record<string, VerbFn> widens keyof to `string`, which makes `isVerb` prove
nothing and lets an unknown verb index the map. `satisfies` instead, and there is
now a check that Verb is still the four-member union.
Uninstall deliberately does not remove the path. A stale path with no item behind
it is dropped by useDock, and keeping it means disable/enable and reinstall put
the tile back where the user had it rather than at the end.
tsgo clean, frontend builds. 787 pass / 7 fail — 6 identical to before; the 7th
is plugins/music/cliamp, which install pulled into test discovery and which the
manifest documents as parked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Other machines have to make the same database change, and pasted SQL is the
wrong way to ship it. `scripts/rename-capabilities-to-permissions.ts` renames
the table, its column, both indexes and its three CHECK constraints in one
transaction, and refuses to guess:
neither table nothing to do; db:push will create it
already renamed no-op, prints the grant count
BOTH tables present stops and says a human must decide
old table only migrates, counts before and after, prints every grant
Testing it found a bug that reading it had not. The existence checks were
inside the transaction but ran on the pool rather than on `tx`, so they could
not see the uncommitted rename: `columnExists('role_permissions','capability')`
answered false because that table did not exist yet on that connection, and the
COLUMN rename was silently skipped. The result was a `role_permissions` table
with a `capability` column — half migrated, and only failing on the next query.
That was found by building a scratch database in edge-pertento's exact shape
and running the script against it, rather than by review. Every check now
happens before the transaction, against the old names.
Verified end to end on that scratch: 6 grants migrated intact, a second run
correctly no-ops, and `db:push` afterwards leaves role_permissions and its rows
alone while creating the rest of the schema. Indexes come out as
role_permissions_pkey and uq_role_permissions_role_permission.
Also swept the last all-caps survivors the case-sensitive passes missed:
CORE_CAPABILITIES → CORE_PERMISSIONS, and a react-query key still spelling
['ROLE_CAPABILITIES']. The only CAPABILITIES left in src/ is the wallet's, which
is Lightning and stays.
The word meant four different things in this repo, not the three the offscale
doc records:
1. the permission registry → RENAMED here
2. $OFFICER_ROOT/capabilities/ items → kept; this is what capabilities are
3. sidecar routing keys → step 3, becoming `handles`
4. Lightning wallet features → kept; a domain term, and on the wire
to the mobile apps
The fourth was not in the doc and a global find-and-replace would have broken
the mobile wallet, which reads `{ kind, capabilities: Capability[] }` from the
wallet sidecar. So this renamed against an explicit file allowlist rather than
by sweeping the tree, and `CapabilityPage.tsx` — the UI for the item store, and
correctly named already — was left alone.
Moved: servers/capabilities/ → servers/permissions/, capability-gate.ts →
permission-gate.ts, users/capabilities-routes.ts → permissions-routes.ts,
hooks/useCapabilities.ts → usePermissions.ts. Identifiers follow.
Three breaks the typechecker could not see, all found by exercising it live.
The route paths moved with the prose sweep, so the server served
/user/permissions while the frontend still called /user/capabilities. A 404 on
every page load, and tsgo clean throughout.
The response FIELD moved too. `client.get<SelfPermissions>()` is an unchecked
cast, so `data.capabilities` became `undefined` at runtime with no compile
error — `can()` would have answered "no" to everything and the dock would have
emptied itself.
And the grants list was passed straight out of the database, so it arrived as
`{ role, capability, level }` while the screen read `grant.permission`. Every
role would have rendered as holding nothing. It is now mapped in the route:
the wire says `permission`, the column still says `capability`, and step 2
therefore changes nothing any client can see.
The stale react-query keys were the quiet one: two files still invalidated
['self-capabilities'] after the hook moved to ['self-permissions'], so
installing a plugin would have silently stopped refreshing the dock.
The database is untouched — `role_capabilities` and its `capability` column are
step 2, and the two call sites that cross that boundary say so in a comment.
Round-tripped the 9 live grants through the admin endpoint to prove the PUT
contract survived: 9 before, 9 after, Member's three intact.
