4d4606d4a2ba181f5530ec9ae0d3ac8e91443bfc
14
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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4d4606d4a2 |
close the owner's dotfiles once somebody else has a shell
ubuntu's default umask is 002 with user-private groups, so everything the owner
creates lands 775/664. alone on a machine that is harmless. it stops being
harmless the moment a member has a login — and member homes are NESTED inside
the owner's, so the owner's home must stay traversable AND readable (the
ancestor-read requirement bun exposed today) and every dotfile in it is legible
by default.
measured as green before writing this: ~/.pm2/logs (all 12 files, every log the
platform has written), ~/.pm2/dump.pm2, ~/.claude/projects (names every
directory the owner works in), ~/.config, ~/.local, ~/.cache, ~/.npm, ~/.bun,
~/.opencode — all listable. assertSecretsClosed was already holding the line
that matters: .env, .ssh, .zsh_history, .claude.json and the credentials are
denied, and dump.pm2 turned out to hold no secret values because bun loads .env
at runtime rather than through pm2.
so this is the tier below fatal: not tokens, but logs and the shape of the
owner's work.
it runs from PROVISIONING, not from setup, and that is the point. ~/.claude does
not exist until the agent has run once; a chmod at install time finds half the
list missing and silently does nothing — the same failure mode as the ACL mask
earlier today. every member's arrival re-closes whatever appeared since.
two directories are left open on purpose, and both are the same latent bug:
/usr/local/bin/bun -> /home/pastilhas/.bun/bin/bun
/usr/local/bin/gh -> /home/pastilhas/.local/bin/gh
system-wide tools installed into one user's home, so every member resolves them
through it. i found this by closing them and breaking bun and gh for green.
~/.local/share and ~/.local/state ARE closed; only the bin directory is
reachable. the honest fix is installing them outside the owner's home.
verified both directions on this host: green is denied .claude, .pm2, .config,
.local/share, .local/state, .cache — and still has working bun, gh, psql, their
own claude, and their own project tree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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4c3682dae6 |
let a member read the two directories above their own home
`bun run` from anywhere inside a member's home died with
error loading current directory
error: An internal error occurred (CouldntReadCurrentDirectory)
before it looked at package.json, bun.lock or .git — all of which were present.
it is not walking up looking for a workspace root. it primes its resolver cache
by walking DOWN from / and opening every component of the cwd for READING:
openat("/home/pastilhas/officerdev/") = 6
openat(".../officerdev/data/") = -1 EACCES
openat(".../officerdev/data/<email>/") = -1 EACCES
those two are 711 — traversable, not listable — which is enough to cd into a
home and not enough for a program that reads its ancestors. `getcwd` succeeds;
the ancestor read is what fails. `O_PATH` would need only `x`, so this is
arguably bun's bug, but it presents as a member's project being mysteriously
unbuildable and nothing here can fix it from the other side.
so DATA_PATH and the account dir now carry a named ACL entry per member. that
gives up the property the old comment named — a member can now `ls` DATA_PATH
and learn the other accounts' email addresses — and keeps everything that
matters: every home is still 700 and owned by its member, every platform
sibling still 700 and owned by the service user. verified as green: the account
list is visible, and email_accounts, another home, the repo .env, the owner's
ssh key, .pgpass and ~/.claude/.credentials.json are all still denied.
the mask is set explicitly to rx alongside the entry. chmod recomputes the mask
from the group bits, which for 711 is --x, so without that the next member's
provisioning would silently clamp every earlier member back to traverse-only.
