A team owns a shared folder. Any Admin may create one. A team may grant a
capability the member's role lacks, capped so the creator cannot attach
anything they do not hold themselves. Deleting a role is refused while anyone
holds it in a team, same as globally.
Dashboards deferred deliberately: they need editor-versus-viewer, which is a
permission shape nothing here has, since every grant today is read-or-write over
a whole capability.
Also records two things phase 4 must not get wrong. The folder boundary is a
Linux group, not the grant — every role already holds files at write, so the
capability was never what kept teams apart. And the grant cache is keyed on role
today; teams make it per-user, which is easy to lose silently.
Plus the quota model and its prerequisite: enforcement is the kernel's, because
members have terminal and can write past anything the platform counts. Neither
officer-dev nor alpha can carry filesystem quotas today and neither can be fixed
while running. edge-pertento is where it matters — the first real multi-user
host — and it should be checked before it gains accounts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
Three files said there was no way to create a second account. There is:
POST /api/users, owner-gated, with a form under Settings -> User Management,
plus role change, password reset, Linux provisioning and delete. The plan went
further and sequenced a whole phase around building it.
It cost something today. A recommendation to "do phase 5 first, it unblocks
everything" was made from this text, and withdrawn only because opening
api/users/ to write the spec found the route already there.
Worth naming the shape rather than just fixing the sentences: docs:check
compares numbers, so the counts stay honest while the prose rots. Both times
this has bitten, the stale claim was a paragraph nothing could verify. A phase
marked "not built" is worth checking against the tree before planning around
it — a plan is written once, the code moves daily.
The root CLAUDE.md carries the same correction plus the roles-as-a-table state;
it is not in a git repo, so it is fixed on disk only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
Roles and teams, phase 1. `isSuperAdmin` asked `user.role === 'Super Admin'`, which
was right while roles were a hardcoded union and nothing could write a new one. It
stopped being right the moment roles became a table: from then on "add a role" and
"become the owner" were the same feature, reachable from whatever UI manages roles.
So ownership is `OWNER_USER_ID` and nothing else. `isOwner` is the new name and
`isSuperAdmin` delegates to it, so no call site changes who it admits — widening any
"owner-only" route to "owner or Super Admin" is a separate decision per route, not a
side effect of this.
Still a database read rather than a bare comparison: a deleted or blocked account
must not remain the owner because its id happens to match.
`getOwnerUser` becomes a primary-key lookup. It used to select on the role with
`order by id` as a tiebreak, because two holders would otherwise make "who owns this
server" whatever Postgres returned first — an answer that decides the agent
sidecar's identity, vault access and origin scoping. That tiebreak, the write-path
refusals and the CHECK all protected an answer that is now a primary key.
Several Super Admins are allowed. What the role carries is real and belongs in the
UI rather than a refusal here: it provisions an OS account with sudo, which puts the
holder outside Officer's permission system and cannot be undone by revoking the role
afterwards. That is the operator's decision, not this endpoint's.
Two departures from docs/roles-and-teams.md, both recorded there. The CHECK pinning
user 1's role is KEPT — redundant for ownership, but it still forbids the owner
being set to Member, which is a nonsense state that costs nothing to prevent. And
promotion to Super Admin is allowed while creating an account directly as one is
not: promotion happens to an account somebody has looked at, creation is a form
filled once, and the role that grants sudo should not be a dropdown default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Officer-Session: 656f5c85-e49a-4f1f-b9f3-042a04b4d043
Design for tomorrow, written down so the work starts from a spec. Phase 0 is
already built; everything after it is plan.
The load-bearing decision is the smallest one. Ownership is answered today by
users.role === 'Super Admin', which was fine while roles were a hardcoded union
and nothing could write a new one — and becomes a privilege-escalation path the
moment roles are editable data, because then adding a role and becoming the owner
are the same feature. So phase 1 is just that: the owner is OWNER_USER_ID, every
existing call site keeps meaning owner, and nothing downstream starts until it
lands.
Teams union rather than restrict, which is the only coherent resolution and has a
consequence worth stating: a team can only ever grant. Deny rules are named under
what must not be built, along with a role that confers ownership and team-scoped
execution capabilities.
And the thing a reader would otherwise discover at the end of phase 4: there is
still no way to create a second account, so this is a permission model for
accounts that cannot yet exist. Sequenced last because it is orthogonal, flagged
because it may be worth doing first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5