Also reverted prettier churn on five landing-page files that a broad --write
picked up. Second time today; the lesson is not sticking.
tsgo clean. 797 tests, 787 pass, same 7 pre-existing failures — two of which
now read "path → permission" rather than "path → capability".
an exclusionary rule, made structural. a plugin does not render a screen: it
contributes panels and says how they are arranged, and the shell renders
WorkspaceView around them.
web/panels.ts appRegistryMetas — at least one panel
web/layout.ts defaultLayout — how they are arranged
both required the moment web/ exists, and missing either is refused at discovery
by name and with the reason. tested:
probeplug: has a web/ directory but is missing web/layout.ts.
Every plugin route renders a Workspace: contribute panels and a layout,
not a screen.
there is deliberately no way to export a component. one that could would be free
to render a bare div, a full-page form, or its own navigation, and the platform
would become a shell hosting strangers' layouts rather than one application.
non-compliance is not so much refused as unrepresentable — there is nowhere to
put a screen.
the shell registers <prefix> and <prefix>/:section, exactly as the core screens
do, so a plugin's sections stay addressable and cmd-clickable, and panels read
useParams independently rather than passing state between themselves.
appTypes.allowed is pinned to that plugin's own keys, so a persisted layout
naming something else falls back instead of rendering another plugin's panel
inside this screen.
the example plugin is rebuilt to model it — two panels, a layout, one of them
calling its own /api/example/ping through useClient — because the reference
implementation is what everyone copies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gap at the other end of create-user.ts: the owner could set a password once, at
creation, and never again. Losing it meant a hand-written UPDATE with an argon2
hash — the same "edit Postgres by hand" hole that creating accounts used to have.
POST /api/users/:id/password, owner-gated, with a button on the row.
GENERATED, not typed. The failure this exists for is "I created the account and
forgot to copy the password down", and an owner typing a replacement can lose it the
same way on the second go. Shown once in a dialog built to be copied — a dialog and
not a toast, because a toast that times out while somebody finds a pen loses the one
thing they came for.
The generator satisfies validatePassword BY CONSTRUCTION rather than by luck: one
character drawn from each of the four required classes, the rest from the union,
then Fisher-Yates shuffled so the first four positions are not always
lower/upper/digit/special. Rejection sampling throughout — `% n` on a byte biases
the early characters. Then it runs validatePassword on its own output, so if the
rules ever gain a requirement the alphabets do not cover it throws at the one call
site instead of minting passwords the login form rejects. Measured: 20,000
generations, all four classes present every time.
l, I, 1, O and 0 are absent from the alphabets. This gets read off a screen and
typed somewhere else.
Signs them out everywhere, as asked: passwordChangedAt = now, and userMiddleware
already refuses any token whose iat predates it. That overwrites the null
create-user leaves to mean "the owner chose this, not them" — checked, nothing reads
that column except the token check.
The Linux account is deliberately untouched, and the dialog says so. Members have no
Linux password and never had one: ensureOsUser runs useradd with no -p, so it is
created locked. Their terminal goes through setpriv, which does not authenticate;
their SSH is the key the owner pasted; `su - <member>` as root does not ask. And
machine-setup sets PasswordAuthentication no — verified on this host — so one could
not be used to log in even if it existed. Setting one would be a new way in, not a
repair.
The owner is excluded: they have change-password, which asks for the current one,
and resetting themselves here would end the session doing it.
Verified: transpiles, all lucide icons exist, 20k generator runs. tsgo next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
navigator.clipboard is secure-context only, like crypto.randomUUID before it —
over plain http on a tailnet address the object does not exist. Twenty call
sites across eighteen files, in three states that all looked fine in review:
bare calls that threw and killed the handler, optional-chained calls that
silently did nothing, and one carrying the comment "Officer is always behind
HTTPS", which it is not.
The optional-chained ones are the worst of the three: a copy button that reports
success and copies nothing is indistinguishable from a working one until someone
pastes.
helpers/clipboard.ts falls back to document.execCommand('copy') over an
off-screen textarea — deprecated, and it works on any origin because it predates
the secure-context rule. Off-screen rather than hidden, because display:none and
visibility:hidden elements cannot be selected and the copy fails silently.
Reading the clipboard has no equivalent: execCommand('paste') was never permitted
from script. The file browser's paste-a-file path now checks canReadClipboard()
and explains itself instead of throwing.
docs/http-secure-context-audit.md is the full sweep the owner asked for: what was
fixed, what cannot be, and what was checked and found clear. crypto.subtle is
used nowhere in the frontend, which was the one worth confirming since it has no
cheap fallback. Notification's six matches are type names, not the API.
geolocation and navigator.share are already guarded. getUserMedia is in four
files and is being removed — but QrTransfer uses it for the CAMERA, not a
microphone, so "remove audio" does not cover it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
OFFICER_OS_USERS is gone. The platform behaves as it always would have with the
flag on, and there is nothing to enable.