applied by hand to the one existing account; provisioning covers new ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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fb0286e1a9 |
put rootless docker back, behind the developer gate
Uncommented at all three sites: the call and import in provisionOsAccount, the ~/.local/dockers bind-mount directory in confineUserTree, and the DOCKER_HOST block in the member zshrc. Not restored unconditionally, which is how it was before. It now sits behind the same Developer check as the Postgres role — the gate that prompted disabling it in the first place. So rolePermitsDatabase is renamed rolePermitsDevTools: it gates two things now and a name saying "database" while deciding whether you get containers is the kind of comment that goes stale silently. ~/.local/dockers is created for EVERY account rather than only Developers. It is two install calls, and confineUserTree is the function that places the layout, not the one that knows who is a Developer — so a member promoted later finds it already correct. Postgres role work is untouched and still in place. Verified: transpiles. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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41cdd1e63a |
stop creating the container bind-mount directory too
~/.local/dockers existed only so a rootless container's inner uid could traverse to a bind source. No daemon, no need. Commented out with its reasoning intact in confineUserTree. .local itself stays — it is not Docker's. The claude installer targets ~/.local/bin, and the comment above it records that directory being created root-owned and blocking the install. Nothing to change in deprovisionOsAccount: it never called os-user-docker.ts. Its only Docker-shaped part is capturing /etc/subuid before userdel, which already treats a missing entry as normal and is worth keeping for any rootless tooling. Verified: transpiles. No test referenced composeDir. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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8207824a81 |
build the secret store: one key per purpose, none in .env
.env now holds PORT and POSTGRES_URL. Every encryption and signing key lives in $OFFICER_ROOT/secrets/officer-keys.db — 0600, 0700 directory, owned by the service user, created on first use. The design doc planned to move ONE at-rest key into the store. What shipped splits it: headscale, wallet, photos, jellyfin, invoiceshelf, vault and service-connections each get their own, plus jwt. VAULT_STORE_KEY encrypted all seven, so one leak opened all of them — and it was named after whichever plugin needed it first, which is why it read as safe to change if you did not run a vault. A core install bootstraps two, jwt and headscale; the rest appear when their plugin first asks. The file IS the secret. No second key unlocks it, because a key beside the store it opens buys nothing. The gain was never secrecy, it is blast radius: bun auto-loads .env into all twenty pm2 processes, so a key there is readable from /proc/<pid>/environ of twenty processes — officer-music held the key that decrypts wallet seed envelopes. Two defects found by testing the store rather than reading it, both of which would have shipped: The WAL was 0644. Enabling WAL creates -wal and -shm at 0644 rather than inheriting the database's mode, and a freshly written key lives in the WAL before checkpoint — so the 0600 on the database was decorative. The 0700 directory covered it, but only until someone loosened the directory. PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL takes an exclusive lock, and busy_timeout was set AFTER it. With twelve concurrent openers, six died on that line with SQLITE_BUSY. Every sidecar opens this store at boot, so they open it simultaneously by definition: most of them would have failed to start on a cold boot and none on a warm one. Fixed by ordering the pragmas; re-tested with twelve racing processes, one key, one row. crypto.ts takes a purpose as its first argument now, which the design doc had explicitly promised would not happen — 32 call sites across seven query modules. That promise is corrected in the doc rather than quietly dropped. Also live, not just comments: wallet/upstream.ts gated wallet storage on process.env.VAULT_STORE_KEY and would have reported "unconfigured" forever. It asks the store now, and the question it answers changed — not "did somebody set a variable" but "can this process open the store", since the key is created on demand. assertSecretsClosed covers the store, its directory and its WAL. The jwt key mints owner tokens, so a member's shell reading it is strictly worse than the .env leak that check was written for. Not typechecked: node_modules is empty and installs are frozen, so the officerdb/secret-store subpath could not be resolved at runtime here — verified that officerdb/types fails identically, so it is the empty tree and not the new export. The store module itself was tested directly: creation, idempotence across processes, hasKey not creating, permissions, and the twelve-way race. Every changed file parses; the setup section runs and degrades correctly when the import is unavailable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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040ea41dbc |
per-user linux accounts are not optional any more
OFFICER_OS_USERS is gone. The platform behaves as it always would have with the flag on, and there is nothing to enable. Six conditionals, five of which were dead weight — provisionOsAccount, deprovisionOsAccount and the create/delete paths each opened with an early "not enabled on this server" return, and the API told the frontend whether to render the Linux controls at all. Those go, along with the 'disabled' DeprovisionResult stage, which nothing can produce now. The sixth is the one with teeth. assertSecretsClosed opened with `if (!OS_USERS_ENABLED) return`, described in its own comment as "a no-op when the feature is off, so an existing install is unaffected until the owner opts in". It is now unconditional: the server refuses to boot while any .env in the project root is group- or world-readable. A member's shell reading .env and printing JWT_SECRET was confirmed exploitable when this check was written, and a prerequisite that only holds when somebody remembers to set a variable is not a prerequisite. Nothing to remove on the environment side — the flag was never in .env.example or in the setup script. Not typechecked: node_modules is empty in this tree and installs are frozen, so tsgo could not run. All six files parse under `bun build --no-bundle`, and the changes are deletions of dead branches plus one removed early return. Formatted with prettier 3.9.6 via bunx rather than the pinned resolution, for the same reason; its one unrelated reformat was reverted by hand. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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ef000aaf51 |
pipe the installer into bash, and stop inventing a root-owned .local
Green's first provision failed three ways. host caught all three on the live
box; two are fixed here and the third is his to bisect.
