The permission model being built reads the HTTP method to decide whether a
non-owner may make a call: safe methods are reads, everything else is a write.
That only works if the method tells the truth. These five read something and
returned it while announcing themselves as writes, so a member would have been
denied a read they are entitled to because of a habit in how the route was
declared.
/api/file-browser/video-info POST {url} -> GET ?url=
/api/file-browser/video-playlist POST {url} -> GET ?url=
/api/server-settings/ocr/models POST {url} -> GET ?url=
/api/transmission/_officer/port-test POST -> GET
/api/jellyfin/_config/:id/test POST|GET -> GET only
The last one already answered to both, which is worse than either: a method that
means nothing cannot be the thing authorisation reads.
Deliberately stops at five. A sweep of all 100 mutating routes found many more
reads wearing POST, and they are staying, for two reasons that are not going
away: some need a request body GET cannot carry (/stt takes multipart audio;
/tts, /ocr, /transcribe take payloads), and some carry a credential, where a
query string is the wrong place — access logs, shell history and Referer headers
all capture those, request bodies do not (/tts/voices takes an apiKey, the four
/test endpoints take connection secrets, /local-providers/probe takes auth).
So the method alone can never carry the permission model, and the registry will
need an explicit per-route classification regardless. Converting these five is
worth it because it is free; converting the rest would be a breaking change
across 117 mobile call sites that buys nothing.
Web callers updated in the same commit; the sidecar contract comments now match.
Mobile has exactly one caller to change — transmissionPortTest in
packages/core/src/services/transmission.ts — and no shim was added, because an
endpoint answering to both methods is the problem this commit exists to fix.
docs/api-method-changes-2026-08-06.md is the handoff for the mobile team: what
changed, the one line to edit, what deliberately did NOT change and why, and how
to verify.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
the sidecar now describes every audio and subtitle stream on the chosen source. a subtitle
jellyfin can deliver as an external file gets a /_jf webvtt path with the embedded ApiKey
stripped; one it cannot gets the reason instead, so the picker can show it disabled rather
than pretend it does not exist. colliding labels get their stream index — two tracks called
"English - ASS" are a coin flip otherwise.
quality is a named rung rather than a number. a bitrate the owner picks maps onto the rung
at or below it, which is what stops jellyfin's ResolutionNormalizer from inventing a
resolution from an unrounded number. auto stays absent so a copyable source still copies.
the control bar is ours in all three transports. progressive has no timeline the browser can
render, and an audio-track or quality change is a re-negotiation with the server rather than
something a <video> knows how to do — one bar for all three is what keeps those from being
three different players. the menus are hand-rolled because a radix dropdown portals to
document.body, which is outside the fullscreen element and would be invisible exactly when
the player is most likely to be used.
no scrubber thumbnails: they come from trickplay tiles and this server generates none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
a live transcode has no length and no byte ranges, so the progressive mp4 the player
used could not be seeked — a scrub restarted ffmpeg at a new offset. jellyfin's own
HLS playlist is VOD and spans the whole runtime, so seeking it is a segment request.
hls.js is checked in rather than installed. installs are frozen so that adding a
package is a reviewed act, and a committed file also has no install-time hook, which
is the vector the 2026-08-04 npm worm used. provenance, hashes and the update recipe
are in vendor/README.md; the tarball sha512 matches the registry's published integrity.
the sidecar now overrides VideoBitrate and MaxWidth on the TranscodingUrl jellyfin
hands back, for the same reason progressivePath computes them: jellyfin resolves that
bitrate from MaxStreamingBitrate (~119 Mbit, the ceiling that exists to let a stream
copy through) and sets no width, which asks a CPU-only container to encode 4K.
safari is deliberately not given the m3u8 — segment URIs are relative and would not
carry the ?token=, and it cannot set an Authorization header the way hls.js can.
progressive stays as the fallback for any browser without MSE.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
a transcode url without `videoBitrate` is not "let the server choose".
jellyfin resolves the missing value to 0 and runs ResolutionNormalizer
over it, which maps a bitrate onto a resolution — 0 lands on the bottom
rung. verified here: a 3840x1600 hdr source came back through
scale=...min(max(iw,ih*a),416)... with -maxrate 0.
the number has to be picked per source, because the two cases pull
opposite ways: a cap is a reason for jellyfin to REFUSE a stream copy,
and the absence of one is what makes a cpu-only 4k encode hopeless. so
copyable h264 asks for a ceiling nothing hits and no width, and anything
being genuinely re-encoded asks for 1080p at 12 mbit.
verified both branches against the ffmpeg command jellyfin logs: h264 mkv
→ -codec:v:0 copy, hevc 10-bit hdr → libx264 at 1920 wide, tonemapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
adds the /jellyfin screen and its two panels (nav + view) on top of the
jellyfin sidecar, following the photos/invoiceshelf shape.
the transcode path is a progressive mp4 rather than hls, so no hls.js
dependency is added under the frozen-install rule. that stream has no
length and no byte ranges, so the player owns its own scrubber and seeks
by re-negotiating at a new startTimeTicks, tracking offset + currentTime;
a direct file keeps native controls. the hls url is still returned, so
switching later is a player change only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
officer-jellyfin owns the whole Jellyfin contract: the instance URL, the access
token, the Jellyfin user it belongs to and the DeviceId its sessions are keyed
by. The platform side is a 17-line proxy holding no credentials.
Servers are a registry, not a single row — this machine runs four instances and
the owner switches between them. The password is never stored: it is traded once
for an access token through AuthenticateByName, and only that token is persisted,
encrypted.
Two doors. /_officer/* is a hand-written JSON façade for the things the browser
should not have to know — the user id in the path, the Fields lists that decide
whether a grid has posters, the PlaybackInfo negotiation. /_jf/* is a GET-only,
allow-listed byte pass-through for images, video, HLS and subtitles; it keeps
Jellyfin's own paths because a master playlist references its segments
relatively, so any renaming would mean rewriting m3u8 bodies.
TranscodingUrl arrives with api_key=<access token> in its query string and would
otherwise be handed straight to a video element. It is stripped before anything
is returned; the pass-through re-adds the credential as a header.
Video only — Officer's own player owns audio, so music collections are filtered
out of the library list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pastilhasandClaude Opus 5