Six conditionals, five of which were dead weight — provisionOsAccount,
deprovisionOsAccount and the create/delete paths each opened with an early
"not enabled on this server" return, and the API told the frontend whether to
render the Linux controls at all. Those go, along with the 'disabled'
DeprovisionResult stage, which nothing can produce now.
The sixth is the one with teeth. assertSecretsClosed opened with
`if (!OS_USERS_ENABLED) return`, described in its own comment as "a no-op when
the feature is off, so an existing install is unaffected until the owner opts
in". It is now unconditional: the server refuses to boot while any .env in the
project root is group- or world-readable. A member's shell reading .env and
printing JWT_SECRET was confirmed exploitable when this check was written, and a
prerequisite that only holds when somebody remembers to set a variable is not a
prerequisite.
Nothing to remove on the environment side — the flag was never in .env.example
or in the setup script.
Not typechecked: node_modules is empty in this tree and installs are frozen, so
tsgo could not run. All six files parse under `bun build --no-bundle`, and the
changes are deletions of dead branches plus one removed early return. Formatted
with prettier 3.9.6 via bunx rather than the pinned resolution, for the same
reason; its one unrelated reformat was reverted by hand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
DEFAULTS. Every role now starts with the three confined capabilities at write, seeded in
bootstrap. These are what the platform is FOR — an account that signs in and reaches none of
them is not restricted, it is useless, and making the owner grant them by hand first is a
step with no decision in it.
Seeded as real rows rather than implied by absence, which keeps the table's one rule intact:
a missing row means no access, always, with no exception to remember. Revoking one therefore
works like revoking anything else — the row goes and nothing puts it back. Done in bootstrap
because that happens exactly once per install, so seeding can never fight a later revocation.
Non-fatal: an owner whose roles hold nothing is a one-click fix, while failing bootstrap over
it leaves a platform with no account at all.
`app` capabilities are deliberately not defaulted — they reach data the owner may not intend
to share, and each needs a sidecar before it means anything.
SCREEN. Role selection is tabs rather than a dropdown: three roles are the axis you move
along, and a select hid two of them behind a click while giving no sense of which one you are
editing. Row descriptions are gone — with three rows called Terminal, Chat and Files they
explained nothing — and the "needs a Linux account" warning went with them, since every
account now gets one at creation, so it was noise about a state that no longer occurs on its
own. `needsOsAccount` is removed from the API too, not just hidden.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reversing my own call from an hour ago. I built the denied-route screen to EXPLAIN the
absence — "Music is not installed", with a link to the app store — and argued a redirect
erases what you asked for. The owner's correction is the better principle: a server should
not know about a sidecar it does not have. Explaining Music is the app describing a feature
that, as far as this install is concerned, does not exist, and it leaks the whole catalogue
of what could be installed to any member who types a URL.
So a denied path is now indistinguishable from an unknown one: redirect home, the same
answer App.tsx's path="*" already gave. One behaviour for a member without a grant, an
owner without the sidecar, and a typo. Nothing disclosed.
The Permissions screen loses both explanatory blocks for the same reason. One listed every
capability whose sidecar is absent — a catalogue of uninstallable features presented as a
permissions decision. The other described chat, tasks, the desktop and the wallet as
"not grantable" to an owner who may have none of them installed. `notInstalled` is gone
from the API too, not just hidden in the UI. What is on that screen is what this server can
actually do.
Still short of what the owner described, and worth naming rather than implying otherwise:
routes are DECLARED in App.tsx for every screen and this hides the ones that should not
resolve. The end state is routes REGISTERED from the manifests of installed sidecars, so an
uninstalled feature has no route to hide. The manifests already exist and the dock is
already built from them; the router is not, yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three findings from granting Files to a role and signing in as the member.
THE BLANK SCREEN. WorkspaceView returns null until workspace.isLoaded, and isLoaded
was the success flag of GET /api/dashboards — which the `dashboards` capability gated.