THE INSTALLER IS BASH AND WE PIPED IT INTO SH. A script read on stdin never has
its shebang honoured — the interpreter you name is the one that runs it — and
install.sh declares #!/bin/bash and uses [[ =~ ]] on line 9. On Ubuntu /bin/sh
is dash, so it died with `Syntax error: "(" unexpected`, which reads like a
corrupt download rather than the wrong interpreter. scripts/setup.sh carried the
same line for the owner's own install and is fixed too.
INSTALL -D CREATED ~/.local AS ROOT. `install -d` makes missing parents but
applies -o/-g/-m only to the final component, so blessing ~/.local/dockers
invented a root:root .local inside the member's own home. Rootless Docker then
died on `mkdir …/.local/share: permission denied`, and the Claude installer
targets ~/.local/bin, so fixing the shell alone would have hit this next.
That is
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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401dcb710c |
a blessed directory for container bind mounts
From a live-server report: a bind-mounted postgres:18-alpine crash-looped with
`mkdir: can't create directory '…/18/docker'` on a directory that already existed.
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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71589aee99 |
a member's terminal looks like the owner's
A new Linux account opens a shell with nothing: useradd copies /etc/skel, which on Ubuntu is a bash rc, and the account's shell is zsh — so it got no prompt, no history, no completion, no colour. "Their own account" should not mean a worse terminal than the owner's. src/servers/shell-skel/zshrc is the template, and scripts/starship.toml is reused rather than copied: setup.sh already deploys it for the owner, so one file serves both audiences and they cannot drift. Seeded by provisionOsAccount, which means the retry button applies it to accounts that already exist — no delete-and-recreate. The template depends on nothing but zsh. Starship, eza, nvim, bun, deno and cargo are each used only if present, and every path is $HOME-relative — the owner's own .zshrc has three absolute /home/pastilhas paths in it, which is exactly what a template must not inherit. Without starship it falls back to a zsh prompt showing the same information, because a shell that opens with a broken prompt reads as a broken machine. Never overwrites: written only when the file is ABSENT. ~/.zshrc.local is sourced last and never written, so there is somewhere to put your own config that no future template can reach. Three fixes found by running it: - install -D creates missing parents but applies -o/-g only to the FILE, so ~/.config came out root:root — readable but not writable by its owner, which would have surfaced weeks later as one tool mysteriously failing. The parent is now created explicitly. - useradd took its shell from process.env.SHELL, which under PM2 is whatever PM2 was launched from. A member's shell depended on how the server happened to be started. Now chosen from what is installed: zsh, else bash. - the pty sidecar spawned ITS $SHELL for a member, not theirs. It now execs their passwd shell via sh -c, so the login shell in /etc/passwd is the one they get. starship moves out of the light-profile skip. The light profile exists to serve a file browser, a terminal and chat — the terminal is one of its three reasons to be, and it is what every member gets. Leaving starship out meant the fallback prompt on exactly the installs most likely to have members. oh-my-zsh, eza and lazygit stay full-only. Verified in a real member shell: zsh from passwd, HISTFILE in their own home, eza-backed ll, starship active, EDITOR=nvim, and an edit to .zshrc surviving a reprovision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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b4f88ec161 |
routes refuse at the route, and a new home is empty
Three things, from a member sitting on /music with no music capability on a server with no music sidecar: an empty library, and 403s in the console. PERMISSIONS AT THE ROUTE. `canVisit` filtered the dock and nothing else, so the tile was hidden and the route was wide open — typing the path, following an old link or restoring a tab rendered the screen anyway. RouteGate now wraps every screen in one place, inside the error boundary. It does not redirect. Sending someone to `/` erases what they asked for and reads as a bug: they clicked Music and landed on Home. It says why instead, and the URL stays put so a reload after installing the thing just works. And it says which of the two reasons applies, because they need different screens and send the reader to different places. `not-installed` is a fact about the SERVER — the owner gets a link to the app store. `not-granted` is a fact about the ACCOUNT, and only the owner can change it. Presenting either as the other sends you looking in the wrong place. ROUTES FOLLOW THE SIDECAR. Free, once the above exists: `deniedRoutes` already covers "held but its sidecar is not installed", so an uninstalled feature has no tile AND no screen. The dock, the Permissions list and the routes now agree because they read one answer. NO MORE SEEDING. Downloads/Documents/Music/Videos/Pictures are gone from both places that made them — the member's provisioning and, older and worse, `/ls`, which created folders in somebody's home as a side effect of LOOKING at it. A listing that invents its own contents is a listing you cannot trust, and the platform has no standing to choose a person's folder layout. A new home is empty. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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d3bed0add9 |
the file browser can actually read a member's home, and plans is gone
"This folder is empty" was a lie. The five seeded directories were sitting there and the platform's readdir raised EACCES: a member's home is 700 and owned by them, which is correct for a shell and locks out the file browser, which runs inside the platform process. /ls caught the error and returned an empty listing, so a refusal looked exactly like data. Two doors, two boundaries, and that is the point rather than a compromise. The terminal and the agent RUN AS the member and the kernel is the boundary there. The file browser acts on the member's behalf from inside the platform, which already applies its own containment and is the owner's process on the owner's machine — it can read anything via sudo regardless. Giving it access describes who is doing the work. Done with named POSIX ACLs, because it has to hold in BOTH directions: a file the platform writes must be editable by the member and vice versa. Mode bits cannot say that — whichever party is neither owner nor group lands in "other", and widening "other" opens the home to every account on the box. A shared group fails the same way, since both parties would have to be in it and that puts every member in a group that can read every other member's home. Two named entries plus `d:` defaults grant exactly two users and are inherited by whatever either side creates, whatever their umask. Verified: platform lists the home, member edits a platform-written file, platform edits a member-written file, and a SECOND member is refused on both ls and cat. /ls now distinguishes EACCES from a missing directory. An empty result is data and must never be how a refusal looks. acl joins the core packages in setup.sh — the alternative is an account that provisions and then cannot list its own home. Also: the file browser's own useTasks/useAgents fired /tasks, /agents and both category endpoints on every render, which is where the last four 403s came from — they are the context menu's Run Task and agent submenus, execution-only. Gated. And plans is deleted: router, screen, routes, dock tile, hook, page title and its capability. It read markdown from <repo>/plans, which does not exist. Fresh-install Permissions is now Files alone, with Terminal to come. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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ea0d2396f7 |
linux accounts use the chosen username, and refuse to take one over
Two changes, and the second is what makes the first safe. The officer_ prefix is gone: a member's account is the username the owner typed, so whoami says who they are and a commit from their checkout is attributed to something recognisable. Measured first — useradd on this host accepts everything validateUsername permits, including dots, hyphens, underscores and uppercase. The prefix was also load-bearing, though, and not for looks. ensureOsUser REUSES an existing account, which is what makes it re-runnable, and that was safe by construction while only we created officer_* names. Unprefixed, adoption becomes the dangerous path: a platform account named root would have found root in passwd, and every runAs for that member would have been a root shell. So adoption now requires the existing account's passwd home to be exactly the home we are about to confine — that is what makes it ours — and any uid below 1000 is refused outright. Verified: root and daemon refused as system accounts, and the owner's own username refused by name with its real home quoted back. Also, the ancestor trap from the first real install. A member's home is under DATA_PATH, which is under the OWNER'S home, and /home/<owner> is 750 on Debian and Ubuntu — so every mode bit on the account tree was right, the directory existed, and the member still could not reach it for want of x four levels up. It surfaced as "ssh-keygen: Could not stat …/.ssh: Permission denied", which points at the wrong thing entirely. firstUntraversableAncestor now walks the chain as the member before anything uses the home, and the error names the directory and the chmod. The dev machine was already 751, and the probe used /tmp, so it never crossed the ancestor that mattered. Worth remembering as a shape of mistake. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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4d513c0e13 |