So a member with files granted got a completely blank Files screen and no request to
/api/file-browser at all: the panel never mounted. Terminal, Chat and every other
workspace screen were the same.
/api/dashboards is not a feature. It is the per-user key-value store where every
screen keeps its layout, entirely `personal`, every row keyed to the caller. Gating it
does not restrict an account, it breaks it — which is the definition of `core` at the
top of the registry. Moved there.
And the failure mode was wrong independently: `isLoaded` now covers a failed fetch as
well as a successful one, with `loadFailed` for the difference, so a screen that cannot
remember its layout still renders with defaults instead of showing nothing and
explaining nothing.
THE STRAY REQUESTS. Six shell-level queries gated on isAuthenticated but not on
capability, so a member's first paint fired 403s at /server-settings/settings,
/jobs/counts (every three seconds, forever), /chat/models, /plans, /music/now-playing
and the chat access policy. Each now checks the capability it needs. JobsIndicator and
RescanButton also render nothing without `tasks` and `items` — the header was offering
two links to a screen the member cannot open and a button that would 403.
THE PERMISSIONS SCREEN. It listed all fourteen app capabilities on a server where none
of their sidecars are installed. Offering to grant Photos on a machine with no Immich
is not a permission decision. It now shows only what is installed, lists the rest as
"nothing installed for these yet" so their absence reads as a fact rather than a bug,
and marks confined rows as needing a Linux account. Fails open on a degraded read.
Found while checking that: the headscale catalogue entry claimed only the `headscale`
capability, but the same sidecar also serves `vpn` — a member enrolling their own
device — so vpn was never subtracted. Hence `alsoServes`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /users/:id/provision-linux, and a terminal button on each user row. One
operation covering three needs that were all previously answered by "delete the
account and make it again":
backfill an account created before the feature existed, or while the host was not
set up for it
retry the first attempt failed for something since fixed — the traversable
ancestor chmod being the one everybody hits once
re-key replace authorized_keys with a new public key
Deleting to redo a retryable side effect throws away the password, the dashboards and
everything else keyed to the row.
The provisioning block moves out of create-user into provisionOsAccount, shared by
both entry points for the same reason app-store/members.ts is shaped that way: two
moments, one piece of work.
Found by testing the retry rather than the create: provisionUserDirs re-chmods every
directory including home, and home belongs to the MEMBER after the first successful
run — chmod requires ownership, so it threw EPERM and took every retry down before it
started. Those chmods are now a default for directories being created, not an
assertion about ones that already exist; os-user.ts sets the home's mode through sudo
and is the authority for it.
The route answers 200 with the error in the body, because the interesting cases are
partial: "the account exists and is confined but the keys failed" is not nothing
having happened, and the row shows both halves.
Verified end to end: blocked ancestor reports the chmod and leaves osUser null, the
retry after that chmod succeeds and records the row, and a re-key replaces
authorized_keys without rotating the outbound key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Inbound and outbound are two keys doing two jobs, and treating them as
alternatives breaks the goal:
inbound ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, from an optional public key the owner pastes
on the create form. Their private half stays on their laptop.
outbound ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, generated in their home, never leaves the machine.
"They pasted a key, so skip generating one" is the obvious simplification. Agent
forwarding covers a human in an interactive session, but a platform-spawned agent
has no agent socket to borrow — so an edge checkout it is asked to commit and push
needs a key that lives on the box. The inbound key is therefore optional and the
outbound one is not.
No linux password, ever: useradd sets none, which blocks password login and does
not block key auth. So "real user, reachable over SSH, no password anywhere" is
the resting state, and the platform password stays the platform's business.
Validation is about line count, not key shape. Every line of authorized_keys is a
credential, so a pasted value with a newline would install a SECOND key silently.
Multi-line refused, a private key refused by name, an options prefix refused.
Every write goes through sudo install: the home is 700 and the member's, so the
service user cannot even create .ssh. install sets content, owner and mode in one
step, and content travels as a temp path so nothing quotes a form value into a
shell. ssh-keygen runs AS the member so the private key is never briefly root's.
known_hosts is not seeded — StrictHostKeyChecking accept-new instead. The Gitea
SSH endpoint is not knowable at create time, and the default setting makes a first
connection prompt, which in a non-interactive agent turn is a hang rather than an
error. accept-new still refuses a changed host key.