files, for a member, in their own home
Introduces a fifth capability kind. `files` was `execution` — never grantable, because it meant the OWNER'S filesystem. It is now `confined`: execution-shaped, but the kernel enforces the boundary because the account has its own Linux user, its own home, and no permission above it. The rule that makes `confined` mean something lives in authorize.ts, once: a confined grant is DROPPED for an account with no osUser. So "granted but unconfined" resolves to no access rather than to the owner's home — which is what it would otherwise resolve to, since getOwnerHomeDir ignores the email it is handed whenever HOME_DIR is set. One rule covers the HTTP routes, the websocket doors and the dock, instead of each router remembering. resolveHomeDir(userId) is the new seam and it reads the row rather than the token, for the same reason authorize.ts re-reads role: provisioning a Linux account for an existing member has to take effect on the next request, not in thirty days. The file browser resolves it in middleware and puts it on ctx user, because getRootDir is called from fifteen places in that router. Making it async would have meant editing fifteen call sites, and the cost of missing one is serving the owner's home to a member. Now a handler cannot run without the answer. Two things a real run caught: - /ls seeds Downloads/Documents into the home as the service user, which is EPERM against a 700 home owned by the member — it took the whole listing down. Seeding is now best-effort there and happens at provision time instead, as the member. - .unique() on os_user made db:push ask whether to TRUNCATE users, which is unanswerable non-interactively. uniqueIndex instead, per databases/CLAUDE.md. Verified: a member without a Linux account is refused by name; with one, resolves to their own home and NOT to HOME_DIR; the owner still resolves to HOME_DIR; and every .. escape is refused while an absolute path is rebased under the root. Terminal is still execution — that is the next stage. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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pastilhasandClaude Opus 5
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5c7ceb2283 |
per-user linux accounts, stage 1: the account and the privilege drop
A member gets a real Linux account whose home is the directory the platform already
provisions for them. Nothing uses it yet — this is the mechanism plus the account,
deliberately with no behaviour change, so the file browser and terminal can be moved
onto something already proven.
Bun.spawn silently ignores uid/gid. Verified on 1.3.10: from uid 1000,
Bun.spawn(['id','-u'], {uid: 65534}) exits 0 and prints 1000. No throw, no warning.
Bun's types don't declare the option so typed code can't reach it by accident, but the
runtime accepts it, and a silently absent isolation boundary is the worst outcome this
feature could have. So privilege drops go through sudo -n setpriv, and a test pins Bun's
behaviour — if it's ever implemented, that test tells us we may simplify.
sudo is required for the drop and not because of the uid: --init-groups fails with
"Operation not permitted" for an unprivileged caller even when reuid'ing to its own
account, because setgroups(2) is root-only. --reset-env is what stops the platform's
environment crossing; verified POSTGRES_URL is unset on the far side and HOME arrives
from the target's passwd entry.
Three bugs that only a real run with a real useradd could find:
- chmod after chown fails forever, because chmod needs ownership. Both orderings fail
unprivileged. Both operations now go through sudo, which is what makes it re-runnable.
- a member could read ANOTHER member's home: provisionUserDirs created at the default
umask (755) and only the account being created got confined. An unlistable parent is
no protection when the child is world-readable and emails are guessable. The skeleton
is now created closed, 711 on the account dir and 700 inside.
- platform/.env was 664 and a member's shell printed JWT_SECRET, which is enough to mint
an owner token and bypass every capability check. Now a boot check that refuses to
start with OFFICER_OS_USERS on while any .env in the project root is group- or
world-readable.
Design, the measured results and the staging plan: docs/per-user-linux-accounts.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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