The generated public key is stored on the row and shown twice: on the after-create
panel and behind a key button on the user's row. It has an errand attached that
nothing else will remind anyone about — it must be added to their Gitea account.
Verified with a real useradd: .ssh 700 and id_ed25519 600 both owned by the member
and usable by them, authorized_keys byte-identical to the paste, no key rotation on
a second run, and a multi-line paste refused with authorized_keys untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/users plus an Add-account form in Settings > User management. Until now
createUser had one call site — bootstrap, gated on an empty user table — so every
non-owner account anywhere had been inserted into Postgres by hand.
Created accounts are Active. The column defaults to Unverified and signin refuses
anything else with a bare UNAUTHORIZED, which is exactly what made the hand-INSERT
route look like a wrong password.
Also closes a hole found while reading the write path: a second Super Admin was
storable. The CHECK constraint pins user 1's role but cannot see other rows, and
getOwnerUser() was LIMIT 1 with no ORDER BY, so two holders would have made "who owns
this server" a question the query plan answered — and that answer feeds the agent
sidecar's identity, vault access and origin scoping. Both write paths now refuse the
role and getOwnerUser() orders by id.
USER_DIRS and provisionUserDirs move into data-path.ts so the create handler and
scripts/provision-user-dirs.ts cannot disagree about what an account's skeleton is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ALL_DOCK_ITEMS was a hardcoded list of everything, so a fresh machine offered Photos, Jellyfin,
Transmission and the rest — each leading to a screen reporting itself unavailable — and adding a sidecar
meant editing the shell. Neither survives sidecars shipping from their own repositories.
Split in two. CORE_DOCK_ITEMS is the baseline that exists on every install: chat, files, terminal, the
app's own screens, and Gitea, which is in the light profile because it fronts a remote instance.
Everything else is derived from installed sidecars' UI manifests, delivered with /capabilities.
Sent with the capability answer rather than fetched separately so the dock has ONE source. Two requests
means two moments, and a dock rendered between them shows a tile for something uninstalled or nothing
for something installed. Filtered by capability server-side too: a member is not handed the manifest of
a feature they cannot use, because "hidden in the client" is the kind of privacy that lasts until
someone opens the network tab.
Verified live. The owner — who bypasses every permission check — does not bypass this: /photos is absent
from routes and present in deniedRoutes because Photos is not installed. Flipping a row's `enabled`
makes its tile leave and return with no process touched.
Two things fell out. A manifest can declare extraTiles, because CalDAV is one sidecar presenting as
Calendar AND Contacts, and collapsing them to keep the model tidy would make the app worse. And
DEFAULT_DOCK_PATHS no longer pins /music: useDock drops a path with nothing behind it, so the default
dock came up a tile short on any machine where Music was never installed — a default that references an
optional feature is how an app looks subtly wrong on a fresh install for no stated reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
settings > integrations > personal > api keys. mirrors the dav app
password panel, which is the same problem: a secret that exists for one
response, so the new key stays on screen until dismissed rather than in
a toast.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Five settings pages moved from a `*_SELECTED` global to `/settings/:page/:section`. The
sidebar entry is a react-router `<NavLink>` rather than a button holding the key in its
onClick closure, so a section is linkable, cmd-clickable and gets its active state from the
router; each page renders one `SettingsRoute` guard that canonicalises both the bare route
and a section that does not exist.
Integrations needed more than the shared factory. It builds its own sidebar, and it kept the
Enterprise/Personal tab in a second global — which is why a deep link to a Personal section
could never have worked: the link set the section, the tab stayed on Enterprise, and the
content pane said "Select a section" about a section that existed. The tab is derived from
the section key now.
Also removes the `/settings/resources` menu item (audit M8) and its two locale keys: there
has never been such a route, so it bounced to the catch-all and out to `/`.
Four channels were bare string literals repeated across files, with the payload type supplied by each
caller. Neither hole errors: a typo yields a different, empty channel — publisher publishing into nowhere,
subscriber waiting forever — and a publisher and subscriber can simply disagree about the payload with
nothing to check them. defineChannel(name, initial) returns the hook, officerdev/src/channels.ts declares
the four, and every usePanelChannel call site in the repo now passes a shared constant.
files:refresh-signal was bumped two different ways: Date.now() at the Chat sites, setSignal((n) => n + 1)
at the FileViewer ones. The increment is wrong — useGlobal's functional setter applies against the value
captured at render, so two bumps in one render window both compute snapshot + 1 and the second writes the
same number as the first. Nobody re-reads and the file that was just written stays stale. Date.now() has
the same flaw at millisecond scale, and the four FileViewer sites (save, delete, extract, transcribe) sit
close enough to hit it. useFilesRefresh's bump is a module counter that never reads React state, so it is
right however many times it is called between renders, and it is identity-stable through a ref because
useGlobal's setter is a fresh closure every render and this goes into dependency lists.
system-settings:run-command is deleted. It had a writer once — 7c0b11c wired the AI harness installer to
it — and when that install moved server-side to POST /server-settings/chat-providers/install the write
went with it, leaving a channel whose only remaining writes were clears, a terminal pane nothing could
open, and a second layout nothing could select.
PanelComponentEntry's component, header and provider are typed with { panelId: string }, which is what
PanelSlot has always rendered them with. A no-prop component is still assignable, so no screen changed.
chat:active-session and preview:refresh are declared but still have no subscriber. preview:refresh has no
plausible one — the PreviewProvider that read it is gone from the repo — but both are published by the
chat panel, and that is not this branch's to change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
useCapabilities is the frontend's view of the model and explicitly NOT its
enforcement — hiding a dock icon is a courtesy, the 403 in origin-validation
is the lock. so it fails OPEN: if the request errors the full dock renders.
a member clicking through to a 403 is a bad minute; an owner locked out of
their own platform by a transient network error is an incident, and the
server refuses what it should refuse either way.
the endpoint returns held routes AND denied routes, because absence from the
held list cannot distinguish a route this account lacks from one no
capability claims at all — `/`, the settings shell — and a guard that cannot
tell those apart either blanks the app or guards nothing. i wrote the first
version without the second list and it silently permitted everything.
`can` and `canVisit` are memoised on the query data. a verb rebuilt every
render gets a new identity every render, which is how every playback report
in the jellyfin player was disabled for days; the dock filter puts one in a
useMemo dependency list, so it would have been the same bug.
the permissions screen is one role at a time, with an explicit save and a
dirty state, rather than a roles-by-capabilities grid — a grid invites
reading across rows, which is not a question anyone has, and makes revoking
gitea for every member one click among fifty. it also states plainly why
terminal, chat, files and the rest are absent, so their absence reads as a
decision rather than as a missing feature.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The permission model being built reads the HTTP method to decide whether a
non-owner may make a call: safe methods are reads, everything else is a write.
That only works if the method tells the truth. These five read something and
returned it while announcing themselves as writes, so a member would have been
denied a read they are entitled to because of a habit in how the route was
declared.
/api/file-browser/video-info POST {url} -> GET ?url=
/api/file-browser/video-playlist POST {url} -> GET ?url=
/api/server-settings/ocr/models POST {url} -> GET ?url=
/api/transmission/_officer/port-test POST -> GET
/api/jellyfin/_config/:id/test POST|GET -> GET only
The last one already answered to both, which is worse than either: a method that
means nothing cannot be the thing authorisation reads.
Deliberately stops at five. A sweep of all 100 mutating routes found many more
reads wearing POST, and they are staying, for two reasons that are not going
away: some need a request body GET cannot carry (/stt takes multipart audio;
/tts, /ocr, /transcribe take payloads), and some carry a credential, where a
query string is the wrong place — access logs, shell history and Referer headers
all capture those, request bodies do not (/tts/voices takes an apiKey, the four
/test endpoints take connection secrets, /local-providers/probe takes auth).
So the method alone can never carry the permission model, and the registry will
need an explicit per-route classification regardless. Converting these five is
worth it because it is free; converting the rest would be a breaking change
across 117 mobile call sites that buys nothing.
Web callers updated in the same commit; the sidecar contract comments now match.
Mobile has exactly one caller to change — transmissionPortTest in
packages/core/src/services/transmission.ts — and no shim was added, because an
endpoint answering to both methods is the problem this commit exists to fix.
docs/api-method-changes-2026-08-06.md is the handoff for the mobile team: what
changed, the one line to edit, what deliberately did NOT change and why, and how
to verify.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The role column now has somewhere to be used from. Lists every account, changes
roles, removes members.
API — all owner-only, mounted on the existing users router:
GET /api/users list, plus the role enum so the UI never
hand-writes the names
PATCH /api/users/:id/role change a role
DELETE /api/users/:id remove an account
ownerGate uses isSuperAdmin, which now reads the role column. The global backstop
in originScopeMiddleware already confines a non-owner token to /api/auth +
/api/music, so a Member cannot reach any of this — the gate is the explicit
statement of intent and gives a clear 403 rather than leaning on a rule written
for another purpose.
The password hash never leaves the handler: listing accounts is not a reason to
hand out hashes, so the response is an explicit shape rather than the row.
The owner is refused twice over, in both handlers, before the database has to.
ck_users_owner_is_super_admin and deleteUser() would each reject it anyway, but a
raw CHECK violation surfaces as a 500 in Postgres wording, which tells the person
clicking a dropdown nothing. Same reason `isOwner` is on the wire: the UI locks
that row rather than offering an action that cannot succeed.
The menu entry is shown to the owner only. That is tidiness, not access control —
the route stays reachable and the endpoints are gated server-side, because a
hidden menu item is not a permission and anything relying on it being hidden is
already wrong. Said so in the code, next to both.
Deleting cascades — passkeys, dashboards, screens, email accounts, playlists —
and there is no undo, so it asks first and says what goes.
Not built: invitations. Creating an account still means bootstrap or a row by
hand; an invite flow needs a token, an email and an acceptance screen, which is
its own piece of work.
Untested at runtime: the routes 404 on the running server because platform TS
does not hot-reload. Everything typechecks, the token path was verified against
/api/dashboards, /api/tasks and /api/jobs returning 200, and the 404 is the
restart asymmetry rather than the wiring. Needs `pm2 restart officer`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Settings → Integrations → Calendar & Contacts sync. without this there is no way
to mint a credential from the app, and minting one was the first step of testing
the whole caldav feature on a phone.
the generated password is returned by POST and never again — it is stored as an
argon2 hash, so there is nothing to read back. that one fact drives the screen:
the new credential appears in a panel that stays until dismissed, with the
server url and username beside it, because once it is gone the only remedy is to
revoke and mint another.
the server url is read from window.location.origin rather than configured. it is
by definition the address that reached this page, so it is the one that will
work on the phone.
rows show the hint prefix and last-used date. "never used" is the tell that a
device was set up wrong, so it gets its own wording rather than a blank.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All three existed to drive the platform from a chat app. The phone app does that now, so
they are dead weight — three bot gateways, three command parsers, account pairing, admin
config screens and bot tokens sitting in the database.
Gone entirely: telegram/ and whatsapp/, discord/'s bot and command handler, the shared
channel plumbing they were the only users of (pairing.ts, send-and-await.ts, types.ts,
routes.ts and its 20 config/pairing/status endpoints), the six settings components, and
their sections in the integrations screen.
What Discord keeps is the one piece worth keeping — pushing a message out — as
notify/discord.ts, configured by DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in the env. No UI, no pairing, no
stored credential, and it never throws: a notification that fails to send is logged and
dropped. Unset means notifications are silently skipped, which is the default state.
Kept deliberately: send-claude-code.ts and send-opencode.ts. They live under channels/ but
have nothing to do with chat apps — they are how /chat and the pipeline executor drive an
agent turn.
Also drops four dependencies with no remaining importer (discord.js,
node-telegram-bot-api, whatsapp-web.js, qrcode), and the /sync-now route added to the email
sidecar an hour ago, whose only consumer was the channel handlers.
The "Channel Models" settings section stays, with its description corrected — it is keyed
off the general access policy rather than anything channel-specific, so it governs non-owner
accounts, not chat apps. Whether that whole class still earns its place is the open
question already noted against origin-validation.
Not touched: the telegram, whatsapp and discord rows in server_integrations, which still
hold their bot tokens. Deleting rows is a different kind of decision and the SQL is in the
handover.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
deletes the last of the projects/apps cluster: the published-app store
(/api/apps + /api/app-serve), the project dev-server and its websocket
proxy (/api/dev-server + /api/dev-server-proxy), the shared html-rewrite
they were the only consumers of, and their frontend — the Preview panel,
the UserApp panel/header, useUserApps and the /settings/apps screen.
also drops getUserProjectsDir and getUserAppsDir, the ProjectType and
ProjectDefinition types, and the 'dev-server' websocket provider from
server.tsx. nothing on disk is touched.
1440 deletions, 31 insertions. tsgo clean.
- DiscordAccount seeded DiscordStatus without its two nullable fields.
- bug-report typed reporter.name as string, but users.name is nullable; and the
Discord upload wrapped a Buffer directly in a Blob.
- Lucide icons take no `title` prop, so the sync spinner's tooltip moved to a
wrapping span.
- DesktopView cast its dynamic import to a type that included `| null`.
- dock PUT cast the request body straight to string[]; it now rejects anything
that is not an array of strings instead of writing it to the database.
- buildZodSchema assembles a mutable record, since z.ZodRawShape is readonly in
zod v4.
- The dev-server proxy forwards Bun's `string | Buffer` frames through a helper
that satisfies WebSocket.send without copying.
bunx tsgo is now clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three unrelated type errors that each pointed at something actually broken:
- Dashboard.CodeEditor was deleted in ab03b17 ("Projects") while the
/code-editor route and the dock's Editor item kept pointing at it, so the
route rendered undefined. Screen restored.
- Appearance.tsx imported 'themes', a workspace deleted in 0746844. Nothing
reads settings.appearance.colorTheme and no theme CSS survives, so the picker
was writing a value with no consumer. Removed it and the setting; colorMode
stays, it is live.
- officerdev exported both a component and a type named AppRegistry, so
`import { AppRegistry }` resolved to the type and <AppRegistry /> failed to
typecheck. Renamed the Record type to AppRegistryMap.
Also declares "*.css" so side-effect stylesheet imports resolve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer is single-user: the server owner is the only account, created once by
/auth/bootstrap. Everything that existed to serve additional users was
unreachable, so it is gone rather than left looking like it does something.
Accounts: drop the invite / resend-invite / delete / list-users routes and the
Users settings screen, the inert /auth/signup handler, and the account
verification chain it fed (verify, resend-verification, VerifyScreen, the
UserInvite + VerifyAdmin + VerifyRegistration templates). /auth/verify-token
survives for password resets only, and now requires a reset-password token
rather than accepting any signed JWT.
Roles: drop the users.role column and the four-value USER_ROLES enum. The
permissions table granted every role identical methods, and every
role === 'Super Admin' check was permanently true. The JWT no longer carries a
role claim.
Sandbox: remove sidecar/sandbox.ts and its five call sites. bwrap was selected
only for non-Super-Admin users, so it never ran. It was also not a usable agent
jail as written — --share-net, the project root (with .env) bound read-only,
and runuser dropping to the server's own uid. Rebuilding it for agent
containment would be a different construction, and git history keeps this one.
getHomeDir keeps its DATA_PATH meaning; the new getOwnerHomeDir resolves the
owner's real login home, which is what terminals, chats and task runs use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First sync still uses IMAP with app password. Subsequent syncs use
Gmail API history.list + messages.get with OAuth for faster, more
reliable incremental sync. Dispatch gmail-sync handler for gmail
accounts instead of generic email-sync. Show sync button for synced
accounts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- add isync to setup.sh
- ask for gmail address alongside app password in integrations
- add PermanentError to job queue (skips retries for non-recoverable failures)
- use PermanentError for missing credentials, missing executable, auth failures
- auto-add /email to dock after successful gmail sync
- invalidate dock cache on sync completion for seamless UI update
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two-tier model policy: system policy (admin, allowedModels) controls
member access, per-user hiddenModels controls personal visibility.
All model selectors now use useUserVisibleModels. Moved providers
and model visibility out of system settings, AI models out of profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Added detailed error logging to detect snap node compatibility issues
- When Pi process exits with code 1, log helpful diagnostic info including node path
- Add hint to check for snap node and reinstall via apt/nvm
- Create SNAP_NODE_COMPATIBILITY.md with full troubleshooting guide
- Document root cause: snap node has file descriptor incompatibility with Bun.spawn stdin pipes
- Provide clear installation instructions for NodeSource and nvm alternatives
- rewrite gmail-sync handler: mbsync downloads to local Maildir, then import to sqlite
- add app password field to google integration config and API
- gmail sync section independent from oauth in settings UI
- live mbsync progress streaming to job status
- recoverable failure email with instructions for overquota/auth errors
- sync meta persisted to job on failure for richer notifications
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhas
